Future Carrier (Including Costs)
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Oops......
Refitting Royal Navy’s combat ship engine to cost tens of millions That's an Integrated electric propulsion (IEP) system - isn't that the same as fitted in the new carriers?
THE ELECTRIC WARSHIP - THEN, NOW AND LATER
Refitting Royal Navy’s combat ship engine to cost tens of millions That's an Integrated electric propulsion (IEP) system - isn't that the same as fitted in the new carriers?
THE ELECTRIC WARSHIP - THEN, NOW AND LATER
Last edited by ORAC; 29th Jan 2016 at 09:34.
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Word is that the RN has put out an urgent request to suppliers of solar panels for quotes to fit the T45 fleet.
The good news is that the new carriers have plenty of surface to cover in panels. The fact that once covered with panels they won't be able to launch/recover aircraft isn't a problem, as the F35s are so shot with software issues it's unlikely they will ever fire a shot/drop anything in anger.
The good news is that the new carriers have plenty of surface to cover in panels. The fact that once covered with panels they won't be able to launch/recover aircraft isn't a problem, as the F35s are so shot with software issues it's unlikely they will ever fire a shot/drop anything in anger.
Oops......
Refitting Royal Navy’s combat ship engine to cost tens of millions That's an Integrated electric propulsion (IEP) system - isn't that the same as fitted in the new carriers?
THE ELECTRIC WARSHIP - THEN, NOW AND LATER
Refitting Royal Navy’s combat ship engine to cost tens of millions That's an Integrated electric propulsion (IEP) system - isn't that the same as fitted in the new carriers?
THE ELECTRIC WARSHIP - THEN, NOW AND LATER
The issue is not so much the IEP system itself, rather the reliability of the complex cycle GT - WR21 - fitted to T45 combined with the rather small diesel generators fitted to the T45, assumed for harbour use only.
The QEC Gas Turbines are a very different beast, without the issues that affect WR21. The QEC DG are sized to be much more than harbour generator units.
To be fair to BAES, their original T45 offer used a completely different propulsion GT and arrangement, supplied by GE. A certain SoS whose constituency was not a million miles removed from the HQ of a large UK GT manufacturer apparently mandated the use of WR21. Allegedly......
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"without the issues that affect WR21."
brave man Boffin - considering they haven't sailed under power yet...
and I'm sure the T45 sytems passed any number of bench tests
brave man Boffin - considering they haven't sailed under power yet...
and I'm sure the T45 sytems passed any number of bench tests
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Landing in crab
Hi guys, totally unrelated subject but I have a question, I'm a doing my 73 type and reading about landing with crab in the fctm, it says it is no reccomended on dry runway because it has a large lateral deviation from the touchdown point.. Now it says can be used more on a slippery runway as it won't drift towards the downwind side a lot... How is this? You would imagine on a slippery runway it would drift more as it has less friction,, any thoughts.. Thanks in advance
You either understand what's going on with T45. Or you don't.
What's going on?
So what is the plan for the T45's?
On the info available it seems that the DGs are being upgraded so that at least the lights and weapons work when they are drifting around the oggin after the GTs fail.
Say it ain't so.
KB
On the info available it seems that the DGs are being upgraded so that at least the lights and weapons work when they are drifting around the oggin after the GTs fail.
Say it ain't so.
KB
Pre-upgrade non-WR21 generating capacity = 4MW
Post upgrade non-WR21 capacity = 9-12MW, including another generating unit. Also means the tricky stuff added to WR21 can be ditched.....
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Puts the costs per ton and "steel is cheap" argument into perspective. And if anyone asks what the aviation aspect is..... its from AW&ST......
Cost Overruns Lead To Slashed U.K. Frigate Order
Royal Navy’s Type 26 ‘affordable’ frigate is breaking the bank
Francis Tusa | Aviation Week & Space Technology - Defense Technology Edition
Implicit in the design of the British Royal Navy’s Type 26 frigate was that it should cost no more than two-thirds of a Type 45 destroyer.
