Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Wrathmonk, caz stated that even if a major emergency occurred after waypoint change the finding would still stand because they were "flying too fast". I am not asking him to defend the finding, I'm asking him what "flying too fast" means specifically, and how he knows that they were "flying too fast". Of course if anyone else can answer those questions it would be instructive. The more one probes into this BoI the more it seems that the pilots were hung out to dry on the evidence "modelled" by the manufacturer. Given that there is a very good chance that the aircraft crashed because of known deficiencies in ALL Chinook Mk2's, that evidence is suspect even before one studies the reliability of the data on which it was "modelled". It is at that point that I find I have very little faith in it whatsoever. It would be interesting to see what view an objective and fair Accident Investigation would make of it. That has yet to happen.
Olive, thank you for the link to past posts on VFR, from which we get the MOD's version (to the Mull Group):
which you confessed yourself content with at #4576. Thus it would seem that "flying too fast" would imply an IAS in excess of 140kts. Messrs W&D were obviously of the opinion that was indeed the case, as they seemed to suggest to the HoL that conditions could well have been VMC before waypoint change as compared to "the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre" requiring IFR as above. Other than the "modelling" by Boeing, why should there be reason to believe that IAS was indeed above 140kts? Other than suggesting that to gainsay the RO's findings is absurd, is it not true that as ever we just don't know what their precise IAS was?
"The Board members concluded that the prevailing weather conditions were such as to demand flight in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre. The prescribed minima for flying visually, VFR, are horizontal visibility of 1 km beneath a cloud base of at least 250 feet, if flying below 140 knots; and a visibility of greater than 5kms, 500ft minimum cloud base, and 1500 metres horizontally from cloud, if above this speed.
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The Rules of The Air for an aircraft flying under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) are simple and brief:
1. Pilots are responsible for maintaining separation from other aircraft.
2. Pilots are to maintain visual meteorological conditions (VMC). If a pilot is unable to maintain VMC, instrument flight rules (IFR) are mandatory. The conditions for VFR vary according to aircraft type and speed and are stated earlier on this thread. (4560 region).
The ROs were both experienced and accomplished pilots in their respective rotary wing and fast jet fields, with clear understandings of the Rules of The Air when making their judgements. It is absurd to suggest that they made their decisions lightly or that they selected information to fit their findings.
1. Pilots are responsible for maintaining separation from other aircraft.
2. Pilots are to maintain visual meteorological conditions (VMC). If a pilot is unable to maintain VMC, instrument flight rules (IFR) are mandatory. The conditions for VFR vary according to aircraft type and speed and are stated earlier on this thread. (4560 region).
The ROs were both experienced and accomplished pilots in their respective rotary wing and fast jet fields, with clear understandings of the Rules of The Air when making their judgements. It is absurd to suggest that they made their decisions lightly or that they selected information to fit their findings.
I would be genuinely grateful if you would cast your eyes over this missive in it's entirety as I would value your thoughts.
If the RO's had told us exactly what had happened, stated exactly why it had happened and furnished everyone with proof that satisfies the requirements to enable them to reach the verdict they had, then this thread and the campaign would have never have come to fruition.
I spent the best part of 10 happy years as a Puma crewman, initially when it was 2 crew ops, then operating in NI in some of the most awful weather day and night, then in Germany with trips to Belize etc. I hark back to those days and the healthy respect for weather that rotary crews were taught from day 1 and there are, amongst many others, 3 main things here, that for me simply do not add up.
1. Nobody can state with any degree of accuracy as to at what exact point the aircraft departed VFR and entered IFR. In fact whilst it's generally accepted, based on witness statements that at some point prior to impact they ended up being IFR at max chat, no one can prove conclusively that they were ever IFR.
Before people snort in derision I ask the aircrew amongst you to consider how many times you have been aloft and seen the edge of fog/low cloud where within 100 yards or so you could go from absolute porridge to gin clear? Or the drivers amongst you to consider how many times on a motorway have you gone from fog to clear in a few car lengths? Unless I have mis read things there was no witness at the point of impact so how can anyone say with 100% certainty the crash site was in fog?
