Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Chinook
Tucumseh. Reading the last few posts again, I am not sure whether you believe that (a) The aircraft was not airworthy, and that therefore the crew cannot be held responsible for anything that happened; or, (b) the aircraft was not airworthy and it was this inadequacy that actually caused the crash. Regards. John Purdey
JP
I have been away but have PM'd you. But, for the open record, my opinion is this;
The BoI and ROs had the cause "Organisational Fault" open to them so were, by definition, duty bound to address this possibility. They did not - it has been noted often that the BoI report does not even mention the word "airworthiness".
The record clearly shows that there was "Organisational Fault" because the airworthiness regulations were not implemented properly (a la Nimrod) but, far worse, the Boscombe advice on aircraft safety (e.g. the "positively dangerous" statement and gross immaturity of design) was ignored and the facts misrepresented in the CAR and RTS. The act of issuing these Releases clearly implies, to users, that, inter alia, the design is mature, the installed performance has been established and is satisfactory and the safety audit trail is complete. To misrepresent these facts to Aircrew, especially given the "positively dangerous" warning, is a far greater offence than the Nimrod officers are currently accused of.
My opinion is that, if the BoI/ROs had acknowledged Organisational Fault in the context of Airworthiness (i.e. Safety), then a verdict of Gross Negligence against the pilots would be impossible to sustain unless the same was levelled at those responsible for the airworthiness shambles. In other words the Air Staffs were allowed to be judge and jury in their own case, but were also the "Police" and "CPS" as they decided how the BoI was to be conducted, what they were to investigate and what timeframe was to be assessed.
I cannot say if this lack of airworthiness caused or contributed to the crash, but I have an opinion. Firstly, it is a simple fact that a very significant percentage of the avionic systems had absolutely no clearance whatsoever. That points to Boscombe not having time to establish the installed performance, which in turn informs the Limitations, Cautions, Warnings etc in their CAR recommendations and the FRCs / ACM. (Their recommendation to Controller Aircraft, Sir Donald Spiers, was that he SHOULD NOT sign the CAR).
It is accepted fact that Flt Lt Tapper was so concerned at this dearth of information on, for example, the Nav System, that he took the extraordinary step of visiting the SuperTANS Design Authority in an effort to find out what the problems being experienced meant. For example, the RTS told him that "Error" warnings were "meaningless". Now, I'm no pilot, but I think I'd want to know what an "Error" caption meant on the primary Nav kit I was using (GPS + SuperTANS). It is an astonishing (and negligent) state of affairs not to have mitigated such a Human Factors risk before Release to Service. The very possibility of such a risk occurring should alone be sufficient to give the pilots the benefit of doubt.
I hope this answers your question.
Tucumseh. Reading the last few posts again, I am not sure whether you believe that (a) The aircraft was not airworthy, and that therefore the crew cannot be held responsible for anything that happened; or, (b) the aircraft was not airworthy and it was this inadequacy that actually caused the crash. Regards. John Purdey
The BoI and ROs had the cause "Organisational Fault" open to them so were, by definition, duty bound to address this possibility. They did not - it has been noted often that the BoI report does not even mention the word "airworthiness".
The record clearly shows that there was "Organisational Fault" because the airworthiness regulations were not implemented properly (a la Nimrod) but, far worse, the Boscombe advice on aircraft safety (e.g. the "positively dangerous" statement and gross immaturity of design) was ignored and the facts misrepresented in the CAR and RTS. The act of issuing these Releases clearly implies, to users, that, inter alia, the design is mature, the installed performance has been established and is satisfactory and the safety audit trail is complete. To misrepresent these facts to Aircrew, especially given the "positively dangerous" warning, is a far greater offence than the Nimrod officers are currently accused of.
My opinion is that, if the BoI/ROs had acknowledged Organisational Fault in the context of Airworthiness (i.e. Safety), then a verdict of Gross Negligence against the pilots would be impossible to sustain unless the same was levelled at those responsible for the airworthiness shambles. In other words the Air Staffs were allowed to be judge and jury in their own case, but were also the "Police" and "CPS" as they decided how the BoI was to be conducted, what they were to investigate and what timeframe was to be assessed.