The latter is a design where advanced technology ran away, leading to costs that resulted in six ships being built instead of 12, and with the nonrecurring costs of a full class amortized across those half-dozen ships. As a result, the Type 45s have a unit production cost (UPC) of £650 million ($975 million), excluding R&D. To avoid this, Type 26 was to be “cost capped” at a UPC of just over £400 million. But by the time of the November 2015 U.K. Strategic Defense and Security Review, the anticipated class of 13 Type 26 frigates was cut back to eight as a result of UPCs escalating to well above £600 million—about the same as a Type 45.
How did this happen? Put simply, the Type 26 got too big. And size drives cost, even if other factors are at play. A dominant concept in Royal Navy ship design was expressed by the First Sea Lord at the start of the 2000s, Adm. Mike Boyce: “Steel is cheap, and air is free.” He advised that in designing the Type 45, the naval service should not replicate errors of the previous Type 42 destroyer class. These were a bad compromise in size and capability. Because the treasury reduced the ship’s size to save money, when it came to updates, trying to shoehorn equipment into too-small spaces cost inordinately more. So, with steel 5-7% of a ship’s cost, Boyce was arguing that you should build ships with, in effect, empty spaces to accommodate updates.
However, as the Type 26 design developed, size ballooned.
Here are some reasons for the escalation in size and cost:
Land-attack missile tubes. Vertical launch silos for these missiles are 2-2.5 meters (6.5-8.2 ft.) longer than for standard surface-to-air missiles, equating to a draft up to 2-2.5 meters deeper.
Chinook-capable deck. The Type 23 deploys the Merlin medium-lift helicopter, but the target for the Type 26 is a Chinook. Even if the hangar is not Chinook-capable, the deck will need to be 6-10 meters longer. That means a plug of steel weighing 400-600 tons.
Mission bay. It is fashionable to have a bay for extra payloads, to make a ship adaptable and even future-proof. But adding the capability to carry a dozen 20-ft. ISO containers securely means a big box (with handling cranes and rails), which adds a several-hundred-ton section in the middle of the ship.
Modernizing crew quarters. This is an issue with real size/cost implications. Ships are no longer built with 30-60-sailor mess decks—most recruits would balk. Instead, there have to be 2-4-person spaces, a far larger provision of showers and separate facilities for women. All of which adds size, weight and cost. As a point of comparison, if the Type 23 frigate were built to current crew standards, it would displace 1,200-1,500 tons more than it does. At full displacement of around 4,500 tons, that brings the ship close to 6,000 tons, not far from what a Type 26 displaces.
Design creep means larger ships and correspondingly higher unit production costs.
Even if the U.K.’s appetite for the Type 26 does not meet its financial resources, comparisons should be made to put matters into perspective. In studying the costs of European frigates/destroyers for the past 20 years (including inflation), a range of costs for frigates/destroyers emerges: European general-purpose frigate cost per ton: $100,000; European antisubmarine-optimized frigate cost per ton: $125,000. Multiply the latter figure by 7,000, and it comes to the cost of a Type 26. The Type 26 is not “expensive”—it costs exactly what a 7,000-ton+ antisubmarine-warfare-optimized escort should cost. However, if it didn’t have a Chinook-capable flight deck, vertical-launch silos and large mission bay, it could be 1,500-2,000 tons lighter and so cost £425 million compared with more than £600 million.
And it isn’t just the U.K. that has been hit by this trend. France planned to buy a class of 17 Fremm multimission frigates but because of cost, reduced the program to eight ships. So, size matters. Even if the price of steel is at historic lows, an antisubmarine-warfare frigate will not be cheap since steel is not driving the price.
The U.K. now plans to launch a “truly affordable frigate” program—notionally called the Type 31—to enter service in the late 2020s.
