Fatal Accident Inquiries and Inquest
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There were effects that needed covering, predictable and predicted or not.
I am not defending any individual decisions made anywhere, merely that VSOs have to make decisions based on risk assessments.
The simple nature of statistics mean that even very low risks happen occasionally and then bad things happen.
Second guessing with hindsight later is just idiocy.
Chug.
I think you have bigger picture issues.
Nimrod was saving lives and doing good work.
Getting it to meet airworthiness regs cost money we didn't have or was judged to be better spent elsewhere, so we flew it hoping we would get by with the bodge as we have many times with many aircraft over the years.
There was no golden option where we had the aircraft airborne and airworthy.
It was have the bodge or lose the capability.
Personally I would not have grounded them after the event, let alone before.
So what if we lost one occasionally?
We lost ground troops daily yet we kept them there.
That is the job.
By flying Nimrod we reduced their very high risk a little by accepting some.
I personally believe that it is ok to trade a little extra risk upward from ground troops to flyers.
There is no "soldierworthiness" dept looking after the guys on the ground and this has skewed things in modern militaries. For some reason aircrew are protected at the expense of soldiers and sailors.
How many aircrew died in Iraq and Afghanistan?
It has come to be accepted that any loss of life airborne is a symptom of a mistake.
This is madness.
Lives are lost even in brilliant victories.
The negligible loss rate of aircrew compared to the ground troops suggests that contrary to your complaints we were unwilling to shoulder our fair burden of risk.
Those who mention the high unit cost of Nimrod thus the need to protect it are missing the point. If it can't get airborne and do the job then it is worthless.
Chug, I accept that you and Tuc worship at the feet of the god Airworthiness, and that's great. We need people like you to fight it's corner. The debate is good.
We also need VSO's that will put you back in your box when required.
When I fly an aircraft, occasionally I might have to break a rule. When I come back, that will be dissected by my superiors and I will be judged on the result and the intention.
The VSO's have been through a very similar system, and they seem to have had their actions blessed.
Let it go, and in particular let go the accusations about deliberately sabotaging our capability. That just makes you look mental.
TOFO
I'll read it if I can find it.
Tourist:-
Well, only by other VSO's who in the main tried to place the blame for the effects of these illegal decisions and orders on subordinates, even deceased JO's!
The reason why the Nimrod fleet was permanently grounded is of course never fully spelled out. If you say it was because it was condemned as unairworthy by the MAA, then blame the VSO's who gave it an RTS knowing it to be so. The reason why the Mull Chinook crashed has never been spelled out, except notoriously by Wratten and Day. It was, however, granted an RTS in a knowingly Grossly Unairworthy condition. The Hercules was put to Wartime Tactical use when knowingly Unfit for Purpose. These were all policy decisions taken at the highest level. Issuing an RTS to an aircraft known to be unairworthy is not only contrary to regulation, it is also illegal.
Where does the buck stop in your world, Tourist? If they start withholding your pay and allowances because, "there is no money left", would you nod sagely and dismiss others' protests with a "So What"? I suspect you would!
I don't worship at any altar, save that of maximising our defence effort for the lowest possible cost. Contrary to what you propose, a fully airworthy military airfleet will beat an unairworthy one in that regard everytime.
The VSO's have been through a very similar system, and they seem to have had their actions blessed.
The reason why the Nimrod fleet was permanently grounded is of course never fully spelled out. If you say it was because it was condemned as unairworthy by the MAA, then blame the VSO's who gave it an RTS knowing it to be so. The reason why the Mull Chinook crashed has never been spelled out, except notoriously by Wratten and Day. It was, however, granted an RTS in a knowingly Grossly Unairworthy condition. The Hercules was put to Wartime Tactical use when knowingly Unfit for Purpose. These were all policy decisions taken at the highest level. Issuing an RTS to an aircraft known to be unairworthy is not only contrary to regulation, it is also illegal.
Where does the buck stop in your world, Tourist? If they start withholding your pay and allowances because, "there is no money left", would you nod sagely and dismiss others' protests with a "So What"? I suspect you would!
