F-35 Cancelled, then what ?

[LowObservable]

Dont ask for a link, I don't have one. I have a friend who works out there.

Suuuure you do

//pats KF on head

[Rulebreaker]

The last paragraph does it for me in the credibility stakes don't remember hearing those statements in the 00's it was Lockheeds way or the highway

Outgoing F-35 programme boss shares hard won lessons

"Somewhere along the way, we made an error in our parametric weight models," Burbage says "Turned out we were predicting the things that we knew about pretty well, the structural parts were pretty close, the small detail parts were pretty close. What wasn't predicted well by the model was stealth and internal weapons bays because the airplane that had those capabilities weren't part of the database."

[Killface]

Dont ask for a link, I don't have one. I have a friend who works out there.

Suuuure you do

//pats KF on head

Are you questioning whether I have friends or whether what I said is true? I welcome any correction to what I posted, if my friend was in error, I will gladly stand corrected, and inform him of his mistake.

[NITRO104]

Killface and the gang, is this a Bill Sweetman or F35 thread?
If you're that desperate for attention, may I suggest some online matchmaking service, leaving this thread to professional personnel?

Thx

[SpazSinbad]

BF-08 Tail Art Cherry Point Jul 2013

Are youse Brits gonna have some fancy tail art?


DVIDS - Images - F-35 visits Cherry Point [Image 1 of 2]

[Courtney Mil]

Probably not, Spaz. I would expect the usual tail flash, tail letter and a squadron emblem of some sort. All in toned-down colours, of course. Nothing fancy, but it will be tasteful. The display jet, however, God only knows. That could well be quite horrid.

[busdriver02]

You guys are miss-applying Boyd. He advocated fast transients, so a sustained turn circle has no bearing. According to Boyd a fighter should be able to bleed energy as well as regain very rapidly.

[GreenKnight121]

For LO and so on...
US Navy solves X-47B tailhook problem in-house - IHS Jane's 360

Richard Scott, London - IHS Jane's Navy International 09 September 2012

The US Navy (USN) has admitted another problem with a new aircraft tailhook design, this time affecting the Northrop Grumman X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System Aircraft Carrier Demonstration (UCAS-D) programme.
According to a release issued by Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) on 5 September, the service was forced to urgently task its Fleet Readiness Center South West (FRCSW) at Naval Air Station (NAS) North Island, California, to redesign and manufacture new hook points for the X-47B after arrestment roll-in tests revealed problems with the original design.


"In late spring, a team from Patuxent River, Maryland, called on FRCSW at NAS North Island to redesign the hook point for ... the X-47B UCAS-D", NAVAIR said. "When unsuccessful roll-in arrestment tests of the X-47B revealed the need for a modified hook point, the team needed to come up with a plan to make the modifications in order to perform arrested landings and catapult launches this fall [autumn]."


According to NAVAIR, the FRCSW signed a formal work order on 10 July, anticipating the manufacturing and shipping process would take up to one month. However, the engineering and manufacture of the hook points took slightly longer; for example, machining the first steel part took longer than expected, as a result of which the FRCSW invested in a more efficient machine to decrease cycle times.

Navy Preps For X-47B Cats, Traps On Carrier

Navy Preps For X-47B Cats, Traps On Carrier
December 10, 2012
By Amy Butler, Graham Warwick

Northrop redesigned the X-47B tailhook because engineers had placed it too close to the landing gear. The distance didn't allow the landing cable to bounce and rest back on the ground so the tailhook could scoop under the cable and connect to it. The problem is similar to that experienced by Lockheed Martin with the F-35C tailhook. The redesign, executed in 45 days, has proven successful in three arrestment roll-in demonstrations, says Capt. Jamie Engdahl, Navy UCAS program manager.
Arrested landing trials are slated to start early next year.