Cost Overruns Lead To Slashed U.K. Frigate Order
Royal Navy’s Type 26 ‘affordable’ frigate is breaking the bank
Francis Tusa | Aviation Week & Space Technology - Defense Technology Edition
Implicit in the design of the British Royal Navy’s Type 26 frigate was that it should cost no more than two-thirds of a Type 45 destroyer.
The latter is a design where advanced technology ran away, leading to costs that resulted in six ships being built instead of 12, and with the nonrecurring costs of a full class amortized across those half-dozen ships. As a result, the Type 45s have a unit production cost (UPC) of £650 million ($975 million), excluding R&D. To avoid this, Type 26 was to be “cost capped” at a UPC of just over £400 million. But by the time of the November 2015 U.K. Strategic Defense and Security Review, the anticipated class of 13 Type 26 frigates was cut back to eight as a result of UPCs escalating to well above £600 million—about the same as a Type 45.
How did this happen? Put simply, the Type 26 got too big. And size drives cost, even if other factors are at play. A dominant concept in Royal Navy ship design was expressed by the First Sea Lord at the start of the 2000s, Adm. Mike Boyce: “Steel is cheap, and air is free.” He advised that in designing the Type 45, the naval service should not replicate errors of the previous Type 42 destroyer class. These were a bad compromise in size and capability. Because the treasury reduced the ship’s size to save money, when it came to updates, trying to shoehorn equipment into too-small spaces cost inordinately more. So, with steel 5-7% of a ship’s cost, Boyce was arguing that you should build ships with, in effect, empty spaces to accommodate updates.
However, as the Type 26 design developed, size ballooned.
Here are some reasons for the escalation in size and cost:
Land-attack missile tubes. Vertical launch silos for these missiles are 2-2.5 meters (6.5-8.2 ft.) longer than for standard surface-to-air missiles, equating to a draft up to 2-2.5 meters deeper.
Chinook-capable deck. The Type 23 deploys the Merlin medium-lift helicopter, but the target for the Type 26 is a Chinook. Even if the hangar is not Chinook-capable, the deck will need to be 6-10 meters longer. That means a plug of steel weighing 400-600 tons.
Mission bay. It is fashionable to have a bay for extra payloads, to make a ship adaptable and even future-proof. But adding the capability to carry a dozen 20-ft. ISO containers securely means a big box (with handling cranes and rails), which adds a several-hundred-ton section in the middle of the ship.
Modernizing crew quarters. This is an issue with real size/cost implications. Ships are no longer built with 30-60-sailor mess decks—most recruits would balk. Instead, there have to be 2-4-person spaces, a far larger provision of showers and separate facilities for women. All of which adds size, weight and cost. As a point of comparison, if the Type 23 frigate were built to current crew standards, it would displace 1,200-1,500 tons more than it does. At full displacement of around 4,500 tons, that brings the ship close to 6,000 tons, not far from what a Type 26 displaces.
Design creep means larger ships and correspondingly higher unit production costs.
Even if the U.K.’s appetite for the Type 26 does not meet its financial resources, comparisons should be made to put matters into perspective. In studying the costs of European frigates/destroyers for the past 20 years (including inflation), a range of costs for frigates/destroyers emerges: European general-purpose frigate cost per ton: $100,000; European antisubmarine-optimized frigate cost per ton: $125,000. Multiply the latter figure by 7,000, and it comes to the cost of a Type 26. The Type 26 is not “expensive”—it costs exactly what a 7,000-ton+ antisubmarine-warfare-optimized escort should cost. However, if it didn’t have a Chinook-capable flight deck, vertical-launch silos and large mission bay, it could be 1,500-2,000 tons lighter and so cost £425 million compared with more than £600 million.
And it isn’t just the U.K. that has been hit by this trend. France planned to buy a class of 17 Fremm multimission frigates but because of cost, reduced the program to eight ships. So, size matters. Even if the price of steel is at historic lows, an antisubmarine-warfare frigate will not be cheap since steel is not driving the price.