I don't worship at any altar, save that of maximising our defence effort for the lowest possible cost. Contrary to what you propose, a fully airworthy military airfleet will beat an unairworthy one in that regard everytime.
Last edited by Chugalug2; 27th Oct 2015 at 23:40. Reason: Too many tries and too many blames
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New FAI Bill
I note that the new FAI bill (2016) states that mandatory FAIs will be carried out for a death in Scotland "while the person was acting in the course of the person’s employment or occupation".
Whilst the Crown Office has, in the past, insisted that service people are not employed I fail to see how anyone can now argue that they do not have an occupation.
DV
Whilst the Crown Office has, in the past, insisted that service people are not employed I fail to see how anyone can now argue that they do not have an occupation.
DV
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Unless they reside in FSA?
Family Services Accommodation, bad joke.
Family Services Accommodation, bad joke.
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The need for a Tornado FAI
Training Criticised In Helicopter Crash Inquest
This story shows how the findings of an inquest can differ from an internal MOD Service Inquiry, and that is why it was, and still is, essential to have an FAI into the Tornado collision incident of 2012. I understand that criminal investigations are now being carried out, probably involving the actions of senior officers. Senior officers should have been named and investigated for Tornado. The Crown Office's failure to recognise that the word of MOD/MAA is not the complete story let them off the hook. MoD/MAA do not name and condemn their own.
DV
This story shows how the findings of an inquest can differ from an internal MOD Service Inquiry, and that is why it was, and still is, essential to have an FAI into the Tornado collision incident of 2012. I understand that criminal investigations are now being carried out, probably involving the actions of senior officers. Senior officers should have been named and investigated for Tornado. The Crown Office's failure to recognise that the word of MOD/MAA is not the complete story let them off the hook. MoD/MAA do not name and condemn their own.
DV
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Tornado FAI
Tomorrow, 1st May, new evidence will be discussed with the Scottish Crown Office in attempt to convince the Lord Advocate that an independent civil Fatal Accident Inquiry should take place into the 2012 Tornado collision. The submission of new evidence is permitted under the new 2016 FAI act.
DV
DV
Training Criticised In Helicopter Crash Inquest
This story shows how the findings of an inquest can differ from an internal MOD Service Inquiry, and that is why it was, and still is, essential to have an FAI into the Tornado collision incident of 2012. I understand that criminal investigations are now being carried out, probably involving the actions of senior officers. Senior officers should have been named and investigated for Tornado. The Crown Office's failure to recognise that the word of MOD/MAA is not the complete story let them off the hook. MoD/MAA do not name and condemn their own.
DV
This story shows how the findings of an inquest can differ from an internal MOD Service Inquiry, and that is why it was, and still is, essential to have an FAI into the Tornado collision incident of 2012. I understand that criminal investigations are now being carried out, probably involving the actions of senior officers. Senior officers should have been named and investigated for Tornado. The Crown Office's failure to recognise that the word of MOD/MAA is not the complete story let them off the hook. MoD/MAA do not name and condemn their own.
DV
Quite by chance while searching FOI responses on a work task I came across this one inviting the HSE to link the Moray Firth midair with the Sean Cunningham accident. The point made by Mr Jones about the lack of a FAI interested me in the context of this thread. An extract from his request to the HSE follows:
The height and speed of the collision is totally irrelevant, as I’m sure the writer well knows. The height, speed, attitude and rate of change of those parameters at *ejection* are what matters. Even taking the position that SI reports are not to be trusted, it takes a special kind of obtuseness to infer that the crews *might* have ejected from their disintegrating aircraft at the impact parameters. The request seems to me in bad faith, designed to gain the attention of a non-specialist organisation by misleading them. And here was me thinking this was a campaign with integrity at its heart!
Two Tornado crew members died when their Martin Baker Mk10 seats and associate survival equipment failed to operate within the design envelope of ground level to 50,000 ft, and at speeds from zero to 630 knots. The Tornado collision took place at around 1000 ft and at a speed of 448 knots, technically well within the design parameters.
