Decision to axe Harrier is "bonkers".
N_a_b
I've edited my last post. The comment about the Americans taking GR9s was based on rumours that I've read....
Capt Pugwash
I am as cynical about politicians as the next man, but since Illustrious is near the end of her refit, how do you see his comments as promoting his vested interests? He isn't arguing for more ships, or for more refits.
The defence secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff are shortly of to Wahington to discuss Libya. I wonder if the carrier topic will come up?
Meanwhile: Pressure mounts on Liam Fox over defence cuts
They will focus in particular on the decision not to have an operational aircraft carrier for most of the next decade and there will be demands to reverse the mothballing of 90 Harrier jets for use in operations in Libya.
Dr Fox is understood to want to bring the Harriers back into service.
The Scotsman last week revealed the aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious, which is supposed to be turned into a helicopter carrier, has been prepared in its refit at Rosyth in a way that would allow Harriers to fly from it.
I've edited my last post. The comment about the Americans taking GR9s was based on rumours that I've read....
Capt Pugwash
I am as cynical about politicians as the next man, but since Illustrious is near the end of her refit, how do you see his comments as promoting his vested interests? He isn't arguing for more ships, or for more refits.
The defence secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff are shortly of to Wahington to discuss Libya. I wonder if the carrier topic will come up?
Meanwhile: Pressure mounts on Liam Fox over defence cuts
They will focus in particular on the decision not to have an operational aircraft carrier for most of the next decade and there will be demands to reverse the mothballing of 90 Harrier jets for use in operations in Libya.
Dr Fox is understood to want to bring the Harriers back into service.
The Scotsman last week revealed the aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious, which is supposed to be turned into a helicopter carrier, has been prepared in its refit at Rosyth in a way that would allow Harriers to fly from it.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 29th Apr 2011 at 17:12.
WEBF,
Are these Harriers breeding or something? I understood there to be about 45 when the SDSR concluded. Since then, there were suddenly 65, now it seems, according to "The Scotsman" there are 90 of them?
Yet at the point of retirement, there was a squadron a piece. Allowing for 12 each, including the OCU, that's 36, with perhaps 2 at Coningsby. This leaves 7 in case they're needed. I'm not that naive, of course, to imagine there are only 45. But to suggest there are as many as the Scotsman claims is getting a little dramatic and carried away with the moment.
FB
Are these Harriers breeding or something? I understood there to be about 45 when the SDSR concluded. Since then, there were suddenly 65, now it seems, according to "The Scotsman" there are 90 of them?
Yet at the point of retirement, there was a squadron a piece. Allowing for 12 each, including the OCU, that's 36, with perhaps 2 at Coningsby. This leaves 7 in case they're needed. I'm not that naive, of course, to imagine there are only 45. But to suggest there are as many as the Scotsman claims is getting a little dramatic and carried away with the moment.FB
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In the days of three FLS the FAF was 34 single seaters for the frontline, plus 2 twin seaters. 20(R) had approximately 10 single and four twin seaters. Some were on loan to BAe, others in the JUMP programme, 41 Sqn had a couple, CAT 3 plus repairs were being done on some more etc. If you totted up 'all the GR7/9 in the UK' you got to about 73.
Apply a standard deviation of about 2 to all the above figures and you won't be (far) wrong.
As far as I am aware, the reduction from 18 to 10 FE@R didn't result in the disposal of any airframes.
What the above does gloss over is the 'fleets within fleets' issue. Not all of these frames would be 107 Cap E(A)s.
Not that this should in any way be taken as my opinion on whether or not it's coming back. It isn't - crying shame, but it isn't.
Apply a standard deviation of about 2 to all the above figures and you won't be (far) wrong.
As far as I am aware, the reduction from 18 to 10 FE@R didn't result in the disposal of any airframes.
What the above does gloss over is the 'fleets within fleets' issue. Not all of these frames would be 107 Cap E(A)s.
Not that this should in any way be taken as my opinion on whether or not it's coming back. It isn't - crying shame, but it isn't.
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Defence Contracts Bulletin
From today's MOD DCB:
Section VI: Summary of Requirements / Description of Work
Summary of Requirements / Description of Work: Technical assistance services. The Contractor shall provide an Independent Safety Audit, Safety and Environmental Subject Matter Expert advice and updates to the Harrier Environmental Case to support the Harrier Disposal Programme.