The U.K. now plans to launch a “truly affordable frigate” program—notionally called the Type 31—to enter service in the late 2020s.
It's a shame Tusa doesn't stick to what he knows.....that article is littered with duff info.
The difference between a Mk41 tactical length launcher and a strike length launcher is about 3ft, less than half what he claims. Worse still, it isn't an impact on draft (which is weight-dependent), the actual effect if any is on depth (a different parameter). Increasing depth can actually be weight-neutral, as you tend to get more strength out of a deeper section, so need proportionally thinner steel - up to a point of course!
His estimates for additional weight incurred by "plugs" for Chinook flight decks and modular spaces are also off by some margin. The average weight (not displacement, but actual material) per metre length of a T26 is about 40te/m.
The escort displacements quoted in his little table are also all over the place - there a significant element of comparing apples with wheelbraces going on in that lot.
Worst of all it perpetuates (perhaps at someone's behest?) the idea that size is directly proportional to cost. It isn't. It does have an effect, but it's far from scalable. The European warship cost rates he suggests must have been from a very small sample - as I'm struggling to identify more than a couple of "ASW" ships built in the last twenty years - let alone work out where their cost info came from and on what basis........
Warship cost is all about manhours and materials, which don't scale in direct proportion to displacement - particularly where you have effects like HV electrical systems, modular cabins, productivity / build advances over 20-odd years of nominal improvement sprinkled among the data. There are elements that add cost (additional safety requirements and procedures, software and soforth), but these are offset by use of MOTS/COTS equipments and procedures.
The question to ask is where the additional costs in material and labour are coming from - and more pertinently whether they are "real" or "programmed".
The difference between a Mk41 tactical length launcher and a strike length launcher is about 3ft, less than half what he claims. Worse still, it isn't an impact on draft (which is weight-dependent), the actual effect if any is on depth (a different parameter). Increasing depth can actually be weight-neutral, as you tend to get more strength out of a deeper section, so need proportionally thinner steel - up to a point of course!
His estimates for additional weight incurred by "plugs" for Chinook flight decks and modular spaces are also off by some margin. The average weight (not displacement, but actual material) per metre length of a T26 is about 40te/m.
The escort displacements quoted in his little table are also all over the place - there a significant element of comparing apples with wheelbraces going on in that lot.
Worst of all it perpetuates (perhaps at someone's behest?) the idea that size is directly proportional to cost. It isn't. It does have an effect, but it's far from scalable. The European warship cost rates he suggests must have been from a very small sample - as I'm struggling to identify more than a couple of "ASW" ships built in the last twenty years - let alone work out where their cost info came from and on what basis........
Warship cost is all about manhours and materials, which don't scale in direct proportion to displacement - particularly where you have effects like HV electrical systems, modular cabins, productivity / build advances over 20-odd years of nominal improvement sprinkled among the data. There are elements that add cost (additional safety requirements and procedures, software and soforth), but these are offset by use of MOTS/COTS equipments and procedures.
The question to ask is where the additional costs in material and labour are coming from - and more pertinently whether they are "real" or "programmed".
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Well whatever it is it looks as if we can't build an "affordable" escort any more...
either we stick with the River class or someone has to educate the Treasury and the Cabinet that anything bigger is going to cost hundreds of millions a pop......
either we stick with the River class or someone has to educate the Treasury and the Cabinet that anything bigger is going to cost hundreds of millions a pop......
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Why would "hundreds of millions" be considered too much?
Compared to the price of a single jet they are very reasonable on a bang per buck ratio.
Rather more expensive to run perhaps....
Compared to the price of a single jet they are very reasonable on a bang per buck ratio.
Rather more expensive to run perhaps....
It's a shame Tusa doesn't stick to what he knows.....that article is littered with duff info.
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"Why would "hundreds of millions" be considered too much?"