Easy Street
I've read your link. It seems to me the main point being made is that of inconsistency by, in this case, the HSE (but one could also say the CPS in England and Wales and the Procurators Fiscal in Scotland). They went after Martin-Baker in the Cunningham case, after MoD admitted guilt and liability. Yet take no action in far worse cases.
I agree with you - the HSE is non-specialist. In the Cunningham case, the judge ignored specialist evidence, as did the HSE, who were permitted to make false accusations and mislead the court.
Another point raised by the correspondent is the status of servicemen under Scots Law. That Fatal Accident Inquiries in Scotland did not take place for servicemen is not well known. People here may immediately think 'Mull of Kintyre FAI in 1996'. But that was for the RUC and MI5 officers who died. Not the RAF aircrew or Army officers. Sheriff Young made that clear in his remarks but was missed by most. The difference between Young and the Cunningham judge was that he did his job properly, and knew that he must explore MoD's actions (offences) in order to satisfy his public interest remit. The disgrace was that the Scottish Crown Office didn't follow through against MoD. Therefore, I think it unfair to say DV's campaign lacks integrity. It is MoD, HSE and parts of the judiciary who do.
The technical point you make is correct.
I've read your link. It seems to me the main point being made is that of inconsistency by, in this case, the HSE (but one could also say the CPS in England and Wales and the Procurators Fiscal in Scotland). They went after Martin-Baker in the Cunningham case, after MoD admitted guilt and liability. Yet take no action in far worse cases.
I agree with you - the HSE is non-specialist. In the Cunningham case, the judge ignored specialist evidence, as did the HSE, who were permitted to make false accusations and mislead the court.
Another point raised by the correspondent is the status of servicemen under Scots Law. That Fatal Accident Inquiries in Scotland did not take place for servicemen is not well known. People here may immediately think 'Mull of Kintyre FAI in 1996'. But that was for the RUC and MI5 officers who died. Not the RAF aircrew or Army officers. Sheriff Young made that clear in his remarks but was missed by most. The difference between Young and the Cunningham judge was that he did his job properly, and knew that he must explore MoD's actions (offences) in order to satisfy his public interest remit. The disgrace was that the Scottish Crown Office didn't follow through against MoD. Therefore, I think it unfair to say DV's campaign lacks integrity. It is MoD, HSE and parts of the judiciary who do.
The technical point you make is correct.
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Double Standards ?
It is wonderful news that a date has been set for an FAI into the Clutha helicopter accident. However, what is interesting is that a mandatory FAI is being called for the police who died, "while they were acting in the course of their employment", and it is being carried out iaw the 2016 act even though the accident took place in Nov 2013.
In a letter to the Justice Committee, dated 21st May 2015, from Mr Steven McGowan (Procurator Fiscal Major Crime and Investigation Fatalities), it was pointed out that an FAI was not convened for the Tornado accident because the 3rd Edition of Carmichael on Sudden Deaths and Fatal Accident Inquiries states at paragraph 2-07 that deaths of members of Armed Forces whilst on duty are not deaths in the course of employment. What he failed to point out was that the paragraph also covers police officers.
However, Mr McGowan's oversight (intentional or otherwise) did not go unnoticed by Christine Grahame when Stage 1 of the 2016 Bill was debated in the Scottish Parliament on 25th Sept 2015. She made it clear that as things stood "mandatory FAIs are currently held when a death occurs in Scotland either as a result of a work-related accident or when the deceased was in legal custody at the time of death. The former does not apply to the armed forces or indeed to police officers on duty."
So where does all this leave the call for an FAI into the 2012 Moray Firth Tornado accident? If the Crown Office has given the go ahead for a mandatory FAI under the new 2016 Act for an accident that took place in 2013, and for people who were technically not covered under the old Act, and still not covered, then they have to demonstrate that there is a level playing field for all in Scotland. Based on this recent interpretation of the 2016 Act, and the additional documentation presented to the Crown Office on 1st May, I fail to see how the Lord Advocate can reject a call for a mandatory FAI for the Moray Firth collision under section 2(1) and 2(3) of the Inquires into Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths etc. (Scotland) Act 2016.