JB
Section VI: Summary of Requirements / Description of Work
Summary of Requirements / Description of Work: Technical assistance services. The Contractor shall provide an Independent Safety Audit, Safety and Environmental Subject Matter Expert advice and updates to the Harrier Environmental Case to support the Harrier Disposal Programme.
JB
Suspicion breeds confidence
This story just won't go away.....
Government ready for a U-turn over scrapped Harriers - East Hampshire - The News
Government ready for a U-turn over scrapped Harriers - East Hampshire - The News
Interesting link Navaleye.
A senior navy source told The News: ‘The Harriers have only been mothballed so they could be brought back out to fly at any time. Until you crush something, it can be used.
Am I a particularly naughty boy for wondering if that also applies to old Sea Harriers in storage? Still, the GR9 can do all sorts of things, including limited air defence (see the reference to remarks by MM here on GR9 supported by Sea King ASaCs/AWACS/shipboard fighter controllers).
Clearly GR9/AIM-9L is inferior to FA2/AMRAAM. I don’t discount that. Likewise, GR9 would not be credible against a modern fighter/active missile mix in many cases. However, you stated that GR9 had ‘no offensive anti air [sic] capability’. As someone with just a few thousand hours of AWACS experience (including flying in support of CVS and on several SKASaC sorties) I can tell you that you are incorrect.
The GR9 is slightly slower than the FA2 yes. However, it has significantly greater endurance and manoeuvrability.
Even without a radar, a GR9 with AIM-9L benefitting from SKASaC support would be as capable as a 1982 FRS1 sans AEW. Why? Firstly, the FRS1 Blue Fox radar was pulse only and therefore had extremely limited capability overland or against a high sea state (that’s why the PD Blue Vixen was developed). The majority of engagements in 1982 were ship controlled into the visual or pure visual pick ups. Meanwhile, in the Falklands we needed to keep DCA CAPs airborne due to the lack of AEW. FRS1 also seemed to do relatively well against supersonic capable Mirage III and Daggers.
With SKASaC providing wide area AEW overland and in all sea states (PD radar), GR9 could be maintained on deck alert and provide an AD capability at least on a par, if not superior to FRS1 sans AEW. When scrambled, SKASaC support would largely overcome the GR9 lead nose. Moreover, GR9 has a very nice EO/IR, defensive aids and RHWR capability, all of which were lacking from Sea Harrier (FRS1 or FA2). I’m not quite sure how you work out GR9 is limited to daylight VFR intercepts. I’ve personally controlled GR9s conducting night time NVG PIs and have seen GR7s kill F-16s, FA-18Cs, Mirage 2000 and Tornado F3s at night on exercise.
This was originally posted on ARRSE - here. The Auriga deployment of 2010 featured the Ark Royal based Harrier GR9s doing air to air work against Hornets, both in self defence whilst doing ground attack and in air defence of the task group - directed on to the target by the ASaCS Sea King and shipborne fighter controllers.
I still think my idea of getting a dozen or so AV8B+s (Harriers with radar) in exchange for our GR9s and continuing to make Illustrious (until 2014) and Queen Elizabeth thereafter available for continued USMC Harrier embarkations is a winner!
Anyway, here are some old threads that also discussed these issues:
RN Fixed Wing future?
Head of Royal Navy threatens resignation over push to scrap Harriers
Harrier dispute between Navy and RAF chiefs sees Army 'marriage counsellor' called in
When I wrote an angry letter soon after the SDSR, I mentioned all the different people involved in safe flying operations aboard the carrier. Thus far, I resisted the urge to copy letters word for word, however, here is what I said with respect to skills:
If the Royal Navy has no capacity to operate fixed wing aircraft at sea for a decade, then all the skills that are needed will be lost. It is generally reckoned that building these skills up from being non existent to the level we currently have would take approximately ten years – maybe longer. Of course, the pilots can be sent to work with the US Navy or someone else, to build up experience of carrier operations. However, operating fixed wing aircraft (and helicopters to a certain extent) is a whole ship activity. It does not only involve the aircrew and flight deck personnel, but virtually everyone. There is no way we can send hundreds of sailors to work in American carriers, and most of these specialist skills need to be maintained by constant practice. Many are carrier specific.
