Military AircrewA forum for the professionals who fly the non-civilian hardware, and the backroom boys and girls without whom nothing would leave the ground. Army, Navy and Airforces of the World, all equally welcome here.
I'm sorry, bast0n, I hope you are fully recovered now! As to JP's post I can only quote the bits with which I am in agreement with, I'm afraid. Thor Nogson, sorry I forgot to respond to your point re intentions to go to the LZ. Point taken but it's all getting a little esoteric to suggest that the BoI didn't know or didn't want to know about a planned overflight/landing at the Mull DZ when there is no evidence of such intention, other than the circumstantial evidence that Walter proposes to us, let alone how that would affect its finding. There is already enough evidence that other issues surrounding the RTS, the airworthiness and the experiences of aircrew (in particular that of the Odiham UTP) that the BoI didn't know or didn't want to know that makes the finding untenable. But that is in the real world of course, and not in the Kafkaesque one of the MOD which no doubt will soon threaten to "Thcream and thcream 'till it's thick" unless we all go away!
It can also describe an intentional distortion of reality by powerful but anonymous bureaucrats. "Lack of evidence is treated as a pesky inconvenience, to be circumvented by such Kafkaesque means as depositing unproven allegations into sealed files ..." Another definition would be an existentialist state of ever-elusive freedom while existing under unmitigatable control.
The adjective refers to anything suggestive of Kafka, especially his nightmarish type of narration, in which characters lack a clear course of action, the ability to see beyond immediate events, and the possibility of escape. The term's meaning has transcended the literary realm to apply to real-life occurrences and situations that are incomprehensibly complex, bizarre, or illogical.
I just thought that I would pop this in to help those less able than you and I to see the grass for the trees................eh?
You do neither yourself or this thread any credit.
I suggest you go away until you have grown up a bit.
It's SOP with you isn't it? You see something you don't like and you attack the author rather than the content. My point is absolutely valid. There are significant portions of the events during that flight that you cannot know. But from a hole in the ground and some wreckage, you, (and others), manage to conjure up a sequence of events that lead to a conclusion you like.
It amuses me that several here allow themselves to simply accept "simulations" from Boeing as reasonably accurate accounts. I quite clearly remember being told in the mid 80's when a Mk I went in in the Falklands killing several friends of mine that we were not to discuss the DASH runaway because there may be legal ramifications for Boeing. They were the same company when this aircraft flew into the Mull as they were in the mid 80's and have no interest in having the failures, faults and shorcomings in their airframes brought to light.
The FADEC software would be a joke if it weren't such a serious failure at the most basic level. To hear that it can't be independently audited is laughable... It contains known bugs that have manifested themselves in unpredictable activities... Yet it has full authority over both engines simultaneously. That's lunacy if you are the inventor and are flying the aircraft yourself. To put it in numerous airframes and send others out to fly it borders on attempted murder.
You keep toeing the party line Baston, you're a credit to your leaders. Those leaders whose lack of integrity has them disregarding their own rules at the cost of their subordinates. Like you, they should be ashamed of themselves.
In your passion Airborne I think that you are close to the nub of this scandal; vested interests. As usual the biggest vested interest in the UK Military is not the armed forces but those who supply them, those who work for those who supply them and those who hope to work for those who supply them. Add to that the arrogance of Senior Officers who know more about modern operations than those involved in them directly, because they did something vaguely related too long ago than they would care to admit, and you have a potent cocktail. Stir in rather than shake the secret British ingredient and you have our very unique "Bombe Surprise" in sadly every sense. That ingredient is of course the once renowned and envied Civil Service. Sir Humphrey has morphed into a monster, proud of the fact that he can ensure that scandals like this will never be put right, endex, as Atlantic Cowboy tells us. Well, we shall see. This aircraft was unairworthy, and known to be so by the very crew flying it that day. They may not have used the "A" word, very few seemed even to know what it meant or what it didn't mean. They had no illusions though about the Chinook Mk2, and begged for a Mk1 for this task at least. "No, get on with it", was the reply from above. So they did, but at least they took the sensible precaution of replanning the trip for the shortest over-water leg. In that at least they succeeded, for when what they feared happened they were able to make land-fall. Unfortunately it was hilly and cloud covered and whatever the malfunction, and we now know enough about the Mk2 to know that it was probably very basic and very severe, it defeated them. It does not do to dwell too long on those final few minutes in that flight deck, but they would not have stopped fighting until the very end. That a Chain of Command that so betrayed them and their passengers should so resolutely set out to destroy their memory is unconscionable and a comment on itself rather than them. There is a great deal to be put right here. I have enough faith left in the RAF at least to believe that it will make a start sooner, I hope, rather than later. My views on the MOD are clear and well rehearsed to not need repeating for a change!