The argument that the Military Aviation Authority produced a comprehensive report for the Tornado accident, thus negating the need for an FAI, can not be justified. The AAIB, a truly independent body, carried out a investigation into the Clutha accident, which lasted two years and resulted in a 176 page technical report.
DV
In a letter to the Justice Committee, dated 21st May 2015, from Mr Steven McGowan (Procurator Fiscal Major Crime and Investigation Fatalities), it was pointed out that an FAI was not convened for the Tornado accident because the 3rd Edition of Carmichael on Sudden Deaths and Fatal Accident Inquiries states at paragraph 2-07 that deaths of members of Armed Forces whilst on duty are not deaths in the course of employment. What he failed to point out was that the paragraph also covers police officers.
However, Mr McGowan's oversight (intentional or otherwise) did not go unnoticed by Christine Grahame when Stage 1 of the 2016 Bill was debated in the Scottish Parliament on 25th Sept 2015. She made it clear that as things stood "mandatory FAIs are currently held when a death occurs in Scotland either as a result of a work-related accident or when the deceased was in legal custody at the time of death. The former does not apply to the armed forces or indeed to police officers on duty."
So where does all this leave the call for an FAI into the 2012 Moray Firth Tornado accident? If the Crown Office has given the go ahead for a mandatory FAI under the new 2016 Act for an accident that took place in 2013, and for people who were technically not covered under the old Act, and still not covered, then they have to demonstrate that there is a level playing field for all in Scotland. Based on this recent interpretation of the 2016 Act, and the additional documentation presented to the Crown Office on 1st May, I fail to see how the Lord Advocate can reject a call for a mandatory FAI for the Moray Firth collision under section 2(1) and 2(3) of the Inquires into Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths etc. (Scotland) Act 2016.
The argument that the Military Aviation Authority produced a comprehensive report for the Tornado accident, thus negating the need for an FAI, can not be justified. The AAIB, a truly independent body, carried out a investigation into the Clutha accident, which lasted two years and resulted in a 176 page technical report.
DV
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It is wonderful news that a date has been set for an FAI into the Clutha helicopter accident. However, what is interesting is that a mandatory FAI is being called for the police who died, "while they were acting in the course of their employment", and it is being carried out iaw the 2016 act even though the accident took place in Nov 2013.
In a letter to the Justice Committee, dated 21st May 2015, from Mr Steven McGowan (Procurator Fiscal Major Crime and Investigation Fatalities), it was pointed out that an FAI was not convened for the Tornado accident because the 3rd Edition of Carmichael on Sudden Deaths and Fatal Accident Inquiries states at paragraph 2-07 that deaths of members of Armed Forces whilst on duty are not deaths in the course of employment. What he failed to point out was that the paragraph also covers police officers.
However, Mr McGowan's oversight (intentional or otherwise) did not go unnoticed by Christine Grahame when Stage 1 of the 2016 Bill was debated in the Scottish Parliament on 25th Sept 2015. She made it clear that as things stood "mandatory FAIs are currently held when a death occurs in Scotland either as a result of a work-related accident or when the deceased was in legal custody at the time of death. The former does not apply to the armed forces or indeed to police officers on duty."
So where does all this leave the call for an FAI into the 2012 Moray Firth Tornado accident? If the Crown Office has given the go ahead for a mandatory FAI under the new 2016 Act for an accident that took place in 2013, and for people who were technically not covered under the old Act, and still not covered, then they have to demonstrate that there is a level playing field for all in Scotland. Based on this recent interpretation of the 2016 Act, and the additional documentation presented to the Crown Office on 1st May, I fail to see how the Lord Advocate can reject a call for a mandatory FAI for the Moray Firth collision under section 2(1) and 2(3) of the Inquires into Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths etc. (Scotland) Act 2016.
