Vulcan: who pressed THE button?
I understood that TSR2 certainly had the range to reach Moscow from the UK and return.
However, the traitorous bunch of pinko lefties which was ruining the UK a few years later made a political decision that Tornado could not do so - no doubt at the insistence of their Communist masters in the Kremlin.
However, the traitorous bunch of pinko lefties which was ruining the UK a few years later made a political decision that Tornado could not do so - no doubt at the insistence of their Communist masters in the Kremlin.
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Targets: P.Hennessy, Secret State, 2nd. Ed,2002, P.330 has a 22/10/64 brief for new PM: "it is estimated that the V-force could destroy some 20 major Russian cities". P.333 plots Baltic ingress targets (posters here assisted this). P.211-215 has 2/11/67 Intelligence Appreciation of Soviet targets in UK. J.Baylis/K.Stoddart, The Br.Nuclear Experience: The Roles of Beliefs, Culture and Identity, OUP, 2014,Ap.3, P221 has 5/10/62 Bomber Command targeting memo: the notional National Plan as 15 cities; the SIOP-integrated Plan, 59xThor+39xMBF Mks.2, as:
- “previously”: 57 targets: 48 cities, 6 Air Defence Centres (ADCCs), 3 (LRAF) bomber bases;
- now: 98: 16 cities, 44 “offensive” sites (i.e: airfields), 10 ADCCs, 28 IRBM sites. Next review 7/63. Hennessy,The Prime Minister, 2001, P114 has that “down to 16 cities (due to) improvements (in) air defences”.
By 4/76, when confirming funding for the Chevaline Penetration Enhancement of Polaris, Ministers accepted the Moscow Criterion: its: "“effect does not come (from 1xFBM but) probably (32xwarheads) of 1xSSBN. (It would be hard) to disentangle the system to take on a number of targets at once”. L.Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Macmillan, 2nd.Ed,1989, P148.
Much of this was laid out 2005-ish in a display at Kew, including a WE177B. We paid for all this: it is ours; nothing of current military novelty.
TSR.2: BE: the pinkos: in 1965 bought 4 SSBNs; 1974 bought their penaids; Jan. 1979: extracted Jimmy Carter's agreement to supply Trident II C4 (Maggie T made it D5). And more besides. A factor in deletion of TSR.2 was the Airships cluttering this tactical Canberra replacement (WE177A small Bang) with Big Bang WE177B and/or a stand-off weapon, to retain a deep "strategic" role post-SSBN. The asset became HI-VALU, so would never have been risked in an opening, iron phase...yet that precision, to find moving targets, was the core of its avionics suite, time and cost. TSR.2 was “an albatross round our necks (Healey) took the decision which would have had to be taken by (Conservative SofS Defence Thorneycroft. MoD was) writing (it) would have (to go) it was just that (Labour) took the opprobrium” B.Jackson/E.Bramall,Chiefs,Brassey,92,P361
- “previously”: 57 targets: 48 cities, 6 Air Defence Centres (ADCCs), 3 (LRAF) bomber bases;
- now: 98: 16 cities, 44 “offensive” sites (i.e: airfields), 10 ADCCs, 28 IRBM sites. Next review 7/63. Hennessy,The Prime Minister, 2001, P114 has that “down to 16 cities (due to) improvements (in) air defences”.
By 4/76, when confirming funding for the Chevaline Penetration Enhancement of Polaris, Ministers accepted the Moscow Criterion: its: "“effect does not come (from 1xFBM but) probably (32xwarheads) of 1xSSBN. (It would be hard) to disentangle the system to take on a number of targets at once”. L.Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Macmillan, 2nd.Ed,1989, P148.
Much of this was laid out 2005-ish in a display at Kew, including a WE177B. We paid for all this: it is ours; nothing of current military novelty.