On the flight deck, aircraft handlers need to be able to speedily and safely move aircraft around the flight deck, both by giving visual cues to pilots and by using vehicles. They also need to be able to deal with any fires or other incidents that might occur. The RN School of Flight Deck Operations at RNAS Culdrose has a dummy deck, dubbed HMS Siskin, where aircraft handlers learn their trade. Real aircraft, including a number of retired Sea Harriers, are used and move under their own power to simulate a carrier deck. However, they cannot simulate the movement of a ship at sea in variable sea conditions, pitching and rolling. Nor can they simulate things such the carrier increasing speed to launch aircraft and the sudden wind over the deck. Getting experience of these things and building experience and confidence requires people to spend time at sea working with aircraft for real. This is a key skill area that will decline very rapidly if we have no flying from carriers.
Other personnel may also need to work on the flight deck, amongst the aircraft. These include the people who maintain the aircraft, and those who fuel and arm them. They too need experience of doing it for real.
Beyond the flight deck, lots of other personnel in different parts of the ship are involved. These include the Navigating Officer and the Officer of the Watch and his/her team on the bridge, who must ensure that the ship is on the right heading for flying operations. The Commander (Air) and his team are responsible for running aviation activities. The marine engineering watchkeepers in the Ship Control Centre are responsible for increasing the speed of the carrier’s engines when needed for launching aircraft, they also carry out adjustments to things such as the ship’s trim, so as to maintain a level deck for flying. There are various sensors, communications systems and landing aids that need to be maintained and operated. All of these are things that demand time spent practising at sea.
Air Traffic Control is of critical importance, as are others who are involved in airspace management. A carrier is unlike any airfield in that she moves. Land based ATC cannot provide the same experience. Her command team must also consider the constraints put on her movements by the maritime environment, by her escorts, and by the need to be aware of the existence of things such as merchant shipping or fishing boats. The aircrew that fly from the deck also need to have an understanding of all these issues. They must also understand how they fit in with the rest of the ship and task group. Finally, no carrier operations mean that in ten years time, there will be no senior naval officers with experience or understanding of these complex issues.
Most of these things cannot be taught on a dummy deck, or in a simulator, but need developing by real flying aboard real decks. The RN has been doing this for many decades, and the experience and expertise, much of it won at great cost, handed down. It seems unlikely that the body of experience would survive a ten year gap of non use. Interestingly, young officers entering the training pipeline to become pilots or observers have been told that to go from scratch to the level of expertise we currently have would take ten years – this is based on the experience of others Navies like those of Spain and Italy who have gained carriers more recently than us.
Some of my comments here are based on what I was fortunate to witness aboard HMS Illustrious in late 2007. Although I had a pretty good idea of what to expect, the number of different parts of ship involved in maintaining safe and effective flying operations took me by surprise. The teamwork was impressive. If a mere [me - a Reservist junior rate] can see this, why does the review turn a blind eye? Whilst in the dinner queue one evening I looked in a magazine I found loafing, there was an article in which a senior aviator (ex Sea Harrier) commented on the danger of future Fleet Air Arm personnel becoming unfamiliar with the shipboard environment and deck operations. My path has crossed with aviation connected personnel at other times, and they have all expressed similar views.
I would suggest that basics are basics, regardless of whether the future is V/STOL or involves "Cats and traps". Will there be exchanges for lots of chockheads - moving live jets on deck 24 hours a day in all weather in rough sea states, the people who fuel, arm and work on aircraft on deck - amongst jet blast (and FOD issues) the OOW and bridge team - who have to put the ship in the right place, direction and speed for aircraft to take off or land, Ops Room personnel - who have to operate sensors/weapons and talk to aircraft, maintainers of this equipment, landing aids maintainers, the ME watchkeepers keeping a nice level deck and increasing speed when needed, ATC types, Fighter Controllers, senior Officers in the carrier (Cdr(Air), Lt Cdr(Flying), Captain, XO) - they need to know how to run things, senior Officers elsewhere (MOD, Navy Command, task group commanders) who need to know how aircraft are used as task group weapons, etc?
