PQ17
racedo, your objection to my suggestion that a superior's order might be challenged if it flies in the face of the known facts seems to be based on the effect it would have on the career of he who objects.
You make my point splendidly! Those who sat around the table that day were not JOs but VSOs, so even more career at stake you might say. Tough! Their responsibility was to see that the best appreciation of the situation was made and thus the best course of action taken. It wasn't, because to a man they deferred to the bizarre, unprecedented, and obstinate opinion of a sick man, and one other.
They failed their country, their Service and, most importantly of all, those in PQ17 and those desperately waiting for the relief it carried.
Poor Show!
You make my point splendidly! Those who sat around the table that day were not JOs but VSOs, so even more career at stake you might say. Tough! Their responsibility was to see that the best appreciation of the situation was made and thus the best course of action taken. It wasn't, because to a man they deferred to the bizarre, unprecedented, and obstinate opinion of a sick man, and one other.
They failed their country, their Service and, most importantly of all, those in PQ17 and those desperately waiting for the relief it carried.
Poor Show!
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Robert Cooper
I read this book when I was a young man. The descriptive writing, of the Arctic Sea conditions, stayed with me for many years. An excellent read.
HMS Ulysses
SASless,
"...Familiar with the RAF refusal to provide Coastal Command the assets it needed...."
Lets actually throw some facts at that comment shall we? The PQ-17 tragedy occurred in July 1942. In 1942 the RAF was very short of four engined long range aircraft, especially ones suited to maritime reconnaissance. The Short Stirling and Handley Page Halifax were only entering service in small numbers. The best long range assets available to Coastal Command were US built Liberators and PBY Catalinas, and UK built Sunderlands.
As to the numbers game, in Feb 1942 (the closest date I could readily find to July 1942) Coastal Command had 44 Squadrons including 5 4 engined and 4 PBY.
In March 1943 Bomber Command had 62 Sqns, only 36 of which were 4 engined, with considerable numbers of 2 engined Wellingtons and Whitleys still around. In direct comparision, in Feb 1943 Coastal Command had 48 Sqns, of which 16 were 4 engined or PBY.
I would suggest that a ratio of 62:48 does not imply that Coastal Command were starved of aircraft. Indeed 48 Sqns shows the importance that was given to airpower in the maritime environment. Yes, Bomber Command was bigger, and the bomber offensive was a high priority, but you must consider the situation at the time. With (apart from the situation in North Africa) limited ability to "take the fight to the enemy/strike back" other than from the air, the Bomber Offensive was seen as the only way seen to keep the pressure on until the infamous "second front" was opened. Striking back was an important psychological, as well as practical, strategy.
Various comments have already been made about Churchill. It should be noted that the one thing that "kept him awake at night" was his fear over losing the "Battle of the Atlantic". He certainly saw it as a main long term priority, and aircraft were well recognized as a way to neutralize and eventually destroy the U-Boat threat.
"...Familiar with the RAF refusal to provide Coastal Command the assets it needed...."
Lets actually throw some facts at that comment shall we? The PQ-17 tragedy occurred in July 1942. In 1942 the RAF was very short of four engined long range aircraft, especially ones suited to maritime reconnaissance. The Short Stirling and Handley Page Halifax were only entering service in small numbers. The best long range assets available to Coastal Command were US built Liberators and PBY Catalinas, and UK built Sunderlands.
As to the numbers game, in Feb 1942 (the closest date I could readily find to July 1942) Coastal Command had 44 Squadrons including 5 4 engined and 4 PBY.
In March 1943 Bomber Command had 62 Sqns, only 36 of which were 4 engined, with considerable numbers of 2 engined Wellingtons and Whitleys still around. In direct comparision, in Feb 1943 Coastal Command had 48 Sqns, of which 16 were 4 engined or PBY.
I would suggest that a ratio of 62:48 does not imply that Coastal Command were starved of aircraft. Indeed 48 Sqns shows the importance that was given to airpower in the maritime environment. Yes, Bomber Command was bigger, and the bomber offensive was a high priority, but you must consider the situation at the time. With (apart from the situation in North Africa) limited ability to "take the fight to the enemy/strike back" other than from the air, the Bomber Offensive was seen as the only way seen to keep the pressure on until the infamous "second front" was opened. Striking back was an important psychological, as well as practical, strategy.
