Defence: Public ignorance, the media, and cutbacks
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not quite true. It does mention that the Lynx carried the raiding party while the yank helicopter watched from overhead (sorry I mean carried out supporting surveillance...)
Thread Starter
10/10 for not getting the point. The article was written by a USN aviator, about the utility of armed shipborne helicopters in current operations. The RN/RM involvement was neither here nor there in many ways.
The purpose of this post isn’t to re-tell the story of the event. Both HMS MONMOUTH and USS BATAAN released reports of the incident which can be found in the open press. The PAO’s put hard work into these articles, read them for the story of a successful boarding to retake control of the M/V Caravos Horizon. Instead of rehashing the story, here at the USNI blog we’ll look at the larger picture…what lessons can we learn about counter-piracy and naval irregular warfare?
In October of 2010 I was lucky to be invited to speak as a panelist at the Naval Institute’s History Conference “Pirates on the High Seas” during a discussion of the history of piracy and counter-piracy titled “Blackbeard to the Barbary.” In my opening remarks I highlighted three things that stuck out from the 200+ year history of the USN’s counter piracy missions: Platforms, People, and Partnerships. Specifically, having the right “low end/high end” mix of hardware to do the job, having professional and aggressive junior officers to lead operations, and having competent and willing allies to work with in the region. The combined Anglo-American response to the attack on M/V Caravos Horizon reinforces that these principles are as important in the twenty-first century as they were when Decatur, Porter, and Downes sailed in the nineteenth.
PLATFORMS
When it comes to the hardware involved in this successful operation, a key takeaway is the vital importance of rotary-wing aviation. Irregular operations rarely require the expensive, fast, sexy, high altitude TACAIR jets that you’ll find in Hollywood movies. They need the quiet professionals of the often overlooked naval rotary-wing community. Helicopters embarked on the ships that conduct counter-piracy operations are a force multiplier that provide the ability to respond rapidly, develop critical ISR, and finally to provide overwatch and maritime air support for boarding operations. Sending a ship on counter-piracy or irregular warfare missions without an embarked helicopter significantly degrades the unit’s capability.
The rapid response by the RN Lynx to the scene allowed for the development of early situational awareness which became a key factor for success. The follow on arrival of Bay Raider allowed the ISR net to be cast further away from the attacked vessel. It was able to find two skiffs, which they believed were the suspected “sea bandits.” Our Knighthawk remained overhead briefly as a visible deterrent, and the skiffs turned away from the shipping lanes and headed off at high speed. The two aircraft together could cover hundreds of square miles and help develop situational awareness far beyond the capability of a single surface combatant. When time came for the boarding, the ability to have Bay Raider provide armed overwatch and ISR while the Lynx conducted the insertion was an important element of protecting the boarding party and helping to ensure their success.
In 2003, 814 NAS deployed aboard RFA Fort Victoria as ar of Operation Telic, for the purpose of ISR and overwatch for the frigate and destroyer borne Lynx. FIACs were the threat then, but small boats present similar detection and idenification problems regardless of whether they are FIACs, pirates, or smugglers. The naval helicopter really is the maid of all work. As the article concludes:
The motto of HSC-28 Detachment TWO is “So Others May Live…Or Die.” Whether as a search and rescue aircraft or a helicopter gunship, DET 2 is a best friend to mariners in distress, worst enemy to those who aim to disrupt maritime security in the regions where we operate. The pride that I feel in being associated with DET 2’s maintenance team, naval aircrewmen, and our pilots is endless. After four and a half months supporting maritime security and contingency operations off the coast of Libya, we have moved southeast, and for the foreseeable future we remain on station…
If only we had more ships with large flight decks AND hangars. Would it not have been better for the Type 45 to have a hangar that could accomodate a pair of Merlins - after all the flight deck is huge? The LPDs Albion and Bulwark had their hangars removed from the design to save money, despite the fact that they have large flight decks.
The purpose of this post isn’t to re-tell the story of the event. Both HMS MONMOUTH and USS BATAAN released reports of the incident which can be found in the open press. The PAO’s put hard work into these articles, read them for the story of a successful boarding to retake control of the M/V Caravos Horizon. Instead of rehashing the story, here at the USNI blog we’ll look at the larger picture…what lessons can we learn about counter-piracy and naval irregular warfare?
