Buccaneer vs Red Fleet
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Buccaneer vs Red Fleet
I was analyzing an old document (late 1982) about Buccaneer tactics vs major warships of the Red Banner Fleet.
It covers Buccs attacking with Martel, Martel TV and LGBs.
But in light what happened shortly before in the South Atlantic Conflict, I wonder if Martel was ever a reliable weapon?
In any case, the cold war warriors in the forum agrees with the conclussions on par. 4? I think the release of weapons was very near for a "stand off" attack against a soviet warship...
It covers Buccs attacking with Martel, Martel TV and LGBs.
But in light what happened shortly before in the South Atlantic Conflict, I wonder if Martel was ever a reliable weapon?
In any case, the cold war warriors in the forum agrees with the conclussions on par. 4? I think the release of weapons was very near for a "stand off" attack against a soviet warship...
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I must admit that it is no too often that an individual from Argentina starts a thread discussing how to sink ships using air based munitions and posts pictures of a UK document that has Secret stamped all over it.
No doubt the people on the South Bank will be interested to learn how the OP got hold of this document.
I imagine that the OP got the document by requesting it from the National Archives... years ago, someone would've gone through the document, crossing out the word SECRET, but there are an awful lot of files from the 80s which are now declassified and available for public access, but with the classification staring out at you as though it was still applicable.
RAF Buccaneer - 12 Squadron Training Film - NATO OPEN GATE - 1978
Never mind tactics, is anyone else now going doody doody doo to the tune of Vangelis' To The Unknown Man?
I just ckecked if it available online and it is, appears to be complete, quality is average.
Thread Starter
I must admit that it is no too often that an individual from Argentina starts a thread discussing how to sink ships using air based munitions and posts pictures of a UK document that has Secret stamped all over it.
Now, back to 2015, fod God´s sake.
Thread Starter
I don´t know, the "issue" is because I am Argentine? Because I posted "sensitive" info from the National Archives? Because the safety of the Buccaneer crewmembers is at risk now?
I am only trying to discuss 35+ years ago Cold War tactics. If this is bothering someone, no problem, I will delete the first post and that´s it.
REgards,
I am only trying to discuss 35+ years ago Cold War tactics. If this is bothering someone, no problem, I will delete the first post and that´s it.
REgards,
Commenting solely on the above document.
1) the variation in the Martel failure rate is not given in the pages above. It would be helpful to know this (i.e. parameters for point 2. g.)
2) Do not confuse failure rate (technical) with survival rate (due to enemy SAD).
3) The mixture of ARM and TVM/LGB is important, as are their subsequent survival rates. Ultimately the aim is to get sufficient ship killing weapons on target. More ARMs generally means less effective SAD, which means a higher percentage of TVM/LGB get through, but less are launched in the first place as the pylons are taken up with ARM. The key, as ever,is..............
SURPRISE !!!!*
4) The aircraft survival rate is important as the remaining aircraft are needed to take out the remaining ships. Whilst one Bucc was expected to be lost per attack on a Kirov class (five times any other boat), my recollection is that in 1982 the Sovs only had one (the Kirov itself), so a good trade-off really.
*and FEAR. SURPRISE! and FEAR, and Ruthless Efficiency, and nice red uniforms
1) the variation in the Martel failure rate is not given in the pages above. It would be helpful to know this (i.e. parameters for point 2. g.)
2) Do not confuse failure rate (technical) with survival rate (due to enemy SAD).
3) The mixture of ARM and TVM/LGB is important, as are their subsequent survival rates. Ultimately the aim is to get sufficient ship killing weapons on target. More ARMs generally means less effective SAD, which means a higher percentage of TVM/LGB get through, but less are launched in the first place as the pylons are taken up with ARM. The key, as ever,is..............
SURPRISE !!!!*
4) The aircraft survival rate is important as the remaining aircraft are needed to take out the remaining ships. Whilst one Bucc was expected to be lost per attack on a Kirov class (five times any other boat), my recollection is that in 1982 the Sovs only had one (the Kirov itself), so a good trade-off really.
*and FEAR. SURPRISE! and FEAR, and Ruthless Efficiency, and nice red uniforms
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OK! Notwithstanding what's been said before I might be able to shed some light here having been involved in MARTEL with 12 Sqn in the mid-70s (and having actually fired a TVM on Aberporth during Trial Mistico).
The launch range for TVM was 10nm and the missile climbed to 2000ft after launch where it flew autonomously until the navigator caught a glimpse of the target on his TV screen whence he would select Terminal Phase, take control and dive the missile into the target. He could side step the missile up/down/left/right in the cruise phase and he could slew the seeker head left and right - all this to assist with target acquisition. Of the 6 missiles fired on my Mistico all hit the target within 3 metres apart from a rogue that went skywards upon selection of Terminal Phase and had to be destroyed by Range Control.