But this didn't fix the problem...
The day of the unmanned aircraft. - The DEW Line

By Dave Majumdar on May 15, 2013 12:02 AM

Meanwhile, the US Navy launched a Northrop Grumman X-47B from the USS George H W Bush earlier today--our very own Zach Rosenberg was there. The Navy got Flightglobal a slot on the helicopter even though they initially told us there was no room. The launch looks like it was quite successful--take a look below.

However, the X-47B did not carry out an arrested landing upon returning to Pax River. That could be because the unmanned jet was having difficulty making even that first trap it did the week before where the Navy showed off a video of the aircraft snagging a wire. Sources told the DEW Line, at the time of the earlier trap, the aircraft now had a 10 percent field boarding rate... So hopefully, this isn't an indication of a major problem. The X-47B guys have had to redesign their tail hook a number of times now due to the same inaccurate Navy-supplied wire dynamics model that was partly responsible for the F-35C's woes.

So, in the first week of May 2013, some 5 months after the USN claimed to have "solved" the X-47B's tailhook problems, it still had only a 10% success rate!

Sounds like Killface's friend is correct.

[WhiteOvies]

KF & LO - there is a difference between an X jet and an F jet when it comes to measuring success for this sort of thing. F-35C is an in production (well LRIP) aircraft, X-47B is a flight sciences technology demonstrator.

Spaz, the tail flash reminds me of a certain 800 NAS, however the first 3 UK jets do not wear any Sqn markings.

CM - check out VFA 101's CAG bird for an example of a coloured version!

[JSFfan]

You guys are miss-applying Boyd. He advocated fast transients, so a sustained turn circle has no bearing. According to Boyd a fighter should be able to bleed energy as well as regain very rapidly.

Not to mention the OODA observe, orient, decide, and act, that the f-35 takes hands down

Some are taking a very narrow view of a 4th gen with limited fuel and weapon/pods and trying to make a story

[SpazSinbad]

VFA-101 at Eglin AFB F-35C tail logo CAGbird

VFA-101 at Eglin AFB F-35C tail logo CAGbird 'Grim Reaper'

Click thumbnail:

[SpazSinbad]

X-47B to trap on board USS George H.W. Bush

For 'GreenKnight121': (Possibly an inaccurate or misleading headline but WTF)

X-47B to trap on board USS George H.W. Bush Navy on July 10th, 2013

"The X-47B will make an arrested landing on board USS George H.W. Bush, off the coast of Virginia, on Jul. 10."

&

"...In May, Sailors aboard USS George H.W. Bush worked X-47B operations for the first time and the world watched as they catapulted the aircraft from the deck with ease.

Throughout the next few days, we saw X-47B complete nine perfect touch-and-go landings on the moving carrier deck....

...Final X-47B shore-based arrested landings at Patuxent River were successfully completed in late June. Carrier suitability engineers put the aircraft through a series of very demanding tests, including hard landings and high speed arrestments, proving beyond a shadow of a doubt that we were ready to land on a moving carrier deck. Both X-47B aircraft are now certified to conduct carrier flight operations, including catapults, arrested landings, flight deck taxi operations, maintenance and refueling...."

Unmanned X-47B Readies for Final Touchdown

[Finnpog]

@SpazSinbad
They could certainly do something a little 800 NAS with that marking.
I think that an 809 NAS phoenix on the fin, even in toned down colours a la SHAR in 1982 would be striking.
Some black & white chequer-boarding and a trident, a mailed fist or a yellow lightning bolt with black and red fin flash would also be nice (if it could be reclaimed from the Hawk.

As much as I would hope to see a winged one on the fin or fuse, I do feel that 1(F) sits well on the Typhoon.

[LowObservable]

Good luck to the X-47B team... And a job done on schedule (horrors!) because it was a six-year award in 8/07.

US Navy Awards UCAS-D Contract To Northrop Grumman-Led X-47 Team

And if anyone had predicted back then that it would trap before F-35C, they'd have been regarded as a lunatic.

[GreenKnight121]

Assuming that today's planned trap actually happens.

Still no word... either they haven't tried yet, or....