The skills issue was also mentioned on the Sea Jet and Future Carrier threads.
Now back to Libya. It really does seem that we may be putting both hands in the Libyan mangle.
Royal Navy Ships Sail To Join Cougar 11
The largest warship in the Royal Navy, HMS Ocean is carrying a mix of support helicopters, Apache attack helicopters and landing craft. These enable her to land Royal Marines, their vehicles and equipment and sustain them as they undertake exercises across the region.
Also - HMS Aibion Plays TAG
Interesting times ahead. Can anyone else sense that our amphibious forces are about to be sent to Libya? We can't put boots on the ground in Libya – but what about fins?
For this reason, it seems sensible that the UK is continuing with its Cougar amphibious deployment to the Mediterranean, comprising HMS Albion, HMS Ocean, RFA Cardigan Bay and HMS Sutherland, together with elements of 40 Commando Royal Marines. Ostensibly, they will conduct littoral operations off Cyprus. But with their ability to provide more imaginative solutions to the crisis, their deployment might be an indication of the way ahead. Although boots on the ground might be a step too far, "fins" on the ground, able to deter and prevent serious attacks on civilians before returning to their ships, might prove acceptable – and the low-footprint approach would get around any sense of them being an occupying force.
But even while we do our best to bring the Libyan mission to a speedy and successful conclusion, we must consider the broader implications. The very deployment of the Cougar force recognises that the Mediterranean is likely to be the source of political, economic and demographic challenges for some time to come. Over the next decade, a confusing array of demographic, climatic and societal pressures will severely challenge the political and economic realities with which Europeans have been comfortable for the past 60 years or so.
One of the most important and pressing issues is for European nations, both collectively and individually, to determine and implement a strategy for the region that will deliver security, stability and prosperity. But they will also need to maintain credible, effective and balanced military forces that are agile and powerful enough to deal with a broad range of crises: war does not come cheap, and nor, for that matter, does peace.
In this sense, Libya is both a laboratory and a test case. So far, it has proved that Europe on its own lacks the cohesion and military resources to undertake even a modest coercive campaign, on its own doorstep, without the support of the United States. It seems clear that a truly strategic reassessment is long overdue. In other words, someone needs to take charge.
A senior navy source told The News: ‘The Harriers have only been mothballed so they could be brought back out to fly at any time. Until you crush something, it can be used.
Am I a particularly naughty boy for wondering if that also applies to old Sea Harriers in storage? Still, the GR9 can do all sorts of things, including limited air defence (see the reference to remarks by MM here on GR9 supported by Sea King ASaCs/AWACS/shipboard fighter controllers).
Clearly GR9/AIM-9L is inferior to FA2/AMRAAM. I don’t discount that. Likewise, GR9 would not be credible against a modern fighter/active missile mix in many cases. However, you stated that GR9 had ‘no offensive anti air [sic] capability’. As someone with just a few thousand hours of AWACS experience (including flying in support of CVS and on several SKASaC sorties) I can tell you that you are incorrect.
The GR9 is slightly slower than the FA2 yes. However, it has significantly greater endurance and manoeuvrability.
Even without a radar, a GR9 with AIM-9L benefitting from SKASaC support would be as capable as a 1982 FRS1 sans AEW. Why? Firstly, the FRS1 Blue Fox radar was pulse only and therefore had extremely limited capability overland or against a high sea state (that’s why the PD Blue Vixen was developed). The majority of engagements in 1982 were ship controlled into the visual or pure visual pick ups. Meanwhile, in the Falklands we needed to keep DCA CAPs airborne due to the lack of AEW. FRS1 also seemed to do relatively well against supersonic capable Mirage III and Daggers.
With SKASaC providing wide area AEW overland and in all sea states (PD radar), GR9 could be maintained on deck alert and provide an AD capability at least on a par, if not superior to FRS1 sans AEW. When scrambled, SKASaC support would largely overcome the GR9 lead nose. Moreover, GR9 has a very nice EO/IR, defensive aids and RHWR capability, all of which were lacking from Sea Harrier (FRS1 or FA2). I’m not quite sure how you work out GR9 is limited to daylight VFR intercepts. I’ve personally controlled GR9s conducting night time NVG PIs and have seen GR7s kill F-16s, FA-18Cs, Mirage 2000 and Tornado F3s at night on exercise.
