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All this talk of airworthiness, what can it achieve?
Take the software aspect – current thinking about complex software is that it is nigh on impossible to be sure of completely de-bugging it – what chance would those checking out that FADEC software at the time have had of making it anymore safer beyond what it was even when the anomalies that they had raised had been sorted? The questions regarding what significant improvements had been made to that software between this crash date and the accumulation of thousands of hours of subsequent HC2 flying still beg specific answers.
The control jam theory seems weak in the light of Boeing's removing its recommendation for regular inspection of the bonding in the “broom cupboard”, as if any such jamming could have been in so many axes as to prevent appropriate evasive manouevres and indeed with an inherrently unstable a/c continuing apparently straight and level on an apparently intended course – the lighthouse keeper's testimony that there was no perceived change in engine note right up to impact suggests no struggle for control and the final evasive manouevre made perfect sense in the event of being surprised by the closure with the ground. The matched power settings reinforce the 'keeper's observation.
How about considering a scenario that fits all that is known about this flight?
The photo below looks down at the LZ I have described in previous posts:
035 (mag – the course of their final leg) runs approximately 11 O'clock to 5 O'clock
A pass directly over this LZ (enough to demonstrate the capability of the CPLS system, for example) or a wave-off even if the intention had been to actually land, conditions permitting, would have been safe on this heading and at their approach altitude as, with no need to climb into the orographic cloud and no need for an increase in power, they merely had to veer off to the left, swinging around the back of the lighthouse, dropping down the slope as they would have (with their power settings) to the clear sea.
The track they actually made (035 but displaced to the right) took them full on to higher ground that did not slope off to the left and the gradient of which increased abruptly (they hit a mini cliff).
I cannot envisage such an experienced and able crew risking getting it wrong – they had to have been trusting some local aid to have been lining them up with that LZ – the only candidate I can think of is a PRC112 – any other ideas?
Last edited by walter kennedy : 2nd November 2009 at 21:50.
Reason: addition picture
Walter, this was a bus run; nothing more. What interest would a bunch of senior security personnel (all non-aviators) have in any perceived specific helicopter capability?
Cows
As Beagle seems to know “those in the know” perhaps you could ask him what new capability the HC2s had that could have been worth demonstrating/exercising a pin-point approach to a site with fixed local weather – then perhaps you could rethink who was on board and whether a demo of such a capability could be sold to them, especially as a training component was often included in such flights and it would not have changed their schedule.
Oh, and your confident statement “...this was a bus run; nothing more.” - why, when they already had a safe route for a bus run (Ald, wptH, wptB), did they cross the Antrim hills in marginal weather conditions and confidently approach the Mull so closely yet having the intention (as evidenced by the selection of wptB and a crs of 028 on the navigator's HoSI) of soon heading back to the safe track (partway along H to B)? This excursion couldn't have been for the scenery that day.
Last edited by walter kennedy : 4th November 2009 at 20:51.
Reason: addition
1. There was no Controller of Aircraft Release for the use of PRC 112 in British Military Aircraft.
2. There was, therefore, no clearance for PRC 112 to be used in the Chinook Mk2 of the Royal Air Force.
3. If, despite this, it could be proved that the Pilots agreed to carry out a PRC 112 assisted "Fly By" on the Mull that day; then there will be few (if any) contributors to this thread who would dissent with the Finding of Negligence.
Caz, we may disagree on other aspects of this case but regarding the whole PRC112/LZ argument I wholeheartedly agree with you. Unfortunately Walter is sat there accusing many of us of being myopic whilst consistently pursuing his one and only, almost outlandish hypothesis.
Especially bearing in mind the small number of hours the crew had on the Mk2, and their concerns over the safety of the type, a homing demonstration in marginal weather would surely not be on the agenda; the crew would be only interested in conventional navigation to the destination.
Bearing in mind the nav kit on board, a lat. & long. passed over the radio is far more useful, btw. I can think of no reason why these passengers would be interested in a homing demonstration in the first place. From the passenger seats they would have no way of observing and assessing the technique of any type of homing, or even seeing out of the front of the aircraft.