In October of 2010 I was lucky to be invited to speak as a panelist at the Naval Institute’s History Conference “Pirates on the High Seas” during a discussion of the history of piracy and counter-piracy titled “Blackbeard to the Barbary.” In my opening remarks I highlighted three things that stuck out from the 200+ year history of the USN’s counter piracy missions: Platforms, People, and Partnerships. Specifically, having the right “low end/high end” mix of hardware to do the job, having professional and aggressive junior officers to lead operations, and having competent and willing allies to work with in the region. The combined Anglo-American response to the attack on M/V Caravos Horizon reinforces that these principles are as important in the twenty-first century as they were when Decatur, Porter, and Downes sailed in the nineteenth.
PLATFORMS
When it comes to the hardware involved in this successful operation, a key takeaway is the vital importance of rotary-wing aviation. Irregular operations rarely require the expensive, fast, sexy, high altitude TACAIR jets that you’ll find in Hollywood movies. They need the quiet professionals of the often overlooked naval rotary-wing community. Helicopters embarked on the ships that conduct counter-piracy operations are a force multiplier that provide the ability to respond rapidly, develop critical ISR, and finally to provide overwatch and maritime air support for boarding operations. Sending a ship on counter-piracy or irregular warfare missions without an embarked helicopter significantly degrades the unit’s capability.
The rapid response by the RN Lynx to the scene allowed for the development of early situational awareness which became a key factor for success. The follow on arrival of Bay Raider allowed the ISR net to be cast further away from the attacked vessel. It was able to find two skiffs, which they believed were the suspected “sea bandits.” Our Knighthawk remained overhead briefly as a visible deterrent, and the skiffs turned away from the shipping lanes and headed off at high speed. The two aircraft together could cover hundreds of square miles and help develop situational awareness far beyond the capability of a single surface combatant. When time came for the boarding, the ability to have Bay Raider provide armed overwatch and ISR while the Lynx conducted the insertion was an important element of protecting the boarding party and helping to ensure their success.
In 2003, 814 NAS deployed aboard RFA Fort Victoria as ar of Operation Telic, for the purpose of ISR and overwatch for the frigate and destroyer borne Lynx. FIACs were the threat then, but small boats present similar detection and idenification problems regardless of whether they are FIACs, pirates, or smugglers. The naval helicopter really is the maid of all work. As the article concludes:
The motto of HSC-28 Detachment TWO is “So Others May Live…Or Die.” Whether as a search and rescue aircraft or a helicopter gunship, DET 2 is a best friend to mariners in distress, worst enemy to those who aim to disrupt maritime security in the regions where we operate. The pride that I feel in being associated with DET 2’s maintenance team, naval aircrewmen, and our pilots is endless. After four and a half months supporting maritime security and contingency operations off the coast of Libya, we have moved southeast, and for the foreseeable future we remain on station…
If only we had more ships with large flight decks AND hangars. Would it not have been better for the Type 45 to have a hangar that could accomodate a pair of Merlins - after all the flight deck is huge? The LPDs Albion and Bulwark had their hangars removed from the design to save money, despite the fact that they have large flight decks.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 3rd Sep 2011 at 15:05.
Originally Posted by cazatou
WEBF
Perhaps you should do a little research into what happened to the RN's Carriers in the first few months of WW2!!!
Perhaps you should do a little research into what happened to the RN's Carriers in the first few months of WW2!!!
P.S. Did you know that a FAA Skua shot down the first German aircraft of WW2 and that FAA aircraft from HMS Indefatigable shot down the last enemy aircraft of the war? Every day's a school day, eh?
Thread Starter
How does one do a quote with "originally posted by....." appearing in the box? Genuine question.
I assume that you are talking about the loss of Couragous, lost whilst on anti U Boat operations where her aircraft where performing a visual sweep. Technology such as ASV radar, or other things that were later carried did not exist. She (standing by for correction) was launching aircraft, and had to leave her escorts. I think you are also talking about of loss of Glorious during the Norwegian campaign, a tragedy that is mentioned in sea survival discussions. She was destroyed by gunfire from the two German Battle cruisers. At the time she had no aircraft in the air, which would have spotted two large German units.
Since the RAF had largely run carrier aviation prior to WW2, there were no ex aviators in senior positions, and no voice for the FAA at Admiralty level. The skills and experience to use aircraft effectively did not exist, and had to be built during the war (a lesson from history that we should not ignore). Later on, technologies and experience levels did improve, and the escort carriers performed valuable work and were key in many convoy battles, both against U Boats and long range bombers/reece aircraft.
The point about the value of naval helicopters in current operations stands, as does the point about the odd procurement system that gives us destroyers with large (Chinook size) flight decks but relatively small hangars, and LPDs with even larger flight decks but no hangar.