This was originally posted on ARRSE - here. The Auriga deployment of 2010 featured the Ark Royal based Harrier GR9s doing air to air work against Hornets, both in self defence whilst doing ground attack and in air defence of the task group - directed on to the target by the ASaCS Sea King and shipborne fighter controllers.
I still think my idea of getting a dozen or so AV8B+s (Harriers with radar) in exchange for our GR9s and continuing to make Illustrious (until 2014) and Queen Elizabeth thereafter available for continued USMC Harrier embarkations is a winner!
Anyway, here are some old threads that also discussed these issues:
RN Fixed Wing future?
Head of Royal Navy threatens resignation over push to scrap Harriers
Harrier dispute between Navy and RAF chiefs sees Army 'marriage counsellor' called in
When I wrote an angry letter soon after the SDSR, I mentioned all the different people involved in safe flying operations aboard the carrier. Thus far, I resisted the urge to copy letters word for word, however, here is what I said with respect to skills:
If the Royal Navy has no capacity to operate fixed wing aircraft at sea for a decade, then all the skills that are needed will be lost. It is generally reckoned that building these skills up from being non existent to the level we currently have would take approximately ten years – maybe longer. Of course, the pilots can be sent to work with the US Navy or someone else, to build up experience of carrier operations. However, operating fixed wing aircraft (and helicopters to a certain extent) is a whole ship activity. It does not only involve the aircrew and flight deck personnel, but virtually everyone. There is no way we can send hundreds of sailors to work in American carriers, and most of these specialist skills need to be maintained by constant practice. Many are carrier specific.
On the flight deck, aircraft handlers need to be able to speedily and safely move aircraft around the flight deck, both by giving visual cues to pilots and by using vehicles. They also need to be able to deal with any fires or other incidents that might occur. The RN School of Flight Deck Operations at RNAS Culdrose has a dummy deck, dubbed HMS Siskin, where aircraft handlers learn their trade. Real aircraft, including a number of retired Sea Harriers, are used and move under their own power to simulate a carrier deck. However, they cannot simulate the movement of a ship at sea in variable sea conditions, pitching and rolling. Nor can they simulate things such the carrier increasing speed to launch aircraft and the sudden wind over the deck. Getting experience of these things and building experience and confidence requires people to spend time at sea working with aircraft for real. This is a key skill area that will decline very rapidly if we have no flying from carriers.
Other personnel may also need to work on the flight deck, amongst the aircraft. These include the people who maintain the aircraft, and those who fuel and arm them. They too need experience of doing it for real.
Beyond the flight deck, lots of other personnel in different parts of the ship are involved. These include the Navigating Officer and the Officer of the Watch and his/her team on the bridge, who must ensure that the ship is on the right heading for flying operations. The Commander (Air) and his team are responsible for running aviation activities. The marine engineering watchkeepers in the Ship Control Centre are responsible for increasing the speed of the carrier’s engines when needed for launching aircraft, they also carry out adjustments to things such as the ship’s trim, so as to maintain a level deck for flying. There are various sensors, communications systems and landing aids that need to be maintained and operated. All of these are things that demand time spent practising at sea.
Air Traffic Control is of critical importance, as are others who are involved in airspace management. A carrier is unlike any airfield in that she moves. Land based ATC cannot provide the same experience. Her command team must also consider the constraints put on her movements by the maritime environment, by her escorts, and by the need to be aware of the existence of things such as merchant shipping or fishing boats. The aircrew that fly from the deck also need to have an understanding of all these issues. They must also understand how they fit in with the rest of the ship and task group. Finally, no carrier operations mean that in ten years time, there will be no senior naval officers with experience or understanding of these complex issues.
Most of these things cannot be taught on a dummy deck, or in a simulator, but need developing by real flying aboard real decks. The RN has been doing this for many decades, and the experience and expertise, much of it won at great cost, handed down. It seems unlikely that the body of experience would survive a ten year gap of non use. Interestingly, young officers entering the training pipeline to become pilots or observers have been told that to go from scratch to the level of expertise we currently have would take ten years – this is based on the experience of others Navies like those of Spain and Italy who have gained carriers more recently than us.
