Wing Commander Spry
Wg Cdr Spry
I have one question which, I suggest, must be addressed before all else.
What is MoD (including the MAA) doing about the underlying cause of “Savings at the expense of Safety”?
After all, it was the main criticism of the Nimrod Review, which led to the formation of the MAA. To date, there has been much waltzing around the subject, revamping perfectly good regulations and seeking to justify hundreds of staff and consultants by creating a raft of new terms and abbreviations. But all this serves to confuse, with the root problem left untouched. New (or old) regulations are useless if the underlying problem is that implementation is optional.
How about someone in the MAA, or a Project Team, writing an article on why, when rain forests are being chopped down to accommodate these new papers, the one Def Stan setting out the mandated procedures for maintaining the Build Standard, a pre-requisite to the Safety Case, Airworthiness and Air Safety, has been cancelled without replacement. If that person wants a copy of the Def Stan, give me a shout, because MoD no longer has one. In other words, the basics are being forgotten in the rush to hide the elephant in the room.
Best wishes
I have one question which, I suggest, must be addressed before all else.
What is MoD (including the MAA) doing about the underlying cause of “Savings at the expense of Safety”?
After all, it was the main criticism of the Nimrod Review, which led to the formation of the MAA. To date, there has been much waltzing around the subject, revamping perfectly good regulations and seeking to justify hundreds of staff and consultants by creating a raft of new terms and abbreviations. But all this serves to confuse, with the root problem left untouched. New (or old) regulations are useless if the underlying problem is that implementation is optional.
How about someone in the MAA, or a Project Team, writing an article on why, when rain forests are being chopped down to accommodate these new papers, the one Def Stan setting out the mandated procedures for maintaining the Build Standard, a pre-requisite to the Safety Case, Airworthiness and Air Safety, has been cancelled without replacement. If that person wants a copy of the Def Stan, give me a shout, because MoD no longer has one. In other words, the basics are being forgotten in the rush to hide the elephant in the room.
Best wishes
While we're being a nitpicky bunch, in Dan McBride's article you have expanded "SF" into "Special Forces", (its usual meaning), when in the context of Northern Ireland at the time and Bessbrook Mill it meant "Security Forces" ie regular army/RUC.
Doesn't detract from the point of the article excellent article though.
Is Jan's hat still on Tigger?
Doesn't detract from the point of the article excellent article though.
Is Jan's hat still on Tigger?
Wg Cdr Spry
Sorry, I should have made myself clearer.
I appreciate you are not the MAA. I firmly believe the MAA has approached their task from the wrong angle, simply because it is an embarrassment to admit what the real problem is. The result is, from what I read here because I no longer have any direct contact, that Front Line has borne the brunt of this change for the sake of change.
The root problem is crystal clear. It was not at Front Line. It was at 3 Star level in the RAF and 2 Star level in MoD(PE). The former caused the waste that forced the “savings at the expense of safety”. That latter was complicit, supported by our 4 Star (where, I believe, Haddon-Cave’s rather cutting comment about submariners managing aviation came from).
I have had the opportunity to speak to senior MAA figures and I can tell you there was not an iota of understanding of the difference between airworthiness and fitness for purpose, or that airworthiness facilitates serviceability. They had no idea how to (a) attain airworthiness (which is almost entirely invisible to Front Line) or (b) maintain airworthiness (which is largely invisible to Front Line, especially since the regulations governing aforesaid Build Standard were dumped).
How many in the MAA have direct experience of the area where the root problem is? There are plenty with Front Line experience, but few with attaining and maintaining Airworthiness. And we already know from evidence at one inquest that staffs are no longer taught how to attain and maintain fitness for purpose. I just feel you are being inundated with a raft of ingenious solutions to non-existent problems, while the real problems are ignored to protect the guilty.
Sorry, I should have made myself clearer.
I appreciate you are not the MAA. I firmly believe the MAA has approached their task from the wrong angle, simply because it is an embarrassment to admit what the real problem is. The result is, from what I read here because I no longer have any direct contact, that Front Line has borne the brunt of this change for the sake of change.
