Telegraph - RAF bare bones article
We are directed to waste money and then blamed for that waste.
As I may have said before (!) there are firm rules about how to avoid waste. Implementing them is a legal obligation.
But it's a disciplinary offence to implement them, and has been since December 1992.
Unless of course the Minister for the Armed Forces and the Head of the Civil Service wish to rescind this ruling, which they kindly confirmed in writing less than a year ago.
Roadster,
If you re-read the very 1st post of this thread, you will note:
Which means it isn't 6 ac required from a pot of 59, its 6 for Iraq plus (x) for AFG plus (y) for Nigeria. Added to the airframe management is the lack of aircrew problem, which has already been mentioned.
Back to the BA analogy with lack of crews to man aircraft. Good luck with a recruiting campaign that starts with the expectation of being away from family and friends for 6 months each year in a sh1t hole, sharing a room with a pilot who snores and having to walk down the corridor for a p1ss and a shower matched to rates of pay that are non-negotiable for a period of several years etc.....
If you re-read the very 1st post of this thread, you will note:
Sir Michael, a former Chief of the Air Staff, said with fighters already committed to defending UK air space and operations in Afghanistan, Nigeria, and the Falklands, the RAF would be badly stretched to take on a new campaign.
The RAF is short of pilots and navigators, while the longer the campaign carried on, the more wear and tear would hit the reliability of the ageing Tornados, he said.
The RAF is short of pilots and navigators, while the longer the campaign carried on, the more wear and tear would hit the reliability of the ageing Tornados, he said.
Back to the BA analogy with lack of crews to man aircraft. Good luck with a recruiting campaign that starts with the expectation of being away from family and friends for 6 months each year in a sh1t hole, sharing a room with a pilot who snores and having to walk down the corridor for a p1ss and a shower matched to rates of pay that are non-negotiable for a period of several years etc.....
Roadster,
On top of Party Animal's numbers for the operational activity (6+x+y), there's also a need for jets for OCU training (a), jets for sqn training at home (b) and jets in scheduled maintenance (c). So perhaps 6+x+y+a+b+c does equal 60.
But as identified, it's people, not aircraft, that is often the limiting factor.
On top of Party Animal's numbers for the operational activity (6+x+y), there's also a need for jets for OCU training (a), jets for sqn training at home (b) and jets in scheduled maintenance (c). So perhaps 6+x+y+a+b+c does equal 60.
But as identified, it's people, not aircraft, that is often the limiting factor.
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All good points, again.
I'm out of this discussion now, as the next obvious question is how many combat-ready crew are available, but that's obviously an OPSEC issue.
Good luck to all involved.
I'm out of this discussion now, as the next obvious question is how many combat-ready crew are available, but that's obviously an OPSEC issue.
Good luck to all involved.
The real culprits must be some combination of defence inflation and inefficiency. As I understand it, defence spending in real terms (ie AFTER allowing for inflation) is not that much less than it was in 1991. In 2010 it was about the same and has dipped slightly since.
Yet the difference in what that money buys is eyewatering - eg 7 combat sqns down from around 30; 19 frigates and destroyers down from around 50; 7 non-SSBN submarines down from around 25; and around 160,000 total personnel down from around 306,000.
You pays your money and you gets a lot less (what you do get is more capable, unit for unit, but then again it can't be in two or more places at once).
Yet the difference in what that money buys is eyewatering - eg 7 combat sqns down from around 30; 19 frigates and destroyers down from around 50; 7 non-SSBN submarines down from around 25; and around 160,000 total personnel down from around 306,000.
You pays your money and you gets a lot less (what you do get is more capable, unit for unit, but then again it can't be in two or more places at once).
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ROADSTER - If the RAF has 60 aircraft of a particular type (I know it's 59x GR4, but we'll go with easy maths), and is struggling to provide 6 for a new task, this raises two questions in my mind:
1. (Less important). What happened to the other 40 from the previous 100? Just retired as 30 year old hulks? Refer to my previous post on FE@R - Tornado Force is on a "phased" drawdown to 18 FE&R (to save money) so one of the impacts of this is that the jets not required to sustain the new FE&R will be withdrawn. If so, what does that say about the inability of the latest jet (i.e. Typhoon) after 6 years in service (FGR4) and 11 years for the Typhoon as a whole, to take on the roles it needs to in order to do its job?