WEBF
Perhaps you should do a little research into what happened to the RN's Carriers in the first few months of WW2!!!
Perhaps you should do a little research into what happened to the RN's Carriers in the first few months of WW2!!!
Since the RAF had largely run carrier aviation prior to WW2, there were no ex aviators in senior positions, and no voice for the FAA at Admiralty level. The skills and experience to use aircraft effectively did not exist, and had to be built during the war (a lesson from history that we should not ignore). Later on, technologies and experience levels did improve, and the escort carriers performed valuable work and were key in many convoy battles, both against U Boats and long range bombers/reece aircraft.
The point about the value of naval helicopters in current operations stands, as does the point about the odd procurement system that gives us destroyers with large (Chinook size) flight decks but relatively small hangars, and LPDs with even larger flight decks but no hangar.
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FODPlod
Yes I did - however, did you know that the CinC Coastal Command of the RAF at the outbreak of WW2 had commanded HMS Empress (one of the Navy's first aircraft carriers) on Christmas Day 1914 in the attack on the German seaplane base at Cuxhaven?
Yes I did - however, did you know that the CinC Coastal Command of the RAF at the outbreak of WW2 had commanded HMS Empress (one of the Navy's first aircraft carriers) on Christmas Day 1914 in the attack on the German seaplane base at Cuxhaven?
Originally Posted by cazatou
Originally Posted by FODPlod
P.S. Did you know that a FAA Skua shot down the first German aircraft of WW2 and that FAA aircraft from HMS Indefatigable shot down the last enemy aircraft of the war? Every day's a school day, eh?
Early War
From its formation in 1936 the Command did not receive the support it required to be an effective naval air service...
...the events of April to June 1940 overturned the balance of power, as the Germans conquered Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands, Belgium and France. This allowed the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine to operate from French ports on the Atlantic coast, much closer to the Atlantic shipping lanes. It also put German air power within range of Britain's ports on all of its coasts. The advantage now enjoyed by the Germans allowed them to inflict heavy losses to merchant shipping supplying food and war materials to Britain, potentially threatening to starve Britain. While merchant shipping was suffering these high losses, Coastal Command had proven ineffective at countering air or sea attacks on Allied shipping. In particular, it was ineffective at protecting English Channel convoys, which were forced to abandon operations for a few months, starting in July 1940. RAF Fighter Command was given the task, as it enjoyed the majority of RAF resources at the time.
The strategic air attack and defence predominated in the RAF, despite the warning signs of 1914 to 1918, that U-Boats were going to become a main opponent again, and aircraft were a suitable counter to their operations. Coastal Command became the "Cinderella service" until 1943...
From its formation in 1936 the Command did not receive the support it required to be an effective naval air service...
...the events of April to June 1940 overturned the balance of power, as the Germans conquered Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands, Belgium and France. This allowed the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine to operate from French ports on the Atlantic coast, much closer to the Atlantic shipping lanes. It also put German air power within range of Britain's ports on all of its coasts. The advantage now enjoyed by the Germans allowed them to inflict heavy losses to merchant shipping supplying food and war materials to Britain, potentially threatening to starve Britain. While merchant shipping was suffering these high losses, Coastal Command had proven ineffective at countering air or sea attacks on Allied shipping. In particular, it was ineffective at protecting English Channel convoys, which were forced to abandon operations for a few months, starting in July 1940. RAF Fighter Command was given the task, as it enjoyed the majority of RAF resources at the time.
The strategic air attack and defence predominated in the RAF, despite the warning signs of 1914 to 1918, that U-Boats were going to become a main opponent again, and aircraft were a suitable counter to their operations. Coastal Command became the "Cinderella service" until 1943...
Thread Starter
Actually this brings us back to my point...
When SDSR said we no longer need Nimrod or any sort of MPA, the assumption was made that RN Merlins would be able to perform many of the Nimrod's tasks. Yet the review cut back the number of platforms to support Merlin squadrons - one less CVS (HMS Ark Royal), one less AOR (RFA Fort George), whilst frigate number cuts and the continuing pressure on the fleet reduces the availability of Merlin equipped Type 23s...
Originally Posted by myself
If only we had more ships with large flight decks AND hangars.
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WEBF
We know what your views are - they are constantly repeated over and over again.
The users of this forum have little (if any) influence, let alone control, over the decisions which made up the SDSR.
May I suggest that, instead of constantly repeating your views on this forum, you institute a Petition to No. 10 Downing Street.
