Sea Jet
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"Absolutely none that present sufficient a threat to the UK to justify retention of the SHAR.
CVF and F-35 will be a very flexible concept, SHAR and CVS are not-fact!"
You are correct. CVF and F-35 will indeed be very flexible. However, I would put it to you that JFH (inlcuding GR 7/9s and FA2s) is a lot more flexible than a purely GR7/9 force.
As to threats to the fleet, I note, merely as an example, that the British Government didn't wake up to the threat from Germany, Italy and Japan until 1935. Until then they had been operating under the assumption that there would be a 10-year lead in to any major war allowing the build up of sufficent forces to counter the threat. 4 years later, not 10, we were involved in a major European war. I'm not saying that this is likely to happen in this case, but a big risk is being taken that between 2006-12 (assuming procurement of CVF and JSF doesn't slip right) the fleet will not come under threat from any aircraft or missile that can't be countered by Sea Dart or PAAMS. 8 years is quite long enough for the possibility that the world will look quite different from today. Obviously this is a risk that the government is willing to take. I can go along with this, reluctantly, as long as I'm not then expected to sit up threat in a Type 42 that has long since passed obsolesence and try and cover the gap with a missile notable mainly for its historic value.
CVF and F-35 will be a very flexible concept, SHAR and CVS are not-fact!"
You are correct. CVF and F-35 will indeed be very flexible. However, I would put it to you that JFH (inlcuding GR 7/9s and FA2s) is a lot more flexible than a purely GR7/9 force.
As to threats to the fleet, I note, merely as an example, that the British Government didn't wake up to the threat from Germany, Italy and Japan until 1935. Until then they had been operating under the assumption that there would be a 10-year lead in to any major war allowing the build up of sufficent forces to counter the threat. 4 years later, not 10, we were involved in a major European war. I'm not saying that this is likely to happen in this case, but a big risk is being taken that between 2006-12 (assuming procurement of CVF and JSF doesn't slip right) the fleet will not come under threat from any aircraft or missile that can't be countered by Sea Dart or PAAMS. 8 years is quite long enough for the possibility that the world will look quite different from today. Obviously this is a risk that the government is willing to take. I can go along with this, reluctantly, as long as I'm not then expected to sit up threat in a Type 42 that has long since passed obsolesence and try and cover the gap with a missile notable mainly for its historic value.
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Vapour,
Don't worry you'll not have to sit up threat in a Type 42 because most of those will have gone as well!
The current 10 year 'no-threat' timeline does look spookily similar to the 1920s and 30s doesn't it. Of course the hindsight merchants will look at the start of any new conflict and look back 10 years and find the first spark that lead to war - and say we missed it at the time.
Still in the meantime, and with a huge hole in the cash plan - binning SHAR makes sense. When we see the totality of the changes needed to keep within MOD's budget I think even the fervent SHAR supporters will agree that the SHAR would have been in the tranche of cuts - sorry re-balancing - in any case.
Time to move on chaps - nostalgia doesn't win wars.
Don't worry you'll not have to sit up threat in a Type 42 because most of those will have gone as well!
The current 10 year 'no-threat' timeline does look spookily similar to the 1920s and 30s doesn't it. Of course the hindsight merchants will look at the start of any new conflict and look back 10 years and find the first spark that lead to war - and say we missed it at the time.
Still in the meantime, and with a huge hole in the cash plan - binning SHAR makes sense. When we see the totality of the changes needed to keep within MOD's budget I think even the fervent SHAR supporters will agree that the SHAR would have been in the tranche of cuts - sorry re-balancing - in any case.
Time to move on chaps - nostalgia doesn't win wars.
Someone still thinks it useful
Someone must still think it (both the Sea Harrier and organic air defence) useful - particularly for amphibious operations.
Someone must think it useful in operations as part of a coalition.
Ships Head West For Aurora - Navy News
This would suggest operations carried out over a large length of coastline, with different component task groups in different places, seperated by significant distances. Not completely unlike some of the scenarios I have suggested......
Someone must think it useful in operations as part of a coalition.
Ships Head West For Aurora - Navy News
This would suggest operations carried out over a large length of coastline, with different component task groups in different places, seperated by significant distances. Not completely unlike some of the scenarios I have suggested......
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 26th May 2004 at 14:06.
Suspicion breeds confidence
Webf, well spotted. This really does highlight the double standards and hypocrisy in the MoDs thinking. Invincible's task is to provide air defence and CAS to the UK/NL amphibious group landing in North Carolina.