2. (More important). If the structure and procedures of the RAF are such that it needs 10x as many aircraft to provide a small force for a new op, then that looks like something is very wrong. Refer to previous post on FE&R - no-one is saying that "10x" as many jets are needed to support a 6 a/c det ALONE. 3:1 ratio is about right, in other words for every one deployed there will be another 2 required to sustain that deployment, be they in maint, OCU, used for workup training by a non-deployed unit, etc
The RAF has shed many airfields (Cottesmore, Kinloss, Leuchars, Coltishall all major airfields) , several aircraft types (Tornado F3, Jag, Harrier, Nimrod, C130K, Tristar, Merlin off the top of my head), and yet still is in this position. What is wrong?
If the savings produced by shedding aircraft fleets (and aircraft within remaining fleets) haven't produced a efficient and capable air force, then something is very wrong at the top. Looks like a systemic failure of thinking. Now I'm warming to your thinking and I agree that it looks poor. It would take a long time to answer your questions properly but, fundamentally, it boils down to a few things:
I don't know what the answer is, and it thankfully isn't my problem, but it does look pretty bad.
1. (Less important). What happened to the other 40 from the previous 100? Just retired as 30 year old hulks? Refer to my previous post on FE@R - Tornado Force is on a "phased" drawdown to 18 FE&R (to save money) so one of the impacts of this is that the jets not required to sustain the new FE&R will be withdrawn. If so, what does that say about the inability of the latest jet (i.e. Typhoon) after 6 years in service (FGR4) and 11 years for the Typhoon as a whole, to take on the roles it needs to in order to do its job?
2. (More important). If the structure and procedures of the RAF are such that it needs 10x as many aircraft to provide a small force for a new op, then that looks like something is very wrong. Refer to previous post on FE&R - no-one is saying that "10x" as many jets are needed to support a 6 a/c det ALONE. 3:1 ratio is about right, in other words for every one deployed there will be another 2 required to sustain that deployment, be they in maint, OCU, used for workup training by a non-deployed unit, etc
The RAF has shed many airfields (Cottesmore, Kinloss, Leuchars, Coltishall all major airfields) , several aircraft types (Tornado F3, Jag, Harrier, Nimrod, C130K, Tristar, Merlin off the top of my head), and yet still is in this position. What is wrong?
If the savings produced by shedding aircraft fleets (and aircraft within remaining fleets) haven't produced a efficient and capable air force, then something is very wrong at the top. Looks like a systemic failure of thinking. Now I'm warming to your thinking and I agree that it looks poor. It would take a long time to answer your questions properly but, fundamentally, it boils down to a few things:
- The constant broken promises of "if you just cut Capability X, then you can keep Y and Z" (only to find that next week/month/year capability Y and then Z get cut as well)
- The constant broken promises of "jam tomorrow", which similar to the above require taking a cut (or two) now for a future capability that never materialises
- Short term thinking - money that's been spent is considered spent, i.e. gone as opposed to being an investment. No-one cares if £Xm was spent last year resurfacing an airfield runway to keep it serviceable for the next 25yrs. What's important is how much money can be saved NOW by turning off the runway lights. The same logic applies to investment in a/c fleets as has been evidenced in recent years.
I don't know what the answer is, and it thankfully isn't my problem, but it does look pretty bad.
IIRC from my time on a Gr4 sqn some (5yrs) time ago, only a small number were considered war goers out of a fleet of 135. I can't remember exactly how many 'diamond' fleet jets we had- I wouldn't say in this forum anyway but it wasn't that many.
While I agree with Sir MIcheals concerns, who does he think he's trying to get to? Those in the RAF already know and from what I've seen at work (civvy now thankfully) nobody really cares outside. Nobody I work with has even mentioned this latest adventure at all in the course of conversation.
While I agree with Sir MIcheals concerns, who does he think he's trying to get to? Those in the RAF already know and from what I've seen at work (civvy now thankfully) nobody really cares outside. Nobody I work with has even mentioned this latest adventure at all in the course of conversation.
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People outside bl**dy do care! And we're struggling to place the blame entirely on funding or wicked politicians. If we had been in the happy position of the RAF budget increased tenfold, we'd presumably now instead have hundreds of knackered aircraft with the wrong fit or software, corroding expensively in hangars with nobody to fly or maintain them.