Various comments have already been made about Churchill. It should be noted that the one thing that "kept him awake at night" was his fear over losing the "Battle of the Atlantic". He certainly saw it as a main long term priority, and aircraft were well recognized as a way to neutralize and eventually destroy the U-Boat threat.
racedo, your objection to my suggestion that a superior's order might be challenged if it flies in the face of the known facts seems to be based on the effect it would have on the career of he who objects.
You make my point splendidly! Those who sat around the table that day were not JOs but VSOs, so even more career at stake you might say. Tough! Their responsibility was to see that the best appreciation of the situation was made and thus the best course of action taken. It wasn't, because to a man they deferred to the bizarre, unprecedented, and obstinate opinion of a sick man, and one other.
They failed their country, their Service and, most importantly of all, those in PQ17 and those desperately waiting for the relief it carried.
Poor Show!
You make my point splendidly! Those who sat around the table that day were not JOs but VSOs, so even more career at stake you might say. Tough! Their responsibility was to see that the best appreciation of the situation was made and thus the best course of action taken. It wasn't, because to a man they deferred to the bizarre, unprecedented, and obstinate opinion of a sick man, and one other.
They failed their country, their Service and, most importantly of all, those in PQ17 and those desperately waiting for the relief it carried.
Poor Show!
Deference to someone because of their position has time and again led to disaster because people who could challenge either haven't or done it in such a way that nobody believes them. Nobody wants to end someones career because you forever remembered for doing it.
Errors in judgement that have occurred previously but despite the errors the cock up still worked out without it being a disaster because the enemy did something unexpectedly.
Sadly everybody then forgets the errors that led to it and happy it worked out.
Commanders who disobey orders and it turns out ok get away with it, those who disobey and it ends in disaster are not so lucky.
I have no disagreement with you that PQ17 was badly served by those in London.
A certain officer called Nelson disobeyed his superior at Copenhagen with a perfect result.
How many people disobeyed orders and it led to disaster have then gone on to greater things ? Would suggest not many as they then removed from position.
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How many people disobeyed orders and it led to disaster have then gone on to greater things ? Would suggest not many as they then removed from position.
racedo, you may well suggest that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty were only capable of group think. I couldn't possibly comment, other than to say that the group think on this occasion was opposed to scatter. The problem was that when over ruled by their superior (+1), the group think seems to have been an agreed position that no more could be done. Wrong!
Poor Show!
Poor Show!
Beags,
The USS North Carolina carries nine 16 inch guns.....and would have been capable of going toe to toe with the Tirpitz.
We have to remember the Tirpitz was at anchor in Altenfijord.....and not at sea.
The FSL had been told that.
As to disobeying Orders.....Pound was the FSL and thus the most Senior Officer in the RN....thus he issued Orders and everyone obeyed them. Is that not the way a Military force operates?
The USS North Carolina carries nine 16 inch guns.....and would have been capable of going toe to toe with the Tirpitz.
We have to remember the Tirpitz was at anchor in Altenfijord.....and not at sea.
The FSL had been told that.
As to disobeying Orders.....Pound was the FSL and thus the most Senior Officer in the RN....thus he issued Orders and everyone obeyed them. Is that not the way a Military force operates?
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Chug, I am with racedo. I stand by my position that the one in command is in absolute command. Have you never heard your boss ever say that boss say it is not a democracy.
Another VSO that again went against advice was Boy Browning. I am sure there are many other instance where operations, both successful and unsuccessful, were forced through against advice.
Staffs might by sycophantic (Kim Jong-Un's spring to mind) or give best and unequivocal advice but still ignores. Dowding, Park, and Leigh-Mallory spring to mind although in that case is was one 2* disagreeing with the other.
Where I would agree with you is that Pound was wrong and should have been over-ruled but even at that exalted level it would have been a fine line between incapacity and mutiny.
Another VSO that again went against advice was Boy Browning. I am sure there are many other instance where operations, both successful and unsuccessful, were forced through against advice.
Staffs might by sycophantic (Kim Jong-Un's spring to mind) or give best and unequivocal advice but still ignores. Dowding, Park, and Leigh-Mallory spring to mind although in that case is was one 2* disagreeing with the other.
