Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Ah so we have reached the final resort, insult. The bottom line fellas is that these two flew a fully servicable aircraft (no evidence has been found of any problems, including the engines) at high speed into a rock face killing 29 people. You wish to excuse them on the basis of some rules. Good day to you.
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Courtney,
perhaps you could learn a thing or two from contributers such as Cazatou and John Purdey. Whilst they have opposing views to me, they put across their viewpoint in a reasonable and courteous way.
Most of the time, their argument gives me cause for thought and I'm happy to admit that, on occasion, they have made me doubt my own argument. However, on every given occasion, the simple fact is that the burden of proof required of absolutely no doubt whatsoever has not been met.
Your point of simply ignoring the rules because they don't suit your opinion undermines your whole argument and, if I may say so, your credibility. As I have said on many occasions, I have no issue with anyone having a different opinion to mine. At least, like Mr Purdey and Caz, please have a credible argument.
Kind regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
perhaps you could learn a thing or two from contributers such as Cazatou and John Purdey. Whilst they have opposing views to me, they put across their viewpoint in a reasonable and courteous way.
Most of the time, their argument gives me cause for thought and I'm happy to admit that, on occasion, they have made me doubt my own argument. However, on every given occasion, the simple fact is that the burden of proof required of absolutely no doubt whatsoever has not been met.
Your point of simply ignoring the rules because they don't suit your opinion undermines your whole argument and, if I may say so, your credibility. As I have said on many occasions, I have no issue with anyone having a different opinion to mine. At least, like Mr Purdey and Caz, please have a credible argument.
Kind regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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This thread has taken one of its periodic bad turns.
Courteny has recently contributed with his take on the accident. Others have responded with their own views on his arguments. So far so good.
Why, ShyTorque, is it 'strange' that Courteny has only just contributed? Perhaps he has only recently joined the Internet, found PPrune or just felt the need to make a contribution.
Why, Ears, is his timing or escalation of argument 'sinister' and what is the 'Clive' innuendo?
When conducted at the level of Brian Dixons courteous, measured debate, this thread is clearly capable of of achieving much. When it resorts to personal attack, criticism of anothers reasons for contributing and, I repeat, unsupported slurs on the integrity of the officers responsible for the verdict, it starts to shoot itself in the foot and inevitably becomes far less worthy of respect.
Courteny has recently contributed with his take on the accident. Others have responded with their own views on his arguments. So far so good.
Why, ShyTorque, is it 'strange' that Courteny has only just contributed? Perhaps he has only recently joined the Internet, found PPrune or just felt the need to make a contribution.
Why, Ears, is his timing or escalation of argument 'sinister' and what is the 'Clive' innuendo?
When conducted at the level of Brian Dixons courteous, measured debate, this thread is clearly capable of of achieving much. When it resorts to personal attack, criticism of anothers reasons for contributing and, I repeat, unsupported slurs on the integrity of the officers responsible for the verdict, it starts to shoot itself in the foot and inevitably becomes far less worthy of respect.
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This is my second submission to this thread and, as I have already stated, I, like many others, knew and had flown with Jon, Rich, Graham and Kev – and flew with John Day on more than one occasion. I first met Jon in Oman and, in fact, spoke to him minutes before he out briefed on that fateful day.
It is incredibly difficult to collate a response on this thread, because we simply do not know what happened – and, critically, what the crew said - at every stage of that flight prior to the aircraft’s impact.
Yes, I thought John Day gave a good account to the Select committee on how he arrived at his decision – However, weather/visibility assessments……now I start to have a problem!
Do I think that Jon Tapper was a very capable individual/CR SF pilot/captain – Yes, I do.
I also firmly believe that Rich, Graham and Kev would have played a positive role that day the moment events started to go ‘not as briefed’ – such was the calibre of these 3 individuals.
Courtney has - for some I am sure – bluntly stated: Quote The bottom line fellas is that these two flew a fully servicable aircraft (no evidence has been found of any problems, including the engines) at high speed into a rock face killing 29 people. Unquote
I think 3000+ replies later that there are many of us who will struggle with the simplicity of this statement – and whatever happens in the New Year with the SoS’s review there will still be many questions left unanswered.