We know what your views are - they are constantly repeated over and over again.
The users of this forum have little (if any) influence, let alone control, over the decisions which made up the SDSR.
May I suggest that, instead of constantly repeating your views on this forum, you institute a Petition to No. 10 Downing Street.
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The strategic air attack and defence predominated in the RAF, despite the warning signs of 1914 to 1918, that U-Boats were going to become a main opponent again, and aircraft were a suitable counter to their operations. Coastal Command became the "Cinderella service" until 1943...
Thread Starter
With both Harrier and Nimrod, I wonder if part of the problem was that those capabilities were seen as being in support of the RN, yet not owned by the RN so Their Lordships could not save them?
Was it assumed that since CVF was key to the future, no sane Government would axe the current carrier strike capability, due to the problems involved in preparing for the future, as mentioned here?
Likewise, was it assumed that Nimrod's role in supporting the deterrent was so important that it would be safe?
Was it assumed that since CVF was key to the future, no sane Government would axe the current carrier strike capability, due to the problems involved in preparing for the future, as mentioned here?
Likewise, was it assumed that Nimrod's role in supporting the deterrent was so important that it would be safe?
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WEBF - the loss of both those capabilities you mention has been covered in depth on this and other threads, but for the record the reasons were:
- Harrier - lack of cash, force became to small (due to previous cuts) to make it worthwhile retaining, plus a lack of cash!
- Nimrod - lack of cash, political unwillingness to progress with a tainted platform, lack of cash, technical difficulties some of which remained unresolved, plus a lack of cash!
Thread Starter
Defence cuts are worse than those which allowed Nazi Germany to rearm - Telegraph
Gwyn Prins, of the London School of Economics, said the threat from failed states and terrorist organisations was worse than that of Hitler because it of their unpredictability.
He accused the Government of ignoring the lessons of history by not preparing for the unexpected and called for last year’s Strategic Defence and Security Review to be scrapped.
Professor Prins, in a paper called The British Way of Strategy-Making: Vital Lessons For Our Times, said Britain was cutting military equipment which might prove to be vital in future.
He said if proper levels of equipment for the Armed Forces were not maintained it would be impossible to replace them in time to cope with future threats when they developed.
If the defence cuts were not reversed, he predicted a significant loss in a future war, with far-reaching effects.
“The UK’s standing in the world which our Armed Forces have given us over the centuries will be broken because we will be defeated and will be shown to have failed,” he said.
Instead, he argued, military chiefs and civil servants should be freed to develop strategy and policy entirely free from financial considerations.
Once the military principles had been established, only then would the financial implications be explored.
Prof Prins said this would make clear in advance the sacrifices that the Government were demanding to save money, rather than when it was too late.
He said this had been done successfully in the early 1930s after years of underinvestment in the Royal Navy which saw the number of fighting ships drop by 60%.
He also said there were several other parallels, including a troubled coalition government which believed more in soft power than a powerful military.
The plan was implemented just in time to fight off the Nazis until the Americans joined the Second World War.
He said the strain put on Britain's Armed Forces in Libya - in particular aircraft and ships - only highlighted the impact of the cuts.
Prof Prins warned: “The strategic environment now is not the same. We’re not facing the rise of dictators like Hitler. In many ways it’s worse.
“We simply don’t know where the threat will come from but you can smell it on the wind.
“There’s not been a similar level of unrest in Europe which has not ended in violence.
“We are already seeing the start of a breakdown of civil society in Greece.”
In January, former defence chiefs warned in a letter to The Daily Telegraph that the scrapping of the RAF’s £4 billion fleet of Nimrod surveillance aircraft created a “massive security gap” that risked the UK’s security.
The SDSR made a range of controversial cuts, scrapping HMS Ark Royal and Harrier jets and leaving Britain without a working aircraft carrier until 2020.
It was intended to tackle £38 billion deficit at the Ministry of Defence. However, it will leave the Royal Navy with fewer sailors than at any point in the last 100 years, the Army with 11,000 fewer personnel and just 50 Challenger II tanks - down from about 500.
Prof Prins added: “It’s the old lesson. If you forget your history, you are doomed to repeat it.
“The politicians need to learn from our historical precedents before it’s too late.”
Ouch!
Gwyn Prins, of the London School of Economics, said the threat from failed states and terrorist organisations was worse than that of Hitler because it of their unpredictability.
He accused the Government of ignoring the lessons of history by not preparing for the unexpected and called for last year’s Strategic Defence and Security Review to be scrapped.
