Are politicians finally beginning to 'get it'?
Thread Starter
Join Date: Feb 2012
Location: Home alone
Posts: 295
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Are politicians finally beginning to 'get it'?
'Britain must scale back ambitions without more defence money' - Telegraph
The defence sercretary may be towing the party line, but at least there is now a sizable group of cross party MPs that are now aware of the choice being laid out in front of us rather than "blah blah blah 4th biggest defence budget blah blah blah"
The defence sercretary may be towing the party line, but at least there is now a sizable group of cross party MPs that are now aware of the choice being laid out in front of us rather than "blah blah blah 4th biggest defence budget blah blah blah"
Report made by a committee which will get quietly put into House of Commons Library and MPs can claim they weren't listened to by Govt.
People who came up with report have no power to do anything about it.
People who came up with report have no power to do anything about it.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Feb 2012
Location: Home alone
Posts: 295
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I'm inclined to disagree, I would be highly surprised (then again maybe not at all) if the defence select committe weren't involved in SDSR15, given that they are probably more knowledgeable than anyone about the shortcomings of the MoD's processes and SDSR10's shortfalls. I'm not in any way saying it's going to lead to a cash bonanza, but it might make the PM shut the f*ck up the next time he starts harping on about intervening in countries X,Y and Z!
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: UK
Posts: 1,515
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
People who came up with report have no power to do anything about it.
The DSC has been banging on about budget versus capability for quite a while and one suspects it won't be too far in the future before a big military player responds in a negative manner to some sort request for military intervention. presumably followed by a very public resignation.
Before we get to that, we might be looking at a major policy change...such as binning all expeditionary capabilities and their associated foreign policies. Which would a fairly seismic event. Come to think of it, the last person who wanted to go down that road was Neil Kinnock.
So I think if the DSC keep throwing a bright spotlight over the issue of under-funding, somethings going to have to give and that might cost a defence secretary, or who knows, even a prime minister, their job. So I think it unlikely these reports will be quietly ignored.
In truth though, and as the report points out very clearly, Joe Public really does not have a scoobies what is going on...and that is the biggest threat of all.
Join Date: May 2006
Location: 2 m South of Radstock VRP
Posts: 2,042
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I said previously on a different Thread, we should bring back the Public Information Film. Not only should it convey what's done but why it's done.
The average Taxpayer thinks that the Forces exist to defend the Nation. That creates the mindset of "who wants to invade us anyway". What isn't made clear to them is the function of defending the Nation's interests. That important function is easily overlooked and
The average Taxpayer thinks that the Forces exist to defend the Nation. That creates the mindset of "who wants to invade us anyway". What isn't made clear to them is the function of defending the Nation's interests. That important function is easily overlooked and
First step towards DSR 2015
House of Commons Defence Committee: Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part One (Published 7 Jan 2014)
Conclusions and recommendations
Was the 2010 Strategic and Security Review strategic?
1. We have previously noted that the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review and the 2010 National Security Strategy were governed by the overriding strategic objective of reducing the UK’s budget deficit. (Paragraph 12)
2. We have found it difficult to divine any other genuinely strategic vision in either document. This is the first of a series of reports that we intend to publish to assist in the preparation of the next Defence and Security Review; we hope that they will both inform and shape the next Review and the next National Security Strategy and help to drive a more strategic approach to security across Government. (Paragraph 12)
3. There is a need for an agreed definition of strategy. Our inquiry has suggested that there is not a clear definition being adhered to within Government. We offer our definition of strategy as “a course of action integrating ends, ways and means to meet policy objectives”, which the Secretary of State has accepted, as one that should be adopted in preparation of the next National Security Strategy and the next Defence and Security Review. We recommend that the Ministry of Defence should work within Government to ensure that this definition is used consistently. (Paragraph 13)
4. We welcomed the establishment of the National Security Council which has given greater operational focus and coordination across Departments. However, we echo the criticism of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy that the National Security Council is failing to take on the higher strategic role that it might have done in Government. (Paragraph 14)
The drivers of SDSR 2010
5. The 2015 Review should set out the Government’s thinking on how the Armed Forces need to be re-balanced following the end of operations in Afghanistan, and address the challenges inherent in regenerating their capability following the end of operations. (Paragraph 18)
Public support for defence spending and for expeditionary operations
6. One of the greatest strategic threats to defence is the disconnect between the Armed Forces and the public caused by a lack of understanding of the utility of military force in the contemporary strategic environment. The Government cannot hope to bridge this divide without looking to explain what it believes the UK’s position in the world could or should be, and the manner in which that is to be delivered. Without a proactive communications strategy, there is a serious risk of a lack of support for defence amongst the public. We ask the Department to review its communications strategy for the next Defence and Security Review and keep the Committee fully informed of its conclusions. We are convinced that there is an important role for this Committee, and Parliament as a whole, to play in articulating the case for defence to the public at large. (Paragraph 24)
The case for a national strategy?