Where I would agree with you is that Pound was wrong and should have been over-ruled but even at that exalted level it would have been a fine line between incapacity and mutiny.
I am loathe to quote Wiki.....but there is a good summary of the situation faced by Coastal Command prior to and during the War.
It points to the Air Ministry in unflattering terms and points out the lack of preparedness and strategic thought prior to the War....and a failure to properly assess the threat of the U-Boat and properly address the needs of Coastal Command re Trade Protection as a result.
Bomber Command may have been seen as the only way to take the fight to the Enemy by some.....but starving to death while doing that would have been a sad outcome of a false priority. Recall Food Rationing did not end until 1948 in the UK.
The loss of the French Fleet and German access to French Ports is what presented the Allies with a real problem and led to unsustainable losses in Merchant Shipping owing to the ease in access to the Atlantic by the U-Boats.
Once that threat was recognized, strategic plans developed, and proper priority was given to Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare, did Coastal Command and US Forces (primarily USN Carrier forces) become effective in dealing with the U-Boat threat.
RAF Coastal Command - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
It points to the Air Ministry in unflattering terms and points out the lack of preparedness and strategic thought prior to the War....and a failure to properly assess the threat of the U-Boat and properly address the needs of Coastal Command re Trade Protection as a result.
Bomber Command may have been seen as the only way to take the fight to the Enemy by some.....but starving to death while doing that would have been a sad outcome of a false priority. Recall Food Rationing did not end until 1948 in the UK.
The loss of the French Fleet and German access to French Ports is what presented the Allies with a real problem and led to unsustainable losses in Merchant Shipping owing to the ease in access to the Atlantic by the U-Boats.
Once that threat was recognized, strategic plans developed, and proper priority was given to Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare, did Coastal Command and US Forces (primarily USN Carrier forces) become effective in dealing with the U-Boat threat.
RAF Coastal Command - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Which part of racedo's diatribe are you with, PN? He has successively suggested that (UK?) Commanders were only there because of accident of birth and by the same token could not be removed, to a different position that their subordinates were not willing to risk their careers in challenging their decisions, to yet another position that decisions taken at Board level are subject to Group Think, even though all are opposed (bar 2) to what the Group Think states. I am not persuaded by any of those scenarios.
We are not looking here at a tactical command. If the Convoy Commander orders it to scatter, it scatters. What we are looking at is a supposed best course of action after careful lengthy deliberation at the Admiralty. Of course the resultant order is sent in the name of the FSL, but the assumption of those receiving it is that is an overall agreed position and not contrary to it.
You cannot have a situation where one man can imperil thousands of others and millions of tons vital supplies simply because he is unwell, and thus rejects the advice given him by everyone else (bar 1). This is exceptional and requires exceptional response, rather like when Air Marshals issue illegal orders. Your duty then is to kiss goodbye to your career and report them to their superiors. Whether you do or not is the measure of you, not of them.
We are not looking here at a tactical command. If the Convoy Commander orders it to scatter, it scatters. What we are looking at is a supposed best course of action after careful lengthy deliberation at the Admiralty. Of course the resultant order is sent in the name of the FSL, but the assumption of those receiving it is that is an overall agreed position and not contrary to it.
You cannot have a situation where one man can imperil thousands of others and millions of tons vital supplies simply because he is unwell, and thus rejects the advice given him by everyone else (bar 1). This is exceptional and requires exceptional response, rather like when Air Marshals issue illegal orders. Your duty then is to kiss goodbye to your career and report them to their superiors. Whether you do or not is the measure of you, not of them.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
When JC was talking of the Tirpitz and comparing shell weights he also mentioned the thickness of her armour. I think he made a slip in units when talking on the thickness of her armour.
Her main belt protecting the machinery spaces etc was 13 inches and that on the main turrets was 14 inches. Her weakest spot was her main deck between 3.9 and 4.7 inches.
Now it was a truism at the time that you needed an armour piercing shell of greater diameter than the thickness of the armour. It follows that only plunging shot from the 6 inch gunned cruisers would have been effective against the main deck.
Her main belt protecting the machinery spaces etc was 13 inches and that on the main turrets was 14 inches. Her weakest spot was her main deck between 3.9 and 4.7 inches.
Now it was a truism at the time that you needed an armour piercing shell of greater diameter than the thickness of the armour. It follows that only plunging shot from the 6 inch gunned cruisers would have been effective against the main deck.
