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As it seems before waypoint change they were most likely not in fog, thick or otherwise, caz, that doesn't really help. Instead of answering questions that you were not asked, please answer the ones that you were:
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So they were in control of the aircraft, flying towards the cloud enshrouded Mull intending as planned to turn left at the "Waypoint Change" but were already Grossly Negligent? Why? Because they were "flying too fast"? How fast was that, caz? The only speed known to any degree of accuracy is the speed deduced from impact damage. Is that the "flying too fast" speed? Why? If you were the BoI President and had done a proper Accident Investigation, that uncovered the Lack of Airworthiness and took into account the evidence of Flight Control malfunction in the wreckage, you would still find the primary cause of the accident to be the Gross Negligence of the pilots before "Waypoint Change" even though they could still have been flying in VMC?
In their evidence to the HOL Committee both the Reviewing Officers stated that negligence had occurred by the time the Pilots made the waypoint change. If they were IMC then the flight should have been conducted in accordance with IFR. If they were not in cloud then they had flouted the basic rules of Airmanship by flying too fast and too close towards the cloud covered high ground of the Mull which they subsequently impacted.
Is it not a reasonable assumption they intended to turn at or shortly after the WP? If a pilot intends to change direction at a waypoint which will take the aircraft away from cloud, it is not mandatory to transfer to IFR.
It is my understanding that, if at any point the Chinook had a latent control jam preventing the helicopter from turning, but the helicopter were continuing on a straight course (i.e. Aldergrove to WP A) the aircrew may not have had any indication that there was a problem. The problem would only become apparent when they tried to instigate a change of course away from dead ahead.
I’m no pilot, but does the above not completely negate the basis upon which the ROs made their decision? Especially given the plethora of evidence available about control jams, their cause (and sometimes unknown cause) and effect?
There is a known time for them leaving the Aldergove CTZ and a known time for impact. The average groundspeed between those 2 points was 158 kts and groundspeed at impact, whilst attempting an escape manouvre, was conspicuously similar at approx 150 kts(AAIB).
The Yachtsman could see that the Mull was shrouded in cloud and the Chinook passed approx 200 ft above him. It flew straight on, without deviation, until the final desperate attempted escape manouvre.
They were in control of the Aircraft at Waypoint change and they were in control for that final attempted manouvre. There was no evidence of any technical malfunction that could have caused the crash.
What you have to do is come up with evidence - not hypothesis - that proves the existence of a major systems failure so serious that it prevented the Pilots from transmitting a Distress Call, Squawking Emergency, activating a Distress Beacon or even getting their Pax to adopt Crash Positions. You would also have to explain how such a malfunction managed to disappear without trace and how it is that there has been no repetition of such a malfunction in the 15 years since this tragedy.
I would point out that no such evidence has yet been produced.
Caz, is it not true that the average groundspeed that you quote has been challenged? Was not the boundary time that of a radio call reporting clear of the CTZ rather than exactly crossing it? Was the time of impact from the same time base? I cannot see how as the first must have been an ATC one, the second from the aircraft data base. Whatever the average groundspeed overall, how does this reflect your "flying too fast" speed which is presumably based on IAS and reflects GASO Helicopter Low Level VFR speed restrictions. Is that so and if so what is that max IAS? Is it not also true that the "150 kts" impact speed was not deduced from impact damage by the AAIB, as I thought, but by Boeing's infamous model and your supposed escape manoeuvre inferred by the position of cyclic, yaw and thrust controls. Could these same indications have been rather signs of vain attempts to regain control, together of course with the detached collective spring balance found in the wreckage? Contrary to what you say Mr Cable stated that the possibility of a control system jam could not be dismissed. If that had happened I cannot think of anything more major, with both pilots solely and desperately concerned with regaining control of the aircraft to the very end.
Caz will trot out the following mantra, as he did when answering, on JP's behalf, an even simpler request for evidence (see Posts 5304 and 5342).