The root problem is crystal clear. It was not at Front Line. It was at 3 Star level in the RAF and 2 Star level in MoD(PE). The former caused the waste that forced the “savings at the expense of safety”. That latter was complicit, supported by our 4 Star (where, I believe, Haddon-Cave’s rather cutting comment about submariners managing aviation came from).
I have had the opportunity to speak to senior MAA figures and I can tell you there was not an iota of understanding of the difference between airworthiness and fitness for purpose, or that airworthiness facilitates serviceability. They had no idea how to (a) attain airworthiness (which is almost entirely invisible to Front Line) or (b) maintain airworthiness (which is largely invisible to Front Line, especially since the regulations governing aforesaid Build Standard were dumped).
How many in the MAA have direct experience of the area where the root problem is? There are plenty with Front Line experience, but few with attaining and maintaining Airworthiness. And we already know from evidence at one inquest that staffs are no longer taught how to attain and maintain fitness for purpose. I just feel you are being inundated with a raft of ingenious solutions to non-existent problems, while the real problems are ignored to protect the guilty.
Hello again guys. Been away for a few weeks and delighted to find this thread on my return. Thank you, Wg Cdr, for doing us the honour and for the links to Air Clues.
I didn't want my first post back here to be a rant, BUT, I really do feel strongly about one thing. The good Wg Cdr Spry is here of his own free will as a service to us. I think it only fair to treat him with the respect that deserves and, more importantly, to remember his role. He is NOT an MoD punch bag to be expected to field policy questions, especially those that relate to issues of the past, how they happened or how they were (or are being handled). All of those issues may well be valid topics for debate, but not in this thread.
If there are beefs from the past or issues of current policy then either write an article for the Wg Cdr to consider for publication or publish your points in a more appropriate thread. This is Flight Safety today and getting the message out to flyers, not a forum for recriminations or arguments about policy issues.
If it wouldn't be published in Air Clues, soft, strong and thoroughly absorbent, it probably shouldn’t be published here.
You may feel differently, but those are my thoughts. Wg Cdr Spry is not a punch bag.
Courtney
(happy to be back)
I didn't want my first post back here to be a rant, BUT, I really do feel strongly about one thing. The good Wg Cdr Spry is here of his own free will as a service to us. I think it only fair to treat him with the respect that deserves and, more importantly, to remember his role. He is NOT an MoD punch bag to be expected to field policy questions, especially those that relate to issues of the past, how they happened or how they were (or are being handled). All of those issues may well be valid topics for debate, but not in this thread.
If there are beefs from the past or issues of current policy then either write an article for the Wg Cdr to consider for publication or publish your points in a more appropriate thread. This is Flight Safety today and getting the message out to flyers, not a forum for recriminations or arguments about policy issues.
If it wouldn't be published in Air Clues, soft, strong and thoroughly absorbent, it probably shouldn’t be published here.
You may feel differently, but those are my thoughts. Wg Cdr Spry is not a punch bag.
Courtney
(happy to be back)
CM:-
Absolutely right CM, so who has been punching him? This is a forum for grown ups. Grown ups should be able to discuss the scandal that is UK Military Airworthiness. The good Wg Cdr himself has explained that Flight Safety and Air Safety are both dependent on Airworthiness. That is the conundrum, because what happened in the past during Haddon-Cave's "Golden Period of Airworthiness" reduced Airworthiness, and hence Flight Safety, and hence Air Safety, to the dire straits that it is in today.
We can either ignore that, keep ticking the boxes and keeping our fingers crossed, or face up to it like, well grown ups. RAF VSOs perpetrated this mess. It is for the RAF to clear it up.
Hope that's not too punchy, Courtney.
Wg Cdr Spry is not a punch bag.
We can either ignore that, keep ticking the boxes and keeping our fingers crossed, or face up to it like, well grown ups. RAF VSOs perpetrated this mess. It is for the RAF to clear it up.
Hope that's not too punchy, Courtney.
Last edited by Chugalug2; 4th Jul 2013 at 21:56.
CM
I asked myself why the sudden change and willingness to seek opinion from an anonymous forum. The answer must be a certain level of disquiet among the Wg Cdr's colleagues at the enormous changes going on.