7. The imminent end of operations in Afghanistan provides an opportunity for the Government to think more strategically about the UK’s place in the world in shaping the 2015 National Security Strategy and the 2015 Defence and Security Review. We believe that there is a persuasive case for a national strategy to be incorporated in the National Security Strategy, defining what position in the world the UK should adopt as the ends of the strategy and setting out the combination of hard and soft power that represent the ways and means of getting there. Even though the strategy will, in practice, be dynamic to meet changing threats and challenges, the document should make clear the process by which it has been arrived at, confirming the Government’s priorities, and contain clear definitions of policy and strategy and how they relate to each other. The National Security Strategy (NSS) should be the subject of a published annual report on its implementation. The NSS should provide the strategic context for the Defence and Security Review. (Paragraph 32)
8. The concept of fighting power provides a useful framework for analysis of the operational effectiveness of the Armed Forces. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) pledge d that it would not entail a “strategic shrinkage” for the UK. We ask the Ministry of Defence to provide us with an assessment of the fighting power of the Armed Forces both prior to the SDSR 2010 and now, and to outline in the Defence and Security Review 2015, the impact of any changes on that fighting power. (Paragraph 33)
The UK’s place in the world
9. A vision of the UK’s position in the world needs to be articulated in the National Security Strategy as the basis for any consideration of the next Defence and Security Review. As noted above, this requires active communications in which this Committee is ready to play its part. This vision would represent the definition of the ends of the strategy; a truly strategic DSR should outline the ways and means by which those ends could be achieved to provide the integration that is presently lacking. (Paragraph 37)
The changing context for the DSR 2015
10. This short inquiry has only scratched the surface in examining the potential impact of current geo-political developments on the UK and its strategic alliances. However, there can be few developments more fundamental to the UK’s strategic position than the US pivot to the Pacific. The Government’s thinking on the implications of this and other developments for the country’s broader security and for the military capabilities that the country requires is a matter of vital interest for both Parliament and the public. The process of development of the National Security Strategy should be the vehicle for the Government to seek to engage both in this debate. (Paragraph 43)
Towards the Next Defence and Security Review
11. The fact that a number of the asymmetric security threats to the UK, such as from terrorism or cyber attack, may not be capable of being deterred in all circumstances requires the Government to think more strategically about the resilience of the country’s critical infrastructure and recovery followinga successful attack. This needs to inform the next NSS and DSR and an assessment must be made of the proportion of resources dedicated to these functions. (Paragraph 50)
12. The list of changing factors identified in this interim inquiry gives only a flavour of the full range of those that will need to be taken into a ccount in framing the next NSS and DSR. We acknowledge that some factors affecting Government strategic thinking cannot be put in the public domain, but, if the public is to be brought on board, the Government must do more to set out the rationale behind its strategic thinking and make a commitment to allocate the necessary resources to give it substance. (Paragraph 51)
A Comprehensive Spending Review
13. We raised concerns in our report on the last SDSR that there might be a discrepancy between the ambitions outlined and the resources available to fulfil them. If the expected real-terms increase in funding from 2015 were not tobe made available, the Defence and Security Review would have to make clear that strategic ambition would have to be curtailed, and explain how that would be achieved. There is an inescapable link between budget and the capacity to deliver a strategic ambition which must be recognised and acknowledged in any DSR process. (Paragraph 59)
14. A failure to meet the Ministry of Defence’s budgetary assumptions could lead to a disproportionate decline in the Armed Forces’ fighting power, which would have a significant impact on the UK’s strategic ambition. (Paragraph 60)
15. There is a danger of defence becoming a matter of discretionary spending. We note that the National Security Adviser referred to expeditionary capability as “optional”. To a degree, the NSA is correct. However, discretionary decisions about the expeditionary capability that the UK retains must be based on proper strategic decision making about the UK’s place in the world and not simply flow from the “horse-trading” that surrounds the CSR process. (Paragraph 61)
Sequencing of the NSS, CSR and DSR
16. While we accept that the three documents should be developed in parallel, we believe that the National Security Strategy should be published first. As we have argued, the NSS should outline a vision of the UK’s role in the world that should not be driven purely by a consideration of the resources available. (Paragraph 66)