Professor Prins, in a paper called The British Way of Strategy-Making: Vital Lessons For Our Times, said Britain was cutting military equipment which might prove to be vital in future.
He said if proper levels of equipment for the Armed Forces were not maintained it would be impossible to replace them in time to cope with future threats when they developed.
If the defence cuts were not reversed, he predicted a significant loss in a future war, with far-reaching effects.
“The UK’s standing in the world which our Armed Forces have given us over the centuries will be broken because we will be defeated and will be shown to have failed,” he said.
Instead, he argued, military chiefs and civil servants should be freed to develop strategy and policy entirely free from financial considerations.
Once the military principles had been established, only then would the financial implications be explored.
Prof Prins said this would make clear in advance the sacrifices that the Government were demanding to save money, rather than when it was too late.
He said this had been done successfully in the early 1930s after years of underinvestment in the Royal Navy which saw the number of fighting ships drop by 60%.
He also said there were several other parallels, including a troubled coalition government which believed more in soft power than a powerful military.
The plan was implemented just in time to fight off the Nazis until the Americans joined the Second World War.
He said the strain put on Britain's Armed Forces in Libya - in particular aircraft and ships - only highlighted the impact of the cuts.
Prof Prins warned: “The strategic environment now is not the same. We’re not facing the rise of dictators like Hitler. In many ways it’s worse.
“We simply don’t know where the threat will come from but you can smell it on the wind.
“There’s not been a similar level of unrest in Europe which has not ended in violence.
“We are already seeing the start of a breakdown of civil society in Greece.”
In January, former defence chiefs warned in a letter to The Daily Telegraph that the scrapping of the RAF’s £4 billion fleet of Nimrod surveillance aircraft created a “massive security gap” that risked the UK’s security.
The SDSR made a range of controversial cuts, scrapping HMS Ark Royal and Harrier jets and leaving Britain without a working aircraft carrier until 2020.
It was intended to tackle £38 billion deficit at the Ministry of Defence. However, it will leave the Royal Navy with fewer sailors than at any point in the last 100 years, the Army with 11,000 fewer personnel and just 50 Challenger II tanks - down from about 500.
Prof Prins added: “It’s the old lesson. If you forget your history, you are doomed to repeat it.
“The politicians need to learn from our historical precedents before it’s too late.”
Ouch!
WEBF - get over it! We don't face any threats now from hardware heavy attacks from other nation-states. There is too much democracy around, and too much interlinked commercial interest for the UK to ever enter again into a full on war against a nation-state which is going to threaten our frontiers. Glibly announcing that we "must learn from the lessons of history" is akin to arguing that the Lancashire Yeomanry should be well armed in case those narrow-minded heathen child-burning bigots from Yorkshire ever invade again.
The RN should accept that it will never again have a globally capable surface fleet and instead concentrate resources on its globally capable bombers and UK coastal surveillance/maritime patrol. Ideally give up the ludicrous solitary & unaffordable carrier and instead trade for long-term control of a new maritime surveillance aircraft fleet to support the bombers.
The RN should accept that it will never again have a globally capable surface fleet and instead concentrate resources on its globally capable bombers and UK coastal surveillance/maritime patrol. Ideally give up the ludicrous solitary & unaffordable carrier and instead trade for long-term control of a new maritime surveillance aircraft fleet to support the bombers.
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Defend The Homeland
Trim Stab, I think you need to be careful what you wish for!
Warning non-aviator posting! (I know that bothers some!)
Post cold war government defence policy has been; 1) Defence of the homeland including the strategic deterrence) 2) Projection of limited expeditionary influence.
2) Has meant development of a maritime oriented capability and strategy, hence the long winded aircraft carrier programme. This was started in the 90's following on from building a strong amphibious capability. (I think the strongest for at least 50 years) As far as I am aware, this policy is still in place, even post SDSR. (Demonstrated by the retention of Ocean / Illustrious as well as Albion & Bulwalk (now of course one at a time) and most of the bay class) Without strike and air based AD, there is of course something deficient in this capability. So that is why we have an aircraft carrier programme!
I think the expeditionary strategy will always be up for review. And if the government decides we don't want to do that anymore, the aircraft carriers will go. But if that happens I think you will find all the forces will be impacted. The Navy will lose it amphibious capability, the Marines will fall out of favour and the surface fleet will be further reduced. But I would speculate that there would be no JCF and Tornadoes would also be retired as soon as Afghanistan is done. Defence of the homeland means Typhoons will some multi role capability. I think the slashing of the RAF would extend beyond that as well.