Finally, in anticipation of responses highlighting the commitment and hard work of RAF personnel, let me say you are preaching entirely to the converted.
Finally, in anticipation of responses highlighting the commitment and hard work of RAF personnel, let me say you are preaching entirely to the converted.
'People outside do b****y care! '
Do you honestly think the average civvy even read this article?
Do you think people lay in bed at night worrying that the RAF has only got 7 FJ Sqns?
I don't think so.
Do you honestly think the average civvy even read this article?
Do you think people lay in bed at night worrying that the RAF has only got 7 FJ Sqns?
I don't think so.
Vetflyer,
Yes I've no doubt you do care, however your presence on this forum illustrates that you've got more than a passing interest. The point I am making is that your average man or woman on the street is not the slightest bit interested in what Sir has to say or the problems within the service. What was he expecting? A demo outside the House of Commons to demand more money for the RAF?
Until bombs start going off on the tube or an RAF base the GBP will not take any notice of what he or a succession of retired Army Officers have to say.
On a different note: If the manpower situation is so bad, isn't it time to call on our reserves to augment the front line? There must be plenty of ex Gr4 techs out there with a reserve commitment to call on who would welcome a few months at Akr or Marham? Or even use the RauxAF to bolster the front line?
We seem to be very keen on the reserves at the moment- let's give them the opportunity.
Yes I've no doubt you do care, however your presence on this forum illustrates that you've got more than a passing interest. The point I am making is that your average man or woman on the street is not the slightest bit interested in what Sir has to say or the problems within the service. What was he expecting? A demo outside the House of Commons to demand more money for the RAF?
Until bombs start going off on the tube or an RAF base the GBP will not take any notice of what he or a succession of retired Army Officers have to say.
On a different note: If the manpower situation is so bad, isn't it time to call on our reserves to augment the front line? There must be plenty of ex Gr4 techs out there with a reserve commitment to call on who would welcome a few months at Akr or Marham? Or even use the RauxAF to bolster the front line?
We seem to be very keen on the reserves at the moment- let's give them the opportunity.
Not sure if we have a/c techs as "regular" reserves surely it would be difficult to remain current
If you only turn up at weekends when there is no flying?
I think most of our reserves are in trades that can play at weekends I.e. chefs/regt/stackers/medics.
If you only turn up at weekends when there is no flying?
I think most of our reserves are in trades that can play at weekends I.e. chefs/regt/stackers/medics.
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Aircraft Tech Trades are part of the reserve - only Ex-forces aircraft techs may apply (and have your pension messed up if your receiving it).
Seems to be mainly concentrated around Brize according to the RAF Recruitment web site
Seems to be mainly concentrated around Brize according to the RAF Recruitment web site
Originally Posted by 4everAD:8677820
Not sure if we have a/c techs as "regular" reserves surely it would be difficult to remain current
If you only turn up at weekends when there is no flying?
I think most of our reserves are in trades that can play at weekends I.e. chefs/regt/stackers/medics.
If you only turn up at weekends when there is no flying?
I think most of our reserves are in trades that can play at weekends I.e. chefs/regt/stackers/medics.
Surely a tech/pilot/WSO who has a reserve commitment and has recently left (say 6mnths to a year) would only need a minimum amount of training to bring them up to speed and be able to augment the regulars.
Papa, they may well only need a minimal amount of training but you'll probably find that very few would be interested, after all many of them left for the reasons that we need them back!
Besides that doesn't it take something slightly more threatening to the realm than IS to call out the reluctant time served reserves (not the voluntary types)?
Besides that doesn't it take something slightly more threatening to the realm than IS to call out the reluctant time served reserves (not the voluntary types)?
Which reserve?
Not sure if we have a/c techs as "regular" reserves surely it would be difficult to remain current
If you only turn up at weekends when there is no flying?
I think most of our reserves are in trades that can play at weekends I.e. chefs/regt/stackers/medics.
If you only turn up at weekends when there is no flying?
I think most of our reserves are in trades that can play at weekends I.e. chefs/regt/stackers/medics.
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Another DT effort....