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It is not the case that JP (myself or anyone else) has to produce new evidence to "PROVE" that the finding of the BOI was correct. If, in UK, a criminal case goes to the Court Of Appeal; the Prosecution does not have to produce new evidence to maintain the Guilty verdict. It is up to the Appellant (and that persons Advocates) to produce new evidence that justifies overturning the original verdict in the eyes of the court. The same applies in Civil cases.
As far as he is concerned, despite IMHO the BoI being flawed, he does not have to prove anything to anybody. Wratten and Days verdict, in his opinion, was correct and proper and therefore until someones finds some new evidence that is positively, undeniably and "without any doubt whatsoever" contrary to Wratten and Days opinion he will not change his position.
Shame Wratten and Day didn't apply the same policy, particularly with regrads to evidence.
In any case, Caz is not a legal expert, as is evidenced by his mantra.
The defence in an appeal merely has the prove that there was a procedural error in the original prosecution to have either the 'guilty' verdict quashed, or a retrial ordered.
The fact that the ROs ignored the requirements of the AP as approved by the Air Board is sufficient.
The defence in this case can also point to the deliberate withholding of vital evidence known to the prosecution.
In a court of law this would have been overturned many years ago.
Wrathmonk, caz stated that even if a major emergency occurred after waypoint change the finding would still stand because they were "flying too fast". I am not asking him to defend the finding, I'm asking him what "flying too fast" means specifically, and how he knows that they were "flying too fast". Of course if anyone else can answer those questions it would be instructive. The more one probes into this BoI the more it seems that the pilots were hung out to dry on the evidence "modelled" by the manufacturer. Given that there is a very good chance that the aircraft crashed because of known deficiencies in ALL Chinook Mk2's, that evidence is suspect even before one studies the reliability of the data on which it was "modelled". It is at that point that I find I have very little faith in it whatsoever. It would be interesting to see what view an objective and fair Accident Investigation would make of it. That has yet to happen.
Olive, thank you for the link to past posts on VFR, from which we get the MOD's version (to the Mull Group):
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"The Board members concluded that the prevailing weather conditions were such as to demand flight in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre. The prescribed minima for flying visually, VFR, are horizontal visibility of 1 km beneath a cloud base of at least 250 feet, if flying below 140 knots; and a visibility of greater than 5kms, 500ft minimum cloud base, and 1500 metres horizontally from cloud, if above this speed.
which you confessed yourself content with at #4576. Thus it would seem that "flying too fast" would imply an IAS in excess of 140kts. Messrs W&D were obviously of the opinion that was indeed the case, as they seemed to suggest to the HoL that conditions could well have been VMC before waypoint change as compared to "the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre" requiring IFR as above. Other than the "modelling" by Boeing, why should there be reason to believe that IAS was indeed above 140kts? Other than suggesting that to gainsay the RO's findings is absurd, is it not true that as ever we just don't know what their precise IAS was?
The Rules of The Air for an aircraft flying under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) are simple and brief:
1. Pilots are responsible for maintaining separation from other aircraft.
2. Pilots are to maintain visual meteorological conditions (VMC). If a pilot is unable to maintain VMC, instrument flight rules (IFR) are mandatory. The conditions for VFR vary according to aircraft type and speed and are stated earlier on this thread. (4560 region).
The ROs were both experienced and accomplished pilots in their respective rotary wing and fast jet fields, with clear understandings of the Rules of The Air when making their judgements. It is absurd to suggest that they made their decisions lightly or that they selected information to fit their findings.
Olive,
I would be genuinely grateful if you would cast your eyes over this missive in it's entirety as I would value your thoughts.
If the RO's had told us exactly what had happened, stated exactly why it had happened and furnished everyone with proof that satisfies the requirements to enable them to reach the verdict they had, then this thread and the campaign would have never have come to fruition.
I spent the best part of 10 happy years as a Puma crewman, initially when it was 2 crew ops, then operating in NI in some of the most awful weather day and night, then in Germany with trips to Belize etc. I hark back to those days and the healthy respect for weather that rotary crews were taught from day 1 and there are, amongst many others, 3 main things here, that for me simply do not add up.