Most, I believe, will be asking Why? They are certainly not told why by MoD. To understand the present, you must understand the past; how else can you be sure the failings have been corrected? At the moment, it is a blind charge toward constant change. No one wants to acknowledge that many people got it right in the past.
In time, there will be vague memories of someone screwing up on something called Nimrod. A Typhoon operator or maintainer will be thinking "Nowt to do with me then". MoD/MAA have promoted this line, compartmentalising the issues. For example, they say Chinook guys having to use Argentinean tech pubs (CHART 1992) is unrelated to Kinloss not having up to date pubs for Nimrod (DRA 1994/6, NART 1998, H-C 2009). Wrong, because both were served by one department whose funding was rundown by the very people charged with a Duty of Care. Why is that Argentinean story not well known? Because VSOs tried to bury the report, denying the existence of that Annex in the media and to Ministers.
MoD/MAA have publicly accepted all but four of H-C's recommendations, but in private still rage against anyone who attempts to meet legal obligations. A thread ran last October about the joint MAA/RAeS conference at which these same old stories were trotted out, grossly misleading everyone there. I wonder how many of Wg Cdr Spry’s readers felt properly represented?
Therefore, my posts seek to reassure the Wg Cdr that those who actually know what caused the failures, and how to fix them, wholeheartedly support the Front Line. Were it up to me, the fixes would be largely invisible to them, except you'd begin to see feedback improve, Fault Investigations would be carried out, Tech Pubs would be accurate and up to date, 765s answered in days, not years and you’d no longer find Mods that worked but weren’t safe (and vice versa); in short, all the little things that combine to maintain a stable, safe Build Standard. All mandated, all ditched in 1991-93 by the CE.
This wouldn’t cost much more. We spend huge amounts getting these things wrong. Often quite deliberately. I’d spend it getting it right. Service training, for air and ground crews, is the best in the world. That is not where the problem lies. One thing I’d do is introduce one brief talk (or handout, it is already written) into training answering the oft-asked question “How do we (front line) influence procurement?” Most will think “We can’t”, but the answer is an eye opener and after 45 mins you’ll realise the reason you don’t think you can is because of the decision to rundown airworthiness. When you see little links like this a lot falls into place.
I asked myself why the sudden change and willingness to seek opinion from an anonymous forum. The answer must be a certain level of disquiet among the Wg Cdr's colleagues at the enormous changes going on.
Most, I believe, will be asking Why? They are certainly not told why by MoD. To understand the present, you must understand the past; how else can you be sure the failings have been corrected? At the moment, it is a blind charge toward constant change. No one wants to acknowledge that many people got it right in the past.
In time, there will be vague memories of someone screwing up on something called Nimrod. A Typhoon operator or maintainer will be thinking "Nowt to do with me then". MoD/MAA have promoted this line, compartmentalising the issues. For example, they say Chinook guys having to use Argentinean tech pubs (CHART 1992) is unrelated to Kinloss not having up to date pubs for Nimrod (DRA 1994/6, NART 1998, H-C 2009). Wrong, because both were served by one department whose funding was rundown by the very people charged with a Duty of Care. Why is that Argentinean story not well known? Because VSOs tried to bury the report, denying the existence of that Annex in the media and to Ministers.
MoD/MAA have publicly accepted all but four of H-C's recommendations, but in private still rage against anyone who attempts to meet legal obligations. A thread ran last October about the joint MAA/RAeS conference at which these same old stories were trotted out, grossly misleading everyone there. I wonder how many of Wg Cdr Spry’s readers felt properly represented?
Therefore, my posts seek to reassure the Wg Cdr that those who actually know what caused the failures, and how to fix them, wholeheartedly support the Front Line. Were it up to me, the fixes would be largely invisible to them, except you'd begin to see feedback improve, Fault Investigations would be carried out, Tech Pubs would be accurate and up to date, 765s answered in days, not years and you’d no longer find Mods that worked but weren’t safe (and vice versa); in short, all the little things that combine to maintain a stable, safe Build Standard. All mandated, all ditched in 1991-93 by the CE.