Last edited by Chugalug2 : 19th July 2009 at 14:07.
You keep toeing the party line Baston, you're a credit to your leaders. Those leaders whose lack of integrity has them disregarding their own rules at the cost of their subordinates. Like you, they should be ashamed of themselves.
Sorry to disappoint you but my views are strictly my own. I am not ashamed to hold to the view that this was a tragic accident caused by pilot error. I have never toed a party line as those who know me will attest to!
Dalek
Please read my previous posts.
To the rest of you -
I think that this thread has had it's day - I am leaving it for pastures less unpleasant and more logical. I have enjoyed the twists and turns of the argument but think it does no good for the friends and families of those who died to keep reading this rather petty repetition that is leading nowhere.
I wish you all well in whatever you are trying to achieve and bid you all a very friendly good bye.
Chugalug2
You wrote in post #
<<They had no illusions though about the Chinook Mk2, and begged for a Mk1 for this task at least. "No, get on with it", was the reply from above. >>
If they had worries about the MK2, it wasn't about handling – the previous day's crew reported that ZD576 had performed very well, smoother than a MK1, etc..- one would have thought they would have liked to have more of a go of it in this respect – they had indeed had serious reservations but at that point it would have been difficult to refuse – there is after all no evidence of control difficulties anyway in the decisive part of the flight.
<<So they did, but at least they took the sensible precaution of replanning the trip for the shortest over-water leg. In that at least they succeeded, for when what they feared happened they were able to make land-fall. >>
Check the maps – there is no difference at all – further, the landfall options on the other route would involve low, level, and clear (weatherwise) ground. What you have written here is absolute nonesense.
<<Unfortunately it was hilly and cloud covered ...>>
And as someone who posted here who was flying in the Antrim Hills area at the time said the weather was “sh**ty” over those hills too – how was this track safer than the flat, low land via waypoint H then B if they had any reservations re the a/c?
Walter, you haven't taken over from JP or bast0n as chief MOD apologist by any chance? I only ask as their fall back position was always to make some incredible statement and simply stick to it. The talk in Chinook crewrooms in those days was of little else than the problems that the new Mk2 was bringing with it, especially uncommanded power excursions (ie FADEC problems) and even jammed flying controls (ie "broom cupboard" problems). That's not of course from my own experience but from those who flew it and have stated as much on this thread. To say that didn't happen to the aircraft on the previous day, or even earlier that day is rather like saying that the Nimrod performed flawlessly right up to when it exploded. We now know that it had been ready to do just that for years, that its very construction meant that it was an accident waiting to happen. Thus it was with the Chinook Mk2, Walter. In a word it was unairworthy. As to maps I am indebted to you for the very same. Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged) The overwater leg, ie flying between landmasses, is shorter from Aldergrove to the Mull than any other. From the Mull they could hug the coast, and as Bertie reminds us this was a helicopter and could force land if necessary. I suspect that was their intention, but the aircraft was to have the last word...