Some of my comments here are based on what I was fortunate to witness aboard HMS Illustrious in late 2007. Although I had a pretty good idea of what to expect, the number of different parts of ship involved in maintaining safe and effective flying operations took me by surprise. The teamwork was impressive. If a mere [me - a Reservist junior rate] can see this, why does the review turn a blind eye? Whilst in the dinner queue one evening I looked in a magazine I found loafing, there was an article in which a senior aviator (ex Sea Harrier) commented on the danger of future Fleet Air Arm personnel becoming unfamiliar with the shipboard environment and deck operations. My path has crossed with aviation connected personnel at other times, and they have all expressed similar views.
I would suggest that basics are basics, regardless of whether the future is V/STOL or involves "Cats and traps". Will there be exchanges for lots of chockheads - moving live jets on deck 24 hours a day in all weather in rough sea states, the people who fuel, arm and work on aircraft on deck - amongst jet blast (and FOD issues) the OOW and bridge team - who have to put the ship in the right place, direction and speed for aircraft to take off or land, Ops Room personnel - who have to operate sensors/weapons and talk to aircraft, maintainers of this equipment, landing aids maintainers, the ME watchkeepers keeping a nice level deck and increasing speed when needed, ATC types, Fighter Controllers, senior Officers in the carrier (Cdr(Air), Lt Cdr(Flying), Captain, XO) - they need to know how to run things, senior Officers elsewhere (MOD, Navy Command, task group commanders) who need to know how aircraft are used as task group weapons, etc?
The skills issue was also mentioned on the Sea Jet and Future Carrier threads.
Now back to Libya. It really does seem that we may be putting both hands in the Libyan mangle.
Royal Navy Ships Sail To Join Cougar 11
The largest warship in the Royal Navy, HMS Ocean is carrying a mix of support helicopters, Apache attack helicopters and landing craft. These enable her to land Royal Marines, their vehicles and equipment and sustain them as they undertake exercises across the region.
Also - HMS Aibion Plays TAG
Interesting times ahead. Can anyone else sense that our amphibious forces are about to be sent to Libya? We can't put boots on the ground in Libya – but what about fins?
For this reason, it seems sensible that the UK is continuing with its Cougar amphibious deployment to the Mediterranean, comprising HMS Albion, HMS Ocean, RFA Cardigan Bay and HMS Sutherland, together with elements of 40 Commando Royal Marines. Ostensibly, they will conduct littoral operations off Cyprus. But with their ability to provide more imaginative solutions to the crisis, their deployment might be an indication of the way ahead. Although boots on the ground might be a step too far, "fins" on the ground, able to deter and prevent serious attacks on civilians before returning to their ships, might prove acceptable – and the low-footprint approach would get around any sense of them being an occupying force.
But even while we do our best to bring the Libyan mission to a speedy and successful conclusion, we must consider the broader implications. The very deployment of the Cougar force recognises that the Mediterranean is likely to be the source of political, economic and demographic challenges for some time to come. Over the next decade, a confusing array of demographic, climatic and societal pressures will severely challenge the political and economic realities with which Europeans have been comfortable for the past 60 years or so.
One of the most important and pressing issues is for European nations, both collectively and individually, to determine and implement a strategy for the region that will deliver security, stability and prosperity. But they will also need to maintain credible, effective and balanced military forces that are agile and powerful enough to deal with a broad range of crises: war does not come cheap, and nor, for that matter, does peace.
In this sense, Libya is both a laboratory and a test case. So far, it has proved that Europe on its own lacks the cohesion and military resources to undertake even a modest coercive campaign, on its own doorstep, without the support of the United States. It seems clear that a truly strategic reassessment is long overdue. In other words, someone needs to take charge.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 18th May 2011 at 13:44.
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The LPH and the Harrier argument are really two very different things.
If we want to use Apache or any other helicopters in Libya, and I am sure there are some scenarios it might prove quite useful, then an RN amphibious group is just what we need to make that happen. Helicopters are slow and need to be close to the battle to be useful. Without a flat deck, it's not going to work.
That is not true of fast jets, where the GR4s and Typhoons are doing just fine however much Sharkey would have the world believe otherwise. Ideally, we'd have Harriers too, but given the choice between scrapping GR9 or GR4 (a bad choice to have to make), we're lucky we kept GR4.