Apparently they claim to have gotten the problems fixed in the 1 1/2 months between the 1st-week-of-May "10% success" report and the "late June completion of successful tests".

We will see.

[LowObservable]

BFZ!

X-47B Completes First-Ever Carrier-Based Arrested Landing

Either they made rapid progress or the 10-per-cent success rate was an exaggeration, like the report of Mark Twain's death. Not that anyone would have any reason to spread such misinformation around.

[In Tor Wot]

F-35 . . . . so what?

Considering the technical hurdles of flying a UCAV off the deck of a ship and back again, I think the tail-hook issue is small (but important) beer that will be resolved in due course.

Congratulations to the USN and Northrop for the work thus far:

X-47B UCAS – Aviation History Under Way

QE2 and PoW are looking less relevant by the day.

[SpazSinbad]

Videos of First Arrested Landing are easily faked (I cannot see it) :-)

X-47B Completes Carrier-based Arrested Landing (2)

"Published on Jul 10, 2013
The X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS) demonstrator completed its first carrier-based arrested landing on board USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) off the coast of Virginia July 10."

X-47B Completes First Carrier-based Arrested Landing (2) - YouTube

[Killface]

Not that anyone would have any reason to spread such misinformation around.

The Navy, DEWline and Dave Mujumdar? hmm.

I'm glad that it trapped but it doesn't mean its not still having issues. 10 percent seemed to be the number that everyone was saying.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Surely a system of systems approach involves worrying about the role played by carrier personnel (throughout the ship) as much as the aircrew?

I tried to point this out over on the Harrier thread, and so have others on various threads - see the comments of Bismark, Not_a_boffin, orca, and Whiteovies.

Bismark:

As I am sure has been said elsewhere, the aircraft and pilots just represent the front end of the carrier strike capability. The idiocy of the SDSR decision, which the PM is about to compound in the FR/UK Defence deal (FT Today), is that we risk losing the capability to operate jets off carriers. All of the expertise on the current CVSs will have gone (we are getting rid of the CVSs), the aircrew will have gone (either PVRd, redundant or moved to other aircraft types, the command experience will have gone (as will the met, ATC, FC, deck handlers, planners etc, etc).

Bismark:

But what is missing in 2020 is the crews on the ships with any experience of aviation - from the CO downwards....I am sure the MAA will have something to say about that, indeed I wonder whether they are doing anything about it at the moment?

Not a boffin:

I'd put a fair bit of money that the guys who've done exchange tours have not done time in CATCC, Wings / Little F (Air & mini-boss in USN), handlers office or the squadron engineering and logs posts.

While they may be adept at doing the mission plan, launch, mission, recovery thing, they are unlikely to have a great understanding of how to spot a deck, arrange aircraft for servicing vice maintenance, weapons prep and bombing up and how all the various departments both in the squadrons and on the ship work to deliver the sortie rate. People thinking just about aircrew and (to some degree) chockheads are missing the point - it's the corporate experience of how to put it all together that is about to be lost. Nor can that be maintained at HMS Siskin - that just gives the basics of handling, not the fine art of pulling it all together.

As SDSR says "we need a plan to regenerate the necessary skills"- all I can say is it had better be a f8cking good one, cunning eneough to do more than brush your teeth with!

WhiteOvies:

The bigger issue is getting everyone else to be ready for a large, busy flight deck. At least there is a team of people looking into this issue and both deckcrew, aircrew and engineers are being appropriately positioned to give them some exposure to this dangerous environment prior to QEC.

orca:

All we need to see is a signed document from CAS saying that he will embark his jets as soon as the CO indicates his ship is ready in all respects to conduct aviation.

The second sentence will indicate that he will disembark them only when the Air Management Organisation is fully up to speed, the Air Group is fulfilling ATO tasking, the Air Weapon supply team have produced weapons to surge capacity and these have been loaded on jets and dropped, the Yellow Coats can marshal, chain and chock a fourship in all weathers, whilst another fourship is taxying for take off. The jets will remain embarked until every Fighter Controller in the fleet has worked a fourship through Red Crown procedures and the JFACCHQ have established resilient comms for a week or two and Flyco have exercised being b#ggered about from dawn to dusk. Repeat all for night ops. When all this is crimped the TG in its entirety will take part in a COMAO based exercise of Neptune Warrior type scope and we'll call it good.