AA
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AA, I don't struggle with it at all.
We are going in circles again, but there was evidence that the aircraft was not fully serviceable. The type in general was not fully serviceable and it could certainly be argued that had common sense prevailed it should not have been flying at all, until all doubts had been completely resolved.
Whatever happened on the flight (and no-one knows, we can only theorise), there was certainly negligence at a higher level. There WERE another options (civvy air or even postpone / cancel the flight), and it could be argued that the RAF failed in its duty of care to the passengers and the crew.
Someone in higher authority made a very poor decision by insisting that an aircraft without a C of A clearance (and actually grounded the previous day by the very department responsible for introducing it into service) should be used for the flight, or any other.
The pilots, having been forced into a corner and paid the ultimate sacrifice, have shamefully been scapegoated by their superiors.
We are going in circles again, but there was evidence that the aircraft was not fully serviceable. The type in general was not fully serviceable and it could certainly be argued that had common sense prevailed it should not have been flying at all, until all doubts had been completely resolved.
Whatever happened on the flight (and no-one knows, we can only theorise), there was certainly negligence at a higher level. There WERE another options (civvy air or even postpone / cancel the flight), and it could be argued that the RAF failed in its duty of care to the passengers and the crew.
Someone in higher authority made a very poor decision by insisting that an aircraft without a C of A clearance (and actually grounded the previous day by the very department responsible for introducing it into service) should be used for the flight, or any other.
The pilots, having been forced into a corner and paid the ultimate sacrifice, have shamefully been scapegoated by their superiors.
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We Really Will Never Know!
As someone who uses his own name I try to avoid getting involved in some of the less than helpful comments that sometimes appear on this thread, but I have to say I am both amazed and appalled by Courtney's last comment.
There are literally thousands of words, based on facts such as the AAIB Report which leave a doubt as to the serviceability of ZD 576 on that fateful day - there are just as many casting doubts on the introduction to service procedures and airworthiness standard achieved with the Chinook Mk 2 fleet at that time. How Courtney can "state", with such apparent certainty, that they "flew a fully serviceable aircraft" into the cliff, when even the Air Marshals accept that they do not know this, is remarkable, and I would certainly welcome his analysis of how he comes to this conclusion - please PM me if you feel it is more appropriate.
In the meantime, and with apologies for again taking up more space with some repetiton can I remind Courtney and others what the HofL actually said in their Part 6 conclusions:
166. If however the finding of negligence at or before the way point change has not been established to the required standard of proof, as we consider to be the case, this proposition does not stand up. The evidence before us was entirely consistent with an intention to alter course and fly VFR to Corran and equally inconsistent with an intention to continue on the same course over the Mull under IFR.
167. The AAIB were not able to exclude the possibility of a control jam given the level of system damage. Nor could they exclude the possibility of pre-impact detachment of the thrust balance spring attachment bracket and other inserts. It will be remembered that this bracket had some three weeks previously detached from the aircraft's thrust/yaw control pallet (see above, para 56). The AAIB were unable to assess the functionality of number 1 DECU owing to gross fire damage. Metallic contamination of the hydraulic system of the integrated lower control actuators found by the AAIB was thought to have been present pre-impact but not to have contributed to the accident; however, the subsequent experience of the US Army and their recommendations (see para 104 above) suggest that such contamination could cause disturbance in the normal operation of those components at the time. DASH runaways have caused temporary loss of control problems as Squadron Leader Burke explained, and UFCMs and false engine failure captions have also afflicted Chinook Mk 2s. Mr Cable accepted that it was possible that there had been an intermittent engine fault which had subsequently reverted to normal before the impact. The problems arising from the newly installed FADEC system had not all been resolved by June 1994; and the Boeing simulation has been shown to have relied to some extent on postulations which are impossible in performance and parameters some of which do not fit with what was found by the AAIB. Can it in these circumstances be said that there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever that it was the voluntary action of the aircrew - including not only both pilots but also MALM Forbes who in our view was probably assisting with the navigation - which caused the aircraft to fly into the hill?