Chugalug2
<<The overwater leg, ie flying between landmasses, is shorter from Aldergrove to the Mull than any other. From the Mull they could hug the coast,>> No it is not - are you not looking at the path via Rathlin Island? Compare Rathlin to Islay with Carnlough to Mull - insignificant. Is not the coast of Islay flatter than the Mull? Is not route H-B a more obvious "handrail" up the coast, nice and straight with the wind on it so that it was clear and you could keep close to it as opposed to Kintyre where the aerodrome was fogged in at the time, the weather would have been following that side, and the coast was very much more indented/irregular for following? Just do your own chartwork and ask people who have "handrailed" up the coast thereabouts just which coast was more likely. You are a fine one too talk of roles in this debate - I take it you are rostered on in the Orwell sheep mode at the moment. Pathetic. And when it comes to performance of the a/c you can totally discount undemanded engine runups because of the matched power levels found and absence of record of excessive rpm - oh, and it would have been the hand of God if they had experienced such as an immediate action in dealing with such is to limit rotor rpm by pulling up on the collective and using that power, is it not? - would have resulted in a sudden climb which would have saved them. Just doing your bit to keep nothing determinable - a disgraceful tactic by all you doing it.
Just doing your bit to keep nothing determinable - a disgraceful tactic by all you doing it.
IMHO that's way out of order. Chugalug2 has stated repeatedly they believe it to have been a control problem occurring in an unairworthy craft. Quite clear, I'd have thought. Certainly not disgraceful, unless not sharing your opinion is the criterion.
Your perfectly coherent explanation lacks one supporting bit of information - without that, it's no more likely than any other view.
Now that Bast0n, JP and (it appears) Caz have said goodnight, should we argue with ourselves. I wonder, given the timing and manner of their withdrawl from the thread, they know something we don't.
Ok, let's just calm down Walter. I have never flown helicopters let alone the Chinook, and defer to anyone who has in the matter of planning a trip necessitating the crossing of the North West Channel with pax in an aircraft that a crew had essentially no confidence in. Picking up on Bertie's point I would have thought that the very shortest over water leg would be the way to go. "Insignificant" differences might just be that between life and death, though in the event the latter resulted anyway. As has been pointed out to you before, evidence extracted from the BoI is very suspect. It was either heavily qualified at the time, or constructed (modelled) from dubious data by the aircraft manufacturer, and though similarly qualified used as a basis of fact with which to come to the infamous finding. I have said before Walter that you have a prima facie case which should be properly investigated by Professional Accident Investigators along with every other possible reason as to why this tragedy happened, including pilot error (negligent, grossly negligent or otherwise) and lack of airworthiness. We know what your theory is, just as we know mine. That is all they will ever be until a proper investigation into this tragedy occurs. It hasn't happened yet, in that at least I hope we can agree. Thor, I'm sure that you are right. Perhaps we are to find out what that "something" is soon? Oh, and thank you!
Yes he is, pulse, and thank you for picking me up on that! Though to be fair, the MOD puts no more store by the deliberations of the HoL or FAI than it does to ours here. Indeed it is uninterested it would seem in any views other than its own. Whether that includes Mr Hadden-Jones QC and his Review into Nimrod (and airworthiness in general) remains to be seen. The higher they are the further they fall! If only that held true for SO's, eh caz?
May I point out that MOD wrote and published "the Rules". They are not guidelines - they are definitive/absolute/peremptory.
The Pilots signed as having read and understood the Orders and Instructions in the Flying Order Book/ GASO's/STCASI's and JSP 318 every month.
Disobeying/ignoring Orders and Instructions are disciplinary offences in the Military at any time. Doing so on Active Service raises the seriousness of the offence to another level. When such offences result in needless Fatalities they are viewed with extreme gravity.
You will recall that the Reviewing Officers deemed the Pilots to be negligent before the "Waypoint Change" (0.95 NM from impact) - when even the HOL Committee admitted the Pilots were in control of the aircraft.
Even if there was an emergency after waypoint change (for which there is no evidence) that does not alter the liability of the Pilots because they had already failed in their duty.
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