Spits and Mossies only?
Torque, not too sure where you get your facts from.
Bomber Command did drop leaflets / bomb Germany at night, with negligible results and losses. Losses did not become an issue until 1941 as the Kammhuber Line started to take its toll.
Seeing as the Mosquito didn't fly until November 1940 and wasn't available in decent quantities until 1943, its hard to see the role it could have played.
The Battle of the Atlantic was effectively over by the summer of 43 and the Battle of the Ruhr in Mar-Jul 43 was directed at German industry, a large part of which was supplying UBoat production. This battle alone took up 5% of Bomber Commands total sorties for WW2. Along with other raids that were specifically on yards and the devastating Operation Gomorrah in July 43, I would argue that in Bomber Commands early war, a substantial part of it was targeted at UBoat production.
Bomber Command did drop leaflets / bomb Germany at night, with negligible results and losses. Losses did not become an issue until 1941 as the Kammhuber Line started to take its toll.
Seeing as the Mosquito didn't fly until November 1940 and wasn't available in decent quantities until 1943, its hard to see the role it could have played.
The Battle of the Atlantic was effectively over by the summer of 43 and the Battle of the Ruhr in Mar-Jul 43 was directed at German industry, a large part of which was supplying UBoat production. This battle alone took up 5% of Bomber Commands total sorties for WW2. Along with other raids that were specifically on yards and the devastating Operation Gomorrah in July 43, I would argue that in Bomber Commands early war, a substantial part of it was targeted at UBoat production.
Torque, not too sure where you get your facts from.
Bomber Command did drop leaflets / bomb Germany at night, with negligible results and losses. Losses did not become an issue until 1941 as the Kammhuber Line started to take its toll.
Seeing as the Mosquito didn't fly until November 1940 and wasn't available in decent quantities until 1943, its hard to see the role it could have played.
The Battle of the Atlantic was effectively over by the summer of 43 and the Battle of the Ruhr in Mar-Jul 43 was directed at German industry, a large part of which was supplying UBoat production. This battle alone took up 5% of Bomber Commands total sorties for WW2. Along with other raids that were specifically on yards and the devastating Operation Gomorrah in July 43, I would argue that in Bomber Commands early war, a substantial part of it was targeted at UBoat production.
Bomber Command did drop leaflets / bomb Germany at night, with negligible results and losses. Losses did not become an issue until 1941 as the Kammhuber Line started to take its toll.
Seeing as the Mosquito didn't fly until November 1940 and wasn't available in decent quantities until 1943, its hard to see the role it could have played.
The Battle of the Atlantic was effectively over by the summer of 43 and the Battle of the Ruhr in Mar-Jul 43 was directed at German industry, a large part of which was supplying UBoat production. This battle alone took up 5% of Bomber Commands total sorties for WW2. Along with other raids that were specifically on yards and the devastating Operation Gomorrah in July 43, I would argue that in Bomber Commands early war, a substantial part of it was targeted at UBoat production.
Bomber Command did drop leaflets / bomb Germany at night, with negligible results and losses. Losses did not become an issue until 1941 as the Kammhuber Line started to take its toll.
Seeing as the Mosquito didn't fly until November 1940 and wasn't available in decent quantities until 1943, its hard to see the role it could have played.
The Battle of the Atlantic was effectively over by the summer of 43 and the Battle of the Ruhr in Mar-Jul 43 was directed at German industry, a large part of which was supplying UBoat production
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Don't forget the marvellous input of Ultra (Bletchley Park). I believe the U-boat commanders were required to pass a Position Report to the Kriegsmarine every 24 hours.
Once the codebreakers had broken into the German Naval "Enigma", this enormously simplified our task in the Battle of the Atlantic.
D.
Once the codebreakers had broken into the German Naval "Enigma", this enormously simplified our task in the Battle of the Atlantic.
D.
t
Breaking Triton had a big impact but you have to figure in convoys and long range air support in that. There was a time lag in decrypting ultra material. As the war progressed the U-boatwaffe started to loose its most experienced commanders.
Don't forget the marvellous input of Ultra (Bletchley Park). I believe the U-boat commanders were required to pass a Position Report to the Kriegsmarine every 24 hours.
Once the codebreakers had broken into the German Naval "Enigma", this enormously simplified our task in the Battle of the Atlantic.
Once the codebreakers had broken into the German Naval "Enigma", this enormously simplified our task in the Battle of the Atlantic.
The Battle of the Atlantic was effectively over by the summer of 43 and the Battle of the Ruhr in Mar-Jul 43 was directed at German industry, a large part of which was supplying UBoat production. This battle alone took up 5% of Bomber Commands total sorties for WW2. Along with other raids that were specifically on yards and the devastating Operation Gomorrah in July 43, I would argue that in Bomber Commands early war, a substantial part of it was targeted at UBoat production. - Rolling20
The turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic is generally regarded as being 23 May 1943, the date on which Admiral Dönitz is believed to have realised that he was obliged to alter his U-boat strategy, coinciding as it did with the arrival in the Mersey of Convoy HX238 from New York and Halifax NS the same week, having incurred fewer losses than almost any other in the previous year.