168. Squadron Leader Burke, when asked whether he saw anything significant in the position of the rudder pedals which were at 77 per cent of full travel, replied that it was "an enormous rudder input", unthinkable at high speed (Q 719; see above, para 112). He had also referred to this matter through one of the papers which he had submitted to the Committee in the following terms: "The position of the rudder pedals on impact (almost full left rudder), the high impact speed, and the fully up, or close to fully up, lever position coupled with 100.5% NR[39] and only 70% torque suggest that an erratic flight path typical of a partial control loss is the most likely of the many guesses as to what was happening in the cloud on ZD 576's last seconds of flight".
169. Witness A commented, "There is absolutely no reason for applying that amount of yaw pedal during forward flight and the only reason I can think of for applying that much yaw pedal would be if the aircraft was becoming extremely difficult to control" (Q 807). He went on to state that the view of the Board that the pedals had been displaced by impact could not be ignored either.
170. Squadron Leader Burke expressed the view that the most likely cause of the accident was a jam of some kind affecting the control of the aircraft, perhaps arising from displaced articles in the broom cupboard (Q 738). A UFCM resulting possibly from a DASH runaway and causing temporary loss of control was also considered by him to be a possibility (Q 739). Such a runaway could cause a temporary increase in rotor speed which the pilot would seek to contain by raising the collective lever thereby forcing the aircraft to climb perhaps unexpectedly into cloud.
171. Witness A considered a control jam to be a strong possibility for the cause of the accident but certainly not an exclusive one (Q 806). He also cited the possibility that a control problem in pitch could have produced oscillations which resulted in the 30 degrees pitch up position in which the aircraft was found (Q 844). Mr Perks expressed the view in his second memorandum that a major mechanical flight controls failure could be an explanation for the difficulty which Boeing experienced in matching their simulation to the data provided.
172. We consider the evidence of Mr Holbrook as to the probability of the pilots being able to see the lower part of the Mull to be of considerable importance - evidence which unfortunately was not before the Air Marshals when they carried out their reviews. For the reasons already given we do not think that the Boeing simulation merits the status which has been accorded to it in the past, and that even if there were some last minute manoeuvre of the aircraft it cannot be said that there was absolutely no doubt whatsoever that it was initiated by pilots who were in control of the aircraft.
173. It follows that the Air Marshals were not justified in concluding that the pilots were in control 4 seconds before impact, or at any time after the way point change. In short it has not been established to the required standard of proof that it was the voluntary action of the pilots which caused the aircraft to fly into the hill.
174. In carrying out our terms of reference, we have considered the justification for the Air Marshals' finding of negligence against the pilots of ZD 576 against the applicable standard of proof, which required "absolutely no doubt whatsoever". In the light of all the evidence before us, and having regard to that standard, we unanimously conclude that the reviewing officers were not justified in finding that negligence on the part of the pilots caused the aircraft to crash. (the bold is theirs not mine)
175. We consider it appropriate to identify those matters to which we have had regard which were not before the Air Marshals when they considered the investigating board's report:
(a) the more detailed evidence of Mr Holbrook as to the weather conditions at sea, and the probability that the crew would have seen the land mass from some distance offshore;
(b) the evidence of Mr Perks, Witness A and Squadron Leader Burke;
(c) the deficiencies in the Boeing simulation with particular reference to the facts that
(i) it did not take account of FADEC and
(ii) it used a postulated speed and ROC which have been shown to be incompatible; and
(d) the possible effect of contamination in the hydraulic fluid in the integrated lower control actuators, as referred to in the US Army report of June 1997.
176. How could it be that a very experienced crew, having planned to fly VFR, having taken when probably visual with the Mull the appropriate steps to alter course, when there was nothing to prevent them flying northwards within sight of the coast, flew into the Mull? It is as Sir John and Sir William speculatively described "incomprehensible" (Q 342) and "astonishing" (Q 377). We shall never know(my bold).