Last edited by Pontius Navigator; 4th Jan 2014 at 13:08.
The Allies had three Battleships (North Carolina, Washington, Duke of York), four Heavy Cruisers (Wichita, Tuscaloosa, HMS Norfolk, HMS Cumberland), and one Aircraft Carrier (Illustrious) along with several Light Cruisers and dozens of Destroyers with which to confront the Tirpitz Task Force.....which seems a fairly substantial force with which to confront the German unit.
The German Task force had one Battleship (Tirpitz), One Heavy Cruiser (Hipper), and two other Cruisers (Lutzow and Scheer), Ten Destroyers, and Nine U-Boats.
What was the head count of ships during the final shoot out with the Bismarck?
The German Task force had one Battleship (Tirpitz), One Heavy Cruiser (Hipper), and two other Cruisers (Lutzow and Scheer), Ten Destroyers, and Nine U-Boats.
What was the head count of ships during the final shoot out with the Bismarck?
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
SASLess, it was Victorious not Illustrious as the latter was in the Indian Ocean. As you know, Victorious was then loaned to the USN in Dec 1942.
One of the dangers of quoting Wiki......
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
SASLess, yes, there are traps in wiki. I amended one error in the PQ17 article.
Another case in point arose on a different thread. The same location was mentioned on wiki in 3 separate areas and led to different conclusions.
Another case in point arose on a different thread. The same location was mentioned on wiki in 3 separate areas and led to different conclusions.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Largely true, the officer class was alive and well.
Once at that position they could only be removed by Churchill and it could not be done in the course of that one day.
Quite
Equally true, no one argued that that should not be the case but clearly it was.
What we are arguing is that Pound had the power and no one was prepared to challenge it. I would also argue that the powers of command at that time were near absolute.
To come nearer to home and more recent times, we were on a 'mandatory' launch order. In the event that we were required to launch the order would be given by the CinC. Our captain at the time said he would refuse that order. Who would have been right had we been ordered to launch - this was peacetime.
and by the same token could not be removed, to a different position that their subordinates were not willing to risk their careers in challenging their decisions, to yet another position that decisions taken at Board level are subject to Group Think, even though all are opposed (bar 2) to what the Group Think states. I am not persuaded by any of those scenarios.
What we are looking at is a supposed best course of action after careful lengthy deliberation at the Admiralty. Of course the resultant order is sent in the name of the FSL, but the assumption of those receiving it is that is an overall agreed position and not contrary to it.
You cannot have a situation where one man can imperil thousands of others and millions of tons vital supplies simply because he is unwell, and thus rejects the advice given him by everyone else (bar 1). This is exceptional and requires exceptional response, rather like when Air Marshals issue illegal orders. Your duty then is to kiss goodbye to your career and report them to their superiors. Whether you do or not is the measure of you, not of them.
What we are arguing is that Pound had the power and no one was prepared to challenge it. I would also argue that the powers of command at that time were near absolute.
To come nearer to home and more recent times, we were on a 'mandatory' launch order. In the event that we were required to launch the order would be given by the CinC. Our captain at the time said he would refuse that order. Who would have been right had we been ordered to launch - this was peacetime.
If I may chip in to the argument about disobeying orders. I haven't had a chance to watch the program yet so apologies if this has already been covered.
One of the PQ17 escorting destroyers was Keppel commanded by Jack Broome.
I need to dig out his book but IIRC he did question the order to withdraw initially (ack flag at the dip) but had confirmation and when alongside the Admirals cruiser in a high speed chase to the south, which he assumed was to engage the Tirpitz, asked why they had withdrawn when discovering it wasn't to engage the enemy. But by then it was too late to go back and had to abandon the convoy
It is possible that he may have ignored the order to withdraw if he was in full possession of the facts?
He went on to say he felt thoroughly ashamed and felt the navy had let down the merchant marine badly.
One of the PQ17 escorting destroyers was Keppel commanded by Jack Broome.
I need to dig out his book but IIRC he did question the order to withdraw initially (ack flag at the dip) but had confirmation and when alongside the Admirals cruiser in a high speed chase to the south, which he assumed was to engage the Tirpitz, asked why they had withdrawn when discovering it wasn't to engage the enemy. But by then it was too late to go back and had to abandon the convoy
It is possible that he may have ignored the order to withdraw if he was in full possession of the facts?