17. The NSS, together with the CSR, setting out respectively the “ends” and the “means” should logically precede the DSR outlining the “ways” of meeting the security objectives within the resources available. The allocation of resources will be based on national spending priorities set to meet the nation’s security needs. Once the national strategy has been articulated in the NSS, the process of agreeing the ways and the means is therefore an iterative one. Getting the balance right between the CSR and the DSR is more important than strict adherence to a particular timetable. (Paragraph 67)
Strategic skills
18. We call on the MOD to provide us with an update on education and skills training in strategy offered to senior officers and officials, both within the Defence Academy and at other institutions. (Paragraph 70)
Accurate and timely historic analysis
19. We recommend that the Ministry of Defence, in close conjunction with the Cabinet Office and National Security Secretariat, initiate the writing of official histories of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns and of other conflicts since the end of the Cold War; review how the history function is be ing undertaken by all three Services and by the Ministry of Defence as a whole; and confirm in the 2015 Defence and Security Review its plans for the preparation and publication of histories and other measures designed to address these deficiencies. This work could usefully call on input and expertise from other Government Departments including the Department for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; since the comprehensive approach became a hallmark of the operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, its lessons should be learnt from and shared across Government as a whole. (Paragraph 76)
Process
20. We see much advantage in the widest consultation on the next National Security Strategy and Defence and Security Review. We have no doubt that the process would be better if Government thinking were available at an early stage to enable structured comment. We have already recommended that the NSS should be published in advance of the DSR. We further recommend that a National Security Green Paper be issued at an early stage in the proceedings to provide a framework against which interested parties may comment. (Paragraph 84)
21. We consider that there are lessons for the MoD to learn from the practice of the French Government in seeking a wide range of input into the reformulation of its Livre Blanc. Given the importance of allies to the implementation of both SDSR 2010 and DSR 2015, it is essential that the UK’s key strategic allies are fully engaged in the process from an early stage. (Paragraph 85)
A shadow process and red team challenge
22. Constructive challenge must be part and parcel of national strategy making. We recommend that independent groups be set up as soon as possible to provide a structured “Red Team” challenge to both the National Security Strategy and Defence and Security Review. (Paragraph 87)
1. We have previously noted that the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review and the 2010 National Security Strategy were governed by the overriding strategic objective of reducing the UK’s budget deficit. (Paragraph 12)
2. We have found it difficult to divine any other genuinely strategic vision in either document. This is the first of a series of reports that we intend to publish to assist in the preparation of the next Defence and Security Review; we hope that they will both inform and shape the next Review and the next National Security Strategy and help to drive a more strategic approach to security across Government. (Paragraph 12)
3. There is a need for an agreed definition of strategy. Our inquiry has suggested that there is not a clear definition being adhered to within Government. We offer our definition of strategy as “a course of action integrating ends, ways and means to meet policy objectives”, which the Secretary of State has accepted, as one that should be adopted in preparation of the next National Security Strategy and the next Defence and Security Review. We recommend that the Ministry of Defence should work within Government to ensure that this definition is used consistently. (Paragraph 13)
4. We welcomed the establishment of the National Security Council which has given greater operational focus and coordination across Departments. However, we echo the criticism of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy that the National Security Council is failing to take on the higher strategic role that it might have done in Government. (Paragraph 14)
The drivers of SDSR 2010
5. The 2015 Review should set out the Government’s thinking on how the Armed Forces need to be re-balanced following the end of operations in Afghanistan, and address the challenges inherent in regenerating their capability following the end of operations. (Paragraph 18)
Public support for defence spending and for expeditionary operations
6. One of the greatest strategic threats to defence is the disconnect between the Armed Forces and the public caused by a lack of understanding of the utility of military force in the contemporary strategic environment. The Government cannot hope to bridge this divide without looking to explain what it believes the UK’s position in the world could or should be, and the manner in which that is to be delivered. Without a proactive communications strategy, there is a serious risk of a lack of support for defence amongst the public. We ask the Department to review its communications strategy for the next Defence and Security Review and keep the Committee fully informed of its conclusions. We are convinced that there is an important role for this Committee, and Parliament as a whole, to play in articulating the case for defence to the public at large. (Paragraph 24)
The case for a national strategy?