JB
There are literally thousands of words, based on facts such as the AAIB Report which leave a doubt as to the serviceability of ZD 576 on that fateful day - there are just as many casting doubts on the introduction to service procedures and airworthiness standard achieved with the Chinook Mk 2 fleet at that time. How Courtney can "state", with such apparent certainty, that they "flew a fully serviceable aircraft" into the cliff, when even the Air Marshals accept that they do not know this, is remarkable, and I would certainly welcome his analysis of how he comes to this conclusion - please PM me if you feel it is more appropriate.
In the meantime, and with apologies for again taking up more space with some repetiton can I remind Courtney and others what the HofL actually said in their Part 6 conclusions:
166. If however the finding of negligence at or before the way point change has not been established to the required standard of proof, as we consider to be the case, this proposition does not stand up. The evidence before us was entirely consistent with an intention to alter course and fly VFR to Corran and equally inconsistent with an intention to continue on the same course over the Mull under IFR.
167. The AAIB were not able to exclude the possibility of a control jam given the level of system damage. Nor could they exclude the possibility of pre-impact detachment of the thrust balance spring attachment bracket and other inserts. It will be remembered that this bracket had some three weeks previously detached from the aircraft's thrust/yaw control pallet (see above, para 56). The AAIB were unable to assess the functionality of number 1 DECU owing to gross fire damage. Metallic contamination of the hydraulic system of the integrated lower control actuators found by the AAIB was thought to have been present pre-impact but not to have contributed to the accident; however, the subsequent experience of the US Army and their recommendations (see para 104 above) suggest that such contamination could cause disturbance in the normal operation of those components at the time. DASH runaways have caused temporary loss of control problems as Squadron Leader Burke explained, and UFCMs and false engine failure captions have also afflicted Chinook Mk 2s. Mr Cable accepted that it was possible that there had been an intermittent engine fault which had subsequently reverted to normal before the impact. The problems arising from the newly installed FADEC system had not all been resolved by June 1994; and the Boeing simulation has been shown to have relied to some extent on postulations which are impossible in performance and parameters some of which do not fit with what was found by the AAIB. Can it in these circumstances be said that there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever that it was the voluntary action of the aircrew - including not only both pilots but also MALM Forbes who in our view was probably assisting with the navigation - which caused the aircraft to fly into the hill?
168. Squadron Leader Burke, when asked whether he saw anything significant in the position of the rudder pedals which were at 77 per cent of full travel, replied that it was "an enormous rudder input", unthinkable at high speed (Q 719; see above, para 112). He had also referred to this matter through one of the papers which he had submitted to the Committee in the following terms: "The position of the rudder pedals on impact (almost full left rudder), the high impact speed, and the fully up, or close to fully up, lever position coupled with 100.5% NR[39] and only 70% torque suggest that an erratic flight path typical of a partial control loss is the most likely of the many guesses as to what was happening in the cloud on ZD 576's last seconds of flight".
169. Witness A commented, "There is absolutely no reason for applying that amount of yaw pedal during forward flight and the only reason I can think of for applying that much yaw pedal would be if the aircraft was becoming extremely difficult to control" (Q 807). He went on to state that the view of the Board that the pedals had been displaced by impact could not be ignored either.
170. Squadron Leader Burke expressed the view that the most likely cause of the accident was a jam of some kind affecting the control of the aircraft, perhaps arising from displaced articles in the broom cupboard (Q 738). A UFCM resulting possibly from a DASH runaway and causing temporary loss of control was also considered by him to be a possibility (Q 739). Such a runaway could cause a temporary increase in rotor speed which the pilot would seek to contain by raising the collective lever thereby forcing the aircraft to climb perhaps unexpectedly into cloud.
171. Witness A considered a control jam to be a strong possibility for the cause of the accident but certainly not an exclusive one (Q 806). He also cited the possibility that a control problem in pitch could have produced oscillations which resulted in the 30 degrees pitch up position in which the aircraft was found (Q 844). Mr Perks expressed the view in his second memorandum that a major mechanical flight controls failure could be an explanation for the difficulty which Boeing experienced in matching their simulation to the data provided.
