V-Force dispersal query
In the early sixties 3 Grp HQ was at Mildenhall. The AOC considered that the only way to arrive at one of his stations was down the runway centre line. When he visited Honington his Jaguar Mk7 driver would take him to his Anson and then belt the car all the way to Honington so it could meet him when he arrived.
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RNAS Yeovilton was used as a V Bomber dispersal airfield
When I was at RAF Honnington with 90 Sqn Valiants from 1961 until the fleet was grounded we always dispersed to RNAS Yeovilton on a regular basis until we converted to in-flight refuelling role. We never actually dispersed in anger and if I remember correctly it was normally for exercise Mayflight.
The normal overseas base for 90Sqn during such operations or exercise Sunspot was RAAF Butterworth.
The normal overseas base for 90Sqn during such operations or exercise Sunspot was RAAF Butterworth.
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Bedford Dispersal
Tim Mc:-
Have just checked my logbook and found the first use of Bedford as a dispersal airfield by 57 Sqn (Victors) was 6 Mar 61. it had a four aircraft pan at the end of the r/w and we lived in rather odd caravans close to the a/c.
On one of the flyoffs from the dispersals the a/c were routed in a stream up the North Sea in a n/e direction and turned south not too far from Sweden.
One of the Sunday papers picked this up and created quite a furore about needless provocation of the Soviets.
Have just checked my logbook and found the first use of Bedford as a dispersal airfield by 57 Sqn (Victors) was 6 Mar 61. it had a four aircraft pan at the end of the r/w and we lived in rather odd caravans close to the a/c.
On one of the flyoffs from the dispersals the a/c were routed in a stream up the North Sea in a n/e direction and turned south not too far from Sweden.
One of the Sunday papers picked this up and created quite a furore about needless provocation of the Soviets.
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RNAS Yeovilton was taken over by Waddington as a dispersal, recall Wattisham, Brawdy, Valley, Manston, Leuchars, Machrihanish to be amonst the dispersals we had visited Wattisham and Manston in 1967 and served at Machrihanish 1968/69, I was the Gen Fitt had a ground leccy and an MT Fitt as permanent staff. What a life! I shut Machrihanish down being the last to leave with an MT Fitt Sgt Tug Wilson and a tear in my eye, we drove a land rover and a big yellow caravan back, night stopping in Carlisle en-route to Waddo, quick fitters course at Saints then did a year at Valley 1969/70 and then relieved at Leuchars for a month late 1970 before offing to the ultimate 'V' dispersal in the snow RAF(U) Goose Bay. What a life started off as an 18 year old SAC and finished up as a JT. Goose to Cranwell early 1972, very much of a culture shock... then out early 1973 thank you! Off to Rhodesia to renew the 44Sqdn friendship on to BAe in Saudi and now still dealing with MoD on a day to day basis.
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Fascinating (resurrected) thread.
I used to work in ATC at weekends at Woodvale in the 60s and don't recall any mention of it being a dispersal for the V-force. There again as a spotty faced college youth I probably didn't need to know!
I recollect the only runway lighting was goosenecks and certainly no ORPs.
Raises the question for me though; how much runway was needed to lift one of these beasts to go to work for the day with an ordinance load + round trip(?) fuel?
I used to work in ATC at weekends at Woodvale in the 60s and don't recall any mention of it being a dispersal for the V-force. There again as a spotty faced college youth I probably didn't need to know!
I recollect the only runway lighting was goosenecks and certainly no ORPs.
Raises the question for me though; how much runway was needed to lift one of these beasts to go to work for the day with an ordinance load + round trip(?) fuel?
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The standard runway length was set at 9000 feet. In the late 50s- early 60s the Mark 1 aircraft would use much of that length. A fully laden Victor 1 in high temps with 21x1000lb of bombs used over 8000 feet.
A Valiant, carrying a 10000lb store would not have been far from that.
The Mark 2 Vulcan on the other hand, fully laden, could probably get off in well under 6000 feet IIRC.
A Valiant, carrying a 10000lb store would not have been far from that.
The Mark 2 Vulcan on the other hand, fully laden, could probably get off in well under 6000 feet IIRC.
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Ah!
So 'IF' Woodvale was indeed earmarked for such a task it would have only been the Vulcan blowing the caravan park away! Thinking back it seemed a tad short for the Meteor at times on a calm hot day.
Ta for the response.
FW
So 'IF' Woodvale was indeed earmarked for such a task it would have only been the Vulcan blowing the caravan park away! Thinking back it seemed a tad short for the Meteor at times on a calm hot day.
Ta for the response.
FW
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FW; do you remember Bob W at WV?
Made many a mug of 'brickies tea' for him, Roger Wheeler, Jim Coulter and Jo the Meteor pilot (surname escapes me) in the WV tower.
Wonderful days!
Ooops....thread drift....sorry folks!