7. The imminent end of operations in Afghanistan provides an opportunity for the Government to think more strategically about the UK’s place in the world in shaping the 2015 National Security Strategy and the 2015 Defence and Security Review. We believe that there is a persuasive case for a national strategy to be incorporated in the National Security Strategy, defining what position in the world the UK should adopt as the ends of the strategy and setting out the combination of hard and soft power that represent the ways and means of getting there. Even though the strategy will, in practice, be dynamic to meet changing threats and challenges, the document should make clear the process by which it has been arrived at, confirming the Government’s priorities, and contain clear definitions of policy and strategy and how they relate to each other. The National Security Strategy (NSS) should be the subject of a published annual report on its implementation. The NSS should provide the strategic context for the Defence and Security Review. (Paragraph 32)
8. The concept of fighting power provides a useful framework for analysis of the operational effectiveness of the Armed Forces. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) pledge d that it would not entail a “strategic shrinkage” for the UK. We ask the Ministry of Defence to provide us with an assessment of the fighting power of the Armed Forces both prior to the SDSR 2010 and now, and to outline in the Defence and Security Review 2015, the impact of any changes on that fighting power. (Paragraph 33)
The UK’s place in the world
9. A vision of the UK’s position in the world needs to be articulated in the National Security Strategy as the basis for any consideration of the next Defence and Security Review. As noted above, this requires active communications in which this Committee is ready to play its part. This vision would represent the definition of the ends of the strategy; a truly strategic DSR should outline the ways and means by which those ends could be achieved to provide the integration that is presently lacking. (Paragraph 37)
The changing context for the DSR 2015
10. This short inquiry has only scratched the surface in examining the potential impact of current geo-political developments on the UK and its strategic alliances. However, there can be few developments more fundamental to the UK’s strategic position than the US pivot to the Pacific. The Government’s thinking on the implications of this and other developments for the country’s broader security and for the military capabilities that the country requires is a matter of vital interest for both Parliament and the public. The process of development of the National Security Strategy should be the vehicle for the Government to seek to engage both in this debate. (Paragraph 43)
Towards the Next Defence and Security Review
11. The fact that a number of the asymmetric security threats to the UK, such as from terrorism or cyber attack, may not be capable of being deterred in all circumstances requires the Government to think more strategically about the resilience of the country’s critical infrastructure and recovery followinga successful attack. This needs to inform the next NSS and DSR and an assessment must be made of the proportion of resources dedicated to these functions. (Paragraph 50)
12. The list of changing factors identified in this interim inquiry gives only a flavour of the full range of those that will need to be taken into a ccount in framing the next NSS and DSR. We acknowledge that some factors affecting Government strategic thinking cannot be put in the public domain, but, if the public is to be brought on board, the Government must do more to set out the rationale behind its strategic thinking and make a commitment to allocate the necessary resources to give it substance. (Paragraph 51)
A Comprehensive Spending Review
13. We raised concerns in our report on the last SDSR that there might be a discrepancy between the ambitions outlined and the resources available to fulfil them. If the expected real-terms increase in funding from 2015 were not tobe made available, the Defence and Security Review would have to make clear that strategic ambition would have to be curtailed, and explain how that would be achieved. There is an inescapable link between budget and the capacity to deliver a strategic ambition which must be recognised and acknowledged in any DSR process. (Paragraph 59)
14. A failure to meet the Ministry of Defence’s budgetary assumptions could lead to a disproportionate decline in the Armed Forces’ fighting power, which would have a significant impact on the UK’s strategic ambition. (Paragraph 60)
15. There is a danger of defence becoming a matter of discretionary spending. We note that the National Security Adviser referred to expeditionary capability as “optional”. To a degree, the NSA is correct. However, discretionary decisions about the expeditionary capability that the UK retains must be based on proper strategic decision making about the UK’s place in the world and not simply flow from the “horse-trading” that surrounds the CSR process. (Paragraph 61)