172. We consider the evidence of Mr Holbrook as to the probability of the pilots being able to see the lower part of the Mull to be of considerable importance - evidence which unfortunately was not before the Air Marshals when they carried out their reviews. For the reasons already given we do not think that the Boeing simulation merits the status which has been accorded to it in the past, and that even if there were some last minute manoeuvre of the aircraft it cannot be said that there was absolutely no doubt whatsoever that it was initiated by pilots who were in control of the aircraft.
173. It follows that the Air Marshals were not justified in concluding that the pilots were in control 4 seconds before impact, or at any time after the way point change. In short it has not been established to the required standard of proof that it was the voluntary action of the pilots which caused the aircraft to fly into the hill.
174. In carrying out our terms of reference, we have considered the justification for the Air Marshals' finding of negligence against the pilots of ZD 576 against the applicable standard of proof, which required "absolutely no doubt whatsoever". In the light of all the evidence before us, and having regard to that standard, we unanimously conclude that the reviewing officers were not justified in finding that negligence on the part of the pilots caused the aircraft to crash. (the bold is theirs not mine)
175. We consider it appropriate to identify those matters to which we have had regard which were not before the Air Marshals when they considered the investigating board's report:
(a) the more detailed evidence of Mr Holbrook as to the weather conditions at sea, and the probability that the crew would have seen the land mass from some distance offshore;
(b) the evidence of Mr Perks, Witness A and Squadron Leader Burke;
(c) the deficiencies in the Boeing simulation with particular reference to the facts that
(i) it did not take account of FADEC and
(ii) it used a postulated speed and ROC which have been shown to be incompatible; and
(d) the possible effect of contamination in the hydraulic fluid in the integrated lower control actuators, as referred to in the US Army report of June 1997.
176. How could it be that a very experienced crew, having planned to fly VFR, having taken when probably visual with the Mull the appropriate steps to alter course, when there was nothing to prevent them flying northwards within sight of the coast, flew into the Mull? It is as Sir John and Sir William speculatively described "incomprehensible" (Q 342) and "astonishing" (Q 377). We shall never know(my bold).
JB
Hopefully that has given Courtney something to think about JB, but as he seems to subscribe to the Code Kangaroo I doubt it will sway him. I merely point out that Courtney was the name of the Eric Sykes character, manservant to Terry Thomas' dastardly and evil Sir Percy in the film Those Magnificent Men in Their Flying Machines. Forever scheming new ways to undermine the opposition at all costs, nonetheless Sir Percy ultimately fails and reaps his well deserved comeuppance. Just thought I'd point out the coincidence- of the name that is- nothing else, of course!
Just a numbered other
It is perhaps understandable, in view of the loss of lives, that he chose to step beyond the confines of the 'rules'.
Your utter lack of logic astounds me. You are the only contributer to this thread thus far to agree with its thrust, whilst upholding the AM's similar disregard for logic.
Either they are guilty of gross negligence with no doubt whatsoever, or the slur on their names is wrong.
Nothing allows the reviewing officers to 'step beyond the confines of the rules'.
Your assertion that somehow the 'loss of life' allows some leeway with the rules is astounding. Are you suggesting that a different set of rules be applied, had only the crew perished?
Those rules existed solely to protect those deceased aircrew, with no way to defend themselves, from the machinations of people like Day and Wratten, not to allow such men to play fast and loose with them to 'tidy up' a difficult and embarrassing accident.
Bizzare
ShyTorque wrote:
That is exactly as I see it. Thank you ShyTorque for such a pithy summary, and thank you Courtney for being the cause of it! Simply substitute the name of any major airline for RAF and you see the enormity of management failure here. But such a civilian scenario could not have occurred. Why? Because the independent Airworthiness Authority, the CAA, would not have allowed a Public Transport operation of such a flawed aircraft to have been flown. Here as in the case of the Hercules fleet, in the case of the Nimrod fleet, in the case of numerous other military aircraft fleets, we see the urgent need to remove Airworthiness Authority from the MOD and into an independent MAA without delay. All of these failures need to be seen in toto, not as separate accidents but as a chain of command failure, by the very commanders who presided over the travesty that this thread seeks to overturn.