In 2 years time the UK will no longer have this capability. So what happens to expeditionary warfare then? We know that T42 cannot operate near land. So, unless the enemy was willing to stay on the ground, or the Dutch are willing to cough up one of their new AEGIS destroyers which can engage air targets over land, then we place all our forces at risk.
What happens, if in a time of crisis, the Americans send us what they sent us in 1939 - their best wishes?
From what I hear, delivery of HMS Daring has slipped to late 2008. Doubtless she will be involved in first of class trials for three years, so this means that the fleet loses two layers of its layered air defence. That places a lot of risk and trust in Sea Wolf.
In 2 years time the UK will no longer have this capability. So what happens to expeditionary warfare then? We know that T42 cannot operate near land. So, unless the enemy was willing to stay on the ground, or the Dutch are willing to cough up one of their new AEGIS destroyers which can engage air targets over land, then we place all our forces at risk.
What happens, if in a time of crisis, the Americans send us what they sent us in 1939 - their best wishes?
From what I hear, delivery of HMS Daring has slipped to late 2008. Doubtless she will be involved in first of class trials for three years, so this means that the fleet loses two layers of its layered air defence. That places a lot of risk and trust in Sea Wolf.
Last edited by Navaleye; 28th May 2004 at 13:11.
Yawn..................................
So, I guess we'll just have to wait until 2012 until we can invade North Carolina on our own then.
Somehow I think if we were ever going to contemplate such an operation against a first world foe (Who?) all on our own the lack of SHAR would be the very least of our problems.
It's going, F-35 will eventually be along to restore the option of a credible maritime AD capability, along with a host of really tasty other capabilities, which is why we are buying it in the first place.
Stop living in the past.
So, I guess we'll just have to wait until 2012 until we can invade North Carolina on our own then.
Somehow I think if we were ever going to contemplate such an operation against a first world foe (Who?) all on our own the lack of SHAR would be the very least of our problems.
It's going, F-35 will eventually be along to restore the option of a credible maritime AD capability, along with a host of really tasty other capabilities, which is why we are buying it in the first place.
Stop living in the past.
Suspicion breeds confidence
Somehow I think if we were ever going to contemplate such an operation against a first world foe (Who?)
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I come in late as I have been busy. But my points are these:
1. Loss of Sub-Harpoon. This is no great shakes. It is not a weapon loved by the submariner. Launching a sub-harpoon missile against a surface target immediately gives away the submarines position. Yes this is true with Tomahawk but you wouldn't go launching Tomahawks from an SSN if the enemy was going to be able to do something about the presence of the submarine. The fact that you are using sub-harpoon itself suggests a threat to the launch platform.
2. MIOPS with T42. I have done MIOPS in the NAG with a T42 (HMS Exeter 1999-2000 deployment when I was the FC1). The sea boat was an issue and we made various recommendations following the deployment regarding the sea boat. It isnt and ideal platform for MIOPS but with adapt/improvise/overcome you can do that type of operation with a T42.
3. Sea Dart in the surface role - the enemy would have to be pretty close, but it is a big old missile going very very fast (remember Harpoon is subsonice), Sea Dart weight half a tonne and is going well over Mach 2. Going to make one hell of a mess.
4. Sea Dart is old but it is not as bad as some made out. HMS Exeter destroyed a Skyhawk flying at just 75ft in 1982. I was involved in a Sea Dart trial whilst serving in HMS Exeter but it is obviously highly classified.
5. CIWS and decoys provide good protection from most SSM's. Exocet was considered pretty much obsolete by the time I left the RN. The decoy systems and Phalanx are very good. The latest generation Russian SSN's that fly at supersonic speeds are the problem and T45 is claimed to be capable of dealing with them.
6. The main problem with T42 is now age. They are expensive to maintain and despite large reductions in crew numbers since conception complement is considerably larger then a T23.
The topic of the thread is off course SHAR. The government are taking an awful risk. Layered defence is one of fundemantals of anti-air warfare. We are getting rid of the best layer. The budget saving may look good to the politicians now, but if ships and men/women are lost as a result....
1. Loss of Sub-Harpoon. This is no great shakes. It is not a weapon loved by the submariner. Launching a sub-harpoon missile against a surface target immediately gives away the submarines position. Yes this is true with Tomahawk but you wouldn't go launching Tomahawks from an SSN if the enemy was going to be able to do something about the presence of the submarine. The fact that you are using sub-harpoon itself suggests a threat to the launch platform.