This wouldn’t cost much more. We spend huge amounts getting these things wrong. Often quite deliberately. I’d spend it getting it right. Service training, for air and ground crews, is the best in the world. That is not where the problem lies. One thing I’d do is introduce one brief talk (or handout, it is already written) into training answering the oft-asked question “How do we (front line) influence procurement?” Most will think “We can’t”, but the answer is an eye opener and after 45 mins you’ll realise the reason you don’t think you can is because of the decision to rundown airworthiness. When you see little links like this a lot falls into place.
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: East Sussex UK
Age: 66
Posts: 6,995
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
I asked myself why the sudden change and willingness to seek opinion from an anonymous forum.
Good to see you back Courtney
Coff.
Last edited by CoffmanStarter; 5th Jul 2013 at 09:37.
Join Date: Dec 2009
Location: Lancaster Block
Posts: 35
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Whilst I do appreciate a heated debate, it would indeed be wrong of me to comment in this forum on policy matters. Please be assured though that I am closely following this thread and, with the contributors permission, I hope to answer some of your concerns or questions in the next edition of Air Clues. My main intent on this thread is, as Coff quite rightly stated, to improve flight safety by
In particular I welcome articles for inclusion in Air Clues on your own experiences, that would benefit the masses by sharing the lessons you may have learnt (“I learnt about…….from that”).
Yours aye
Spry
tapping the vast pool of experience offered by members of this forum
Yours aye
Spry
new posts required to conduct aviation on Crown Property in accordance with recent MAA direction will soon outnumber our front-line fleet - SFSOs, Risk Register Managers, SEMSCOs, LEMSCOs, UFSOs, Stn FOD Offs, HF Instructors, ASIMS Ocurrence Managers all putting together ASMPs, Defence Aerodrome Manuals, DAAFs, Risk Registers, Hazard Logs, Stn FOD plans, etc...etc...
LJ, what the **** do all those acronyms stand for?
Actually, what was really wrong with:
JSP318, Flying Orders and a good brief from the Authorising Officer ... all overseen by a good/experienced Boss
Roland
There is nothing wrong with that, as long as you realise there are people supporting you in the background whose job it is to provide an airworthy aircraft, and others whose job it is to ensure it is fit for purpose. (And where there is overlap, they must know when it is occurring). Only when that is permitted, does "JSP318, Flying Orders and a good brief from the Authorising Officer ... all overseen by a good/experienced Boss" become remotely acceptable. You were happy with JSP318, I was happy with JSP553, 00-970, and 125/2. Each to his own, and together they delivered.
That it is not permitted is why Haddon-Cave was asked to conduct his Review.
Speaking of Haddon-Cave, I learnt from DE&S (!) this week that the official MoD/MAA position is that the systemic failings he reported are entirely unrelated to the systemic failings reported to him, despite them being precisely the same failings.
Now, that's a new one, but entirely consistent with an organisation in denial. To be fair, DE&S did name a senior MAA officer in the reply, so one assumes he is content with this. But it does rather call into question - WTF is going on? Does the MAA pass these gems of wisdom over to Front Line? Or Air Clues staff? Or is it just selective incompetence?
There is nothing wrong with that, as long as you realise there are people supporting you in the background whose job it is to provide an airworthy aircraft, and others whose job it is to ensure it is fit for purpose. (And where there is overlap, they must know when it is occurring). Only when that is permitted, does "JSP318, Flying Orders and a good brief from the Authorising Officer ... all overseen by a good/experienced Boss" become remotely acceptable. You were happy with JSP318, I was happy with JSP553, 00-970, and 125/2. Each to his own, and together they delivered.
That it is not permitted is why Haddon-Cave was asked to conduct his Review.
Speaking of Haddon-Cave, I learnt from DE&S (!) this week that the official MoD/MAA position is that the systemic failings he reported are entirely unrelated to the systemic failings reported to him, despite them being precisely the same failings.
Now, that's a new one, but entirely consistent with an organisation in denial. To be fair, DE&S did name a senior MAA officer in the reply, so one assumes he is content with this. But it does rather call into question - WTF is going on? Does the MAA pass these gems of wisdom over to Front Line? Or Air Clues staff? Or is it just selective incompetence?