Whatever happened on the flight (and no-one knows, we can only theorise), there was certainly negligence at a higher level. There WERE another options (civvy air or even postpone / cancel the flight), and it could be argued that the RAF failed in its duty of care to the passengers and the crew.
Someone in higher authority made a very poor decision by insisting that an aircraft without a C of A clearance (and actually grounded the previous day by the very department responsible for introducing it into service) should be used for the flight, or any other.
The pilots, having been forced into a corner and paid the ultimate sacrifice, have shamefully been scapegoated by their superiors.
Someone in higher authority made a very poor decision by insisting that an aircraft without a C of A clearance (and actually grounded the previous day by the very department responsible for introducing it into service) should be used for the flight, or any other.
The pilots, having been forced into a corner and paid the ultimate sacrifice, have shamefully been scapegoated by their superiors.
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Courtney has also made his contempt of piloting skills known in Rumours and News; he apparently believes that autopilots never fail and that we should all just let the automatics take care of everything, all the time.
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No FO Brown, I’m not contemptuous of pilot skills, only of the ability of so many pilots to deliver those skills. The only thing missing in all these scenarios are flying pigs. Mr Dixon, the chances of this aircraft suffering any of the proposed malfunctions on these pages and colliding with this rock face are infintesimal. All indications are that the crew engaged in a last second extreme manouver to avoid impact. In other words they were either not looking where they were going or were IMC. You may pull the wool over the eyes of various politicians and lawyers, you can quote as many rules as you like and label the actions of this crew as you wish, would a trifle careless on the day do? The results are the same though. Hope that is courteous enough for you.
Last edited by courtney; 2nd Jan 2008 at 14:21.
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My apologies to everyone else for indulging courtney, but...
I was lucky enough to spend over a decade as an Avionic engineer on the Chinook (Mk1, 2 & 3(!)) and during this time investigated a number of Undemanded Flying Control Movements (UFCM's). On a couple of occasions the reason for the UFCM were what you would term 'infintesimal'. During 2 investigations we had cause to call in Boeing; both times the eventual identified cause of the fault had never been experienced before - Infinitesimal indeed. Scouring a fully intact airframe for evidence and the cause of a UFCM is difficult enough, but when the aircraft is scattered across a hillside, the problem would be compounded 1000fold.
Now as I have asked you before, is there doubt as to the cause of this dreadful accident ? Yes or No?
I was lucky enough to spend over a decade as an Avionic engineer on the Chinook (Mk1, 2 & 3(!)) and during this time investigated a number of Undemanded Flying Control Movements (UFCM's). On a couple of occasions the reason for the UFCM were what you would term 'infintesimal'. During 2 investigations we had cause to call in Boeing; both times the eventual identified cause of the fault had never been experienced before - Infinitesimal indeed. Scouring a fully intact airframe for evidence and the cause of a UFCM is difficult enough, but when the aircraft is scattered across a hillside, the problem would be compounded 1000fold.
Now as I have asked you before, is there doubt as to the cause of this dreadful accident ? Yes or No?
Courtney
A simple yes/no answer (plus a couple of ... to meet the minimum post length) will suffice but please answer this question:
Do you know with absolutely no doubt whatsoever what caused ZD576 to crash on the Mull all those years ago?
Regards
W
A simple yes/no answer (plus a couple of ... to meet the minimum post length) will suffice but please answer this question:
Do you know with absolutely no doubt whatsoever what caused ZD576 to crash on the Mull all those years ago?
Regards
W
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Wrath,
I have asked that exact question of the one or two others who support Courtney's version and he like them will simply refuse to answer. He will spin and twist in the wind however he WILL NOT answer the question as to do so simply destroys his and their so obviously flawed argument.
You asked him
"Do you know with absolutely no doubt whatsoever what caused ZD576 to crash on the Mull all those years ago?"
The ONLY answer he can give is NO as there simply is no irrefutable proof as to what exactly happened. He cannot possibly answer YES as even he would not be so stupid to try and convince us that there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
So to reiterate Wrath's question Courtney, or anyone else for that matter
Do you know with absolutely no doubt whatsoever what caused ZD576 to crash on the Mull all those years ago?