If Con Coughlin is saying shiny 2 should saved as a GR4 Sqn then things must indeed be bad! His defence articles are unapologetically pro army and anti light blue. Despite the inaccuracies in the article, dismissal of the SA threat, push to get 16 AAB deployed and lack of appreciation that Air is simply a sticking plaster to buy time and space to indigenous land forces, it at least shows some appreciation of the issues facing the RAF. Who replaces II (AC) at Christmas being one....
Today's DT:
So here we go again: we’re counting the RAF Tornado GR4 warplanes as they take off from Cyprus to attack Islamic fighters in Iraq; and then we’re counting them safely back to base. Only this time, our main interest is focused not so much on the number of warplanes flying back from their combat missions, but whether any of them have actually managed to drop their bombs on the enemy.
Even at this early stage of Gulf War Three, as the military operation against Islamic State has somewhat ambitiously been labelled, it is pretty clear that it bears no relation to the two conflicts that preceded it.
Back in 1991 and 2003, RAF pilots were in very real danger of being shot down by Iraqi air defences. Indeed, during the opening low-level bombing raids of Operation Desert Storm, the initial campaign against Saddam Hussein, Tornado air crews were forced to conduct operations at a safer height after several planes were shot down by intense Iraqi ground fire.
By comparison, Islamic State fighters, so far as we know, have no meaningful air defences, which means that RAF bombers can operate with relative impunity. Their Brimstone bomb loads can be fired well beyond the reach of the rudimentary weapons – mainly automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades – being used by the fighters on the ground.
Yet while the RAF and coalition warplanes operating over Iraq now enjoy the advantage of flying missions in uncontested air space, it seems they are finding it rather difficult to find suitable targets to attack. At least that is the conclusion we must draw from the combat sorties flown by the Tornados thus far; to judge by the full bomb payloads, which are clearly visible as they return to their base at Akrotiri, they are struggling to make serious inroads against the enemy.
Relying on air power alone to confront a resourceful and well-organised outfit such as Islamic State, as I have previously argued, was always going to be a tough call. This reliance, combined with the inability of our political classes to come up with a coherent strategy for dealing with this menace, means that we are now reduced to trying to engage with the enemy from a distance of around 15,000ft.
Meanwhile, the Islamic State fighters, despite the coalition air strikes they have suffered in recent weeks, were yesterday reported to be involved in heavy fighting with Iraqi forces just a few miles outside the capital Baghdad. This is surely a damning illustration of the limitations of the West’s military response.
As numerous retired military chiefs, including Lord Dannatt, the former head of the Army, have warned since the military action was authorised last week, the Islamist threat can only seriously be challenged by combat forces on the ground. Moreover, these need to be forces capable of prevailing against the determined Islamist fighters which, to judge by the unconvincing performance of the Iraqis to date, are unlikely to be either the Iranian-backed Shia militias or the Kurds’ Peshmerga fighters.
But no politician of rank in either London or Washington is even contemplating committing ground forces to deal with the Isil threat. As a result, the military action that has been authorised now looks more like a token gesture than any serious desire to see this menace destroyed. Indeed, nothing better illustrates the confused thinking in the Government’s approach than its almost exclusive reliance on the RAF to tackle the Isil threat, when it has just spent the past four years dramatically reducing the number of combat squadrons to a level where it is barely able to cover its existing international commitments – let alone open up a new theatre of operations.
As Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon, the former Chief of the Air Staff, has pointed out, the RAF had 30 combat squadrons at its disposal at the start of the 1991 conflict; today it has only seven. And demonstrating the exquisite lack of foresight with which our politicians these days approach military issues, the MoD is currently in the process of disbanding one of our three remaining Tornado combat formations, 2 Squadron. This at a time when the ageing fleet provides the only aircraft capable of delivering the pinpoint accuracy required to avoid large numbers of civilian casualties – or collateral damage, as the military planners prefer to call them.
Crippling shortages of combat aircraft severely hampered the RAF’s effort in the 2011 air campaign to overthrow the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, with the result that we flew significantly fewer combat missions than countries such as France (which has 15 combat squadrons). On that occasion, David Cameron was forced to delay his decision to scrap two Tornado squadrons so that the RAF could meet its commitments in Libya, as well as Afghanistan. With the air campaign in Iraq set to run for many years, Mr Cameron should do the same with 2 Squadron’s complement of Tornado bombers.