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: Somewhere near the Rhine
Posts: 100
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I know from experience how tough Wg Cdr Spry's job is and the great step forward that has led to his opening this thread on Pprune. Whilst I have a great deal of respect for the views of many regarding airworthiness, the continued raising of these issues on this thread will severely hamper the good Wg Cdrs ability to continue in this way.
The problems were not just airworthiness related but centre around how to "do" SMS in a military organisation. I would encourage people to use this thread to explore how the brave new world of safety of the MAA and the single services below it can meet the future challenges of defence.
The past is the past, and tragic as that maybe, lets help the well meaning people doing safety today meet the challenges they face in a practical way. I hope that we can all help Wg Cdr Spry with plenty of good material that he can use. He is not here to defend policy decisions elsewhere in defence.
The problems were not just airworthiness related but centre around how to "do" SMS in a military organisation. I would encourage people to use this thread to explore how the brave new world of safety of the MAA and the single services below it can meet the future challenges of defence.
The past is the past, and tragic as that maybe, lets help the well meaning people doing safety today meet the challenges they face in a practical way. I hope that we can all help Wg Cdr Spry with plenty of good material that he can use. He is not here to defend policy decisions elsewhere in defence.
He is not here to defend policy decisions elsewhere in defence.
But surely "he" is there to challenge policies that adversely affect safety? If you don't you're part of the problem.
I'm not convinced by this "past is past" and "no recriminations" stuff. As tuc said earlier, I'd like to know what the failures were so I'd be confident they were being fixed. It seems to me the recriminations continue but against the people who pointed out the failings.
But well done Wg Cdr Spry. I hope you can answer some of questions. Why not just publish the evidence to Haddon-Cave?
TFF:-
You sum up the dilemma of the MAA and of its chosen path perfectly, and with some style too might I add TFF. Just as in the novel that you quote, all that is past is past and we now go forward together from a new Year Zero. Perhaps we should remind ourselves that Mustapha Mond, Big Brother, and Pol Pot were all bad news for those contemplating a quiet life, let alone a safe one.
That is no way to run a pub, let alone Airworthiness. Nothing less than enforcing the Regulations from start to finish will do. The problem is that has not happened for the last three decades, principally because the Airworthiness Authority (the MOD) scrapped the Regs and sacked those engineers who would not comply with an illegal order to sign them off as complied with anyway. Before we can take one positive step into the future the Airworthiness Authority must come to terms with that scandal and confront those who perpetrated this mess and then covered it up.
It doesn't take a genius to realise that can only be done by an independent Airworthiness Authority, ie the MAA must reform out with the MOD and be civilian led. Ditto the MAAIB. Only then can
...explore how the brave new world of safety of the MAA and the single services below it can meet the future challenges of defence.
That is no way to run a pub, let alone Airworthiness. Nothing less than enforcing the Regulations from start to finish will do. The problem is that has not happened for the last three decades, principally because the Airworthiness Authority (the MOD) scrapped the Regs and sacked those engineers who would not comply with an illegal order to sign them off as complied with anyway. Before we can take one positive step into the future the Airworthiness Authority must come to terms with that scandal and confront those who perpetrated this mess and then covered it up.
It doesn't take a genius to realise that can only be done by an independent Airworthiness Authority, ie the MAA must reform out with the MOD and be civilian led. Ditto the MAAIB. Only then can
well meaning people doing safety today meet the challenges they face in a practical way
Last edited by Chugalug2; 6th Jul 2013 at 08:57.
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: East Sussex UK
Age: 66
Posts: 6,995
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
I note that Gp Capt Ian Gale's piece (Page 23 Perfect Storm) made the Sunday Times this weekend ... clearly sourced from Air Clues. A good honest account from a VSO ... Well done Sir 
Mind you I hope the Personnel Bod responsible for exiting such skilled resource without understanding operational dependencies got his/her Brown Envelope
Mind you I hope the Personnel Bod responsible for exiting such skilled resource without understanding operational dependencies got his/her Brown Envelope
Last edited by CoffmanStarter; 15th Sep 2014 at 18:19.