I cannot say if this lack of airworthiness caused or contributed to the crash, but I have an opinion. Firstly, it is a simple fact that a very significant percentage of the avionic systems had absolutely no clearance whatsoever. That points to Boscombe not having time to establish the installed performance, which in turn informs the Limitations, Cautions, Warnings etc in their CAR recommendations and the FRCs / ACM. (Their recommendation to Controller Aircraft, Sir Donald Spiers, was that he SHOULD NOT sign the CAR).
It is accepted fact that Flt Lt Tapper was so concerned at this dearth of information on, for example, the Nav System, that he took the extraordinary step of visiting the SuperTANS Design Authority in an effort to find out what the problems being experienced meant. For example, the RTS told him that "Error" warnings were "meaningless". Now, I'm no pilot, but I think I'd want to know what an "Error" caption meant on the primary Nav kit I was using (GPS + SuperTANS). It is an astonishing (and negligent) state of affairs not to have mitigated such a Human Factors risk before Release to Service. The very possibility of such a risk occurring should alone be sufficient to give the pilots the benefit of doubt.
I hope this answers your question.
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Anyone who saw ZD576 just before the last flight, in regard to the two fin-like things beneath the forward fuselage, which of the two in the picture below looks like it.
Tucumseh. Reading the last few posts again, I am not sure whether you believe that (a) The aircraft was not airworthy, and that therefore the crew cannot be held responsible for anything that happened; or, (b) the aircraft was not airworthy and it was this inadequacy that actually caused the crash. Regards. John Purdey
Personally, I believe that in the absence of any useful evidence of what happened during the last few minutes of the flight in question, nobody knows whether the crew were faced with an irretrievable situation caused by the deficiencies KNOWN to be present in the aircraft, or by some other circumstance, or made an error. Neither of your options above covers the preceding set of possibilities.
Now, you might like to answer the question: should the aircraft have been in service, and if not who was responsible for placing the crew in the position of having to fly an unairworthy aifrcraft?
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Cows
Excellent picture.
And what were they for?
Oh, and the question to anyone with an interest in A/C who may have had a look at ZD576, one of the first HC2s, on the tarmac, or the previous crew even, was effectively did they see such little fins or not?
Excellent picture.
And what were they for?
Oh, and the question to anyone with an interest in A/C who may have had a look at ZD576, one of the first HC2s, on the tarmac, or the previous crew even, was effectively did they see such little fins or not?
My goodness, you’d think that after scheming a significant upgrade like the Mk1 > Mk2 the MoD would at least have Boeing remove all those surplus antennae! VHF Homing. UHF Homing...........
According to the RTS there was no such kit fitted to the Mk2 post-conversion, hence there was no clearance to use it. I do hope the controllers/indicators were removed as well. Confusing to a recent Mk1 pilot you see. All those knobs and switches but no corresponding advice in the RTS/FRCs/ACM. Must have been very confusing. Human factors again.
According to the RTS there was no such kit fitted to the Mk2 post-conversion, hence there was no clearance to use it. I do hope the controllers/indicators were removed as well. Confusing to a recent Mk1 pilot you see. All those knobs and switches but no corresponding advice in the RTS/FRCs/ACM. Must have been very confusing. Human factors again.
What is your point?
That there are those who would willingly misrepresent or ignore the facts on airworthiness, in doing so recklessly engdangering the lives of colleagues; or, by their obtuseness and ignorance, lend support and give succour to those who do.
And there are those who do the right thing.
Fitter2. In answer to your question; I simply do not know whether or not the a/c should have been in service. What is your point? JP
I find it unfathomable that in the face of overwhelming evidence someone refuses to acknowledge the airworthiness (or to be precise, lack of) of an aircraft involved in a major accident, but (in the total absence of evidence to support their view) is certain they knew what happened.
You must be an Air Rank Officer.
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Cows
I really appologise for not immediately recognising the importance of your picture – of course outwardly the UHF antenna pair are identical to the old Violet Picture UHF homing kit – so an outsider would not see anything new.