The anniversary is celebrated in great style in Liverpool every year - as I know to my cost!
Jack
The turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic is generally regarded as being 23 May 1943, the date on which Admiral Dönitz is believed to have realised that he was obliged to alter his U-boat strategy, coinciding as it did with the arrival in the Mersey of Convoy HX238 from New York and Halifax NS the same week, having incurred fewer losses than almost any other in the previous year.
The anniversary is celebrated in great style in Liverpool every year - as I know to my cost!
Jack
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Jack,
Although we won the Battles of the Atlantic in both WWI and WWII, it still true that a submarine blockade is the means by which this country can be brought to its knees in a future war.
It was our good fortune that both the Kaiser and Hitler were land animals, neither appreciated that, if they had only put sufficient resources into their U-boat campaigns, they would have had a good chance of cutting the lifeline which supplied us with food, raw materials and war supplies. As we cannot ourselves produce the food the country needs, all an enemy needs to do then is to wait until we are starved into submission.
Even as it was, Dönitz wasn't doing too badly. Churchill said that this was always his worst worry of the war. Admittedly "Ultra" information was delayed by the time needed by the cryptographers and translators of Bletchley Park, but there were times when Churchill had on his desk a transcript of Hitler's orders to some General in the field before the recipient himself had seen them.
This was particularly useful in the U-boat war: it enabled the Admiralty to re-route convoys away from the "Wolf Packs"; and on occasion, when a U-boat "mother ship" had been located, it was arranged for a recce Catalina to "spot" it (purely by "chance", of course) so that the subsequent fatal attack would be obviously the result of the "sighting". The "chicks", deprived of fuel, stores and torpedo replacements, had no choice but to cut their sorties short and return to port.
Danny.
Although we won the Battles of the Atlantic in both WWI and WWII, it still true that a submarine blockade is the means by which this country can be brought to its knees in a future war.
It was our good fortune that both the Kaiser and Hitler were land animals, neither appreciated that, if they had only put sufficient resources into their U-boat campaigns, they would have had a good chance of cutting the lifeline which supplied us with food, raw materials and war supplies. As we cannot ourselves produce the food the country needs, all an enemy needs to do then is to wait until we are starved into submission.
Even as it was, Dönitz wasn't doing too badly. Churchill said that this was always his worst worry of the war. Admittedly "Ultra" information was delayed by the time needed by the cryptographers and translators of Bletchley Park, but there were times when Churchill had on his desk a transcript of Hitler's orders to some General in the field before the recipient himself had seen them.
This was particularly useful in the U-boat war: it enabled the Admiralty to re-route convoys away from the "Wolf Packs"; and on occasion, when a U-boat "mother ship" had been located, it was arranged for a recce Catalina to "spot" it (purely by "chance", of course) so that the subsequent fatal attack would be obviously the result of the "sighting". The "chicks", deprived of fuel, stores and torpedo replacements, had no choice but to cut their sorties short and return to port.
Danny.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Anyway, other than the Spit and Mossie, what other aircraft were essential?
We have mentioned the Lanc and Sunderland, was the Halifax essential or should more Lancs have been built?
What of the Wellington? It lasted the war and beyond.
Hurricane and Beaufighter, should we have discarded these as tank busters? And Typoon and Tempest?
We have mentioned the Lanc and Sunderland, was the Halifax essential or should more Lancs have been built?
What of the Wellington? It lasted the war and beyond.
Hurricane and Beaufighter, should we have discarded these as tank busters? And Typoon and Tempest?
Thread Starter
The Hurricane design was flawed with thick wings - Farnborough gave Sydney Camm incorrect data.
I believe the Miles aircraft -which was cheaper and quicker to build outperformed the Hurricane.
I believe the Miles aircraft -which was cheaper and quicker to build outperformed the Hurricane.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Apart from getting more kills than the Spitfire, what were the two force numbers kills per aircraft?
The aircraft had a better track width than the Spit. 2x40 mm cannon was something else.
The aircraft had a better track width than the Spit. 2x40 mm cannon was something else.
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The Aircraft that Never Was.
typerated,
Your #70 made me gasp:
"I believe the Miles aircraft - which was cheaper and quicker to build outperformed the Hurricane"
(You can't mean the poor old Master, which was a nice, comfortable ride, and that was about all ???). Never heard of anything else at the time ('42), but Wiki was ready with the answer:
Miles M-20 ! (Eh?),
"......aerodynamically advanced for their time; the M.20 emergency production fighter prototype outperformed contemporary Hawker Hurricanes, despite having fixed landing gear......"
".....In the event, due to dispersal of manufacturing, the Luftwaffe's bombing of the Spitfire and Hurricane factories did not seriously affect production, and so the M.20 proved unneessary and was cancelled".