2. MIOPS with T42. I have done MIOPS in the NAG with a T42 (HMS Exeter 1999-2000 deployment when I was the FC1). The sea boat was an issue and we made various recommendations following the deployment regarding the sea boat. It isnt and ideal platform for MIOPS but with adapt/improvise/overcome you can do that type of operation with a T42.
3. Sea Dart in the surface role - the enemy would have to be pretty close, but it is a big old missile going very very fast (remember Harpoon is subsonice), Sea Dart weight half a tonne and is going well over Mach 2. Going to make one hell of a mess.
4. Sea Dart is old but it is not as bad as some made out. HMS Exeter destroyed a Skyhawk flying at just 75ft in 1982. I was involved in a Sea Dart trial whilst serving in HMS Exeter but it is obviously highly classified.
5. CIWS and decoys provide good protection from most SSM's. Exocet was considered pretty much obsolete by the time I left the RN. The decoy systems and Phalanx are very good. The latest generation Russian SSN's that fly at supersonic speeds are the problem and T45 is claimed to be capable of dealing with them.
6. The main problem with T42 is now age. They are expensive to maintain and despite large reductions in crew numbers since conception complement is considerably larger then a T23.
The topic of the thread is off course SHAR. The government are taking an awful risk. Layered defence is one of fundemantals of anti-air warfare. We are getting rid of the best layer. The budget saving may look good to the politicians now, but if ships and men/women are lost as a result....
Navaleye,
You said;
"Without the organic air defence the average third world banana republic would be a hard nut to crack"
We have needed this capability ONCE in the last thirty years, when the hell are we EVER going to need it on our own again!
Get real.
You said;
"Without the organic air defence the average third world banana republic would be a hard nut to crack"
We have needed this capability ONCE in the last thirty years, when the hell are we EVER going to need it on our own again!
Get real.
What does needed mean?
If you mean that the Falklands was the only case in the last few decades where carriers and/or organic air defence were critical to the mission, then you are right.
However, both CVS and the Sea Harrier have been useful. In the Adriatic, several 90s stand offs with Iraq, Sierra Leone, and other places. You may well argue the involvement was for political rather than tactical reasons but even if this was the case then surely it was useful in demonstrating the wishes and intentions of HM Government.
One of the arguments in 1982 was that recapturing the Falklands would send a message to other potentially aggressive regimes. It did prove that the UK (and by extension the entire West) was willing to fight if necessary, and to sustain losses. What sort of message is the loss of the Sea Harrier, with all the loss of independent capability that results, and the other cutbacks in HM Forces, sending to potential aggressors?
The future is likely to involve many asymmetric aspects. Does this always exclude the use of aircraft? Against undefended forces, a few MiGs go a long way, particularly against things like landing craft or helicopters. Stump up the cash, and the Russians or Chinese will be happy to sell you some supersonic anti ship missiles to go with them. Thus a few MiGs or Sukhois, can seriously inhibit or restrict operations by larger forces in the opponent's littoral.
Several assumptions would appear to be being made by a lot of people.
1. All conflicts will occur after a period of months, or years, to allow us to study or eliminate his command and control facilities.
2. No enemy will have forces both willing and able to fight and inflict real damage on our forces.
3. No nation which has not been subject to no fly zones, sanctions and the like will be hostile. Not even if there are sudden changes of Government.
4. No enemy would try to use his forces in a coordinated way.
I am not convinced myself. Neither is anyone I have spoken to.
Pr00ne - I've just re-read what you wrote.
The whole point of Exercise Rapid Alliance, like some of the scenarios I have mentioned, is that a number of landings are carried out in different locations that may be several hundred miles away from each other. As such it is highly desirable for each task group to have its own dedicated air defence. Particularly when the nearest friendly forces are a lot further away than the enemy airfields.
Without it....see my above comments.
A few MiGs could effectively defeat a force of several large (LPH/LPD etc) ships, many helicopters and hundred or thousands of troops by making their use too risky for these risk averse times.
In 1991 thousands of Iraqi troops, with supporting tanks etc, were commited to defending Kuwaiti beaches from an amphibious assault. There were minefields laid off of the coast. To make the threat real, the mines had to be cleared. Minesweeping and minehunting operations could only commence once air superiority/supremacy had been achieved and the Iraqi surface fleet had been eliminated.