If we want to use Apache or any other helicopters in Libya, and I am sure there are some scenarios it might prove quite useful, then an RN amphibious group is just what we need to make that happen. Helicopters are slow and need to be close to the battle to be useful. Without a flat deck, it's not going to work.
That is not true of fast jets, where the GR4s and Typhoons are doing just fine however much Sharkey would have the world believe otherwise. Ideally, we'd have Harriers too, but given the choice between scrapping GR9 or GR4 (a bad choice to have to make), we're lucky we kept GR4.
But will land based jets based 600+ miles away be responsive enough now? Apart from the possible use of the RFTG, we are now clearing mines from Misrata, and (if you believe the media) we are considering using surface warships for Naval Gunfire Support.
If NGS is being considered, does it mean that Tornado et al cannot respond quickly enough to urgent (fleeting?) targets?
If NGS is being considered, does it mean that Tornado et al cannot respond quickly enough to urgent (fleeting?) targets?
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 4th May 2011 at 12:03.
Originally Posted by WEBF
If NGS is being considered, does it mean that Tornado et al cannot respond quickly enough to urgent (fleeting?) targets?
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JAJ,
A Tornado (or any other aircraft, shore or ship based) can only respond to 'fleeting' targets if:
1. The target is identified, located and passed to the aircraft
2. The aircraft is equipped to hit it and:
3. if the aircraft is close enough to hit it in time.
3 depends on how many aircraft you have on task over the wide potential target area, and what they are carrying. News today from Misrata (excellent report from C4) indicates that NATO don't have enough aircraft on task, or they are not equipped to attack rockets and artillery (typical fleeting targets). In summary, the GR4s and Typhoons (and the other NATO jets) are not 'doing just fine', unless what is happening in Misrata counts as 'just fine'.
And this is where the controversy comes in. Are people still denying that 15 Harriers based around 10 miles off the coast (and moved close up to Misrata, or another area of interest) could not provide a greater density of CAS cover than 15 land based aircraft operating from around 300 plus miles away?
Harriers (8 aircraft squadrons) maintained 2 ship day CAP cover at around 100 miles for days on end from the early 80s. It's hard work, high flying rates, and not practised for some time. But it can be done. Damn shame we can't do it now.
And when fleeting targets are the problem, the Apache (from a CVS) would be exactly what is needed - precision 30mm cannon fire would deliver maximum effect and destroy morale faster than anything else. Not 'quite useful'.
As ever, this is not to denigrate the RAF crews who are wringing a fantastic performance out of their aircraft, and making a huge contribution to helping the Libyan people - they are the most professional air force in the world, in my book. We don't have a choice now, they are the people in the battle, and let's support them all the way. But let's not kid ourselves while we do that.
Best regards
Engines.
A Tornado (or any other aircraft, shore or ship based) can only respond to 'fleeting' targets if:
1. The target is identified, located and passed to the aircraft
2. The aircraft is equipped to hit it and:
3. if the aircraft is close enough to hit it in time.
3 depends on how many aircraft you have on task over the wide potential target area, and what they are carrying. News today from Misrata (excellent report from C4) indicates that NATO don't have enough aircraft on task, or they are not equipped to attack rockets and artillery (typical fleeting targets). In summary, the GR4s and Typhoons (and the other NATO jets) are not 'doing just fine', unless what is happening in Misrata counts as 'just fine'.
And this is where the controversy comes in. Are people still denying that 15 Harriers based around 10 miles off the coast (and moved close up to Misrata, or another area of interest) could not provide a greater density of CAS cover than 15 land based aircraft operating from around 300 plus miles away?
Harriers (8 aircraft squadrons) maintained 2 ship day CAP cover at around 100 miles for days on end from the early 80s. It's hard work, high flying rates, and not practised for some time. But it can be done. Damn shame we can't do it now.
And when fleeting targets are the problem, the Apache (from a CVS) would be exactly what is needed - precision 30mm cannon fire would deliver maximum effect and destroy morale faster than anything else. Not 'quite useful'.
As ever, this is not to denigrate the RAF crews who are wringing a fantastic performance out of their aircraft, and making a huge contribution to helping the Libyan people - they are the most professional air force in the world, in my book. We don't have a choice now, they are the people in the battle, and let's support them all the way. But let's not kid ourselves while we do that.