I have asked that exact question of the one or two others who support Courtney's version and he like them will simply refuse to answer. He will spin and twist in the wind however he WILL NOT answer the question as to do so simply destroys his and their so obviously flawed argument.
You asked him
"Do you know with absolutely no doubt whatsoever what caused ZD576 to crash on the Mull all those years ago?"
The ONLY answer he can give is NO as there simply is no irrefutable proof as to what exactly happened. He cannot possibly answer YES as even he would not be so stupid to try and convince us that there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
So to reiterate Wrath's question Courtney, or anyone else for that matter
Do you know with absolutely no doubt whatsoever what caused ZD576 to crash on the Mull all those years ago?
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Do you know with absolutely no doubt whatsoever what caused ZD576 to crash on the Mull all those years ago?
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Hi Courtney,
perhaps you could enlighten me as to the cause of this then (pages 1 - 7):
https://crc.army.mil/Multimedia/maga...es/ffmay98.pdf
If the rules are there, then I'll quote them. I am simply reminding those who have/do/will look at this injustice of their existence, and to remind everyone that the rules can't be ignored simply because it makes your suppositions and opinions weak.
I'm afraid "a trifle careless on the day" won't do either. How about an honest, "I'm sorry Cook and Tapper familes, but we simply don't know what happened that day."
My heart was lifted by your courteous approach.
Thank you.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
perhaps you could enlighten me as to the cause of this then (pages 1 - 7):
https://crc.army.mil/Multimedia/maga...es/ffmay98.pdf
You may pull the wool over the eyes of various politicians and lawyers, you can quote as many rules as you like and label the actions of this crew as you wish, would a trifle careless on the day do?
I'm afraid "a trifle careless on the day" won't do either. How about an honest, "I'm sorry Cook and Tapper familes, but we simply don't know what happened that day."
My heart was lifted by your courteous approach.
Thank you.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Regarding Courtney’s posts:
.
Funny why you crucify someone who is stating a view that so many would take – shouting down the individual isn’t getting you anywhere.
Face it, the MOD’s version stinks – omitted, selective, and misrepresented evidence together with spin to make the simple case that the pilots were at fault in bad weather.
BUT your version doesn’t offer a damn thing to counter this – you have not used your collective skills and experience to address the many anomalies nor get a consensus from the ample evidence (direct and circumstantial) of what else they may have been tasked with other than passing by the Mull en route.
.
While of course the possibility of an aircraft fault should indeed have been investigated thoroughly by independents (not MOD) – and I do admire the efforts of John Blakeley in particular for doing this most thoroughly and professionally – surely it should not be to the exclusion of all else AND it has now consumed an enormous amount of your time and effort and still leaves the 3 problems I have with an a/c fault (very briefly here now, you’ve heard it all before in detail):
(1) No obvious fault found (yes, I do appreciate 8-15’s post #3016 – “Scouring a fully intact airframe for evidence and the cause of a UFCM is difficult enough, but when the aircraft is scattered across a hillside, the problem would be compounded 1000fold”);
(2) Your suggested faults are either highly improbable (e.g. 2 axis jam freeing itself at last second) or demonstrably wrong (e.g. runaway as engines were found matched) in this instance;
(3) Their flight profile was already in trouble where they were and detailed analysis does not suggest control problems got them into that situation nor prevented recovery.
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You have rather gagged debate in the pursuit of the “nothing can be known” strategy – not digging deeper in case something negative is turned up (some confidence in the pilots this shows!) – which, IMHO, serves the authorities very well because my “pet theory” has it that they came unstuck because of the actions of others.
Let us not forget that the security team on board were not in favour of capitulating to terrorism – had they got to their meeting they would have enacted strategies that would have knocked the terrorists for six – and wasted the months of secret talks between London and the IRA – this crash removed this obstacle to the peace process. We owe it to them (not just the pilots) to explore fully any chance that any activity that this a/c was involved in (ad hoc training or whatever) was vulnerable to accidental or willful disruption by a third party – however unlikely or unpalatable.