Planting a few mines, or even dummy ones, will prevent landings until after MCM operations have taken place. Without the means to provide a CAP, those few MiGs mean that the mines cannot be dealt with.
There has been an investment, over the last few years, and it is going on still, to improve the UK's amphibious capabilities. A new LPH, new LPDs, new RFA landing ships, new landing craft, Chinooks operating from aboard ship, etc etc etc. The whole thing is spoiled by the loss of protective air cover.
Sadly, the Army and RAF people I talk to lead me to conclude that trying to save money on protective systems and equipment, and relying on hoping for the best, is endemic in UK defence.
If you mean that the Falklands was the only case in the last few decades where carriers and/or organic air defence were critical to the mission, then you are right.
However, both CVS and the Sea Harrier have been useful. In the Adriatic, several 90s stand offs with Iraq, Sierra Leone, and other places. You may well argue the involvement was for political rather than tactical reasons but even if this was the case then surely it was useful in demonstrating the wishes and intentions of HM Government.
One of the arguments in 1982 was that recapturing the Falklands would send a message to other potentially aggressive regimes. It did prove that the UK (and by extension the entire West) was willing to fight if necessary, and to sustain losses. What sort of message is the loss of the Sea Harrier, with all the loss of independent capability that results, and the other cutbacks in HM Forces, sending to potential aggressors?
The future is likely to involve many asymmetric aspects. Does this always exclude the use of aircraft? Against undefended forces, a few MiGs go a long way, particularly against things like landing craft or helicopters. Stump up the cash, and the Russians or Chinese will be happy to sell you some supersonic anti ship missiles to go with them. Thus a few MiGs or Sukhois, can seriously inhibit or restrict operations by larger forces in the opponent's littoral.
Several assumptions would appear to be being made by a lot of people.
1. All conflicts will occur after a period of months, or years, to allow us to study or eliminate his command and control facilities.
2. No enemy will have forces both willing and able to fight and inflict real damage on our forces.
3. No nation which has not been subject to no fly zones, sanctions and the like will be hostile. Not even if there are sudden changes of Government.
4. No enemy would try to use his forces in a coordinated way.
I am not convinced myself. Neither is anyone I have spoken to.
Pr00ne - I've just re-read what you wrote.
The whole point of Exercise Rapid Alliance, like some of the scenarios I have mentioned, is that a number of landings are carried out in different locations that may be several hundred miles away from each other. As such it is highly desirable for each task group to have its own dedicated air defence. Particularly when the nearest friendly forces are a lot further away than the enemy airfields.
Without it....see my above comments.
A few MiGs could effectively defeat a force of several large (LPH/LPD etc) ships, many helicopters and hundred or thousands of troops by making their use too risky for these risk averse times.
In 1991 thousands of Iraqi troops, with supporting tanks etc, were commited to defending Kuwaiti beaches from an amphibious assault. There were minefields laid off of the coast. To make the threat real, the mines had to be cleared. Minesweeping and minehunting operations could only commence once air superiority/supremacy had been achieved and the Iraqi surface fleet had been eliminated.
Planting a few mines, or even dummy ones, will prevent landings until after MCM operations have taken place. Without the means to provide a CAP, those few MiGs mean that the mines cannot be dealt with.
There has been an investment, over the last few years, and it is going on still, to improve the UK's amphibious capabilities. A new LPH, new LPDs, new RFA landing ships, new landing craft, Chinooks operating from aboard ship, etc etc etc. The whole thing is spoiled by the loss of protective air cover.
Sadly, the Army and RAF people I talk to lead me to conclude that trying to save money on protective systems and equipment, and relying on hoping for the best, is endemic in UK defence.
Suspicion breeds confidence
PrOOne said
Actually, 24 years.
We have not fought against an opponent threatening our shores for over 60 years. There is is no perceived threat now, but there is no-one here that I know of that advocates the elimination of the figher component of the RAF.
I'd prefer not to hear the sound of stable doors slamming the next time a dictator in a tight spot decides to have a pop.
We have needed this capability ONCE in the last thirty years, when the hell are we EVER going to need it on our own again!
We have not fought against an opponent threatening our shores for over 60 years. There is is no perceived threat now, but there is no-one here that I know of that advocates the elimination of the figher component of the RAF.
I'd prefer not to hear the sound of stable doors slamming the next time a dictator in a tight spot decides to have a pop.
In an ideal world, of course you'd retain carriers and SHar. It's a capability.