As I have pointed out to WK on more than one occasion, if the use of this equipment was the "real" mission, why would the captain ask for a Mk1 Chinook for the flight, which definitely did not have the equipment fitted?
ShyTorque
Thank you for focussing on pertinent points.
<<... if the use of this equipment was the "real" mission, why would the captain ask for a Mk1 Chinook for the flight, which definitely did not have the equipment fitted?>>
An excellent point – brings us back to who above Flt Lt Tapper set up the flight changing from 2 helos to the one Chinook in the first place (I raised this planning aspect some time ago but no-one is prepared to discuss this on this thread) – that person's version of the briefing would be of great value - perhaps he (JT) had misgivings about the demo and was looking for an honourable cop-out?
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<<Especially bearing in mind the small number of hours the crew had on the Mk2, and their concerns over the safety of the type, a homing demonstration in marginal weather would surely not be on the agenda; the crew would be only interested in conventional navigation to the destination.>>
Then why did they not stick to the safe route pre-planned by Lt K? (Ald-wptH-wptB.)
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<<Bearing in mind the nav kit on board, a lat. & long. passed over the radio is far more useful, btw.>>
Flt Lt Tapper would not have trusted the STANS as close in as the position of waypoint change, at their speed, with those conditions on the ground ahead. They had waypoint A already which is (rounded to convenient-to-memorise lat & long) a few tens of yards from the LZ yet which they replaced with wpt B well short of it. As I have described previously, combined with 028 on the navigator's (JT) HoSI, this suggests that they intended heading for the safe, clear track after their activity at the Mull rather than the nonsensical assertion that they would have just turned to B at that point (check out that route). For the several parameters I have given on previous occassions, it seemed that they thought they were lined up with and intended to land or close pass that LZ – they would not have attempted this without some local point reference that they trusted – even in clear conditions, that landscape is bereft of familiar objects making any fast approach there hairy by visual judgement alone (remember that warning for ops in South Georgia – something about in clear vis distances can be very hard to judge – same thing of no familiar objects). After a sea crossing, the STANS could be expected to be out by half a mile or more – Flt Lt Tapper had warned others in his flight of this concern. Because of this a “lat. & long. passed over the radio” would not have been of any use – add to this the possibility of error in the position given, poss error in the understanding of the TX, and the poss error in typing it in while on the move and you can see it's a no-brainer – as I have said all along, the one thing helo pilots tend to trust above all other references is a DME system of some sort located locally, a good example being a TACAN on a heli-deck, and of course the CPLS working off a PRC112 gave the HC2s a local all weather capability of sorts. But don't get hung up on this specific equipment – it is still only my guess as a candidate equipment and I did ask for other ideas – what matters is that the various parameters that we have strongly suggest an excursion to the Mull as part of an extra as yet undisclosed activity – getting that agreed upon is a tack to getting them cleared – beyond that, it may lead to a fuller inquiry leading to real justice.
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<<I can think of no reason why these passengers would be interested in a homing demonstration in the first place. From the passenger seats they would have no way of observing and assessing the technique of any type of homing, or even seeing out of the front of the aircraft.>>
I rather think that several of them could have been sold a demo of the capability of getting in quick for an extraction in adverse conditions – whether they looked out of their windows or not, they could have been informed of the conditions and how things were progressing – perhaps as they swung around the lighthouse at speed they could have been told to look out, that they had got directly there, etc – anyway, it wasn't going to upset their schedule and the RAF was short of flying hours for pure training so like it or lump it – just so long as they accepted all the security eggs (them) being stuffed into one basket (the Mk2) and being flown towards the isolated Mull - whoever put this flight together must have had the same concerns that you raised here, ShyTorque, but with enough chutzpah it worked out.
Originally 2 Puma's were allocated to the Task - but that was changed as 2 Puma's can respond to 2 separate Security Incidents at any time; whereas 1 Chinook (which could only respond to 1 Incident at a time) could carry all the Passengers which would have required 2 Puma's.