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FW, at the time it was too short for the Vulcan as well. A Mk 2 could use a 6000 foot strip but prefered longer. Cranwell was a Valiant dispersal at one point and that is about 6000 feet so that nails that one down.
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From my first Vulcan station (Coningsby) - did one dispersal to Burtonwood. Then from Scampton it was nominally Lossie, but Sys Fitters were then thin on the ground so I was sometimes the only one in the area and used to commute Lossie to the other Scampton disp - Kinloss, depending on where I was needed.
One day making my way along that coastal road in the fairy RVT I got a puncture - and no blasted spare! - had to walk about 5 miles to find a phone!
One day making my way along that coastal road in the fairy RVT I got a puncture - and no blasted spare! - had to walk about 5 miles to find a phone!
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V Force dispersal
I have read much in this thread about where could Vulcans disperse to. But no one seems to have given a thought to. How will they disperse in FOG?
I, amongst others carried out the very successful automatic landing trials on the Vulcan at Bedford. These were specifically designed to enable the Vulcan to fly to a designated airfield 'In any prevailing weather condition.'
I must however point out that on a visit to a Greenham Common airshow after I retired I was shown round the cockpit of a 50Sqdn Vulcan and when I remarked to the Flt Lt Pilot that I was pleased to note that his aircraft was equiped for Autolanding...He replied " Ah thats what those bits are for we never knew"
The Vulcan was impressive in the automatic mode As it was doing 90Knt approaches using Auto Throttle
I, amongst others carried out the very successful automatic landing trials on the Vulcan at Bedford. These were specifically designed to enable the Vulcan to fly to a designated airfield 'In any prevailing weather condition.'
I must however point out that on a visit to a Greenham Common airshow after I retired I was shown round the cockpit of a 50Sqdn Vulcan and when I remarked to the Flt Lt Pilot that I was pleased to note that his aircraft was equiped for Autolanding...He replied " Ah thats what those bits are for we never knew"
The Vulcan was impressive in the automatic mode As it was doing 90Knt approaches using Auto Throttle
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Padhist, AFAIK it was only Scampton that had the autoland. At Cottesmore we were rather envivous but I have to say we never diverted, even on Red, provided we were allowed a stab.
The Blue Star filling station on the A1 was one mile finals. The skipper reckoned that as long as he was at 300 feet, on heading, then we would land. We certainly had to do this one night, gin clear but the cockpit vis ws less than 2 miles. We had been pounding the circuit and collected cement dust from Ketton that fused on the gold-film heated windscreen. I can't recall whether it was SOP to switch it off at low level or to leave it on.
The Blue Star filling station on the A1 was one mile finals. The skipper reckoned that as long as he was at 300 feet, on heading, then we would land. We certainly had to do this one night, gin clear but the cockpit vis ws less than 2 miles. We had been pounding the circuit and collected cement dust from Ketton that fused on the gold-film heated windscreen. I can't recall whether it was SOP to switch it off at low level or to leave it on.
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I would assume that dispersal in fog would never have been an issue. The decision to disperse the V-Force wouldn't have been taken as a last-minute option, therefore there would be sufficient time to take into account weather conditions and suitable locations depending on available aircraft, etc.
As for Woodvale, I thought we'd laid that one to rest? No, it wasn't a dispersal airfield!
As for Woodvale, I thought we'd laid that one to rest? No, it wasn't a dispersal airfield!
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Main base generation - Alert Condition 3 - was seen as a relatively covert and non-escalator increase in readiness. The force was generated to 15 min readiness and held within the ring of steel.
OTOH Alert Condition 2 was an extremely tricky decision. Aircraft slated for dispersal were not fuelled with sufficient fuel for a war mission. The longer the force was retained at Alert Condition 2 the greater its chance of failure.
Alert Condition 1 was the ultimate increase in escalation but the force would not be cocked until aircraft were turned around at their dispersals. In exercises it was rare to be at Alert Condition 2 for more than 6 hours. Once sufficient aircraft were declared combat available the CinC would give the dispersal order with, presumably, the agreement of the PM and Sec State. A little factor such as fog would not have stopped him.
Well, that is my tak on the situation.
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Fair point - if the decision to disperse had been made at a critical point in an escalating situation then weather conditions would have been irrelevant. What I meant was that if the decision to disperse had been made as part of the much-predicted gradual increase in tension (the theory being that dispersing the force sent a clear message) then there would have doubtless been sufficient time to take into account the conditions, availability of aircraft and dispersal bases, etc. But I quite agree that if the move had been taken in response to the possibility of an imminent attack, I don't suppose anyone would have been concerned about fog!
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Tim, at the time we are talking about there was no consideration of gradual it was pure trip wire.
The only consideration was Alert Condition 3 - covert - go for it - all eggs on one basket.
Alert Condition 2 - prepare for dispersal.