TSR.2: BE: the pinkos: in 1965 bought 4 SSBNs; 1974 bought their penaids; Jan. 1979: extracted Jimmy Carter's agreement to supply Trident II C4 (Maggie T made it D5). And more besides. A factor in deletion of TSR.2 was the Airships cluttering this tactical Canberra replacement (WE177A small Bang) with Big Bang WE177B and/or a stand-off weapon, to retain a deep "strategic" role post-SSBN. The asset became HI-VALU, so would never have been risked in an opening, iron phase...yet that precision, to find moving targets, was the core of its avionics suite, time and cost. TSR.2 was “an albatross round our necks (Healey) took the decision which would have had to be taken by (Conservative SofS Defence Thorneycroft. MoD was) writing (it) would have (to go) it was just that (Labour) took the opprobrium” B.Jackson/E.Bramall,Chiefs,Brassey,92,P361
The asset became HI-VALU, so would never have been risked in an opening, iron phase...yet that precision, to find moving targets, was the core of its avionics suite, time and cost.
"To have lost a TSR2 would have been the political equivalent of losing a destroyer".
Financially about 8 million pounds (when 8 Million pounds was a lot of money
)
Last edited by Haraka; 24th Dec 2015 at 10:10.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
TSR 2, cheap.
In 1964 the loss of a Vulcan in a conventional war was equated with the loss of a capital ship, yet the Conservative Government at the time deployed a number of Vulcan s to replace 8 Victors. Whether they retained the final authority for release I don't know.
In 1964 the loss of a Vulcan in a conventional war was equated with the loss of a capital ship, yet the Conservative Government at the time deployed a number of Vulcan s to replace 8 Victors. Whether they retained the final authority for release I don't know.
"The INTRODUCER"
Dennis Healey
In the BBC radio documentary mentioned elsewhere it was mentioned that Healey at one point at least stood in as PM when the actual PM (Callaghan???) was unavailable for reasons that I forget. Healey was asked by the interviewer if he would ever have authorised a retaliatory strike and answered a flat no. Personally I doubt that he was alone in having taken that view (for which I have no evidence.)
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Algy, without checking, I think Peter Hennessey said that AOCinC Bomber Command could launch on his own authority should he be unable to contact the PM. I don't know if that extended to Positive Release as well.
PN-You are correct
Henessey's text states that the AOC Bomber Command could, if all efforts had failed to contact the PM of the day and his nuclear deputies, authorise the V Force to attack their targets.
Ironically, this was apparently a similar strategy to the 'Wing attack Plan R' in Strangelove, and was built in as a nuclear failsafe in the case of the 'bolt from the blue' attack where the Soviets may have tried to decapitate the political command and control structure with a targeted attack on London/Turnstile?? and other important political sites.
Interestingly, when the RN took over the deterrent, no such authority was passed to the C in C Fleet (or similar). As Hennessey states 'special communication arrangements apply' in the same eventuality-presumably the 'letters of last resort' that all SSBN's carry.
Henessey's text states that the AOC Bomber Command could, if all efforts had failed to contact the PM of the day and his nuclear deputies, authorise the V Force to attack their targets.
Ironically, this was apparently a similar strategy to the 'Wing attack Plan R' in Strangelove, and was built in as a nuclear failsafe in the case of the 'bolt from the blue' attack where the Soviets may have tried to decapitate the political command and control structure with a targeted attack on London/Turnstile?? and other important political sites.
Interestingly, when the RN took over the deterrent, no such authority was passed to the C in C Fleet (or similar). As Hennessey states 'special communication arrangements apply' in the same eventuality-presumably the 'letters of last resort' that all SSBN's carry.
One thing I have sometimes wondered. Say there are four aircraft sitting on QRA, all bombed up and waiting the order to go. The crew of one aircraft mutually agree they are off anyway, and scramble independently and head off Eastward.
Once they are airborne, I have always assumed they had total autonomy and as long as all crew members carried out the correct procedures there would be no external way of stopping them releasing the weapon, other, of course, than shooting them down (which I guess would have happened).