What was new was the kit inside – in addition to UHF homing, it gave a DME function to a hand held beacon (PRC112 type) allowing all-weather approaches to assault zones, forward LZs, etc – here's a picture of the whole system (if I haven't already posted this):
What surprises me is that Chugalug2 hasn't commented yet despite him having knowledge of the older UHF homer, and being such a prolific contributor to this thread – I recall someone sometime back writing that the HP's intercom was set to UHF guard?; well here is a snippet of a post made by Chuggers in 29 Aug 2008 on the “Gaining an RAF … brevet” thread:
<<Regarding Violet Picture …. it was tied into the UHF T/R, by selecting ADF. If the recvr was tuned to Guard (243) then it became a means to home in on a Sarbe emergency beacon, and it was SOP to have this combination selected especially for Sea Transit. >>
I really appologise for not immediately recognising the importance of your picture – of course outwardly the UHF antenna pair are identical to the old Violet Picture UHF homing kit – so an outsider would not see anything new.
What was new was the kit inside – in addition to UHF homing, it gave a DME function to a hand held beacon (PRC112 type) allowing all-weather approaches to assault zones, forward LZs, etc – here's a picture of the whole system (if I haven't already posted this):
What surprises me is that Chugalug2 hasn't commented yet despite him having knowledge of the older UHF homer, and being such a prolific contributor to this thread – I recall someone sometime back writing that the HP's intercom was set to UHF guard?; well here is a snippet of a post made by Chuggers in 29 Aug 2008 on the “Gaining an RAF … brevet” thread:
<<Regarding Violet Picture …. it was tied into the UHF T/R, by selecting ADF. If the recvr was tuned to Guard (243) then it became a means to home in on a Sarbe emergency beacon, and it was SOP to have this combination selected especially for Sea Transit. >>
What surprises me is that Chugalug2 hasn't commented yet despite him having knowledge of the older UHF homer, and being such a prolific contributor to this thread – I recall someone sometime back writing that the HP's intercom was set to UHF guard?; well here is a snippet of a post made by Chuggers in 29 Aug 2008 on the “Gaining an RAF … brevet” thread:
<<Regarding Violet Picture …. it was tied into the UHF T/R, by selecting ADF. If the recvr was tuned to Guard (243) then it became a means to home in on a Sarbe emergency beacon, and it was SOP to have this combination selected especially for Sea Transit. >>
<<Regarding Violet Picture …. it was tied into the UHF T/R, by selecting ADF. If the recvr was tuned to Guard (243) then it became a means to home in on a Sarbe emergency beacon, and it was SOP to have this combination selected especially for Sea Transit. >>
Chug
Fitter2. "You must be an Air Rank Officer" You can take the chip off your shoulder, I was once a FIIA! JP
So you were an FIIA. Fascinating. Which of the qualifications left you unable to answer a straight question? Presumably one of the financial ones, from my dealings with the accountancy profession.
Acronym Definition
FIIA Finnish Institute of International Affairs (Helsinki, Finland)
FIIA Foreign Investment Implementation Authority (India)
FIIA Financial Institutions Insurance Association
FIIA Fidelity International Investment Advisors (UK)
FIIA Fellowship of the Institute of Internal Auditors (UK)
Actually (apart from the ability to answer questions honestly) this has little to do with the business of why an unairworthy aircraft hit the Mull.
Thank you Walter. Someone posting on this thread saying "Sorry, I was wrong" is a refreshing and uplifting change from the usual dogged and entrenched positions of the MOD apologists that is its usual diet. So no problem, and respect to you for displaying such standards above the morass that many here wallow in.
Et tu, baston? Well no doubt you're right, in which case why don't you show us all the correct "staffed" way of congratulating Walter on his coup? After years of condescension, ridicule and being patronised it seems he was on to something after all. Now I wonder what is going to turn up next?
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Chugaz
I am not very staff trained!
Are you saying that on Walters evidence they may have been doing a 'self approach' to the Mull?
I do hope not in the visibility as stated by the onlookers on the ground.
If they did, that is a tad more than careless wouldn't you agree?
I am not very staff trained!
Are you saying that on Walters evidence they may have been doing a 'self approach' to the Mull?
I do hope not in the visibility as stated by the onlookers on the ground.
If they did, that is a tad more than careless wouldn't you agree?