1. Nobody can state with any degree of accuracy as to at what exact point the aircraft departed VFR and entered IFR. In fact whilst it's generally accepted, based on witness statements that at some point prior to impact they ended up being IFR at max chat, no one can prove conclusively that they were ever IFR.
Before people snort in derision I ask the aircrew amongst you to consider how many times you have been aloft and seen the edge of fog/low cloud where within 100 yards or so you could go from absolute porridge to gin clear? Or the drivers amongst you to consider how many times on a motorway have you gone from fog to clear in a few car lengths? Unless I have mis read things there was no witness at the point of impact so how can anyone say with 100% certainty the crash site was in fog?
2. Nobody can state with a 100% degree of certainty that the aircraft was serviceable prior to impact. I agree fully that no one can state the aircraft was definitely U/S but there is undeniable evidence to suggest a control malfunction could have occurred but was discounted.
3. Based on the assumptions made by the RO's nobody can tell me why an experienced 4 man crew would ever act in the manner required to confirm the verdict reached. Not a shred of what is assumed fits with SH SOP's and for the life of me I cannot understand why anyone would reach this conclusion.
I spent the first 14 years of my service life as an aircraft technician and whilst I would have loved to have been a pilot I was simply never clever enough so I applied for ALM. One of the main reason for my acceptance and subsequent success, as debriefed by many, was my ability to apply common sense and logic to situations which is all I have tried to do here.
Common sense and logic tell me the aircraft was almost certainly serviceable prior to impact and the crew quite probably porked up. What common sense and logic also go on to tell me is that probably etc simply does not support the verdict reached and tells me that for the life of me I don't know now and never will know exactly why this accident happened.
Now I have always admitted to not being the sharpest tool in the box and all I have ever asked of John Reid on the flight deck of Albert, JP, Caz, Baston, Atlantic Cowboy and others is to show me the conclusive evidence, the smoking gun if you like that give a 100% confirmation of the RO's findings.
Prove to me without a single shadow of a doubt at what point the aircraft went IFR and prove to me without a single shadow of a doubt that the aircraft was fully serviceable at the point of impact and you will convert me to your way of thinking.
But if all you have in your locker is the same supposition that I have this could go on for a while.
Apologies for an intrusion from a non-aircrew long-time lurker but may I suggest a slight amendment to SFFP's previous missive.
"Common sense and logic tell me the aircraft was almost certainly serviceable prior to impact and the crew quite probably porked up. What common sense and logic also go on to tell me is that probably {etc simply} does {not} support the verdict reached by the ROs, however it does not meet the rules in force at the time that "there should be no doubt whatsoever" as to the cause. "
Some have said recently that "no doubt whatsoever" is an impossible standard to achieve and they may well be right - but as this concerned aircrew not able to represent themselves, maybe that was the hidden intent of the standard. After all the rules for ascertaining blame were changed not long after this weren't they?
No matter though because whether or not it was impossible to meet the standard surely the ROs were not entitled to ignore it. The fact that they did use assumption and 'educated' guesswork to support their ruling is the reason this thread was started and is still going.
It would seem that the Boeing simulation, the whole basis for the 158kts impact speed and for the "final flare" which W & D claimed showed that the aircraft was under control 4 secs before crashing is at best a red herring, at worst it brings the motives of those who produced it, offered it as evidence and used it to arrive at the "finding" into question. From the HoL Report:
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Detailed examination by the AAIB of the flight control system disclosed that the DASH extensions found did not correspond to a high speed level flight condition whereas the LCTA extensions did, and it appeared possible that the settings could reflect a dynamic aircraft manoeuvre at the point of impact. Boeing were therefore asked to undertake a study to assess the consistency of the settings and to define the possible manoeuvre. The simulation was a mathematical exercise which, as Mr Cable stated, was "looking really for fairly gross manoeuvres over a pretty short period of time" (Q 957). It was not intended to produce an accurate reconstruction of events but rather to demonstrate what could have happened within certain parameters (Q 982).... 123. The Boeing simulation considered a wide range of possible starting conditions, i.e. conditions pertaining immediately prior to a final manoeuvre. Having rejected possible conditions at an airspeed of 135 knots, they concluded that an airspeed of 150 knots (groundspeed 174 knots) with a ROC of 1000 feet per minute provided "a ready match" with the criteria and was therefore the most likely (AAIB statement para 8).... The groundspeed of 158 knots at impact derived from the Boeing simulation exceeded by 11 knots that of 147 found in the cockpit ground speed indicator (AAIB statement para 6). Moreover, the postulated ROC of 1000 feet per minute at 150 knots airspeed is unattainable. Squadron Leader Burke doubted whether it was achievable with ZD 576's load (Q 920). Witness A explained that while flying he had tried to see whether Boeing's chosen ROC was obtainable at 150 knots and had found that it was impossible in similar conditions (QQ 813-23). He had achieved no more than 400 feet per minute at 150 knots.