Pretty unlikely scenario I agree, but in theory could a rogue crew have got through and carried out a nuclear strike? In the Dr Strangelove scenario, the box which receives the authorisation code has been damaged in the missile attack, but as far as I know there was no equivalent to that box in V Force aircraft.
Once they are airborne, I have always assumed they had total autonomy and as long as all crew members carried out the correct procedures there would be no external way of stopping them releasing the weapon, other, of course, than shooting them down (which I guess would have happened).
Pretty unlikely scenario I agree, but in theory could a rogue crew have got through and carried out a nuclear strike? In the Dr Strangelove scenario, the box which receives the authorisation code has been damaged in the missile attack, but as far as I know there was no equivalent to that box in V Force aircraft.
I think the scenario of a rogue crew would be hard to develop given that all five would have to be in on the plan. Unless the core conspirators were able to "immobilise" any of the five outside the loop!
Rogue Crew
I think TTN, in the highly unlikely event of a rogue crew doing something like that, you are right, i.e. assuming we knew their QRA target (well defined I would be sure), we would then know their ingress routes and be able to alert Soviet/WP AD.
Of course, if they decided 'sod it we're off to Moscow' that would be slightly more problematic.
Of course, if they decided 'sod it we're off to Moscow' that would be slightly more problematic.
My question was highly theoretical, particularly as sitigeltfel said they would all have to be in on it. I'm sure one way or another somebody would have shot them down, but what I really meant was that other than that there would be no external way of preventing the weapon being released.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
TTN, on your new post, indeed.
The big question would be what would a crew do if they saw lots of mushroom clouds behind them but did not get a release message. Would they have obeyed orders or thought what the hell?
An interesting aside, on a dispersal flight the weapon would have been safed and the fuel enough only for the dispersal flight. Crews were briefed to make this transit not radio silent but with all radios switched off so as not to hear any confusing messages.
You can imagine what these might be.
The big question would be what would a crew do if they saw lots of mushroom clouds behind them but did not get a release message. Would they have obeyed orders or thought what the hell?
An interesting aside, on a dispersal flight the weapon would have been safed and the fuel enough only for the dispersal flight. Crews were briefed to make this transit not radio silent but with all radios switched off so as not to hear any confusing messages.
You can imagine what these might be.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
111, not as far as I know. We would have been in the ring of steel as at Cuba with all aircraft generated at main base. The next stage of alert was fraught with danger. Aircraft would have been defuelled, uncocked, and dispersed with radios off. Apart from about 20 aircraft at main bases the force would have been down until after turn round at dispersal. They would start to come back on state (RS15) in about 2 hours at a near dispersal and much longer for a Blue Steel aircraft.
Dispersal was all at once with only hangar aircraft recovered as time went on.
It was anticipated, given political release, to disperse the force early on in any conflict.
Dispersal was all at once with only hangar aircraft recovered as time went on.
It was anticipated, given political release, to disperse the force early on in any conflict.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
I have to say though that when we had a real generation in 1969 the timing was completely different from exercises, the orders were different and the tried and practised procedures went out the window until things stabilised. I don't think we even set up the GDOC.
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Worked on design of release units for those, and for equivalent Sea King ad Lynx ones.
I imagine WE177 would have made a big splash
If a enemy nuclear sub was target, the chopper would have been the only thing that could keep up in rough seas. A frigate would have been limited in extreme weather.
I imagine WE177 would have made a big splash
If a enemy nuclear sub was target, the chopper would have been the only thing that could keep up in rough seas. A frigate would have been limited in extreme weather.
Thank you PN
Dispersal at an early stage make complete sense of course, and although it protects the integrity of the deterrent, it also sends a very powerful signal to the enemy-the pistol is very much cocked, and the force becomes a potential First Strike option-hence Chamberlin's reluctance to disperse during the Cuban Crisis presumably?
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TSR2
Was involved with TSR2 and V bomber weapon release equipment, and TRS2 simulator, until it was cancelled. TSR2 simulator was going to have radar mapping incuded in simulation, and that included target maps. Saw where some of those were.