He went on to say he felt thoroughly ashamed and felt the navy had let down the merchant marine badly.
SASless,
Reference Coastal Command - what exactly is your point? Have you actually read the link you posted to?
Yes, Coastal Command was the Cinderella of the RAF prior to the outbreak of war. However, what sort of maritime war were the British expecting to fight against the Germans? One largely confined to the North Sea. The fall of France and Norway, giving German access to Atlantic and Arctic coastlines was not envisaged. Coastal Commands thinking was inevitably a reflection of that of the Royal Navy. As for Royal Navy thinking at the time, your linked article quotes:
1937 "the Royal Navy no longer considered U-Boats were a threat to Britain's sea lanes
" in December 1937, the Naval and Air Staffs met again, and changed the priority to North Sea reconnaissance. The Naval Staff insisted that commerce raiders presented the greatest danger, and aircraft could prove decisive only in locating enemy Warships.]"
Yes, the RAF failed to adequately assess a future U-Boat threat, but so did the RN. As for not properly developing ASW by aircraft before the war, you're correct, it didn't happen. But neither did the RAF properly develop the art of night fighting. The RAF bomber fleet was inadequate at the start of the war, the fighter force not much better - in 1937 it was still mainly biplanes - air transport was minimal, etc, etc. Pre war errors and false assumptions occurred on all sides, for example, the Germans failed to develop a long range bomber. As for armed services having Cinderella services or aircraft, it still occurs today, where many air forces seem Fast Jet centric as lead by their hierarchy.
My point is that by the time of the PQ-17 convoy, July 1942, the penny had dropped about the importance of long range maritime aviation, and the RAF was doing it's best to catch up on pre war neglect. When you're fighting a global war, with forces stretched literally across the planet, Africa, the Far East, etc, based on pre war assumptions and assets planned for a North Sea conflict, it's not surprising that there are never enough assets to go around.
Oh - by the way, food rationing didn't end in the UK until 1954- not 1948!
BBC ON THIS DAY | 4 | 1954: Housewives celebrate end of rationing
Or, since you seem to prefer wiki:
Rationing in the United Kingdom - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Reference Coastal Command - what exactly is your point? Have you actually read the link you posted to?
Yes, Coastal Command was the Cinderella of the RAF prior to the outbreak of war. However, what sort of maritime war were the British expecting to fight against the Germans? One largely confined to the North Sea. The fall of France and Norway, giving German access to Atlantic and Arctic coastlines was not envisaged. Coastal Commands thinking was inevitably a reflection of that of the Royal Navy. As for Royal Navy thinking at the time, your linked article quotes:
1937 "the Royal Navy no longer considered U-Boats were a threat to Britain's sea lanes
" in December 1937, the Naval and Air Staffs met again, and changed the priority to North Sea reconnaissance. The Naval Staff insisted that commerce raiders presented the greatest danger, and aircraft could prove decisive only in locating enemy Warships.]"
Yes, the RAF failed to adequately assess a future U-Boat threat, but so did the RN. As for not properly developing ASW by aircraft before the war, you're correct, it didn't happen. But neither did the RAF properly develop the art of night fighting. The RAF bomber fleet was inadequate at the start of the war, the fighter force not much better - in 1937 it was still mainly biplanes - air transport was minimal, etc, etc. Pre war errors and false assumptions occurred on all sides, for example, the Germans failed to develop a long range bomber. As for armed services having Cinderella services or aircraft, it still occurs today, where many air forces seem Fast Jet centric as lead by their hierarchy.
My point is that by the time of the PQ-17 convoy, July 1942, the penny had dropped about the importance of long range maritime aviation, and the RAF was doing it's best to catch up on pre war neglect. When you're fighting a global war, with forces stretched literally across the planet, Africa, the Far East, etc, based on pre war assumptions and assets planned for a North Sea conflict, it's not surprising that there are never enough assets to go around.
Oh - by the way, food rationing didn't end in the UK until 1954- not 1948!
BBC ON THIS DAY | 4 | 1954: Housewives celebrate end of rationing
Or, since you seem to prefer wiki:
Rationing in the United Kingdom - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia