Decision to axe Harrier is "bonkers".
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single-role bombers such as the GR9 are of little use enforcing a no-fly zone after dark or if it's IMC!
Now, if Incapability Brown's jobs-for-Jocks aircraftless carriers were to have decent number of F-18E/F/G embarked..
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And the RAF would still be sitting on a postwar duck. (nil points)
XX963 GR.1 S.85 02 Dec 1975 - First flight 18 Nov 1975. It was allocated to No 14 Sqd. On 25 May 1982 it was shot down near Wesel, W. Germany, by a live AIM-9L Sidewinder fired by Phantom FGR.2 XV422 during a simulated combat exercise. The pilot ejected safely.
As someone once told me "A kill's a kill!"
Only as work ceased post October SDSR
The clearance work was ongoing. No guarantee it would have been cleared for Harrier use by now. You'll be claiming integrating Storm Shadow was do-able as well next 
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Back to the theme. Yes, the decision to axe the Harrier was bonkers to me, but then I work for an organisation within Defence. Sometimes though, I wonder if we all work for the same side. The factually incorrect rantings of Ward and that other idiot Lewis Page are given media cred..why, cos it's sensationalist and designed to pit one Service against another. I have never seen any point in puerile 'fly navy, dig army , eat crab' pish that some of the less mature idiots in our Services spout. Maybe the individual colleges should be merged to produce a more well rounded Serviceman who is capable of recognising why a decision has been made the way it has, and not simply believing it to be a hatchet job done by another Service. Tonkas got slashed in the SDSR aswell, a fact that Ward doesn't really touch on in his one eyed analysis.
BEags
Although the value of the Harrier GR9 in enforcing a no fly zone may be limited, it could do ground attack and reece and augment other aircraft types. Harriers are flying from American and Italian decks.
In a different theatre, as pointed out by MM and others, the GR9 could perform an air defence role if aided by an ISTAR asset such as ASaCs Sea King or E3 Sentry, and/or shipborne radars and fighter controllers. If nothing else, it would allow visual identification of suspicious aircraft in situations in which ROE is tight for shipborne weapons, as well as giving the enemy MiG drivers something to thing about.
Despite the lack of organic airpower, we may be commiting amphibious and ground forces to Libya. Brown trousers time.
One of the lessons from Libya is that even non Government players can have aircraft - there was a story a couple of days ago about a rebel MiG 23 and a rebel attack helicopter.
As for the future carriers - they are not in service yet, and without maintaining the skills needed for running a carrier we will have big problems.
FB
Not sure what you mean by the RN "taking on the RAF's role". Operating weapon systems from ships (yes, that includes aircraft) is a Navy role, no?
TTH
I think Sharkey Ward would be more than happy for the mighty Sea Harrier to be resurrected. But surely all Harriers and Sea Harriers became RAF assets under Joint Force Harrier? As for the budget having flex - well there are rumours of some axed assets being reprieved. Each of the four Type 22 frigates that got the SDSR chop have a running cost of something like £32 million per year - additionally they need crews and three out of four would need refits and upgrades. I suspect that it would be cheaper to retain some Harriers than the four T22s.
Biggus
So don't expect too much, it can only lead to disappointment!
Story of my life.
Anyway, after receiving the letter from the MinAF (also my MP) over this matter, I sent a quick e-mail to his researcher. My points were that it is good to see that they are still looking into how to regenerate skills for CVF. I also noted that with Illustrious in service until 2014, and then Queen Elizabeth entering service soon after, we would have a platform capable of embarking fixed wing aircraft throughout this decade and could thus embark American, Italian, or Spanish Harriers to maintain the skills mentioned above. I also repeated hearing of the RNR Harrier proposal, and suggested that having a smaller number of aircraft doing less flying, with less personnel. I also suggested that the fixed costs might be less than fixed due to less upgrades being needed, base closures being unaffected as the aircraft were to be moved to Yeovilton, possible use of Reservist simulator instructors, etc.
I also noted that at the time the Prime Minister was talking about a Libyan no fly zone, and commented that there are no nearby land bases, and that carrier based aircraft would be useful. I also commented on the changes sweeping through the Middle East and asked if our defence policy was on the wrong side of history.
Yesterday - a reply arrived. After thanking me, he said that:
The retention of Illustrious does mean we will have one deck capable of embarking fixed wing aircraft. Embarking foreign Harriers would maintain skills. However, the switch to F35C and Cats/Traps (my words) means that exchanges with the US Navy and the French Navy will be more useful in using Cats and Traps, and large carrier operations. [But what about....see above.]
Note that he didn't say no embarkation of AV8B would ever take place. I am sure that one year (2007) either Spain or Italy asked us to embark their Harriers aboard Illustrious as their carrier was broken.
Then he said that the idea of a smaller Harrier force operated by Reservists had been looked at but dismissed on grounds of not being cost effective.
He commented that Italy and Spain retain smaller Harrier fleets partly by having a Memorandum of Understanding with other nations (the US?) to reduce costs. He also said that base closures do not play are part in these decisions/savings (Cottesmore is to be retained) and the assumptions about contractual liabilities were not wrong.
He commented that financial considerations strongly influenced the decisions, and apologised for the disappointing reply. Well, to be honest, I didn't really expect a sudden U turn. Ministerial collective responsibility and all that.
From the Telegraph today: Rethinking defence cuts: the more things change, the more they stay the same…
Then there’s the question of longer-term cuts. As we and others report this morning, David Cameron is taking a close look at the defence review’s cuts, and wondering whether some of them can and should be eased. The PM’s motives here are twofold. Strategically, he’s aware that the Arab Spring presents Britain with no end of challenges.
Everyone involved, including, I suspect, the PM, was a little surprised at how quickly the Libyan crisis blew up, and how quickly Britain got involved militarily. Given these uncertain times, who’d want to rule out another similar crisis elsewhere? It’s hardly impossible to imagine regime collapse in Yemen leading to calls for a Western intervention to prevent the country becoming even more of an al-Qaeda haven than it is now. Leaving aside the question of political will, does Britain now have the spare military capability take part in any such intervention? And will it have that capability in six months’ time?
Politically, the PM is growing ever more aware of how badly defence cuts go down. It’s no secret that he was dismayed by the reaction to this week’s military redundancies, especially in The Sun. He knows that more is to come. He would not be human if he did not want to at least soften the blows that will inevitably rain down on him.
Later...
So any reversal on cuts would have to be balanced with savings elsewhere. In other words, new cuts. And where would those cuts fall? Well, as analysts including Andrew Dorman point out, the Army would have to be prime candidate. Largely shielded from cuts in the SDSR, surely the Army could lose a few more thousand posts to free up some cash for the RAF and Navy? For much of the SDSR process, that was the MoD’s plan, but the Army cuts were scaled back by the PM.
That last-minute decision skewed the rest of the review and its outcomes, with negative consequences for the other services that are still becoming clear. Awareness of that problem is spreading across Whitehall.
Hence the Harrier chop?
Indeed, the annoyingly well-informed Alex Barker of the FT reports today that even the generals now accept that argument. But Mr Cameron, wary of more bad headlines about sacking Our Boys while they fight in Afghanistan, has said No.
Ah the joys of having a PR man as national leader...
So, at the same time as signalling he’d like to soften the defence cuts, the PM is limiting the MoD’s room for manoeuvre on the issue. Liam Fox and his friends would not be human if they didn’t feel a certain frustration here.
Dr Fox isn't the only one.
So, to summarize, we have a Downing Street machine that wants to avoid bad headlines on defence but is squeamish about radical alternatives, a Treasury that doesn’t want to give an inch, and an MoD that feels that neither of them really understand the real state of defence and what’s possible and what’s not. The result is last-minute compromise deals that mean short-term delays in spending, clever accounting wheezes to understate liabilities, and pressure for politically-expedient climbdowns on cuts — all of which can only increase long-term costs.
If only David Davis had won the Tory leadership.
I wonder if politicians or their staffs read PPRuNe et al?
Although the value of the Harrier GR9 in enforcing a no fly zone may be limited, it could do ground attack and reece and augment other aircraft types. Harriers are flying from American and Italian decks.
In a different theatre, as pointed out by MM and others, the GR9 could perform an air defence role if aided by an ISTAR asset such as ASaCs Sea King or E3 Sentry, and/or shipborne radars and fighter controllers. If nothing else, it would allow visual identification of suspicious aircraft in situations in which ROE is tight for shipborne weapons, as well as giving the enemy MiG drivers something to thing about.
Despite the lack of organic airpower, we may be commiting amphibious and ground forces to Libya. Brown trousers time.
One of the lessons from Libya is that even non Government players can have aircraft - there was a story a couple of days ago about a rebel MiG 23 and a rebel attack helicopter.
As for the future carriers - they are not in service yet, and without maintaining the skills needed for running a carrier we will have big problems.
FB
Not sure what you mean by the RN "taking on the RAF's role". Operating weapon systems from ships (yes, that includes aircraft) is a Navy role, no?
TTH
I think Sharkey Ward would be more than happy for the mighty Sea Harrier to be resurrected. But surely all Harriers and Sea Harriers became RAF assets under Joint Force Harrier? As for the budget having flex - well there are rumours of some axed assets being reprieved. Each of the four Type 22 frigates that got the SDSR chop have a running cost of something like £32 million per year - additionally they need crews and three out of four would need refits and upgrades. I suspect that it would be cheaper to retain some Harriers than the four T22s.
Biggus
So don't expect too much, it can only lead to disappointment!
Story of my life.
Anyway, after receiving the letter from the MinAF (also my MP) over this matter, I sent a quick e-mail to his researcher. My points were that it is good to see that they are still looking into how to regenerate skills for CVF. I also noted that with Illustrious in service until 2014, and then Queen Elizabeth entering service soon after, we would have a platform capable of embarking fixed wing aircraft throughout this decade and could thus embark American, Italian, or Spanish Harriers to maintain the skills mentioned above. I also repeated hearing of the RNR Harrier proposal, and suggested that having a smaller number of aircraft doing less flying, with less personnel. I also suggested that the fixed costs might be less than fixed due to less upgrades being needed, base closures being unaffected as the aircraft were to be moved to Yeovilton, possible use of Reservist simulator instructors, etc.
I also noted that at the time the Prime Minister was talking about a Libyan no fly zone, and commented that there are no nearby land bases, and that carrier based aircraft would be useful. I also commented on the changes sweeping through the Middle East and asked if our defence policy was on the wrong side of history.
Yesterday - a reply arrived. After thanking me, he said that:
The retention of Illustrious does mean we will have one deck capable of embarking fixed wing aircraft. Embarking foreign Harriers would maintain skills. However, the switch to F35C and Cats/Traps (my words) means that exchanges with the US Navy and the French Navy will be more useful in using Cats and Traps, and large carrier operations. [But what about....see above.]
Note that he didn't say no embarkation of AV8B would ever take place. I am sure that one year (2007) either Spain or Italy asked us to embark their Harriers aboard Illustrious as their carrier was broken.
Then he said that the idea of a smaller Harrier force operated by Reservists had been looked at but dismissed on grounds of not being cost effective.
He commented that Italy and Spain retain smaller Harrier fleets partly by having a Memorandum of Understanding with other nations (the US?) to reduce costs. He also said that base closures do not play are part in these decisions/savings (Cottesmore is to be retained) and the assumptions about contractual liabilities were not wrong.
He commented that financial considerations strongly influenced the decisions, and apologised for the disappointing reply. Well, to be honest, I didn't really expect a sudden U turn. Ministerial collective responsibility and all that.
From the Telegraph today: Rethinking defence cuts: the more things change, the more they stay the same…
Then there’s the question of longer-term cuts. As we and others report this morning, David Cameron is taking a close look at the defence review’s cuts, and wondering whether some of them can and should be eased. The PM’s motives here are twofold. Strategically, he’s aware that the Arab Spring presents Britain with no end of challenges.
Everyone involved, including, I suspect, the PM, was a little surprised at how quickly the Libyan crisis blew up, and how quickly Britain got involved militarily. Given these uncertain times, who’d want to rule out another similar crisis elsewhere? It’s hardly impossible to imagine regime collapse in Yemen leading to calls for a Western intervention to prevent the country becoming even more of an al-Qaeda haven than it is now. Leaving aside the question of political will, does Britain now have the spare military capability take part in any such intervention? And will it have that capability in six months’ time?
Politically, the PM is growing ever more aware of how badly defence cuts go down. It’s no secret that he was dismayed by the reaction to this week’s military redundancies, especially in The Sun. He knows that more is to come. He would not be human if he did not want to at least soften the blows that will inevitably rain down on him.
Later...
So any reversal on cuts would have to be balanced with savings elsewhere. In other words, new cuts. And where would those cuts fall? Well, as analysts including Andrew Dorman point out, the Army would have to be prime candidate. Largely shielded from cuts in the SDSR, surely the Army could lose a few more thousand posts to free up some cash for the RAF and Navy? For much of the SDSR process, that was the MoD’s plan, but the Army cuts were scaled back by the PM.
That last-minute decision skewed the rest of the review and its outcomes, with negative consequences for the other services that are still becoming clear. Awareness of that problem is spreading across Whitehall.
Hence the Harrier chop?
Indeed, the annoyingly well-informed Alex Barker of the FT reports today that even the generals now accept that argument. But Mr Cameron, wary of more bad headlines about sacking Our Boys while they fight in Afghanistan, has said No.
Ah the joys of having a PR man as national leader...
So, at the same time as signalling he’d like to soften the defence cuts, the PM is limiting the MoD’s room for manoeuvre on the issue. Liam Fox and his friends would not be human if they didn’t feel a certain frustration here.
Dr Fox isn't the only one.
So, to summarize, we have a Downing Street machine that wants to avoid bad headlines on defence but is squeamish about radical alternatives, a Treasury that doesn’t want to give an inch, and an MoD that feels that neither of them really understand the real state of defence and what’s possible and what’s not. The result is last-minute compromise deals that mean short-term delays in spending, clever accounting wheezes to understate liabilities, and pressure for politically-expedient climbdowns on cuts — all of which can only increase long-term costs.
If only David Davis had won the Tory leadership.
I wonder if politicians or their staffs read PPRuNe et al?
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Now, if Incapability Brown's jobs-for-Jocks aircraftless carriers
I wonder if politicians or their staffs read PPRuNe et al?
). Just think how much tax we would have to pay to cover the 'spending plans' of some of the armchair generals, admirals and air marshals that frequent these boards if they were actually listened to....
the GR9 could perform an air defence role if aided by an ISTAR asset such as ASaCs Sea King or E3 Sentry, and/or shipborne radars and fighter controllers
)Roll on 2015 .....
FB
Not sure what you mean by the RN "taking on the RAF's role". Operating weapon systems from ships (yes, that includes aircraft) is a Navy role, no?
Not sure what you mean by the RN "taking on the RAF's role". Operating weapon systems from ships (yes, that includes aircraft) is a Navy role, no?
The point I was making refers to the blunt choice of whether we should have Harrier GR9s or Tornado GR4s. This apparently was,is non-negotiable. It had to be one or the other being put out to grass. Your's and Sharkey Ward's single concern is that that so & so Sir Sephen Dalton, who's decision it was I suppose, seeing as they are both a part of his ORBAT, chose to hang on to the Tornados. Now bearing in mind that all three services have been jockying for position, as it were, in order to avoid their own crowd being sold down the river, one can imagine why Dalton, forced with such a decision, decided to keep a hold of the more prominent and more ellaborate aircraft. Also the one which he didn't have to hand operational control of half of, to another service. I keep saying this, the maths are so simple; 45 Harriers versus 136 Tornados, you're the C.A.S. the smaller figure is about 50% under direct operational control of the 1st SL, the 136 number are all part of your fiefdom. Which of the two are you going to yield to the Treasury? If he had held onto the Harriers, he would have consigned half of his service's principal role, such as it remains, over to the Navy, thus leaving a much bigger and fatter question mark over the question more often asked by the other two services, "just what are the R.A.F. for". Regardless of the advantages of having a single carrier available with 12 Harriers, surely the ability to deploy to nearby airbases four times that many aircraft and with the ability to carry a wider range of air to ground ordnance is what he's going to consider favourable, especially when 10 more aircraft are constantly deployed at Kandhahar. Bearing in mind the resources and personnel to support these simultaneous campaigns, the Harrier is the obvious choice! For the chop.
Its purely business of course, I'm sure if Sir Stephen were given a wider choice in the SDSR nothing of the sort would go, neither Harriers or Tornados or anything else for that matter. It would be a Strategic Defence and Security Review and not a Fiscal Savings Review.
FB
Last edited by Finningley Boy; 10th Apr 2011 at 18:34.
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Common Sense
I do read this site but rarely comment. Seems a lot of people on here know a wee bit more about the subject matter than I. However, I think this thread is a bit all over the place. To me this is a little easier than this thread or our government make it.
Firstly, to the government. (As if they read PPRUNE :-)) You want to play expeditionary warfare, you need to pay for it. If we can't afford to play, don't play.
If you do want to pay for expeditionary warfare, then air power is important. And to ensure flexibility, such air power needs to capable of maritime delivery. (Regardless of the colour of uniform delivering it) It is pretty poor argument to say that Libya was done from home / Italy so we don't need carriers. Net is if a plane is carrier capable you get to choose where to fly it from. If it is land based you don't. If we had a carrier with the right aircraft it would have been involved in Libya. (Can't say FACT, but seems very obvious to me)
Ark / Harrier is somewhat mute. Ark is pretty broken up already. Further they were never really the rght answer. Not replacing the previous Ark was the real issue. And now we are building those replacements, we need to do it properly. That means two properly equiped carriers (to ensure one *normally* available) , and all strike capability being maritime oriented! In fact the only aircraft that should be land oriented are UK AD and planes that are too big to land on a deck. (AT AAR etc)
We should 100% of kept the harriers though, simply because they provided flexibility. The idea that Afgan was the only thing we will get involved in was always suspect. Allied to the fact that many troops would have preferred the harrier to be kept means that the removal was a wacky decision.
So keeping light blue only typhoons seems reasonable. F35C should be carrier oriented with some land operations when needed. We also need AEW capability from day one.
Before any one thinks I am biased, I am ex-matelot that has equal disdain for crabs or wafoos. Best ship I served on was Cleopatra, sans flying thing on the back! However, now I am just a tax payer trying to make sense of the things governments do.
Firstly, to the government. (As if they read PPRUNE :-)) You want to play expeditionary warfare, you need to pay for it. If we can't afford to play, don't play.
If you do want to pay for expeditionary warfare, then air power is important. And to ensure flexibility, such air power needs to capable of maritime delivery. (Regardless of the colour of uniform delivering it) It is pretty poor argument to say that Libya was done from home / Italy so we don't need carriers. Net is if a plane is carrier capable you get to choose where to fly it from. If it is land based you don't. If we had a carrier with the right aircraft it would have been involved in Libya. (Can't say FACT, but seems very obvious to me)
Ark / Harrier is somewhat mute. Ark is pretty broken up already. Further they were never really the rght answer. Not replacing the previous Ark was the real issue. And now we are building those replacements, we need to do it properly. That means two properly equiped carriers (to ensure one *normally* available) , and all strike capability being maritime oriented! In fact the only aircraft that should be land oriented are UK AD and planes that are too big to land on a deck. (AT AAR etc)
We should 100% of kept the harriers though, simply because they provided flexibility. The idea that Afgan was the only thing we will get involved in was always suspect. Allied to the fact that many troops would have preferred the harrier to be kept means that the removal was a wacky decision.
So keeping light blue only typhoons seems reasonable. F35C should be carrier oriented with some land operations when needed. We also need AEW capability from day one.
Before any one thinks I am biased, I am ex-matelot that has equal disdain for crabs or wafoos. Best ship I served on was Cleopatra, sans flying thing on the back! However, now I am just a tax payer trying to make sense of the things governments do.
PeterGee wrote:
I do read this site but rarely comment. Seems a lot of people on here know a wee bit more about the subject matter than I. However, I think this thread is a bit all over the place. To me this is a little easier than this thread or our government make it.
Firstly, to the government. (As if they read PPRuNe :-)) You want to play expeditionary warfare, you need to pay for it. If we can't afford to play, don't play.
If you do want to pay for expeditionary warfare, then air power is important. And to ensure flexibility, such air power needs to capable of maritime delivery. (Regardless of the colour of uniform delivering it) It is pretty poor argument to say that Libya was done from home / Italy so we don't need carriers. Net is if a plane is carrier capable you get to choose where to fly it from. If it is land based you don't. If we had a carrier with the right aircraft it would have been involved in Libya. (Can't say FACT, but seems very obvious to me) Peter, the trouble with this is, it's not about "lets fly a plane off a carrier because it is more flexible to do so", it's far more important to have capability in the airframe and in this I'm afraid the GR4 wins hands down. Yes, the carriers are very flexible, but the constraints placed upon the ac have serious implications. That doesn't mean we shouldn't have them, we should, but a choice had to be made and the more capable and numerous GR4 was chosen.
Ark / Harrier is somewhat mute. Ark is pretty broken up already. Further they were never really the rght answer. Not replacing the previous Ark was the real issue. And now we are building those replacements, we need to do it properly. That means two properly equiped carriers (to ensure one *normally* available) , and all strike capability being maritime oriented! In fact the only aircraft that should be land oriented are UK AD and planes that are too big to land on a deck. (AT AAR etc) 2 full-sized carriers with proper fast-jets embarked are a far better proposition than our recent setup, but I would not be so hasty to put all our eggs in one (floating) basket.
We should 100% of kept the harriers though, simply because they provided flexibility. The idea that Afgan was the only thing we will get involved in was always suspect. Allied to the fact that many troops would have preferred the harrier to be kept means that the removal was a wacky decision. I've heard this from a few others on here. I'm not sure where you or they get your info from, but every JTAC I've spoken to with recent theatre experience wants the GR4 every time. Flexibility comes from a range of capabilities to deliver effect, not necessarily from being able to hover.
So keeping light blue only typhoons seems reasonable. F35C should be carrier oriented with some land operations when needed. We also need AEW capability from day one.
Before any one thinks I am biased, So all fast air to be Navy-based? Biased, you? The thought never occurred m8. I am ex-matelot that has equal disdain for crabs or wafoos. Best ship I served on was Cleopatra, sans flying thing on the back! However, now I am just a tax payer trying to make sense of the things governments do.
I do read this site but rarely comment. Seems a lot of people on here know a wee bit more about the subject matter than I. However, I think this thread is a bit all over the place. To me this is a little easier than this thread or our government make it.
Firstly, to the government. (As if they read PPRuNe :-)) You want to play expeditionary warfare, you need to pay for it. If we can't afford to play, don't play.
If you do want to pay for expeditionary warfare, then air power is important. And to ensure flexibility, such air power needs to capable of maritime delivery. (Regardless of the colour of uniform delivering it) It is pretty poor argument to say that Libya was done from home / Italy so we don't need carriers. Net is if a plane is carrier capable you get to choose where to fly it from. If it is land based you don't. If we had a carrier with the right aircraft it would have been involved in Libya. (Can't say FACT, but seems very obvious to me) Peter, the trouble with this is, it's not about "lets fly a plane off a carrier because it is more flexible to do so", it's far more important to have capability in the airframe and in this I'm afraid the GR4 wins hands down. Yes, the carriers are very flexible, but the constraints placed upon the ac have serious implications. That doesn't mean we shouldn't have them, we should, but a choice had to be made and the more capable and numerous GR4 was chosen.
Ark / Harrier is somewhat mute. Ark is pretty broken up already. Further they were never really the rght answer. Not replacing the previous Ark was the real issue. And now we are building those replacements, we need to do it properly. That means two properly equiped carriers (to ensure one *normally* available) , and all strike capability being maritime oriented! In fact the only aircraft that should be land oriented are UK AD and planes that are too big to land on a deck. (AT AAR etc) 2 full-sized carriers with proper fast-jets embarked are a far better proposition than our recent setup, but I would not be so hasty to put all our eggs in one (floating) basket.
We should 100% of kept the harriers though, simply because they provided flexibility. The idea that Afgan was the only thing we will get involved in was always suspect. Allied to the fact that many troops would have preferred the harrier to be kept means that the removal was a wacky decision. I've heard this from a few others on here. I'm not sure where you or they get your info from, but every JTAC I've spoken to with recent theatre experience wants the GR4 every time. Flexibility comes from a range of capabilities to deliver effect, not necessarily from being able to hover.
So keeping light blue only typhoons seems reasonable. F35C should be carrier oriented with some land operations when needed. We also need AEW capability from day one.
Before any one thinks I am biased, So all fast air to be Navy-based? Biased, you? The thought never occurred m8.
I am ex-matelot that has equal disdain for crabs or wafoos. Best ship I served on was Cleopatra, sans flying thing on the back! However, now I am just a tax payer trying to make sense of the things governments do.
It is pretty poor argument to say that Libya was done from home / Italy so we don't need carriers. Net is if a plane is carrier capable you get to choose where to fly it from. If it is land based you don't. If we had a carrier with the right aircraft it would have been involved in Libya. (Can't say FACT, but seems very obvious to me) Peter, the trouble with this is, it's not about "lets fly a plane off a carrier because it is more flexible to do so", it's far more important to have capability in the airframe and in this I'm afraid the GR4 wins hands down. Yes, the carriers are very flexible, but the constraints placed upon the ac have serious implications. That doesn't mean we shouldn't have them, we should, but a choice had to be made and the more capable and numerous GR4 was chosen.
JAJ - The argument being made here is NOT GR9 vs GR4, it is that now we're buying a proper carrier, all future FJ should be carrier-capable (as for that matter should all air stores & munitions). That requirement should be pretty much number 1 on the URD/SRD. Constraints placed on aircraft are not as heavy as they used to be and certainly nowhere near that imposed by STOVL ops.
JAJ - The argument being made here is NOT GR9 vs GR4, it is that now we're buying a proper carrier, all future FJ should be carrier-capable (as for that matter should all air stores & munitions). That requirement should be pretty much number 1 on the URD/SRD. Constraints placed on aircraft are not as heavy as they used to be and certainly nowhere near that imposed by STOVL ops.
Not_a_boffin
I think you'll find the only FJ ac we have in the pipeline is the F35C.
The trouble with tying your hands to such a short runway (even with a cat 'n' trap) is that you'll still be severely limited with what weapons you can get airborne (and therefore what effect you can deliver), especially in +50 deg C. On a 13kft runway, this isn't an issue. But perhaps F35 is so good that it will be able to carry 2 x Stormshadow or RAPTOR (or equivalent), I really don't know. My major experiences of STOVL ops is that they suffer hugely from what they can deliver because of weight limits, both on take-off and recovery.
And my other 2 major experiences aboard US carriers (Sarratoga & Abe Lincoln) were that although the ac (A6 and then F18) were highly capable, the mission briefings spent more time discussing departure and recovery than anything else. Indeed target discussion took less than 10 mins; stark contrast to my land-based experiences where departure and recovery are "SOP" and everything is focussed upon the targeting. Perhaps things have changed.
So, yes, a carrier gives you extra freedoms/flexibility that may not be available to land-based fast air, but it also limits the effects that can be delivered - and that's what we're they're for after all, however we decide to go about doing it.
I think you'll find the only FJ ac we have in the pipeline is the F35C.
The trouble with tying your hands to such a short runway (even with a cat 'n' trap) is that you'll still be severely limited with what weapons you can get airborne (and therefore what effect you can deliver), especially in +50 deg C. On a 13kft runway, this isn't an issue. But perhaps F35 is so good that it will be able to carry 2 x Stormshadow or RAPTOR (or equivalent), I really don't know. My major experiences of STOVL ops is that they suffer hugely from what they can deliver because of weight limits, both on take-off and recovery.
And my other 2 major experiences aboard US carriers (Sarratoga & Abe Lincoln) were that although the ac (A6 and then F18) were highly capable, the mission briefings spent more time discussing departure and recovery than anything else. Indeed target discussion took less than 10 mins; stark contrast to my land-based experiences where departure and recovery are "SOP" and everything is focussed upon the targeting. Perhaps things have changed.
So, yes, a carrier gives you extra freedoms/flexibility that may not be available to land-based fast air, but it also limits the effects that can be delivered - and that's what we're they're for after all, however we decide to go about doing it.
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The trouble with tying your hands to such a short runway (even with a cat 'n' trap) is that you'll still be severely limited with what weapons you can get airborne
Big engine Harriers did not
suffer hugely
Why it is do hard to understand that we need the flexibility that carrier aviation brings. No you can't launch a B1 from a carrier but there is the immediate response it provides. No you cant have the full range of effects from a carrier
alone and that is why it needs to be interleaved with land based power. We need the two new carriers so that we are not limited to waiting for 48 hours to launch a few stormshadows from 3000 miles away.
Last edited by Justanopinion; 13th Apr 2011 at 13:39.
Originally Posted by Justanopinion
No you cant have the full range of effects from a carrier alone and that is why it needs to be interleaved with land based power.
It's the selective facts that trouble me. You can say "wait 48 hours to launch a few Stormshadows....", but you then assume the carrier is in place and not on another gin cruise around tropics. I think we should all try and stop these selective truths and leave Sharkey to corner the market in them.
First of all, I'm not knocking the purchase of carriers by the UK (even though I don't think we can afford it!).
However, it strikes me as pretty obvious that if as a nation you happen to have 11 carriers, then you can maintain 5(ish) continously at sea at several strategic positions aound the globe.
If you only have 2 (and probably only one active airwing) then you will do no better than having 1 available most of the time, and it is a distinct possibility that it will be in the wrong place when you do need it....
That doesn't mean that you shouldn't have a carrier, it does mean you should be honest about all the issues involved in having one - GOOD AND BAD!
However, it strikes me as pretty obvious that if as a nation you happen to have 11 carriers, then you can maintain 5(ish) continously at sea at several strategic positions aound the globe.
If you only have 2 (and probably only one active airwing) then you will do no better than having 1 available most of the time, and it is a distinct possibility that it will be in the wrong place when you do need it....
That doesn't mean that you shouldn't have a carrier, it does mean you should be honest about all the issues involved in having one - GOOD AND BAD!
Of course, since carrier strike is part of long term defence strategy, you could argue about whether the loss of Harrier and not embarking jets aboard ship for a decade is in any way compatible with that goal - unless you are the Government. I see nobody commented on the report that the SDSR had been distorted by the PM (not good with practical things or checking facts) at the 11th hour for political reasons.
There was a letter in the Times today regarding defence. Not a subscriber to the website so no link or quotes.
Here is a damning paper by Andrew Dorman: Lessons from Libya
The government seems to have forgotten its own working assumptions with David Cameron leading calls for a no-fly zone and subsequently committing British forces to support the no-fly zone and engage in attacks on Libyan ground forces.
The initial service-led evacuation of entitled personnel raised questions about the cuts announced in the SDSR. The use of HMS Cumberland on its way back to Britain for decommissioning was a little embarrassing. Added to this was the problem of generating ancient Tristar aircraft (the replacement is still not in service whilst the VC-10s are no longer deemed safe to carry passengers). This led to chaotic attempts at leasing civilian aircraft and the eventual use of Hercules aircraft (being retired early) to pick up personnel from bases in the Libyan desert.
The situation might have been worse if it had occurred a few months later. Part of the problem the government had was the lack of a picture of what was going on. The planned 25 per cent cut to the FCO budget must seem a little hasty now. In terms of military capability, the SDSR planned to significant downgrade Britain’s ability to generate information; the Nimrod R1 force of spy planes were due to leave service at the end of March 2011 with their replacements not due into service until 2014, i.e. a three year gap in capability. (As operations continue, the MoD is hoping to keep one of these aircraft going for three more months.)
Moreover, the decision to retire the four Type-22 Batch 3 frigates was not just a reduction in the size of the surface fleet, it also meant that their enhanced information gathering capability and command and control facilities would be lost without replacement*.
The escalation of Britain’s commitment from an evacuation operation to the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 further highlighted problems with the SDSR.
Unlike France, Italy or the United States, the UK has been unable to deploy an aircraft carrier to the Mediterranean. Its contribution to the no-fly zone would at best have been limited. The Royal Navy lost its Sea Harrier air defence capability in 2006 when the previous Labour government took the Sea Harrier force out of service (something that those who argued for its retention to protect the Falkland Islands forget).
However, the Navy had been equipped with the Harrier ground-attack aircraft and thus would have been able to provide a more reactive response to the situation on the ground than that provided by aircraft based in Sicily. It would also have provided the combat search and rescue capability for aircrew whose aircraft were lost over Libya.
Not being able to make a major contribution to a no fly zone is not the same as having no air defence capability - and remember MM (RAF ISTAR expert) has highlighted possible GR9 air defence roles.
*A CVS has even better intelligence gathering and command/control facilities.
As it is, the British government is dependent on this being provided by the United States. Interestingly, although the Harriers have been withdrawn from service they have not been scrapped, unlike the Nimrod MRA4s.
There is therefore the potential to return these aircraft to service aboard the UK’s remaining aircraft carrier and it is clear that the political symbolism of aircraft carriers remains significant.
MOD still owns a few Sea Harriers too - not just at Culdrose at the dummy deck but also elsewhere, and resisted Indian attempts to buy some in 2009.
This is worth a read, too.
There was a letter in the Times today regarding defence. Not a subscriber to the website so no link or quotes.
Here is a damning paper by Andrew Dorman: Lessons from Libya
The government seems to have forgotten its own working assumptions with David Cameron leading calls for a no-fly zone and subsequently committing British forces to support the no-fly zone and engage in attacks on Libyan ground forces.
The initial service-led evacuation of entitled personnel raised questions about the cuts announced in the SDSR. The use of HMS Cumberland on its way back to Britain for decommissioning was a little embarrassing. Added to this was the problem of generating ancient Tristar aircraft (the replacement is still not in service whilst the VC-10s are no longer deemed safe to carry passengers). This led to chaotic attempts at leasing civilian aircraft and the eventual use of Hercules aircraft (being retired early) to pick up personnel from bases in the Libyan desert.
The situation might have been worse if it had occurred a few months later. Part of the problem the government had was the lack of a picture of what was going on. The planned 25 per cent cut to the FCO budget must seem a little hasty now. In terms of military capability, the SDSR planned to significant downgrade Britain’s ability to generate information; the Nimrod R1 force of spy planes were due to leave service at the end of March 2011 with their replacements not due into service until 2014, i.e. a three year gap in capability. (As operations continue, the MoD is hoping to keep one of these aircraft going for three more months.)
Moreover, the decision to retire the four Type-22 Batch 3 frigates was not just a reduction in the size of the surface fleet, it also meant that their enhanced information gathering capability and command and control facilities would be lost without replacement*.
The escalation of Britain’s commitment from an evacuation operation to the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 further highlighted problems with the SDSR.
Unlike France, Italy or the United States, the UK has been unable to deploy an aircraft carrier to the Mediterranean. Its contribution to the no-fly zone would at best have been limited. The Royal Navy lost its Sea Harrier air defence capability in 2006 when the previous Labour government took the Sea Harrier force out of service (something that those who argued for its retention to protect the Falkland Islands forget).
However, the Navy had been equipped with the Harrier ground-attack aircraft and thus would have been able to provide a more reactive response to the situation on the ground than that provided by aircraft based in Sicily. It would also have provided the combat search and rescue capability for aircrew whose aircraft were lost over Libya.
Not being able to make a major contribution to a no fly zone is not the same as having no air defence capability - and remember MM (RAF ISTAR expert) has highlighted possible GR9 air defence roles.
*A CVS has even better intelligence gathering and command/control facilities.
As it is, the British government is dependent on this being provided by the United States. Interestingly, although the Harriers have been withdrawn from service they have not been scrapped, unlike the Nimrod MRA4s.
There is therefore the potential to return these aircraft to service aboard the UK’s remaining aircraft carrier and it is clear that the political symbolism of aircraft carriers remains significant.
MOD still owns a few Sea Harriers too - not just at Culdrose at the dummy deck but also elsewhere, and resisted Indian attempts to buy some in 2009.
This is worth a read, too.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 12th Apr 2011 at 10:06.
Originally Posted by WEBF
It would also have provided the combat search and rescue capability for aircrew whose aircraft were lost over Libya.
Or am I reading more into the quote?
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The worst bit about SDR is it was based on no further threat within 10 years. Then someone said the other day that SDR was "based on the situation in 2010, this is now 2011 - who could have anticipated this" (I paraphrase).