Alert Condition 1 - overt - disperse the force. Force dispersal was the requirement and the longer the decision was defered the less credible the UK independent deterrent.
Remember, force generation would be taking place in the USA and USSR too. In the case of one Fallex exercise, as often cited by Professor Hennessy, the NATO startex was something like 0800 on a Monday morning. CinC Bomber started his exercise 4 days earlier and brought Bomber Command to a dispersed posture before the declaration of NATO Simple Alert.
OK, paper exercise, but gives you an idea.
PS, just a note on paper exercises if you will forgive the drift:
The aircraft, crew and manning states for the exercise were determined by the actual, real-time, status at startex. If an aicraft was u/s at Offutt then that was its startex state. If real world recovery action had begun then that would be factored in. For the exercise any 'peacetime' action would then be accelerated and the aircraft staged back through Goose rather than night stopping. If it went u/s at Goose then that fault might be transfered to the aircraft which was not assumed to be at home base.
Similarly crews would be recalled on paper, no actual recall taking place, and realistic times assumed. Crew X, living near Waddington, would, if not on leave, be assumed to be available at H+1:50. Whereas Crew Y, with several ex-Scampton crew members, might not be available until H+3:00 as they had to negotiate Lincoln traffic pre-Pelham Bridge and so on.
At about H+4 the exercise clock kicked in with 30 minutes = to one hour and ended at about 1700 which, exercise time, was in the early hours of the following morning.
The only consideration was Alert Condition 3 - covert - go for it - all eggs on one basket.
Alert Condition 2 - prepare for dispersal.
Alert Condition 1 - overt - disperse the force. Force dispersal was the requirement and the longer the decision was defered the less credible the UK independent deterrent.
Remember, force generation would be taking place in the USA and USSR too. In the case of one Fallex exercise, as often cited by Professor Hennessy, the NATO startex was something like 0800 on a Monday morning. CinC Bomber started his exercise 4 days earlier and brought Bomber Command to a dispersed posture before the declaration of NATO Simple Alert.
OK, paper exercise, but gives you an idea.
PS, just a note on paper exercises if you will forgive the drift:
The aircraft, crew and manning states for the exercise were determined by the actual, real-time, status at startex. If an aicraft was u/s at Offutt then that was its startex state. If real world recovery action had begun then that would be factored in. For the exercise any 'peacetime' action would then be accelerated and the aircraft staged back through Goose rather than night stopping. If it went u/s at Goose then that fault might be transfered to the aircraft which was not assumed to be at home base.
Similarly crews would be recalled on paper, no actual recall taking place, and realistic times assumed. Crew X, living near Waddington, would, if not on leave, be assumed to be available at H+1:50. Whereas Crew Y, with several ex-Scampton crew members, might not be available until H+3:00 as they had to negotiate Lincoln traffic pre-Pelham Bridge and so on.
At about H+4 the exercise clock kicked in with 30 minutes = to one hour and ended at about 1700 which, exercise time, was in the early hours of the following morning.
Last edited by Pontius Navigator; 17th Apr 2009 at 07:41.
Possession of an automatic landing capability does not automatically confer the ability to operate in reduced visibilities and the use of decision heights (DH) below 200'. The Vulcan had a single channel autopilot that could only confer a fail passive capability and would require a visual segment in the approach in order that centreline tracking could be confirmed. The best that could have been achieved with the equipment as fitted would equate to Category 2 capability, i.e. a DH not below 100' above Touch Down Zone Elevation (TDZE). The required visual reference at DH for a CAT 2 approach are to see 3 approach lights (there are other options but this keeps it simple). The problem with the Vulcan would have been that the viusal cut-oof from the cockpit would have made acquisition of the closest light marginal and significantly reduced the chance of a sucessful approach in the normal Cat2 runway Visual Range (RVR) of 300 mtrs. The only way to increase the success rate would have been to raise the minimum RVR to say 400mtrs and given that the minimum RVR for a normal Cat 1 manual landing was 600 mtrs then the additional capability increase was of marginal value. Remember as well that the system envisaged for the v-aircraft required ground installation of leader cables, it was not a pure ILS system as used today.
In summary, the development of autoland and work done on low vis ops by the Blind Landing Experimental Unit was ground breaking and showed what could be achieved. The technology was developed and procedures established, but this was still a long way away from an operational capability available to all service crews.
YS
In summary, the development of autoland and work done on low vis ops by the Blind Landing Experimental Unit was ground breaking and showed what could be achieved. The technology was developed and procedures established, but this was still a long way away from an operational capability available to all service crews.
YS
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Fair enough, but when the concept was actually put into practise (ie - Cuba) the Force was not dispersed when it should have been, because of the risk of escalation.This suggests that even with a "trip wire" policy, the decision to disperse was never going to be taken without a great deal of consideration?