1. There was no Controller of Aircraft Release for the use of PRC 112 in British Military Aircraft.
2. There was, therefore, no clearance for PRC 112 to be used in the Chinook Mk2 of the Royal Air Force.
While I agree with the gist of your post, that Walter’s LZ theory is unlikely to be a factor, it cannot be discounted when posts like this highlight the appalling failings in the aircraft release process.
The PRC112 would not need Controller Air Release as it is a hand held radio used by ground forces. The airborne component is, commonly, AN/ARS-6(V). Collectively the system is known as AN/AYD-1 PLS. Fitted at Station 130 or thereabouts, I understand.
If an equipment does not have CA Release, it most certainly does NOT follow that it (a) does not have clearance for use in the aircraft or (b) was not in the aircraft.
For example, according to the CA Release at the time of the accident there was no Intercom cleared for use in the Mk2. Yet one was clearly fitted as radio transmissions were made!
Last edited by tucumseh : 8th November 2009 at 07:25.
Caz
It was not that simple.
Look at the timing – the other crews were not aware of the change until the day before yet Flt Lt Tapper must have had some realistic time for him to have thought a request for a MK1 could be accommodated.
Also, someone on this thread (who appeared to have had some standing/cred) let it slip some time back that there had been an intention to use a Chinook some weeks before the event.
The officer at the level above Flt Lt Tapper who oversaw the planning, etc would have been a useful witness at at least one of the inquiries, one would have thought.
Tec
Thanks for the example regarding CAR – I would like to add that it was very much a self contained system and that the first batch delivered were in a “palletised” form such that the on-board component could be easily moved between Chinook MK2s. It was intrinsically accurate such that it worked accurately or it did not work at all – you plugged it in and if readings were apparently of the right order then it could safely be assumed that they were accurate (more accurate than radar in range and +/-4deg in bearing with the integral UHF antennae acting as a direction finder).
Caz
As you don't seem to believe that this kit was ever fitted, here is part of a photo I have of an RAF HC2 Chinook cockpit (the left hand pilot's bit): I have pasted (lower right) an image (from manufacturers material) of an RDU (Remote Display Unit) of the kit in question highlighted with some text; I have also highlighted with text an actual display on the console - I'll leave it to you to decide if they are the same display.
Just trying to keep everything simple; not everyone would be familiar with the procedures existent at the time. The mere fact that a piece of equipment is fitted to an aircraft does not mean it can be used whenever and wherever the Crew decide - WE 177 springs to mind!!
This flight was tasked as a straightforward Passenger carrying flight from Aldergrove to Inverness. There was NO authorisation for any demonstration of the capabilities of the aircraft other than those that were required to complete the Transit Task. Such an authorisation as would have needed for the demonstration that Walter suggests would have required (at the very least) the written approval of AOC 1 Group and any such approval would have included express weather minima for the demonstration.
Walter
Nice photo.
What was the aircraft Mark and Number and when exactly was the photo taken?
It appears to be the same as this one posted here (top row centre!) which would suggest it was, according to the website Chinook HC2 ZA720 (BR) and taken in 2005 during a 'fly in' at The Helicopter Museum. Of course, before anyone else suggests it, that doesn't mean that WK's item of interest could not have been installed years earlier ...
The mere fact that a piece of equipment is fitted to an aircraft does not mean it can be used whenever and wherever the Crew decide - WE 177 springs to mind!!
This flight was tasked as a straightforward Passenger carrying flight from Aldergrove to Inverness. There was NO authorisation for any demonstration of the capabilities of the aircraft other than those that were required to complete the Transit Task.
Quite so. But I can assure you the authorisation to carry WE177 was preceded by comprehensive testing to satisfy the airworthiness signatory that, for example, it was not prematurely released due to an EMC problem.