The argument that the Military Aviation Authority produced a comprehensive report for the Tornado accident, thus negating the need for an FAI, can not be justified. The AAIB, a truly independent body, carried out a investigation into the Clutha accident, which lasted two years and resulted in a 176 page technical report.
DV
In a letter to the Justice Committee, dated 21st May 2015, from Mr Steven McGowan (Procurator Fiscal Major Crime and Investigation Fatalities), it was pointed out that an FAI was not convened for the Tornado accident because the 3rd Edition of Carmichael on Sudden Deaths and Fatal Accident Inquiries states at paragraph 2-07 that deaths of members of Armed Forces whilst on duty are not deaths in the course of employment. What he failed to point out was that the paragraph also covers police officers.
However, Mr McGowan's oversight (intentional or otherwise) did not go unnoticed by Christine Grahame when Stage 1 of the 2016 Bill was debated in the Scottish Parliament on 25th Sept 2015. She made it clear that as things stood "mandatory FAIs are currently held when a death occurs in Scotland either as a result of a work-related accident or when the deceased was in legal custody at the time of death. The former does not apply to the armed forces or indeed to police officers on duty."
So where does all this leave the call for an FAI into the 2012 Moray Firth Tornado accident? If the Crown Office has given the go ahead for a mandatory FAI under the new 2016 Act for an accident that took place in 2013, and for people who were technically not covered under the old Act, and still not covered, then they have to demonstrate that there is a level playing field for all in Scotland. Based on this recent interpretation of the 2016 Act, and the additional documentation presented to the Crown Office on 1st May, I fail to see how the Lord Advocate can reject a call for a mandatory FAI for the Moray Firth collision under section 2(1) and 2(3) of the Inquires into Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths etc. (Scotland) Act 2016.
The argument that the Military Aviation Authority produced a comprehensive report for the Tornado accident, thus negating the need for an FAI, can not be justified. The AAIB, a truly independent body, carried out a investigation into the Clutha accident, which lasted two years and resulted in a 176 page technical report.
DV
Sometimes you need to know the subject matter in order to evaluate the official response. Much like a newspaper report the next day, of an incident that one has witnessed, can read like a different event, the AAIB reports seem fine unless you know the truth. Then the small cracks appear, and you have to wonder what else they got wrong.
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Sometimes you need to know the subject matter in order to evaluate the official response. Much like a newspaper report the next day, of an incident that one has witnessed, can read like a different event, the AAIB reports seem fine unless you know the truth. Then the small cracks appear, and you have to wonder what else they got wrong.
DV
I have been following this thread and others like it for some time without joining in, but now I will stick my head above the parapet. Firstly, I have no knowledge or experience of the higher functioning of the airworthiness or legal systems. I was just a crew dog for nearly thirty years and had some vicarious connections with the Moray Firth mid air.
I am afraid that I just do not see the point of never ending demands for more and more enquiries. We know what happened, we know that better radar coverage and a Collision avoidance system would have helped and we know that the CAS had been delayed several times by senior officers trying to save a few pennies at the behest of their political masters. TCAS was quickly fitted to the GR4 fleet in the aftermath.
What more can be achieved? Identifying this or that long posted or retired VSO who signed something incriminating?
Finally, let us not forget that there was a survivor of this accident. Has anyone asked him if he wants to go through it all again?
TL
I am afraid that I just do not see the point of never ending demands for more and more enquiries. We know what happened, we know that better radar coverage and a Collision avoidance system would have helped and we know that the CAS had been delayed several times by senior officers trying to save a few pennies at the behest of their political masters. TCAS was quickly fitted to the GR4 fleet in the aftermath.
What more can be achieved? Identifying this or that long posted or retired VSO who signed something incriminating?
Finally, let us not forget that there was a survivor of this accident. Has anyone asked him if he wants to go through it all again?