The problem that TVMARTEL had was that it cruised at 420 kts which, despite its small radar cross-section, could make it vulnerable to an alert and capable AD radar (we exercised on Aberporth with F4s trying to track the missile in flight (unsuccessfully, I seem to recall for them and frighteningly when the 14 foot rogue cleared cloud going vertical and shot past the F4's starboard wingtip!). ARMs were launched at 19nms and climbed to high altitude before descending whilst homing towards the Topsail or Headnet C radar. With their proximity fuses the tactical plan was to suppress the targets' acquisition radar and thus allow a clearer path into the target for the Mike 1 or Papa 1 attackers. Of course, the TVM launchers never approached the target by anything inside about 8nms and at very low level were invulnerable to Soviet AD systems of the day.
I proved the effectiveness of ARM when, equipped with inert missiles but war seeker heads, I was tasked to find 4 Soviet warships (they had been lost by the Kipper Fleet having been handed over to them by the Norwegians) off the north of Scotland in the Iceland/Faeroes Gap. With one seeker looking for Topsail and the other Headnet C, we easily picked up the 4 ships at a range of over 100nms and, following the missile steer, flew straight to them at 100feet! MARTEL was a good system in its day.
Now lets turn the clock forward to 1982 and focus our attention on Op Corporate. In the mid-70s, whenever Buccaneers got through to the RN ships during a maritime exercise, the RN always retaliated at the debrief at JMOTS with 'Yes, maybe, but there is no Soviet air threat at sea!' In the mid- to late 70s that was indeed true but it did mean that when they went south in 1982, they were not quite as well prepared as they might have been and their mindset was definitely in the wrong place!
As for TVMARTEL, it was eventually replaced by Sea Eagle, which was an autonomous sea-skimmer that was launched from a much greater range and at low level - so no vulnerability issues for the delivery aircraft with regard to the targets' AD systems there!
Hope that answers any questions or doubts.
Bloggs
The launch range for TVM was 10nm and the missile climbed to 2000ft after launch where it flew autonomously until the navigator caught a glimpse of the target on his TV screen whence he would select Terminal Phase, take control and dive the missile into the target. He could side step the missile up/down/left/right in the cruise phase and he could slew the seeker head left and right - all this to assist with target acquisition. Of the 6 missiles fired on my Mistico all hit the target within 3 metres apart from a rogue that went skywards upon selection of Terminal Phase and had to be destroyed by Range Control.
The problem that TVMARTEL had was that it cruised at 420 kts which, despite its small radar cross-section, could make it vulnerable to an alert and capable AD radar (we exercised on Aberporth with F4s trying to track the missile in flight (unsuccessfully, I seem to recall for them and frighteningly when the 14 foot rogue cleared cloud going vertical and shot past the F4's starboard wingtip!). ARMs were launched at 19nms and climbed to high altitude before descending whilst homing towards the Topsail or Headnet C radar. With their proximity fuses the tactical plan was to suppress the targets' acquisition radar and thus allow a clearer path into the target for the Mike 1 or Papa 1 attackers. Of course, the TVM launchers never approached the target by anything inside about 8nms and at very low level were invulnerable to Soviet AD systems of the day.
I proved the effectiveness of ARM when, equipped with inert missiles but war seeker heads, I was tasked to find 4 Soviet warships (they had been lost by the Kipper Fleet having been handed over to them by the Norwegians) off the north of Scotland in the Iceland/Faeroes Gap. With one seeker looking for Topsail and the other Headnet C, we easily picked up the 4 ships at a range of over 100nms and, following the missile steer, flew straight to them at 100feet! MARTEL was a good system in its day.
Now lets turn the clock forward to 1982 and focus our attention on Op Corporate. In the mid-70s, whenever Buccaneers got through to the RN ships during a maritime exercise, the RN always retaliated at the debrief at JMOTS with 'Yes, maybe, but there is no Soviet air threat at sea!' In the mid- to late 70s that was indeed true but it did mean that when they went south in 1982, they were not quite as well prepared as they might have been and their mindset was definitely in the wrong place!
As for TVMARTEL, it was eventually replaced by Sea Eagle, which was an autonomous sea-skimmer that was launched from a much greater range and at low level - so no vulnerability issues for the delivery aircraft with regard to the targets' AD systems there!
Hope that answers any questions or doubts.
Bloggs
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I imagine that the OP got the document by requesting it from the National Archives... years ago, someone would've gone through the document, crossing out the word SECRET, but there are an awful lot of files from the 80s which are now declassified and available for public access, but with the classification staring out at you as though it was still applicable.
If released documents are not declassified, that poses a real issue to still-classified documents from the same period.
I'll admit, when I saw the documents above, the first thing I saw was the classification.
As, like Marcantilan, I have been researching the Argentine use of the Exocets during the conflict down south, there is a question I have been pondering which I would like to address to the Buccaneer crews here, is what is their opinion of the manner in which the Argentine Etendards utilised the few missiles that they had?
Obviously they chose to use them in smaller numbers and did not have the advantage in quantity of missiles to use - but I would be interested to hear thoughts of professionals who were tasked with carrying out the same type of attack within the UK ranks.
Regards
Andy
Obviously they chose to use them in smaller numbers and did not have the advantage in quantity of missiles to use - but I would be interested to hear thoughts of professionals who were tasked with carrying out the same type of attack within the UK ranks.
Regards
Andy
