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Typhoons Need Midair Collision Avoidance System, Safety Officials Say

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Typhoons Need Midair Collision Avoidance System, Safety Officials Say

Old 15th Jan 2015, 13:46
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Also, it took much longer to determine if “No Go” equipment was working, so when (and where!) was the new No Go/Abort decision point made?

Pretty good question from someone who knows nothing about how aircraft operate. As usual, tourist prefers personal insult over substance. The reports tuc alludes to admit the aircraft leaving the carrier didn't have functioning radar, jtids or iff and half the comms weren't yet working. All were No Go kit. So when is the decision made? The same reports say this was all new kit in the Mk7 so the decision process must have been different. If they'd aborted early, they wouldn't have collided. Not blaming any crew but would want to know what they were taught, or was the conversion course as brief as Tourist implies.
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Old 15th Jan 2015, 14:08
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To be fair, I accept Tourist knows more about operating aircraft than me. Of course he does. The difference is, when I spot an obvious question like that I ask those who should know, I don't dictate the answer. Nor do I automatically rubbish them if they provide an answer I don't understand. I await an answer, or an opinion, by the way. Should be a no-brainer to a Sea King operator who is wholly familiar with all those new systems and changes in operating procedures brought about by a completely different Statement Operating Intent and Usage. Or maybe not, given the necessary contract was cancelled on the grounds they should just make up procedures on the fly!
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Old 15th Jan 2015, 14:10
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if mistakes/breaks from the rules were made they were well intentioned in what the person or persons thought were the best interests of the service.
Would those 'breaks from the rules' include the issue of illegal orders, Tourist? One such order issued by an RAF VSO, to ignore the mandated regulations yet declare them complied with, has been declared proper by the MOD up to and including the SoS ever since, and insists that refusal to comply with it was an offence. That was presumably in the best interests of the Service in your view?
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Old 15th Jan 2015, 14:19
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Tuc

The problem with your posts on your pet crusade are that sometimes I find myself reading them and nodding along because of the work you put into them.......


And then I balance that against the one area of which you talk where I have some knowledge and I find you twisting reality to fit your opinions and I doubt the rest of it all...
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Old 15th Jan 2015, 14:35
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Dervish

This again just like the enthusiastic amateur crash investigation threads.

You don't even know what is relevant!

IFF u/s you say.
Don't think anybody is getting airborne without mode 4 at that point. Get shot down by red crown pretty quick methinks.

IFF on off broken fixed who cares! Why would that be relevant? Do you think that any of the other helicopters even had the ability to see an IFF? Or had TCAS. Or were even radiating!?


Radar not functioning. Hmm. Really?
An aircraft that has only one purpose which is to be an airborne radar and they were going flying without the radar?
I think not. Did it perhaps have limited functionality?

This might seem like a strange question to someone with no knowledge of maritime ops.
Let's assume for the sake of argument that the bagger was getting airborne without a serviceable radar. For fun maybe.
How exactly do you think that this would affect the collision? What do you think that radar does/is good for?

An aircraft with u/s JTIDS, u/s radar is no more dangerous than all the other aircraft in the air that day not fitted with JTIDS or radar....
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Old 15th Jan 2015, 14:39
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Accepted tuc. I’ve got a few questions of my own I don’t understand but Tourist will know. Lifted these from the report as I don’t really understand them myself.

Why did the Board criticise the crew for not seeking a Radar Advisory Service despite the RTS forbidding it?

Could a carrier provide a RAS if it didn’t have IFF and the aircraft didn’t have radar or IFF?

Why did the RTS allow use of NVG when the aircraft wasn't fitted for it? They weren’t using NVG but the problem I see is the Board didn’t know what the RTS said and recommended its use is considered.


Lots of similar questions come out of that report and it bothers me no one seems to have asked them before. All collision related so not thread drift.
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Old 15th Jan 2015, 14:48
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Radar not functioning. Hmm. Really?
An aircraft that has only one purpose which is to be an airborne radar and they were going flying without the radar?
I think not. Did it perhaps have limited functionality?
Just quoting MoDs own reports tourist. The outgoing aircraft didn't have her mission system fired up because of a software loading snag meaning no radar (switch on standby), no JTIDS (the problem software) and limited IFF as the radar wasn't working. No JTIDS meant no JTIDS voice and there was a fault in the GPS so not known if UHF radios working. I guess thats why the question was asked about how long you put up with this before aborting. If you know better...