Sequencing of the NSS, CSR and DSR
16. While we accept that the three documents should be developed in parallel, we believe that the National Security Strategy should be published first. As we have argued, the NSS should outline a vision of the UK’s role in the world that should not be driven purely by a consideration of the resources available. (Paragraph 66)
17. The NSS, together with the CSR, setting out respectively the “ends” and the “means” should logically precede the DSR outlining the “ways” of meeting the security objectives within the resources available. The allocation of resources will be based on national spending priorities set to meet the nation’s security needs. Once the national strategy has been articulated in the NSS, the process of agreeing the ways and the means is therefore an iterative one. Getting the balance right between the CSR and the DSR is more important than strict adherence to a particular timetable. (Paragraph 67)
Strategic skills
18. We call on the MOD to provide us with an update on education and skills training in strategy offered to senior officers and officials, both within the Defence Academy and at other institutions. (Paragraph 70)
Accurate and timely historic analysis
19. We recommend that the Ministry of Defence, in close conjunction with the Cabinet Office and National Security Secretariat, initiate the writing of official histories of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns and of other conflicts since the end of the Cold War; review how the history function is be ing undertaken by all three Services and by the Ministry of Defence as a whole; and confirm in the 2015 Defence and Security Review its plans for the preparation and publication of histories and other measures designed to address these deficiencies. This work could usefully call on input and expertise from other Government Departments including the Department for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; since the comprehensive approach became a hallmark of the operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, its lessons should be learnt from and shared across Government as a whole. (Paragraph 76)
Process
20. We see much advantage in the widest consultation on the next National Security Strategy and Defence and Security Review. We have no doubt that the process would be better if Government thinking were available at an early stage to enable structured comment. We have already recommended that the NSS should be published in advance of the DSR. We further recommend that a National Security Green Paper be issued at an early stage in the proceedings to provide a framework against which interested parties may comment. (Paragraph 84)
21. We consider that there are lessons for the MoD to learn from the practice of the French Government in seeking a wide range of input into the reformulation of its Livre Blanc. Given the importance of allies to the implementation of both SDSR 2010 and DSR 2015, it is essential that the UK’s key strategic allies are fully engaged in the process from an early stage. (Paragraph 85)
A shadow process and red team challenge
22. Constructive challenge must be part and parcel of national strategy making. We recommend that independent groups be set up as soon as possible to provide a structured “Red Team” challenge to both the National Security Strategy and Defence and Security Review. (Paragraph 87)
Written evidence is available here:
Of Hammond.......
But the bloody great elephant in the room is this - not one single politician has ever sought to address the main cause of the "black hole". If you are knowingly and unnecessarily wasting money, and the solution is known, it is a coward's answer to respond by chopping posts and capability.
He said (SDSR) had been shaped by the national security strategy, but also "the urgent need to reduce the £38 billion pound black hole in the defence budget".
But the bloody great elephant in the room is this - not one single politician has ever sought to address the main cause of the "black hole". If you are knowingly and unnecessarily wasting money, and the solution is known, it is a coward's answer to respond by chopping posts and capability.
Given the importance of allies to the implementation of both SDSR 2010 and DSR 2015, it is essential that the UK’s key strategic allies are fully engaged in the process from an early stage. (Paragraph 85)
Acknowledging what our allies are up to is one thing and the US pivot to the Pacific could have immense repercussions. But, we really need to be able to stand alone to achieve whatever our country expects of us and any help offered by allies is purely a bonus.
Good grief - you can't possibly be challenging the "Someone Else will do it" Defence Planning Assumption! How on earth will MB manage to persuade everyone it's all fine now?
So when exactly in 2015 is the DSR 2015 to be completed?
Is there any requirement in law to actually hold an DSR every so often, if at all, in the way that the "2011 fixed-term parliament act" legally introduced 5 yearly elections?