So assuming we do not lose the expeditionary capability, I think we need the carriers. I do not buy that Libyan style ops are the future. To be clear, a maritime strike capability, flown by whoever, provides that role best. (Based on all post WW2 conflicts with one exception!) Remember you can take a carrier air wing ashore, but not the other way around!
The fact is that the carrier problem is caused by governments, not the Navy. Had they been built when they should have been they would have cost half the money. But even at £7 billion, over 50 years they will offer good value for money. Far more so if we did not insist on flying expensive F35s of them! I am not saying that an F18 is the equal on a F35 because I wouldn't. (See the top line of this response) Just seems to me that if we really think we need to reconsider building carriers because we can't afford them, then F18 costs become very attractive.
The core issue here is that we as a country do not get enough value from our defence spend. It is no good saying we are the 4th largest defence spender in the world when we constantly overspend on our equipment procurement.
This statement seems to impact everything we buy. I get the reasons for not buying off the shelf, in order to maintain our industry capability, but if we do need figure how to design and build for world markets, we will always be in this position. In the Navy world, designing the world's best air defence radar for 6 ships is crazy. (T45 and Sampson) I think this applies across defence. So we either figure how to compromise on our requirements so we can sell what we design, or the government needs to acknowledge that it costs more to get the same capability and spend accordingly!
Last point, the future of the services is by no means certain. However, one thing seems clear to me, this is not a good time for cross service rivalries. If attitudes don't change, I think all the services will lose out!
Warning non-aviator posting! (I know that bothers some!)
Post cold war government defence policy has been; 1) Defence of the homeland including the strategic deterrence) 2) Projection of limited expeditionary influence.
2) Has meant development of a maritime oriented capability and strategy, hence the long winded aircraft carrier programme. This was started in the 90's following on from building a strong amphibious capability. (I think the strongest for at least 50 years) As far as I am aware, this policy is still in place, even post SDSR. (Demonstrated by the retention of Ocean / Illustrious as well as Albion & Bulwalk (now of course one at a time) and most of the bay class) Without strike and air based AD, there is of course something deficient in this capability. So that is why we have an aircraft carrier programme!
I think the expeditionary strategy will always be up for review. And if the government decides we don't want to do that anymore, the aircraft carriers will go. But if that happens I think you will find all the forces will be impacted. The Navy will lose it amphibious capability, the Marines will fall out of favour and the surface fleet will be further reduced. But I would speculate that there would be no JCF and Tornadoes would also be retired as soon as Afghanistan is done. Defence of the homeland means Typhoons will some multi role capability. I think the slashing of the RAF would extend beyond that as well.
So assuming we do not lose the expeditionary capability, I think we need the carriers. I do not buy that Libyan style ops are the future. To be clear, a maritime strike capability, flown by whoever, provides that role best. (Based on all post WW2 conflicts with one exception!) Remember you can take a carrier air wing ashore, but not the other way around!
The fact is that the carrier problem is caused by governments, not the Navy. Had they been built when they should have been they would have cost half the money. But even at £7 billion, over 50 years they will offer good value for money. Far more so if we did not insist on flying expensive F35s of them! I am not saying that an F18 is the equal on a F35 because I wouldn't. (See the top line of this response) Just seems to me that if we really think we need to reconsider building carriers because we can't afford them, then F18 costs become very attractive.
The core issue here is that we as a country do not get enough value from our defence spend. It is no good saying we are the 4th largest defence spender in the world when we constantly overspend on our equipment procurement.
This statement seems to impact everything we buy. I get the reasons for not buying off the shelf, in order to maintain our industry capability, but if we do need figure how to design and build for world markets, we will always be in this position. In the Navy world, designing the world's best air defence radar for 6 ships is crazy. (T45 and Sampson) I think this applies across defence. So we either figure how to compromise on our requirements so we can sell what we design, or the government needs to acknowledge that it costs more to get the same capability and spend accordingly!
Last point, the future of the services is by no means certain. However, one thing seems clear to me, this is not a good time for cross service rivalries. If attitudes don't change, I think all the services will lose out!
Thread Starter
How do you define frontiers? In any case, I didn't write the article, and I am not a history academic. Too much democracy around? The people of several Middle Eastern nations would disagree.
You seem to think that an attack has to be a mass attack in Europe to effect the UK. Why?
You seem to think that an attack has to be a mass attack in Europe to effect the UK. Why?