CS
Whilst there were some compulsory redundancies, the majority of the problems at Lossie were brought on by voluntary redundancies and ETs (all helped on their way by aggressive recruiting into the offshore industries), so not really the fault of any individual poster. What it does go to show is that whilst offering voluntary redundancy is one way of sweetening a bitter pill, it can result in the 'wrong' people leaving (from the Service's point of view) and that - dare I say it - greater use of compulsory redundancy in other areas of the Service might have had less effect on 'the sharp end'. Perhaps Manning could have refused a few more of the VRs - but a tough call to make when the policy is 'volunteers first'.
By the way, Spry, it's Gp Capt Gale, not Gail - are you calling him a girl?
By the way again - I must admit to being a little confused as to why this interesting, but in the grand scheme of things fairly minor, story gets pinched by the Sunday Times, when the much bigger and dirtier story continually told by tuc (et al) stays resolutely low-profile. Perhaps if Air Clues can run a story based on the evidence here, it might make the press! (get Fg Off Fixe to write it - sounds like he doesn't have much of a career to lose!)
Whilst there were some compulsory redundancies, the majority of the problems at Lossie were brought on by voluntary redundancies and ETs (all helped on their way by aggressive recruiting into the offshore industries), so not really the fault of any individual poster. What it does go to show is that whilst offering voluntary redundancy is one way of sweetening a bitter pill, it can result in the 'wrong' people leaving (from the Service's point of view) and that - dare I say it - greater use of compulsory redundancy in other areas of the Service might have had less effect on 'the sharp end'. Perhaps Manning could have refused a few more of the VRs - but a tough call to make when the policy is 'volunteers first'.
By the way, Spry, it's Gp Capt Gale, not Gail - are you calling him a girl?
By the way again - I must admit to being a little confused as to why this interesting, but in the grand scheme of things fairly minor, story gets pinched by the Sunday Times, when the much bigger and dirtier story continually told by tuc (et al) stays resolutely low-profile. Perhaps if Air Clues can run a story based on the evidence here, it might make the press! (get Fg Off Fixe to write it - sounds like he doesn't have much of a career to lose!)
Last edited by Easy Street; 7th Jul 2013 at 19:55.
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: East Sussex UK
Age: 66
Posts: 6,995
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
ES ...
Thanks for that. Having had the unenviable task of taking this kind of action, as a COO in a Global Company, I recognise the difficulty of "ring fencing" the experience and talent you want to keep ... but it's not impossible ... if there is a will there is usually a way.
Cheers ...
Coff.
Thanks for that. Having had the unenviable task of taking this kind of action, as a COO in a Global Company, I recognise the difficulty of "ring fencing" the experience and talent you want to keep ... but it's not impossible ... if there is a will there is usually a way.
Cheers ...
Coff.
LJ - to be fair, while those posts do need to be filled (in order to allocate some responsibility for the various efforts they involve), they don't need to always be different persons. Some do, but many can be 'double-hatted' e.g LEMSCO (Local Error Management Safety Co-ord) can also do HF (Human Factors) training and will also be an ideal OI (Occurrence Investigator). In practice, many of the roles are secondary duties with only the SFSO and perhaps SEMSCO (Station Error Management etc etc) needing to be primary posts. Yes, it is new, but at least it is attempting to address the issue. Having seen it at close quarters, the effect will depend greatly on the individual carrying out the duty but at least you will know WHO that is these days!
SP:-
Could you explain what issue you refer to, SP? It seems to me that we have a situation here whereby all the effort is being directed inside the Station Gates, wherein rules and regulations are generally obeyed, and punishment usually follows when they are not.
In contrast, outside of the gates the opposite appears to be the norm, in respect of Airworthiness provision at least. That is where the Elephants are still trampling down the rose beds. That is where the "issue" needs urgently addressing.
Easy Street, thank you for the link. I would commend careful study of it to all who seek to understand what has happened and what should be done to put it right again. I repeat it here:https://sites.google.com/site/milita...orthiness/home
Yes, it is new, but at least it is attempting to address the issue.
In contrast, outside of the gates the opposite appears to be the norm, in respect of Airworthiness provision at least. That is where the Elephants are still trampling down the rose beds. That is where the "issue" needs urgently addressing.
Easy Street, thank you for the link. I would commend careful study of it to all who seek to understand what has happened and what should be done to put it right again. I repeat it here:https://sites.google.com/site/milita...orthiness/home