Is there any requirement in law to actually hold an DSR every so often, if at all, in the way that the "2011 fixed-term parliament act" legally introduced 5 yearly elections?
Last edited by Biggus; 8th Jan 2014 at 09:37.
To draw a parallel, the House of Lords Select Committee on Education and all the scientific institutions have been saying for over a decade that science education in the UK is wrong in just about every way, but the Government (of whatever colour) has done f-all about it. In fact the Government changes have just made the situation worse.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: UK
Posts: 1,515
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Biggus,
Because of my continuing interest in the maritime surveillance capability gap, and because I am aware of the optimism from within the RAF (not from pprune) that an MPA/MMA of sorts will be procured, I have been looking into SDSR 2010 & 2015, Future Force 2020 and the workings of the defence committee.
This is how I understand it (the pub speak is deliberate).
SDSR 2010 was a short term hack to address political and PR issues, drafted on the back of a fag packet by interested parties with very fixed agendas. Anything difficult was kicked into the long grass, or covered up by bullcrap.
Future Force 2020 is a collection of ring fenced capabilities aligned to our security and foreign policy needs. Unfortunately, there is no commitment to fund it.
SDSR 2015 is.....**** knows. If you read the material, clearly the DSC don't know what to expect of it, so how can any of us.
Happy to be told I'm completely wrong, but please supply references.
PS
As far as I can tell there is no MPA/MMA in Future Force 2020, but again I'm more than happy to be told I'm wrong (or even that FF2020 has been binned, even though it is still on the RAF/MOD website
)
PPS
There is no law stating SDSR's have to be held withing a certain timespan, but SDSR 2010 opened by saying it was too long since the last one and they should be every five years. After that good start SDSR 2010 plummeted downhill
Because of my continuing interest in the maritime surveillance capability gap, and because I am aware of the optimism from within the RAF (not from pprune) that an MPA/MMA of sorts will be procured, I have been looking into SDSR 2010 & 2015, Future Force 2020 and the workings of the defence committee.
This is how I understand it (the pub speak is deliberate).
SDSR 2010 was a short term hack to address political and PR issues, drafted on the back of a fag packet by interested parties with very fixed agendas. Anything difficult was kicked into the long grass, or covered up by bullcrap.
Future Force 2020 is a collection of ring fenced capabilities aligned to our security and foreign policy needs. Unfortunately, there is no commitment to fund it.
SDSR 2015 is.....**** knows. If you read the material, clearly the DSC don't know what to expect of it, so how can any of us.
Happy to be told I'm completely wrong, but please supply references.
PS
As far as I can tell there is no MPA/MMA in Future Force 2020, but again I'm more than happy to be told I'm wrong (or even that FF2020 has been binned, even though it is still on the RAF/MOD website
)PPS
There is no law stating SDSR's have to be held withing a certain timespan, but SDSR 2010 opened by saying it was too long since the last one and they should be every five years. After that good start SDSR 2010 plummeted downhill
T O F O,
Thank you for your (as ever) reasoned reply.
The point I was trying to make, as you are probably already aware from other threads, or at least seek clarification on, is that DSR/SDSR 2015 actually happening at all is not a given fact!
DSR 2015, as far as I am aware, is an intention/aspiration/invention of the current coalition government only. To the best of my knowledge Labour has made no commitments yet on Defence.
The first major event before 2015 is the Scottish Independence referendum. A "yes" vote there would drive a coach and horses through current UK Defence policy, as a massive amount of time energy and money would immediately start to be spent unraveling UK Defence assets, bases suppliers, etc, almost none of which has probably been pre-planned (so much for military contingency planning). This would inevitably have a massive knock on effect on any DSR, the two almost inevitably couldn't happen at once, and the initial immediate impact on Defence of Scottish separation would go on well into 2016.
Then there is a UK genreal election due on 7th May 2015, with the result far from clear at this stage. Would it be the current governments intention to hold the DSR before the election, during a period of Purdah *, on the assumption they think they will be re-elected? I would consider this unlikely.
Then there is the election result itself. Presumably a Labour, or Labour/Lib Dem government would feel under no obligation to hold a DSR. It would either be cancelled, or at least delayed while new ministers got to grips with their departments.......given Labours track record on Defence reviews, 2016+?