The evidence suggests:
that they had deliberately turned towards a known landing area for which waypoint A was the inner marker;
they had discarded waypoint A in their nav computer despite it remaining ahead – which suggests the reference to another waypoint in the system;
instrument settings were appropriate for an imminent landing or close pass to ground at the elevation of that area;
they had started to slow down (TAS down 20kts) which put them in a low power regime that would have impeded recovery from an emergency situation (turbine & FADEC response lag);
they were clear of the mist until the last seconds (ground hugging on slopes below orographic cloud) but it would have impaired their judgment of distance off – they would have been totally dependent upon whatever system they were using for this approach;
had their reference been ½ a mile further up the hill than at the landing area, all that is known about this crash is explained.
Now let us start the real debate.
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Funny why you crucify someone who is stating a view that so many would take – shouting down the individual isn’t getting you anywhere.
Face it, the MOD’s version stinks – omitted, selective, and misrepresented evidence together with spin to make the simple case that the pilots were at fault in bad weather.
BUT your version doesn’t offer a damn thing to counter this – you have not used your collective skills and experience to address the many anomalies nor get a consensus from the ample evidence (direct and circumstantial) of what else they may have been tasked with other than passing by the Mull en route.
.
While of course the possibility of an aircraft fault should indeed have been investigated thoroughly by independents (not MOD) – and I do admire the efforts of John Blakeley in particular for doing this most thoroughly and professionally – surely it should not be to the exclusion of all else AND it has now consumed an enormous amount of your time and effort and still leaves the 3 problems I have with an a/c fault (very briefly here now, you’ve heard it all before in detail):
(1) No obvious fault found (yes, I do appreciate 8-15’s post #3016 – “Scouring a fully intact airframe for evidence and the cause of a UFCM is difficult enough, but when the aircraft is scattered across a hillside, the problem would be compounded 1000fold”);
(2) Your suggested faults are either highly improbable (e.g. 2 axis jam freeing itself at last second) or demonstrably wrong (e.g. runaway as engines were found matched) in this instance;
(3) Their flight profile was already in trouble where they were and detailed analysis does not suggest control problems got them into that situation nor prevented recovery.
.
You have rather gagged debate in the pursuit of the “nothing can be known” strategy – not digging deeper in case something negative is turned up (some confidence in the pilots this shows!) – which, IMHO, serves the authorities very well because my “pet theory” has it that they came unstuck because of the actions of others.
Let us not forget that the security team on board were not in favour of capitulating to terrorism – had they got to their meeting they would have enacted strategies that would have knocked the terrorists for six – and wasted the months of secret talks between London and the IRA – this crash removed this obstacle to the peace process. We owe it to them (not just the pilots) to explore fully any chance that any activity that this a/c was involved in (ad hoc training or whatever) was vulnerable to accidental or willful disruption by a third party – however unlikely or unpalatable.
The evidence suggests:
that they had deliberately turned towards a known landing area for which waypoint A was the inner marker;
they had discarded waypoint A in their nav computer despite it remaining ahead – which suggests the reference to another waypoint in the system;
instrument settings were appropriate for an imminent landing or close pass to ground at the elevation of that area;
they had started to slow down (TAS down 20kts) which put them in a low power regime that would have impeded recovery from an emergency situation (turbine & FADEC response lag);
they were clear of the mist until the last seconds (ground hugging on slopes below orographic cloud) but it would have impaired their judgment of distance off – they would have been totally dependent upon whatever system they were using for this approach;
had their reference been ½ a mile further up the hill than at the landing area, all that is known about this crash is explained.
Now let us start the real debate.
Join Date: Jul 2000
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Courtney
Thank you once again for your insightful assessment of the case.
In your post 2990 you said:
You raise a crucial point. The senior officers played fast and loose with the rules. They changed the logical conclusion of the officers who conducted the investigation.
They were cavalier, and quite possibly arrogant.
Somebody needs to correct that error.
I have no doubt, somebody will.
Thank you once again for your insightful assessment of the case.
In your post 2990 you said:
the board may have been constrained by the rules, the senior officers weren't.
They were cavalier, and quite possibly arrogant.
Somebody needs to correct that error.
I have no doubt, somebody will.