There is much more of the same at House of Lords - Chinook ZD 576 - Report but I would be getting my collar felt for adverse effects on PPRuNe Bandwidth. The HoL Report demolishes W & D's, the RAF's and the MOD's case. Trouble is of course they just don't admit it. Someone somewhere has to bring them to account. This was a scandal 15 years ago and remains so today. This aircraft was unairworthy and most probably crashed for that very reason. Time that was faced up to.
"no doubt whatsoever" implies to the general public and to (legal minded politicians) that there's nothing to see here, move on, no foul play, no undisclosed exercise, nothing other than bad airmanship/ pilot error, ignore the conspiracy theorists, no need for more thorough investigation, aircraft and its kit were fine, etc, etc.
Wrt SFFP's (rather excellent, I concede) post, this bit sums up the thoughts of many:
<<3. Based on the assumptions made by the RO's nobody can tell me why an experienced 4 man crew would ever act in the manner required to confirm the verdict reached. Not a shred of what is assumed fits with SH SOP's and for the life of me I cannot understand why anyone would reach this conclusion. >>
I agree totally – simplistically blaming the crew does not sit right – at all.
But if the desired impression is as the first paragraph above then, working backwards, a verdict of gross negligence is required to get it.
So:
1 why was this result so important?; and
2 why is it still necessary to maintain it?
I suggest that while dispelling doubts on the airworthiness of the (then) new HC2s could have been a reason for (1), with their subsequent successful record (2) should not apply.
If it had been a case of an exercise gone wrong, (1) may have been expedient at the time but, with the determination of this campaign, surely the MOD would have yielded, sharing the blame and reducing the judgment against the pilots? So (2) should no longer hold.
I subscribe to the theory that there could have been possible public unrest in NI if there had been any chance of foul play so at the time (1) held – had the peace process been universally accepted as a good thing and people had moved on (sort of the end justifying the means) then (2) wouldn't be explained – but the peace process is still not universally accepted as a good thing 15 years on so (2) holds – and one would hope that just clearing the pilots' names would never be enough, that accepting the crash we had to have for the peace process would be OK if only some of your own service didn't have to carry the can would never be right.
Chugalug, Perhaps you can tell me who made the input to flare the aircraft 4 seconds before impact if it wasn't the pilots.
Well that's the whole point AC, there was no flare because the aircraft was not under control, hence the unusual combination of power and flight controls and other evidence of flying control abnormalities found in the wreckage and all tidily ascribed to impact effect. Read about it at the HoL Report Link in my previous post. Only don't let anyone catch you doing it, they might doubt your commitment to "Command Integrity" (nice Humphrey-ism that, don't you think?):
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128. The Boeing simulation postulations of a ROC of 1000 feet per minute and a speed of 150 knots were essential to the conclusion that a final flare was initiated some 4 seconds before impact. Now that those postulations have been shown to be unattainable, the circumstances and indeed existence of any such flare must be very doubtful. That there was such a flare was crucial to the Air Marshals' conclusion that the crew must have been in control of the aircraft for the last 4 seconds before impact (e.g. QQ 280, 1088). Sir John's calculations (above) give no support to such a conclusion, since they are independent of and in no sense a substitute for Boeing's postulations.