But this isn't an ideal world and tough choices have to be made as to which capabilities have to be retained and which ones are less likely to be required, and which can therefore be (reluctantly) jettisoned.
As Proooone points out, we have NEEDED carriers only once in the last 30 years (you could prehaps say only once since 1956) though they have been 'nice to have' on other occasions, although they represent a massively costly and inflexible way of deploying air power.
The prospects of us needing organic air defence for some autonomous blue water operation against an opponent capable of presenting a viable threat (without allied support and outside the range of land-based AD) are remote.
Other capabilities, which are competing for funding with the SHar are required EACH AND EVERY TIME we do anything, even with coalition support. It's a hard decision, but at the same time there is no contest. SHar has to go, and carrier aviation should follow it.
Given Cold war funding levels I'd keep carriers, no question. But that's not what's being given.
But this isn't an ideal world and tough choices have to be made as to which capabilities have to be retained and which ones are less likely to be required, and which can therefore be (reluctantly) jettisoned.
As Proooone points out, we have NEEDED carriers only once in the last 30 years (you could prehaps say only once since 1956) though they have been 'nice to have' on other occasions, although they represent a massively costly and inflexible way of deploying air power.
The prospects of us needing organic air defence for some autonomous blue water operation against an opponent capable of presenting a viable threat (without allied support and outside the range of land-based AD) are remote.
Other capabilities, which are competing for funding with the SHar are required EACH AND EVERY TIME we do anything, even with coalition support. It's a hard decision, but at the same time there is no contest. SHar has to go, and carrier aviation should follow it.
Given Cold war funding levels I'd keep carriers, no question. But that's not what's being given.
Navaleye,
But we are eliminating AD only aircraft, and there are only 4 F3 Squadrons left, the old hardened UKADGE infrastructure is being abandoned for a centralised above ground CRC at Scampton and we long ago abandoned medium range SAM's and the Rapier units are now as rare as hens teeth. (Army down to 1 Regiment?)
See, the old order changeth.
Multi-role fast jets are the future, Typhoon being the centre of this future when it is eventually available as a true multi-role assett.
What the RAF REALLY needs is a modern up to date version of what I used to fly, the McDonell Douglas F-4M Phantom FGR2, not that we ever actually used it as a multi-role asset, but that's not the point.
What the RAF DOESN'T need is a modern updated version of the English Electric Lightning, and nor does the RN need a naval equivalent, because there is nothing for it to do anymore.
But we are eliminating AD only aircraft, and there are only 4 F3 Squadrons left, the old hardened UKADGE infrastructure is being abandoned for a centralised above ground CRC at Scampton and we long ago abandoned medium range SAM's and the Rapier units are now as rare as hens teeth. (Army down to 1 Regiment?)
See, the old order changeth.
Multi-role fast jets are the future, Typhoon being the centre of this future when it is eventually available as a true multi-role assett.
What the RAF REALLY needs is a modern up to date version of what I used to fly, the McDonell Douglas F-4M Phantom FGR2, not that we ever actually used it as a multi-role asset, but that's not the point.
What the RAF DOESN'T need is a modern updated version of the English Electric Lightning, and nor does the RN need a naval equivalent, because there is nothing for it to do anymore.
Hmmmm
I think our friend Nozzles might argue with that Pr00ne. He flew the Sea Harrier, dropped bombs and took photos, but never shot anyone or anything down (except in exercises).
Jacko
Can YOU read? Nowadays we are talking about operating in the littoral, right under the nose of the enemy. Not blue water stuff like good old cold war ops.
Amphibious operations need air defence. Preferably organic, local air superiority around as task group is need else the use of vulnerable landing craft, helicopters and the like would be suicide.
Where do you think the Sea Harrier will be operating in the NATO exercise? Could it be - covering the UK/NL task group?
Even as part of a coalition it is useful. It will be interesting to hear what the results of this exercise are.
I think our friend Nozzles might argue with that Pr00ne. He flew the Sea Harrier, dropped bombs and took photos, but never shot anyone or anything down (except in exercises).
Jacko
Can YOU read? Nowadays we are talking about operating in the littoral, right under the nose of the enemy. Not blue water stuff like good old cold war ops.
Amphibious operations need air defence. Preferably organic, local air superiority around as task group is need else the use of vulnerable landing craft, helicopters and the like would be suicide.
Where do you think the Sea Harrier will be operating in the NATO exercise? Could it be - covering the UK/NL task group?