2. Nobody can state with a 100% degree of certainty that the aircraft was serviceable prior to impact. I agree fully that no one can state the aircraft was definitely U/S but there is undeniable evidence to suggest a control malfunction could have occurred but was discounted.
3. Based on the assumptions made by the RO's nobody can tell me why an experienced 4 man crew would ever act in the manner required to confirm the verdict reached. Not a shred of what is assumed fits with SH SOP's and for the life of me I cannot understand why anyone would reach this conclusion.
I spent the first 14 years of my service life as an aircraft technician and whilst I would have loved to have been a pilot I was simply never clever enough so I applied for ALM. One of the main reason for my acceptance and subsequent success, as debriefed by many, was my ability to apply common sense and logic to situations which is all I have tried to do here.
Common sense and logic tell me the aircraft was almost certainly serviceable prior to impact and the crew quite probably porked up. What common sense and logic also go on to tell me is that probably etc simply does not support the verdict reached and tells me that for the life of me I don't know now and never will know exactly why this accident happened.
Now I have always admitted to not being the sharpest tool in the box and all I have ever asked of John Reid on the flight deck of Albert, JP, Caz, Baston, Atlantic Cowboy and others is to show me the conclusive evidence, the smoking gun if you like that give a 100% confirmation of the RO's findings.
Prove to me without a single shadow of a doubt at what point the aircraft went IFR and prove to me without a single shadow of a doubt that the aircraft was fully serviceable at the point of impact and you will convert me to your way of thinking.
But if all you have in your locker is the same supposition that I have this could go on for a while.
Apologies for an intrusion from a non-aircrew long-time lurker but may I suggest a slight amendment to SFFP's previous missive.
"Common sense and logic tell me the aircraft was almost certainly serviceable prior to impact and the crew quite probably porked up. What common sense and logic also go on to tell me is that probably {etc simply} does {not} support the verdict reached by the ROs, however it does not meet the rules in force at the time that "there should be no doubt whatsoever" as to the cause. "
Some have said recently that "no doubt whatsoever" is an impossible standard to achieve and they may well be right - but as this concerned aircrew not able to represent themselves, maybe that was the hidden intent of the standard. After all the rules for ascertaining blame were changed not long after this weren't they?
No matter though because whether or not it was impossible to meet the standard surely the ROs were not entitled to ignore it. The fact that they did use assumption and 'educated' guesswork to support their ruling is the reason this thread was started and is still going.
Back to watching.......
"Common sense and logic tell me the aircraft was almost certainly serviceable prior to impact and the crew quite probably porked up. What common sense and logic also go on to tell me is that probably {etc simply} does {not} support the verdict reached by the ROs, however it does not meet the rules in force at the time that "there should be no doubt whatsoever" as to the cause. "
Some have said recently that "no doubt whatsoever" is an impossible standard to achieve and they may well be right - but as this concerned aircrew not able to represent themselves, maybe that was the hidden intent of the standard. After all the rules for ascertaining blame were changed not long after this weren't they?
No matter though because whether or not it was impossible to meet the standard surely the ROs were not entitled to ignore it. The fact that they did use assumption and 'educated' guesswork to support their ruling is the reason this thread was started and is still going.
Back to watching.......
It would seem that the Boeing simulation, the whole basis for the 158kts impact speed and for the "final flare" which W & D claimed showed that the aircraft was under control 4 secs before crashing is at best a red herring, at worst it brings the motives of those who produced it, offered it as evidence and used it to arrive at the "finding" into question. From the HoL Report:
There is much more of the same at
House of Lords - Chinook ZD 576 - Report
but I would be getting my collar felt for adverse effects on PPRuNe Bandwidth. The HoL Report demolishes W & D's, the RAF's and the MOD's case. Trouble is of course they just don't admit it. Someone somewhere has to bring them to account. This was a scandal 15 years ago and remains so today. This aircraft was unairworthy and most probably crashed for that very reason. Time that was faced up to.
Detailed examination by the AAIB of the flight control system disclosed that the DASH extensions found did not correspond to a high speed level flight condition whereas the LCTA extensions did, and it appeared possible that the settings could reflect a dynamic aircraft manoeuvre at the point of impact. Boeing were therefore asked to undertake a study to assess the consistency of the settings and to define the possible manoeuvre. The simulation was a mathematical exercise which, as Mr Cable stated, was "looking really for fairly gross manoeuvres over a pretty short period of time" (Q 957). It was not intended to produce an accurate reconstruction of events but rather to demonstrate what could have happened within certain parameters (Q 982)....