Similarly, when one has installed a new fuel computer the same comprehensive testing is mandatory; followed by a statement as to what level of release is granted for all aircraft equipment. If you speak to any helicopter Design Authority they will tell you one thing about EMC failures – they will put up with a lot, but they will not tolerate interference with the fuel computer. There should be no thought whatsoever given to “read across”. Only a complete fool would say otherwise (and yes, I know some).
When you say;
Quote:
There was NO authorisation for any demonstration of the capabilities of the aircraft other than those that were required to complete the Transit Task.
I accept your word without hesitation.
But what is far more definite is this. There was No clearance, be it switch on, limited or full, to use a substantial part of the aircraft avionics. The underlying reason is clear. The aircraft had not been released to service in accordance with the regulations.
The primary reason was because Boscombe had not recommended CA Release, largely because they considered the implementation of the FADEC and its software “positively dangerous”.
The only possible reason why so many radiating devices did not have clearance was because EMC testing was incomplete. (Indeed, why would Boscombe waste money conducting full EMC testing on an as yet unverified FADEC build standard? Answer – you don’t).
Despite this, Controller Air (Sir Donald Spiers) was prevailed upon to issue a CA Release when validation and verification was incomplete. As you know, the Release to Service Authority merely subsumes this CAR within his RTS, as Part A.
So, CA clearly knew (or should have been told) he was signing a document for which there was no audit trail to even the V&V minima. What is not entirely clear, at least to me, is whether this most serious breach of the airworthiness regulations was made known to the RTSA. Of course, there are those who believe it was the RTSA or his seniors who prevailed upon Sir Donald to sign – the political imperative to be seen to fly the Mk2. Either way, the aircrew were let down by the most appalling breach of Duty of Care and clearest act of gross negligence imaginable.
the one thing helo pilots tend to trust above all other references is a DME system of some sort located locally, a good example being a TACAN on a heli-deck
Walter, How did you come to this conclusion; where did you hear this from? It's not true, certainly not in the low level, VFR, SH environment.
I was RAF trained (initially jet fixed wing) and have been flying helicopters since 1979, 15 of them in RAF SH, quite a lot of it as instructor, some of it in that theatre. I later flew Search and Rescue, then Police, now corporate. In none of those roles do we rely on a DME system "above all other", in the VFR environment.
P.S. can we PLEASE get the photo above re-sized to suit the forum, so we don't have to keep scrolling across the pages?
A very interesting post with which I cannot argue as I was not involved in at all with the introduction of the Chinook Mk2 into Service.
However, that does not in any way detract from the basic failures of Airmanship demonstrated by the Pilots on this flight - for example the disparate subscale settings on the Pilots Barometric Altimeters which would inevitably have caused confusion regarding actual aircraft altitude in relation to Safety Altitude as the aircraft climbed in IMC.
Location: Quite near 'An aerodrome somewhere in England'
Posts: 15,738
Caz, I'm not familiar with the altimeter setting SOPs which applied to the Chinook force at the time, but can you be certain that with 2 baro alts and (I assume) a rad alt, that there was any mandatory requirement for both pilots to have the same subscale setting at that phase of flight?
Various aircraft have different altimeter SOPs. For example some trucky aircraft with 3 altimeters often used to fly with a different subscale setting on the back up altimeter until top of climb. They also had very different rad alt SOPs compared to other aircraft I've flown.
How different were the subscale settings, by the way?
A very interesting post with which I cannot argue as I was not involved in at all with the introduction of the Chinook Mk2 into Service.
I don't think that tucumseh ever said that you were involved with the Chinook Mk2 introduction into service caz, and that certainly wasn't the point he was making. What he says is that there was no authorisation for most of the avionics fitted, probably because they had not been fully tested for ECM, an absolute sine qua non for CAR let alone RTS. Do you accept that or not? If what tuc is saying is true then the aircraft was not airworthy and CAR and RTS were acts of Gross Negligence. So let's just sort than one out before going on your interminable airmanship roundabout, which I just know will get us back to the topic of breakfast! Is tuc right or wrong caz? If wrong, why?
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