Even as part of a coalition it is useful. It will be interesting to hear what the results of this exercise are.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 1st Jun 2004 at 15:04.
Suspicion breeds confidence
Timezta,
Sea Dart does have a limited anti surface capacity, but with a range limited to radar horizon, which makes of marginal use. I saw the result of a Sea Dart trial against a former MTB (Brave class) and it made quite a mess against a small target. A limited warhead, and a fuse that is likely to proximity detonate near a steel hull limits its use still further, although IIRC it did hit the hulk of HMS Leander during a Sinkex.
The example of Exeter's engagement against an A4 in the Falklands is a good one. Certainly, a fine bit of shooting by Exeter but it does highlight the systems main limitation - its easy to be overwhelmed. Exeter engaged 4 air force skyhawks, yet was only able to get a single shot off while they were still within the system's envelope. This is all history book stuff and hopefully the T45 should address these defects.
3. Sea Dart in the surface role - the enemy would have to be pretty close, but it is a big old missile going very very fast (remember Harpoon is subsonice), Sea Dart weight half a tonne and is going well over Mach 2. Going to make one hell of a mess.
The example of Exeter's engagement against an A4 in the Falklands is a good one. Certainly, a fine bit of shooting by Exeter but it does highlight the systems main limitation - its easy to be overwhelmed. Exeter engaged 4 air force skyhawks, yet was only able to get a single shot off while they were still within the system's envelope. This is all history book stuff and hopefully the T45 should address these defects.
Last edited by Navaleye; 1st Jun 2004 at 20:36.
WEBF,
Can't 'who' read?
"In an ideal world, of course you'd retain carriers and SHar. It's a capability.
But this isn't an ideal world and tough choices have to be made as to which capabilities have to be retained and which ones are less likely to be required, and which can therefore be (reluctantly) jettisoned."
There are alternative ways of providing the capabilities it provides. There are other higher priorities.
Can't 'who' read?
"In an ideal world, of course you'd retain carriers and SHar. It's a capability.
But this isn't an ideal world and tough choices have to be made as to which capabilities have to be retained and which ones are less likely to be required, and which can therefore be (reluctantly) jettisoned."
There are alternative ways of providing the capabilities it provides. There are other higher priorities.
Jacko
I was refering to your constant reference to Blue Water operations - an amphibious assault is not done in Blue Water. Yet it is generally agreed that this, which demands air superiority, is the most likely employment of naval forces in the forseeable future....
I was refering to your constant reference to Blue Water operations - an amphibious assault is not done in Blue Water. Yet it is generally agreed that this, which demands air superiority, is the most likely employment of naval forces in the forseeable future....
Who can say?
I guess John Nott thought it unlikely too.
In any case, as Exercise Aurora demonstrates, coalition operations may involve different task groups doing landings in different areas. This would appear to be the scenario NATO have chosen for this exercise.....
Having your own air defence would be very desirable, if not essential.
I guess John Nott thought it unlikely too.
In any case, as Exercise Aurora demonstrates, coalition operations may involve different task groups doing landings in different areas. This would appear to be the scenario NATO have chosen for this exercise.....
Having your own air defence would be very desirable, if not essential.
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Ex Scenarios
Fair point, but only if you think that NATO exercise planners are remotely up to date; a good example would be CLEAN HUNTER where the scenario is completely 'cold war' and the targets are in the eastern part of Germany and the western Baltic states?
Don't confuse legacy exercises with future ops.
SBG
Don't confuse legacy exercises with future ops.
SBG
SBG
You are right to question how up to date NATO exercise planners are, I wonder about it myself when I hear some of the mumbo jumbo that they come up with. However, I don't think that invading the eastern US coast was ever a Cold War scenario, it merely represents lots of other places in the world. The exercise will not be limited to North Carolina but will simulate a larger theatre of operations with different task groups doing different tasks.
During the actual landing stage of an amphibious assault, the troops will be put ashore by various means, which need to be protected. See here.
Beaches vary in gradient, water depth and other characteristics. A beach may have a steep gradient, with the depth of the water increasing rapidly with distance from the shore. Alternatively it may be shallow, so that the frigates escorting the landing craft have to remain several miles off shore, leaving the landing forces in a very vulnerable position, outside the range where our frigates can provide extended point defence. History demonstrates how dangerous even just a few enemy aircraft are during a landing.