Puzzled you keep denying MoD have said things in open source reports.
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Old 15th Jan 2015, 15:04
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Ah, that's more like it.

So, the radar was not u/s as stated, it just wasn't up and running yet.
The IFF was perfectly servicable.
The Radar was not able to see IFF yet because it was not up and running yet.
JTIDS voice has no possible bearing on the accident. The pilots would not be on it anyway.
UHF voice was obviously working because they were talking to the ship.

So in the space of a few posts we have gone from:-

Radar IFF and JTIDS u/s

To:-
Radar not turned fully on yet
IFF perfectly servicable
JTIDS generally servicable and nothing to do with anything anyway.

This is exactly what I'm talking about.
Attempts to skew reality. It no wonder you get ignored.

Let's talk further about it.

Exactly when would a helicopter turn on the radar on leaving the ship in an operational scenario? Do you imagine under normal circumstances a helicopter turns on the radar at takeoff? Can you just for a moment imagine that we have developed procedures that allow aircraft in and out with the radars, IFF, HISLs off so as not to give the position of the carrier away?
Is there another helicopter in the entire British military that even had the capability to see other IFF?

Do you honestly think that radar in the military is like on telly where a little blip on the screen moves towards you and you tell the pilot and he makes a miraculous manuever and all is well?

This does seem like a personal attack, but that is purely because this is a personal and misguided crusade rather than a topic for discussion.
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Old 15th Jan 2015, 15:13
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the radar was not u/s as stated,
Er, it was you who stated it was u/s, Tourist. Read the thread! Oh, if I'm not already on your ignore list (if only!), could you please answer my question above re illegal orders?
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Old 15th Jan 2015, 15:49
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Based on MoD’s reports and admittedly with my non-aircrew limitations;


I
FF u/s you say. Don't think anybody is getting airborne without mode 4 at that point. Get shot down by red crown pretty quick methinks.
IFF wasn’t functioning fully, it at all, because the Mission System wasn’t initiated. Ark Royal’s IFF was U/S. The Inbound Sea King’s IFF and radar was limited due to enforced change in radar mode.


IFF on off broken fixed who cares!
Aircrew should, as it is a No Go item. The RAF lost a Tornado the same day because the IFF system design implementation wasn’t correct.



First you say no-one would get airborne without Mode 4, then Who Cares if it isn’t working. The Tornado crew got airborne because they thought it ok, and died not knowing it wasn’t.

Why would that be relevant? Do you think that any of the other helicopters even had the ability to see an IFF? Or had TCAS. Or were even radiating!?
According to MoD, the other Sea King was capable, although limited in range. The HMS Liverpool Lynx, which had encroached into the CCZ, was radiating in the sense her radar was working as was her I Band transponder. Don’t know about the US aircraft. The lack of IFF return from Outbound was concerning the sole observer in the rear of Inbound. A minor distraction perhaps, but maybe significant at a time when the pilot and other observer were desperately trying to locate her.


Radar not functioning. Hmm. Really? An aircraft that has only one purpose which is to be an airborne radar and they were going flying without the radar? I think not. Did it perhaps have limited functionality?
Inbound was limited, as above. Outbound was in Standby.

This might seem like a strange question to someone with no knowledge of maritime ops.
Let's assume for the sake of argument that the bagger was getting airborne without a serviceable radar. For fun maybe. How exactly do you think that this would affect the collision? What do you think that radar does/is good for?
The Mission System (radar/JTIDS) is fully integrated with the IFF. Each relies upon the other. The screens display IFF data. The interface is facilitated by the Mission System Interface Unit. Neither Sea King could get accurate information from Ark Royal due to her radar limitations and IFF being U/S. Thus, the Defences in Depth against the risk of collision were eroded completely. As stated by the BoI.