The third sentence will indicate that the jets will be back as soon as any of the above notice any degree of skill fade and the process will start again.

Back in early 2007, a Chockhead told me that post Sea Harrier, there were too few embarkations of fixed wing aircraft to retain skills. Later that year, I spent a little time aboard a CVS and learnt pretty much the same thing, and that the dangers of skill fade were real. In late 2009 I heard the FAA Command Warrant say that having more jets at sea, for longer periods, would be key to preparing for CVF/F-35.

Are we doing enough to prepare? Is sending eight Chockheads on exchange enough?

This 1987 article is interesting: The Self-Designing High-Reliability Organization: Aircraft Carrier Flight Operations at Sea

Operations manuals are full of details of specific tasks at the micro level but rarely discuss integration into the whole. There are other written rules and procedures, from training manuals through standard operating procedures (SOPs), that describe and standardize the process of integration. None of them explain how to make the whole system operate smoothly, let alone at the level of performance that we have observed. It is in the real-world environment of workups and deployment, through the continual training and retraining of officers and crew, that the information needed for safe and efficient operation is developed, transmitted, and maintained. Without that continuity, and without sufficient operational time at sea, both effectiveness and safety would suffer.

Moreover, the organization is not stable over time. Every forty months or so there is an almost 100 percent turnover of crew, and all of the officers will have rotated through and gone on to other duty. Yet the ship remains functional at a high level. The Navy itself is, of course, the underlying structural determinant. Uniforms, ranks, rules and regulations, codes of conduct, and specialized languages provide a world of extensive codification of objects, events, situations, and appropriate conduct; members who deviate too far from the norm become "foreigners" within their own culture and soon find themselves outside the group, figuratively if not literally.

Behavioral and cultural norms, SOPs, and regulations are necessary, but they are far from sufficient to preserve operational structure and the character of the service. Our research team noted three mechanisms that act to maintain and transmit operational factors in the face of rapid turnover. First, and in some ways most important, is the pool of chief petty officers, many of whom have long service in their specialty and circulate around similar ships in the fleet. Second, many of the officers and some of the crew will have at some time served on other carriers, albeit in other jobs, and bring to the ship some of the shared experience of the entire force. Third, the process of continual rotation and replacement, even while on deployment, maintains a continuity that is broken only during a major refit. These mechanisms are realized by an uninterrupted process of on-board training and retraining that makes the ship one huge, continuing school for its officers and men.

When operational continuity is broken or nonexistent, the effects are observable and dramatic. One member of our research group had the opportunity to observe a new Nimitz-class aircraft carrier as she emerged from the yard and remarked at how many things had to be learned before she could even begin to commence serious air operations. Even for an older and more experienced ship coming out of an ordinary refit, the workup towards deployment is a long and arduous process. Many weeks are spent just qualifying the deck for taking and handling individual aircraft, and many more at gradually increasing densities to perfect aircraft handling as well as the coordination needed for tight launch and recovery sequences. With safety and reliability as fixed boundary conditions, every moment of precious operational time before deployment is devoted to improving capability and efficiency.

The importance of adequate workup time--for flight operations to be conducted safely at present levels of technical and operational complexity and at the tempo required for demonstrating effectiveness--cannot be overemphasized. During our research we followed one carrier in which the workup was shortened by "only" two weeks, for reasons of economy. As a result, the ship was forced to complete its training during the middle of a difficult and demanding mid-ocean exercise; this placed an enormous strain on all hands. While the crew succeeded--the referees adapted compensating evaluation procedures--risks to ship's personnel and equipment were visibly higher. Moreover, officers and crew were openly unhappy with their own performance, with an attendant and continuing impact on morale.