AAMs - Exactly what is an acceptable war reserve ?
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AAMs - Exactly what is an acceptable war reserve ?
I recall reading something about the RAF only having sufficient air-to-air missiles for 2 weeks of sustained combat during the height of the Cold War in the 1980s, then of course there is the never ending debate about AIM-9Ls in the Falklands and where they came from, and how many we actually had in stock.
All this led me to wonder just how an Air Force, any Air Force, determines just how many short/medium/long range AAMs are adequate for a given fleet of fighters.
I know that you base that decision to a large extent on your perceived threat - a thousand Soviet MiG 23s is different for NATO (of old) than for some nation with an aggressive neighbour who has a minimal air component to their armed forces.
But if we take say, the French Air Force as an example - what would be an acceptable war reserve for them based on the size of their fighter wings and perceived threats in the European theatre ?
Anyone know of the logic behind such planning considerations ?
All this led me to wonder just how an Air Force, any Air Force, determines just how many short/medium/long range AAMs are adequate for a given fleet of fighters.
I know that you base that decision to a large extent on your perceived threat - a thousand Soviet MiG 23s is different for NATO (of old) than for some nation with an aggressive neighbour who has a minimal air component to their armed forces.
But if we take say, the French Air Force as an example - what would be an acceptable war reserve for them based on the size of their fighter wings and perceived threats in the European theatre ?
Anyone know of the logic behind such planning considerations ?
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
You take your weapons load out - say 4 9l, 4 SF. Then the number of AE, say 10 per sqn,say 8 sqn. 320 each.
Then look at the threat - say 300. Assume 2 shots each - 600. You appear to have a satisfactory weapon/target match.
For the second wave load out you have a working assumption of 10% attrition.
Required missiles to replenish those fired is now 2-2 for 72 aircraft. Ie 144 of each.
A buy of 500 each give a you full coverage for two waves. However your usage may not be 50-50 and exercise attacks are used to rebalance the numbers, say 60-40.
Then finally you make an assumption on length of c war and attrition. Your aircraft availability might run out as:
80 72 65 59 53 48 43 39 36 32 29 26 23 21 -
What screws everything is if you dont lose enough aircraft
for instance JP223 in GW 1 ran out before the aircraft whereas in WW 3 it was expected we would run out of aircraft.
Then look at the threat - say 300. Assume 2 shots each - 600. You appear to have a satisfactory weapon/target match.
For the second wave load out you have a working assumption of 10% attrition.
Required missiles to replenish those fired is now 2-2 for 72 aircraft. Ie 144 of each.
A buy of 500 each give a you full coverage for two waves. However your usage may not be 50-50 and exercise attacks are used to rebalance the numbers, say 60-40.
Then finally you make an assumption on length of c war and attrition. Your aircraft availability might run out as:
80 72 65 59 53 48 43 39 36 32 29 26 23 21 -
What screws everything is if you dont lose enough aircraft
for instance JP223 in GW 1 ran out before the aircraft whereas in WW 3 it was expected we would run out of aircraft.
It was complicated but the OSA prevents me from saying too much. But there was a lot of scenario planning and op research against official assumptions. Training entitlement and Test and Evaluation requirements were significant over the 30 odd year life of a missile - most procurement was a one off purchase followed by a lot of maintenance.