So for DSR 2015 to occur, Scots have to vote "no", the Tories, or Tory/Lib Dems have to get back in, and even then it would probably not be until the tail end of 2015.....
As I said to start with, people talk about DSR 2015, decisions flowing from it, assets being lost/gained, etc, as though it is as inevitable as the sun coming up tomorrow.
Personally I see it as nothing more than the current plan, and no plan survives first contact with the enemy.... Still, you have to plan on something.
As ever, I await to be corrected by the more knowledgeable out there - just try to be nice when you do it!
* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purdah_...lection_period)
Thank you for your (as ever) reasoned reply.
The point I was trying to make, as you are probably already aware from other threads, or at least seek clarification on, is that DSR/SDSR 2015 actually happening at all is not a given fact!
DSR 2015, as far as I am aware, is an intention/aspiration/invention of the current coalition government only. To the best of my knowledge Labour has made no commitments yet on Defence.
The first major event before 2015 is the Scottish Independence referendum. A "yes" vote there would drive a coach and horses through current UK Defence policy, as a massive amount of time energy and money would immediately start to be spent unraveling UK Defence assets, bases suppliers, etc, almost none of which has probably been pre-planned (so much for military contingency planning). This would inevitably have a massive knock on effect on any DSR, the two almost inevitably couldn't happen at once, and the initial immediate impact on Defence of Scottish separation would go on well into 2016.
Then there is a UK genreal election due on 7th May 2015, with the result far from clear at this stage. Would it be the current governments intention to hold the DSR before the election, during a period of Purdah *, on the assumption they think they will be re-elected? I would consider this unlikely.
Then there is the election result itself. Presumably a Labour, or Labour/Lib Dem government would feel under no obligation to hold a DSR. It would either be cancelled, or at least delayed while new ministers got to grips with their departments.......given Labours track record on Defence reviews, 2016+?
So for DSR 2015 to occur, Scots have to vote "no", the Tories, or Tory/Lib Dems have to get back in, and even then it would probably not be until the tail end of 2015.....
As I said to start with, people talk about DSR 2015, decisions flowing from it, assets being lost/gained, etc, as though it is as inevitable as the sun coming up tomorrow.
Personally I see it as nothing more than the current plan, and no plan survives first contact with the enemy.... Still, you have to plan on something.
As ever, I await to be corrected by the more knowledgeable out there - just try to be nice when you do it!
* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purdah_...lection_period)
Join Date: Apr 2007
Location: The High Seas
Posts: 35
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Relying on Others...
Surely the recent Syrian example has shown how reliance on other nations may not always deliver the capabilities you have assumed. Admittedly the example is the other way round (i.e. we didn't play when the US wanted to), but I think it highlights the limitations of that planning assumption when national and political self-interest come into play.
Clearly we retain a level of national ambition and capability that doesn't rely on the assistance of partner nations, but I suspect that is actually a very thin veneer when actually tested. It's time to start being honest about our limitations.
Clearly we retain a level of national ambition and capability that doesn't rely on the assistance of partner nations, but I suspect that is actually a very thin veneer when actually tested. It's time to start being honest about our limitations.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: UK
Posts: 1,515
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Biggus, yep pretty spot on.
However, don't worry too much about the yes vote to Jockland - it looks ever more unlikely. Pity, the troublemaker in me wishes for a yes vote, so I can become an official jock (I gots the vote and the property you see).
bugger - I was so looking forward to slipping on me tartan skirt, Man U top & roaring out Flower of Jockland in my cockney accent at the next egg chasing punch up.
I mean how many people could I piss off in one go
However, don't worry too much about the yes vote to Jockland - it looks ever more unlikely. Pity, the troublemaker in me wishes for a yes vote, so I can become an official jock (I gots the vote and the property you see).
bugger - I was so looking forward to slipping on me tartan skirt, Man U top & roaring out Flower of Jockland in my cockney accent at the next egg chasing punch up.