Ask the Treasury.......... maybe it's because the outcomes are so much higher than the initial estimates every time - we started out going to buy a decent number of 45's and the cost led to cuts, we were going to buy a load of Astute's but that has been trimmed back due to cost escallation - and now the 26's are going down the same route
personally I'd like to see a steady building programme over years so the fixed costs are reduced and we get some thing out of the learning curve as well as a decent sized force but when every £ has to be argued for every year it is a very very tough sell politically
No doubt tomorrow we'll see further rightward drift on all sorts of defence programmes so the Chancellor can meet his targets and stay in the running to replace Dave......
Ask the Treasury.......... maybe it's because the outcomes are so much higher than the initial estimates every time - we started out going to buy a decent number of 45's and the cost led to cuts, we were going to buy a load of Astute's but that has been trimmed back due to cost escallation - and now the 26's are going down the same route
personally I'd like to see a steady building programme over years so the fixed costs are reduced and we get some thing out of the learning curve as well as a decent sized force but when every £ has to be argued for every year it is a very very tough sell politically
No doubt tomorrow we'll see further rightward drift on all sorts of defence programmes so the Chancellor can meet his targets and stay in the running to replace Dave......
Thread Starter
British companies develop new thermal metal coating for Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers
British companies have developed a new thermal metal coating for use on the flight deck of the UK Royal Navy's Queen Elizabeth Class (QEC) aircraft carriers.
The coating will protect the carriers' flight deck from the heat generated by the thrusters of the new F-35B Lightning II fighter jets.
Developed in partnership with Tyne and Wear-based Monitor Coatings, the protective coating is a combination of aluminium and titanium that can endure heat levels of up to 1,500°C (2,700°F).
"There is incredible momentum behind the programme to prepare HMS Queen Elizabeth for sea trials."The coating is expected to provide a long-term protection through the life of the aircraft carriers and is considered a key part in the preparation of the first carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth for sea trial next year, followed by flight trials in 2018.
So that protects the deck, but I fail to see how anything other than experience of jets on deck can prepare the deck crews for the noise and jet blast....
British companies have developed a new thermal metal coating for use on the flight deck of the UK Royal Navy's Queen Elizabeth Class (QEC) aircraft carriers.
The coating will protect the carriers' flight deck from the heat generated by the thrusters of the new F-35B Lightning II fighter jets.
Developed in partnership with Tyne and Wear-based Monitor Coatings, the protective coating is a combination of aluminium and titanium that can endure heat levels of up to 1,500°C (2,700°F).
"There is incredible momentum behind the programme to prepare HMS Queen Elizabeth for sea trials."The coating is expected to provide a long-term protection through the life of the aircraft carriers and is considered a key part in the preparation of the first carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth for sea trial next year, followed by flight trials in 2018.
So that protects the deck, but I fail to see how anything other than experience of jets on deck can prepare the deck crews for the noise and jet blast....
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WEBF,
The jets are going on the deck; experience will be gained and maintained.
What have you heard different? What is suggesting there are ways of giving deck crews experience of noise and jet blast, other than being on a pitching deck in sea spray, with jets landing and taking off?
The jets are going on the deck; experience will be gained and maintained.
What have you heard different? What is suggesting there are ways of giving deck crews experience of noise and jet blast, other than being on a pitching deck in sea spray, with jets landing and taking off?
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I was under the impression that there were RN "seedcorn" on USN Carriers and that there was a facility at Culdrose, that had some SHARs for initial training to take place at.
WEBF,
The jets are going on the deck; experience will be gained and maintained.
What have you heard different? What is suggesting there are ways of giving deck crews experience of noise and jet blast, other than being on a pitching deck in sea spray, with jets landing and taking off?
The jets are going on the deck; experience will be gained and maintained.
What have you heard different? What is suggesting there are ways of giving deck crews experience of noise and jet blast, other than being on a pitching deck in sea spray, with jets landing and taking off?
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