An aircraft with u/s JTIDS, u/s radar is no more dangerous than all the other aircraft in the air that day not fitted with JTIDS or radar...
The operating procedures are written on the assumption both are serviceable, but it is important that they (and hence Safety Case) also include possible deviations. (Equally, I assume, the assets it is controlling must know what to do if Mk7 falls offline). This gets to the root of the original question. What instructions was Outbound working to while waiting to see if the Mission System could initiate? And what did the instructions say about what to do and where to go while waiting, and when to abort?
And had they trained for this yet in both Full Mission Trainer and Sim, given the RTS only provided a Switch On Only clearance (“not to be relied upon in any way whatsoever”)? I’ll be honest and say I think this was an error, but it’s a hell of an error to make in the Master Airworthiness Reference and indicative of this entire area not being managed properly.
The Mk7 differs enormously from the Mk2. Both RadHaz and time to initiate software meant the radar could never be fully operational deck to deck. Essentially, the Mk2 could radiate as soon as the interlocks were freed when the swing arm deployed. But the Mk7 would have to wait longer. The BoI refers to this at length. What is also clear from the reports is that in certain respects the ship’s procedures hadn’t changed from Mk2, despite the aircraft form, fit, function and use being completely different. The need to change designation from AEW Mk2 to AEW Mk7 (ASaC was a late affectation) was THE big clue.



Here’s another question for you. Why do you think the Comms/GPS passed full integration testing and trials in 2000, yet in 2003 Time of Day was not integrated with UHF radios? Who agreed to de-specify or de-modify the aircraft to such an extent? And were the Trainer, Sim and Aircraft Specifications (and hence Safety Case) modified to reflect this new Build Standard? Was there a problem with Time of Day in general? Bearing in mind the GPS was only capable of providing 2 ToD loads without a Buffer Unit, was this Buffer unit serviceable, or even fitted? In which case JTIDS, IFF and/or Comms may not work or have intermittent problems. When trying to load software, does the routine include looking for and verifying ToD? If there was a problem, that MAY explain why JTIDS didn’t load. Just a thought, not addressed by MoD.


Edit

UHF voice was obviously working because they were talking to the ship.
I think the reference was to the 2 ARC164 HQII radios, which weren't integrated properly, meaning the system wasn't working to spec, and that assumed by the Trainer and Sim. The AD3400 V/UHF radio was, I assume, working. You'll know which one they used to speak to ship. I'd speculate it wouldn't be UHF2. The Mk7 was the first aircraft to home through an encrypted hopper and this entire area was fraught with political machinations, as the US had de-modified the ARC164 without telling MoD, meaning you lost 50% functionality. Mk7 restored it, but the RN let it slide and didn't resurrect other ARC164 users, so if there was migration of LRUs due to maintenance, the Mk7 could suddenly find itself with a very limited comms fit. Same applied to crypto, which was to spec in the Mk7, but not on the Merlin or Lynx. Migration meant degradation. Sorry, details details, but it all adds up and must be understood by investigators.

Last edited by tucumseh; 15th Jan 2015 at 16:05.
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Old 15th Jan 2015, 16:05
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Sometimes I want to give up.....

One last try.

Both the pilots were pingers by trade.

That means that they were trained from the crib to operate from carriers in a Mk6

Mk6 normal ops would be to lift from a carrier with the radar off. Lights off. Radio silent. IFF mode4 only. No JTIDS.

The loss of all those items would not be a big deal. It's normal ops. Even radar on in a MK6 it is blind in the front aspect would you believe.

On this flight, they were nav lights on, lower HISL off, (normal with both the controversial HISL and the previous strobe due to distracting reflections off the sea) radio on, two way comms with the ship. Hardly operating outside their comfort zone.
Was everything thing perfect?
No, they were constrained in their use of height separation which is not ideal, but these things happen operationally.

IFF is necessary to not get shot down or even be allowed into the operational area but had no effect on the accident, thus who cares.

Re the JTIDS.
DONT CARE!
Nothing to do with me flying the aircraft.

Re operational on the deck
DONT CARE
Nothing to do with me flying the aircraft.

Your points are all about bagging capability which is irrelevant, not flying the airframe safely which is relevant.
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Old 15th Jan 2015, 16:26
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Tourist, I have no problem with what you've just said. But I sincerely do recommend you read the reports.

previous strobe due to distracting reflections
Now, this is where you and I definitely agree. Would you believe that the Reviewing Officers (FLEET) rejected the BoI President's recommendations because they said REFLECTIONS were completely irrelevant, and absolutely NOT to be considered when assessing a distraction. That one can only take into account DIRECT light. (The regs, which I tend to like implementing, much to your chagrin, say both Direct and Reflected/Glare). Another example of MoD re-writing the regs to suit the situation. Now, if you were evr in the position of having tyo accept a design, what would you say if the designer ignored reflected light? You'd bloody jump.