Also a task group operating some distance from other friendly forces (leaving aside unilateral operations) really need to be able to provide their own air defence, particularly if other friendly forces are several hundred miles away, and the enemy forces are near - very likely when operating in the littoral.
Having the Sea Harrier and organic air defence allows the United Kingdom to deploy an autonomous Carrier Task Group and/or Amphibious Task Group which can defend itself from air, surface and submarine threats, perform mines countermeasures operations if needed, put forces ashore and then provide aviation, logistics and naval gunfire support. It might interest you to know that new ammunition, with a longer range, is being introduced for the 4.5 inch gun. Basing logistics and aviation support at sea is a concept that was proved in the Gulf last year, as noted by the MOD report on Operation Telic.
Needing US air cover (possibly needing AAR support) would reduce the autonomy, and hence the degree of influence that the UK has. Being able to provide useful assets has given the UK influence over Washington before, and the sort of capability I have just described is likely to be seen as more useful than providing a few more aircraft to go with the hundreds of their own. The same might be said about Tomahawk.
Up until now, everyone has concentrated on warfighting operations. However, we should also consider a number of possible operations other than war, which may be more likely to occur without US involvement. These might include...
Peace support operations
Low intensity intervention (eg Sierra Leone - see note below)
Evacuation of British (and possibly other) civilians from a war zone
Humanitarian operations
Long range hostage rescue (where hostages are held by a foreign state, or by terrorists aided by a state)
All of these all situations where a handful of hostile aircraft would cause major problems, particularly since the rules of engagement are likely to prohibit shooting them down until they have been positively identified and warned, during which time they may have got dangerously close. In Sierra Leone not everyone was happy about the presence of UK forces, including the Nigerians. What if they (or even just one or two renegade jet pilots) had decided to start harassing or engaging the helicopters and we had no means to counter them?
You are right to question how up to date NATO exercise planners are, I wonder about it myself when I hear some of the mumbo jumbo that they come up with. However, I don't think that invading the eastern US coast was ever a Cold War scenario, it merely represents lots of other places in the world. The exercise will not be limited to North Carolina but will simulate a larger theatre of operations with different task groups doing different tasks.
During the actual landing stage of an amphibious assault, the troops will be put ashore by various means, which need to be protected. See here.
Beaches vary in gradient, water depth and other characteristics. A beach may have a steep gradient, with the depth of the water increasing rapidly with distance from the shore. Alternatively it may be shallow, so that the frigates escorting the landing craft have to remain several miles off shore, leaving the landing forces in a very vulnerable position, outside the range where our frigates can provide extended point defence. History demonstrates how dangerous even just a few enemy aircraft are during a landing.
Also a task group operating some distance from other friendly forces (leaving aside unilateral operations) really need to be able to provide their own air defence, particularly if other friendly forces are several hundred miles away, and the enemy forces are near - very likely when operating in the littoral.
Having the Sea Harrier and organic air defence allows the United Kingdom to deploy an autonomous Carrier Task Group and/or Amphibious Task Group which can defend itself from air, surface and submarine threats, perform mines countermeasures operations if needed, put forces ashore and then provide aviation, logistics and naval gunfire support. It might interest you to know that new ammunition, with a longer range, is being introduced for the 4.5 inch gun. Basing logistics and aviation support at sea is a concept that was proved in the Gulf last year, as noted by the MOD report on Operation Telic.
Needing US air cover (possibly needing AAR support) would reduce the autonomy, and hence the degree of influence that the UK has. Being able to provide useful assets has given the UK influence over Washington before, and the sort of capability I have just described is likely to be seen as more useful than providing a few more aircraft to go with the hundreds of their own. The same might be said about Tomahawk.
Up until now, everyone has concentrated on warfighting operations. However, we should also consider a number of possible operations other than war, which may be more likely to occur without US involvement. These might include...
Peace support operations
Low intensity intervention (eg Sierra Leone - see note below)
Evacuation of British (and possibly other) civilians from a war zone
Humanitarian operations
Long range hostage rescue (where hostages are held by a foreign state, or by terrorists aided by a state)
All of these all situations where a handful of hostile aircraft would cause major problems, particularly since the rules of engagement are likely to prohibit shooting them down until they have been positively identified and warned, during which time they may have got dangerously close. In Sierra Leone not everyone was happy about the presence of UK forces, including the Nigerians. What if they (or even just one or two renegade jet pilots) had decided to start harassing or engaging the helicopters and we had no means to counter them?