It costs around £25 million a year to maintain the squadron’s base at RAF Marnham which, given the billions of pounds the Coalition squanders on foreign aid, seems a small price to pay if the Government wants even this modest effort in Iraq to succeed.
Today's DT:
So here we go again: we’re counting the RAF Tornado GR4 warplanes as they take off from Cyprus to attack Islamic fighters in Iraq; and then we’re counting them safely back to base. Only this time, our main interest is focused not so much on the number of warplanes flying back from their combat missions, but whether any of them have actually managed to drop their bombs on the enemy.
Even at this early stage of Gulf War Three, as the military operation against Islamic State has somewhat ambitiously been labelled, it is pretty clear that it bears no relation to the two conflicts that preceded it.
Back in 1991 and 2003, RAF pilots were in very real danger of being shot down by Iraqi air defences. Indeed, during the opening low-level bombing raids of Operation Desert Storm, the initial campaign against Saddam Hussein, Tornado air crews were forced to conduct operations at a safer height after several planes were shot down by intense Iraqi ground fire.
By comparison, Islamic State fighters, so far as we know, have no meaningful air defences, which means that RAF bombers can operate with relative impunity. Their Brimstone bomb loads can be fired well beyond the reach of the rudimentary weapons – mainly automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades – being used by the fighters on the ground.
Yet while the RAF and coalition warplanes operating over Iraq now enjoy the advantage of flying missions in uncontested air space, it seems they are finding it rather difficult to find suitable targets to attack. At least that is the conclusion we must draw from the combat sorties flown by the Tornados thus far; to judge by the full bomb payloads, which are clearly visible as they return to their base at Akrotiri, they are struggling to make serious inroads against the enemy.
Relying on air power alone to confront a resourceful and well-organised outfit such as Islamic State, as I have previously argued, was always going to be a tough call. This reliance, combined with the inability of our political classes to come up with a coherent strategy for dealing with this menace, means that we are now reduced to trying to engage with the enemy from a distance of around 15,000ft.
Meanwhile, the Islamic State fighters, despite the coalition air strikes they have suffered in recent weeks, were yesterday reported to be involved in heavy fighting with Iraqi forces just a few miles outside the capital Baghdad. This is surely a damning illustration of the limitations of the West’s military response.
As numerous retired military chiefs, including Lord Dannatt, the former head of the Army, have warned since the military action was authorised last week, the Islamist threat can only seriously be challenged by combat forces on the ground. Moreover, these need to be forces capable of prevailing against the determined Islamist fighters which, to judge by the unconvincing performance of the Iraqis to date, are unlikely to be either the Iranian-backed Shia militias or the Kurds’ Peshmerga fighters.
But no politician of rank in either London or Washington is even contemplating committing ground forces to deal with the Isil threat. As a result, the military action that has been authorised now looks more like a token gesture than any serious desire to see this menace destroyed. Indeed, nothing better illustrates the confused thinking in the Government’s approach than its almost exclusive reliance on the RAF to tackle the Isil threat, when it has just spent the past four years dramatically reducing the number of combat squadrons to a level where it is barely able to cover its existing international commitments – let alone open up a new theatre of operations.
As Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon, the former Chief of the Air Staff, has pointed out, the RAF had 30 combat squadrons at its disposal at the start of the 1991 conflict; today it has only seven. And demonstrating the exquisite lack of foresight with which our politicians these days approach military issues, the MoD is currently in the process of disbanding one of our three remaining Tornado combat formations, 2 Squadron. This at a time when the ageing fleet provides the only aircraft capable of delivering the pinpoint accuracy required to avoid large numbers of civilian casualties – or collateral damage, as the military planners prefer to call them.
Crippling shortages of combat aircraft severely hampered the RAF’s effort in the 2011 air campaign to overthrow the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, with the result that we flew significantly fewer combat missions than countries such as France (which has 15 combat squadrons). On that occasion, David Cameron was forced to delay his decision to scrap two Tornado squadrons so that the RAF could meet its commitments in Libya, as well as Afghanistan. With the air campaign in Iraq set to run for many years, Mr Cameron should do the same with 2 Squadron’s complement of Tornado bombers.
It costs around £25 million a year to maintain the squadron’s base at RAF Marnham which, given the billions of pounds the Coalition squanders on foreign aid, seems a small price to pay if the Government wants even this modest effort in Iraq to succeed.