TL
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I have been following this thread and others like it for some time without joining in, but now I will stick my head above the parapet. Firstly, I have no knowledge or experience of the higher functioning of the airworthiness or legal systems. I was just a crew dog for nearly thirty years and had some vicarious connections with the Moray Firth mid air.
I am afraid that I just do not see the point of never ending demands for more and more enquiries. We know what happened, we know that better radar coverage and a Collision avoidance system would have helped and we know that the CAS had been delayed several times by senior officers trying to save a few pennies at the behest of their political masters. TCAS was quickly fitted to the GR4 fleet in the aftermath.
What more can be achieved? Identifying this or that long posted or retired VSO who signed something incriminating?
Finally, let us not forget that there was a survivor of this accident. Has anyone asked him if he wants to go through it all again?
TL
I am afraid that I just do not see the point of never ending demands for more and more enquiries. We know what happened, we know that better radar coverage and a Collision avoidance system would have helped and we know that the CAS had been delayed several times by senior officers trying to save a few pennies at the behest of their political masters. TCAS was quickly fitted to the GR4 fleet in the aftermath.
What more can be achieved? Identifying this or that long posted or retired VSO who signed something incriminating?
Finally, let us not forget that there was a survivor of this accident. Has anyone asked him if he wants to go through it all again?
TL
Who knows what secrets a thorough and independent enquiry might turn up?
Given the history of the RAF & MoD for covering up errors and poor judgement in relation to specifications, and indeed, gash admin at squadron level, an inquiry might save a life in the future. Yes we all think we know the overt cause of the Moray Firth crash, but what else was going on?
Anyone who has any doubts about the effectiveness of such an enquiry need only look at a few previous reports. The truly dangerous element is the repetitive nature of failings. When the report makes recommendations which were already policy at the time of the incident, that's when you can see that the system is failing.
Why is it that we seem to need a fatal accident to get people and processes put under the microscope?
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If ones contention is that aircrew are being sent about their duties, in peace or war, in (or on, beside or using) equipment that is either not fit for purpose or is unsafe then there may be mileage in some form of inquiry - however if it is, or has been, the case then it is, or has been, the case for every second that the equipment has been used and not just in the cases that have resulted in injury or fatality. (Unless of course mitigations in place have varied over time).
If you want to find out ‘what else was going on’? You’re not going to find it out in an inquiry into an isolated event (unless the convening authority set a wide boundary to the scope which is unlikely in my view).
An inquiry into the airworthiness and safe operation (safe to operate/ operated safely) of the Tornado aircraft over its time in service might be what you’re after if that is the case.
My personal (experience based) view is that SIs are thorough.
I feel that in some cases people call for fresh inquiries in the hope of hearing the same thing again from a source viewed as more impartial or more authoritative - as opposed to hearing something new.
If you want to find out ‘what else was going on’? You’re not going to find it out in an inquiry into an isolated event (unless the convening authority set a wide boundary to the scope which is unlikely in my view).
An inquiry into the airworthiness and safe operation (safe to operate/ operated safely) of the Tornado aircraft over its time in service might be what you’re after if that is the case.
My personal (experience based) view is that SIs are thorough.
I feel that in some cases people call for fresh inquiries in the hope of hearing the same thing again from a source viewed as more impartial or more authoritative - as opposed to hearing something new.
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BGG,
Thank you for replying. I’m definitely not trying to be obtuse but my eloquence may have failed me.
The point I was trying to make in my first three paras was this. Perhaps rather than try to illustrate or investigate fundamental, institutional or even personal failings one should do that using an isolated (tragic) accident as evidence within a wider context - the vehicle for which I am unsure of - as opposed to looking at the accident specifically in order to show the wider failings.
Yours,
Orca.
Thank you for replying. I’m definitely not trying to be obtuse but my eloquence may have failed me.
The point I was trying to make in my first three paras was this. Perhaps rather than try to illustrate or investigate fundamental, institutional or even personal failings one should do that using an isolated (tragic) accident as evidence within a wider context - the vehicle for which I am unsure of - as opposed to looking at the accident specifically in order to show the wider failings.
Yours,
Orca.