Ounce of demonsration, etc
M-20
Second prototype Miles M.27 Master III (W8667)
Maximum speed: 242 mph (389 km/h)
at 6,000 ft (1,830 m)
Range: 393 mi (342 nmi, 632 km)
Service ceiling: 25,100 ft (7,650 m)
Armament
Guns: 1 × .303 in Vickers K machine gun
Maximum speed: 340 mph (547 km/h)
at 21,000 ft (6,400 m) [N 12]
Range: 600 mi (965 km)
Service ceiling: 36,000 ft (10,970 m)
Rate of climb: 2,780 ft/min (14.1 m/s
Wing loading: 29.8 lb/ft² (121.9 kg/m²)
Power/mass: 0.15 hp/lb (0.25 kW/kg)
Armament
Guns: 4 × 20 mm (.79 in)
Hispano Mk II cannon
Bombs: 2 × 250 or 500 lb (
110 or 230 kg) bombs
Your #70 made me gasp:
"I believe the Miles aircraft - which was cheaper and quicker to build outperformed the Hurricane"
(You can't mean the poor old Master, which was a nice, comfortable ride, and that was about all ???). Never heard of anything else at the time ('42), but Wiki was ready with the answer:
Miles M-20 ! (Eh?),
"......aerodynamically advanced for their time; the M.20 emergency production fighter prototype outperformed contemporary Hawker Hurricanes, despite having fixed landing gear......"
".....In the event, due to dispersal of manufacturing, the Luftwaffe's bombing of the Spitfire and Hurricane factories did not seriously affect production, and so the M.20 proved unneessary and was cancelled".
Ounce of demonsration, etc
M-20
Second prototype Miles M.27 Master III (W8667)
PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS
MILES M-20
Maximum speed: 333 mph (290 knots, 536 km/h)
Range: 920 mi (800 nmi, 1,481 km)
Service ceiling: 32,800 ft (10,000 m)
Climb to 20,000 ft (6,100 m): 9 min 36 s
(2221 ft/min)
Armament
Range: 920 mi (800 nmi, 1,481 km)
Service ceiling: 32,800 ft (10,000 m)
Climb to 20,000 ft (6,100 m): 9 min 36 s
(2221 ft/min)
Armament
Guns: 8 × .303 inch Browning machine guns
MILES MASTER
Maximum speed: 242 mph (389 km/h)
at 6,000 ft (1,830 m)
Range: 393 mi (342 nmi, 632 km)
Service ceiling: 25,100 ft (7,650 m)
Armament
Guns: 1 × .303 in Vickers K machine gun
HURRICANE I
Max Speed: 328 mph (529km/h)
at 20,000 ft (6,095m)
Armament: Eight .303 in Browning
machine guns mounted in wings
HURRICANE IIC
Max Speed: 328 mph (529km/h)
at 20,000 ft (6,095m)
Armament: Eight .303 in Browning
machine guns mounted in wings
HURRICANE IIC
Maximum speed: 340 mph (547 km/h)
at 21,000 ft (6,400 m) [N 12]
Range: 600 mi (965 km)
Service ceiling: 36,000 ft (10,970 m)
Rate of climb: 2,780 ft/min (14.1 m/s
Wing loading: 29.8 lb/ft² (121.9 kg/m²)
Power/mass: 0.15 hp/lb (0.25 kW/kg)
Armament
Guns: 4 × 20 mm (.79 in)
Hispano Mk II cannon
Bombs: 2 × 250 or 500 lb (
110 or 230 kg) bombs
Note: The Master is shown with the instructor's section of the "glasshouse" swung forward, and his seat raised, to see over his pupil's head.
Danny42C.
Danny42C.
The Hurricane design was flawed with thick wings - Farnborough gave Sydney Camm incorrect data
what other aircraft were essential?
We have mentioned the Lanc and Sunderland, was the Halifax essential or should more Lancs have been built?
We have mentioned the Lanc and Sunderland, was the Halifax essential or should more Lancs have been built?
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
TotD, I excepted these as, like the Kittihawk, Hudson, Mustang, Mitchell, Maraurder, B17, these were not part of British aircraft production.
Of course there was also the Merlin engine, Beaufighter and Mosquito that went the other way.
Of course there was also the Merlin engine, Beaufighter and Mosquito that went the other way.
what other aircraft were essential?
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Megan
I believe there is a reference to the Hurricane's overly thick wing design in:
The United Kingdom's contributions to the development of aeronautics Part 3.The development of the streamlined monoplane (the 1920s-1940s)
Ackroyd, J. A. D. in AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL; 106; 217-268, AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL by ROYAL AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY; 2002
Although I don't have a working link......
The United Kingdom's contributions to the development of aeronautics Part 3.The development of the streamlined monoplane (the 1920s-1940s)
Ackroyd, J. A. D. in AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL; 106; 217-268, AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL by ROYAL AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY; 2002
Although I don't have a working link......