I mean how many people could I piss off in one go
I would like to think that the politicians are 'starting to get it', but the pessimist in me laughs at any such notion. However, what to my mind we are starting to see to see the ground work laid for the next SDSR, what with this Defence Select Committee report and Sir Hew Strachan's conveniently timed piece which appeared in the Telegraph the other day:
Britain's wars 'have no strategy?, says top military adviser - Telegraph
Added to this was Professor Laurence Freedman's magnum opus, Strategy: A History which was published last year and was one of the FT's books of the year, all of which follow on from a glut of papers that RUSI have published in recent years bemoaning the lack of strategic thought in how the UK does defence - both the physical and conceptual parts of operations.
So if I were being an optimist, I would like to say that maybe people are starting to wake up to the fact that a coherent defence strategy must have its genesis in solid evidence and policy, rather than being based solely on Treasury targets. The Government's line that securing the economy had to be the main effort holds water, but only up to a point. As Professor Paul Cornish pointed out in his paper Strategy in Austerity, a country with a failed economy cannot be described as stable, whilst an economically successful country that lacks the means to secure its interests will not remain economically successful for long.
However, I am fundamentally a pessimist, some may even say a cynic. As such I think the current glut of publications and articles on UK strategic thought have appeared precisely because the politicians have not, do not and are not likely 'to get' strategic thinking and need a nudge in the right direction. What we are seeing here, I believe, is the start of 'shaping operations' in advance of the next election. If as the Chancellor notes, we have so far merely dipped a toe in to the waters of austerity and further drastic cuts are required, and if in the post-Afghan era the UK military is seen to not have a purpose - or as is more likely, many individuals do not understand what our purpose is (in these days of globalisation, domestic interests and associated security concerns are often rooted in nebulous causes and issues thousands of miles from your own national doorstep), then the Armed Forces will be ripe for culling and a general public largely concerned with immediate self-gratification will not raise an eyebrow in concern.
Let us pray that those at the top of our respective Services for once stop playing parochial single Service games and start pulling in the same direction in advance of the next election. To my mind, the biggest strategic threat to the UK's armed forces lies not in some far off dusty part of the globe, but in the corridors of Whitehall and the Treasury.
Britain's wars 'have no strategy?, says top military adviser - Telegraph
Added to this was Professor Laurence Freedman's magnum opus, Strategy: A History which was published last year and was one of the FT's books of the year, all of which follow on from a glut of papers that RUSI have published in recent years bemoaning the lack of strategic thought in how the UK does defence - both the physical and conceptual parts of operations.
So if I were being an optimist, I would like to say that maybe people are starting to wake up to the fact that a coherent defence strategy must have its genesis in solid evidence and policy, rather than being based solely on Treasury targets. The Government's line that securing the economy had to be the main effort holds water, but only up to a point. As Professor Paul Cornish pointed out in his paper Strategy in Austerity, a country with a failed economy cannot be described as stable, whilst an economically successful country that lacks the means to secure its interests will not remain economically successful for long.
However, I am fundamentally a pessimist, some may even say a cynic. As such I think the current glut of publications and articles on UK strategic thought have appeared precisely because the politicians have not, do not and are not likely 'to get' strategic thinking and need a nudge in the right direction. What we are seeing here, I believe, is the start of 'shaping operations' in advance of the next election. If as the Chancellor notes, we have so far merely dipped a toe in to the waters of austerity and further drastic cuts are required, and if in the post-Afghan era the UK military is seen to not have a purpose - or as is more likely, many individuals do not understand what our purpose is (in these days of globalisation, domestic interests and associated security concerns are often rooted in nebulous causes and issues thousands of miles from your own national doorstep), then the Armed Forces will be ripe for culling and a general public largely concerned with immediate self-gratification will not raise an eyebrow in concern.
Let us pray that those at the top of our respective Services for once stop playing parochial single Service games and start pulling in the same direction in advance of the next election. To my mind, the biggest strategic threat to the UK's armed forces lies not in some far off dusty part of the globe, but in the corridors of Whitehall and the Treasury.
Now there's a first!
Things are so bad that tonight I had to turn off Question Time half way through and watch the latest episode of Benidorm which I recorded earlier!
It's the only way to keep up with what's happening in the real world!
Things are so bad that tonight I had to turn off Question Time half way through and watch the latest episode of Benidorm which I recorded earlier!
It's the only way to keep up with what's happening in the real world!