Of course, the irony is that FLEET's stance means they disagreed with the Service Deviation permitting lower forward to be switched off if the pilot saw reflected light. According to them, the reflected light had to be ignored.

Glad you agree there was a "previous strobe". I agree too. The IPT told the investigator there was no such thing. A quick look at any Sea King told him they told porkies. (In fact, I understand he was standing next to a series of photographs on the IPT office wall when they told him this!) Presumably one reason why his report was destroyed.

We're getting there.
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Old 15th Jan 2015, 16:27
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The system tells the pilot what he must do to avoid the other aircraft by the proscribed margin.
He is also told that he is not to think, not to look but just to obey instinctively.
I understood that mindset was to guard against confusing an aircraft seen by the pilot with the aircraft which TCAS is avoiding.
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Old 15th Jan 2015, 16:49
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Of course, the irony is that FLEET's stance means they disagreed with the Service Deviation permitting lower forward to be switched off if the pilot saw reflected light. According to them, the reflected light had to be ignored.
I can't get my head round that at all. Are you saying Fleet thought the HISL should not have been switched off, because it was under the cockpit and behind on the tail so not in the pilot's direct line of sight?

Tourist, surely some of that bagger capability you mention contributes to the ability to fly the aircraft safely, especially if he's trying to locate another aircraft in darkness? The board discussed the mission tape a lot and that the incoming pilot was relying on information from the rear. Are you saying he shouldn't have been? From what i read it seems he was a bit limited where he could go due to the tlam corridor. Would that make him more reliant on other sensors apart from his eyes?
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Old 15th Jan 2015, 17:23
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Basil, yes that is correct.
You should not assume the TCAS contact is the one you see since the positions are very inaccurate. You should just follow the RA.
All very well in a airliner cockpit with poor visibility and manoeuvrability but not really military compatible.
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Old 15th Jan 2015, 18:16
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You see now you've got the Daily Mail started now: Typhoon jets could smash into airliners, RAF chief warns* | Daily Mail Online

What a completely moronic headline. Do you know what, my Mini Cooper could smash into an airliner as well!!!

Anyway, if we are to fit TCAS, or other such anti collision detection devices, into the military fleet then let's think about it. How about a non-cooperative collision avoidance device that helps you stop hitting non-squawkers (ie. Aircraft with a transponder on standby or not fitted) or large birds/balloons/model aircraft etc...? Also, let's start fitting the fleet that doesn't have air to air sensors first and thus Typhoon should be one of the last - logically. Fitting a non-cooperative system would also have utility in war time and peacetime.

Finally, if I can't see an airliner with my RADAR, datalink picture, my IRST, my transponder interrogator all sensor fused to my helmet mounted sight with my Mk1 eyeballs then there is something massively wrong!

As you can probably work out, I do not support the idea of TCAS for Typhoon as I think that it will probably cause more problems than it will cause as TCAS was never designed for the type of dynamic manoeuvring a Typhoon can do - there will be Resolution Advisories all over the place as the Typhoon manoeuvres!!

LJ
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Old 15th Jan 2015, 18:39
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Here's an interesting tidbit: The F-35Bs bought by the UK don't have TCAS either!!
Is that crazy, foolish, short sighted, or what?
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Old 15th Jan 2015, 18:44
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Here's an interesting tidbit: The F-35Bs bought by the UK don't have TCAS either!!
Which bit of that is interesting Ken, you repeating what the OP included in post 1 or have I missed something else?

S-D
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Old 15th Jan 2015, 19:00
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I'd like to hear how your mini-cooper could smash into an airliner, Leon. Seriously though, it would be interesting to examine the arguments against fitting a standard commercially available TCAS to most (all?) current RAF types. Sure, it won't cope with all eventualities like formation and high g manoeuvres. But it's inexpensive, available now, and is a very useful piece of kit, surely better than waiting for a yet-to-be-invented all dancing version which may never come.
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Old 15th Jan 2015, 19:13
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Leon
You made the mistake of going back on thread bang on though.
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