Best regards
Engines.
Engines - artillery is a "fleeting target"?
Any ac that is on CAP (CAS) is far better able to respond than one sat on GCAS. Weapon loadout is always a factor, but none are better equipped for the whole range of targets than the GR4.
Ground Alert is a good backup to airborne alert, not a replacement.
We'd all like to have a carrier or 2 off the coast with GR9's & FA2's on board doing their thing, but it ain't going to happen.
Any ac that is on CAP (CAS) is far better able to respond than one sat on GCAS. Weapon loadout is always a factor, but none are better equipped for the whole range of targets than the GR4.
Ground Alert is a good backup to airborne alert, not a replacement.
We'd all like to have a carrier or 2 off the coast with GR9's & FA2's on board doing their thing, but it ain't going to happen.
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JAJ
Tankers are starting to fail and there were barely enough tankers / crews in the first place.
101 were drawing down their frames and crews in anticipation of FSTA and committing to this op has created a big strain on the system.
216 have the Herrick to support and with the C2's on their knees the Sqn have to use their KC's which leaves not a lot left to support Ellemy.
We are reaching tipping point.
GR7/9 off the coast would have saved alot of flying hours for the tankers as you can imagine.
Yes - i know they have gone etc etc but as per the title of the thread, it was a bonkers decision in hindsight.
No tankers, no flyee.
Tankers are starting to fail and there were barely enough tankers / crews in the first place.
101 were drawing down their frames and crews in anticipation of FSTA and committing to this op has created a big strain on the system.
216 have the Herrick to support and with the C2's on their knees the Sqn have to use their KC's which leaves not a lot left to support Ellemy.
We are reaching tipping point.
GR7/9 off the coast would have saved alot of flying hours for the tankers as you can imagine.
Yes - i know they have gone etc etc but as per the title of the thread, it was a bonkers decision in hindsight.
No tankers, no flyee.
Engines
Possibly so. But 15 ac (or FE at R to give them the correct title) was more than the entire Harrier force structure (and I'm including crews and engineers here) was 'funded' for (and therefore capable of). Just because they had 50 ac at Witt/Cott does not mean they have spares / deployment kits / crews / engineers etc to deploy 50. And even if they could have mustered 15 how long could they maintain that for - 6 months maximum I would suggest. Then what? As it now seems this Libya jaunt is going to be more than 'non-enduring' we would be stuffed. And if they could provide 15 on a permanent basis why didn't they do that in AFG where (as we keep getting told) there is never enough CAS assets available????
Are people still denying that 15 Harriers based around 10 miles off the coast (and moved close up to Misrata, or another area of interest) could not provide a greater density of CAS cover than 15 land based aircraft operating from around 300 plus miles away
Originally Posted by Engines
Are people still denying that 15 Harriers based around 10 miles off the coast (and moved close up to Misrata, or another area of interest) could not provide a greater density of CAS cover than 15 land based aircraft operating from around 300 plus miles away?
I believe that we are told that we never have enough rotary assets, not CAS in afghanistan
.
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But 15 ac (or FE at R to give them the correct title) was more than the entire Harrier force structure (and I'm including crews and engineers here) was 'funded' for (and therefore capable of).
And if they could provide 15 on a permanent basis why didn't they do that in AFG where (as we keep getting told) there is never enough CAS assets available????
Once again, while the Harrier force was in Afghanistan it was also capable of achieving other tasks such as deploying to the boat despite the popular opinion to the contrary.
I am not lobbying for the return of Harrier as that will not happen, it was just an impressive aircraft and it is a loss in capability for UK especially in this day and age where we are apparently Flexible and Agile.
the Harrier FEaR was 18 so yes, it could have achieved this
As you allude to it was the reduction in size to 2 sqns that was it's ultimate downfall - to have reduced the GR4 to a similar level in order to save the Harrier would have meant that whilst we would have had flexibility and agility we wouldn't have endurance (in terms of length of an op rather than how big the pee bag is
). And one thing recent history has shown us is that supposed non-enduring operations swiftly become enduring.Lets hope we don't make similar mistakes when it comes to procuring F35C. Buy enough!!!