123. The Boeing simulation considered a wide range of possible starting conditions, i.e. conditions pertaining immediately prior to a final manoeuvre. Having rejected possible conditions at an airspeed of 135 knots, they concluded that an airspeed of 150 knots (groundspeed 174 knots) with a ROC of 1000 feet per minute provided "a ready match" with the criteria and was therefore the most likely (AAIB statement para 8)....
The groundspeed of 158 knots at impact derived from the Boeing simulation exceeded by 11 knots that of 147 found in the cockpit ground speed indicator (AAIB statement para 6). Moreover, the postulated ROC of 1000 feet per minute at 150 knots airspeed is unattainable. Squadron Leader Burke doubted whether it was achievable with ZD 576's load (Q 920). Witness A explained that while flying he had tried to see whether Boeing's chosen ROC was obtainable at 150 knots and had found that it was impossible in similar conditions (QQ 813-23). He had achieved no more than 400 feet per minute at 150 knots.
123. The Boeing simulation considered a wide range of possible starting conditions, i.e. conditions pertaining immediately prior to a final manoeuvre. Having rejected possible conditions at an airspeed of 135 knots, they concluded that an airspeed of 150 knots (groundspeed 174 knots) with a ROC of 1000 feet per minute provided "a ready match" with the criteria and was therefore the most likely (AAIB statement para 8)....
The groundspeed of 158 knots at impact derived from the Boeing simulation exceeded by 11 knots that of 147 found in the cockpit ground speed indicator (AAIB statement para 6). Moreover, the postulated ROC of 1000 feet per minute at 150 knots airspeed is unattainable. Squadron Leader Burke doubted whether it was achievable with ZD 576's load (Q 920). Witness A explained that while flying he had tried to see whether Boeing's chosen ROC was obtainable at 150 knots and had found that it was impossible in similar conditions (QQ 813-23). He had achieved no more than 400 feet per minute at 150 knots.
House of Lords - Chinook ZD 576 - Report
but I would be getting my collar felt for adverse effects on PPRuNe Bandwidth. The HoL Report demolishes W & D's, the RAF's and the MOD's case. Trouble is of course they just don't admit it. Someone somewhere has to bring them to account. This was a scandal 15 years ago and remains so today. This aircraft was unairworthy and most probably crashed for that very reason. Time that was faced up to.
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"no doubt whatsoever" implies to the general public and to (legal minded politicians) that there's nothing to see here, move on, no foul play, no undisclosed exercise, nothing other than bad airmanship/ pilot error, ignore the conspiracy theorists, no need for more thorough investigation, aircraft and its kit were fine, etc, etc.
Wrt SFFP's (rather excellent, I concede) post, this bit sums up the thoughts of many:
<<3. Based on the assumptions made by the RO's nobody can tell me why an experienced 4 man crew would ever act in the manner required to confirm the verdict reached. Not a shred of what is assumed fits with SH SOP's and for the life of me I cannot understand why anyone would reach this conclusion. >>
I agree totally – simplistically blaming the crew does not sit right – at all.
But if the desired impression is as the first paragraph above then, working backwards, a verdict of gross negligence is required to get it.
So:
1 why was this result so important?; and
2 why is it still necessary to maintain it?
I suggest that while dispelling doubts on the airworthiness of the (then) new HC2s could have been a reason for (1), with their subsequent successful record (2) should not apply.
If it had been a case of an exercise gone wrong, (1) may have been expedient at the time but, with the determination of this campaign, surely the MOD would have yielded, sharing the blame and reducing the judgment against the pilots? So (2) should no longer hold.
I subscribe to the theory that there could have been possible public unrest in NI if there had been any chance of foul play so at the time (1) held – had the peace process been universally accepted as a good thing and people had moved on (sort of the end justifying the means) then (2) wouldn't be explained – but the peace process is still not universally accepted as a good thing 15 years on so (2) holds – and one would hope that just clearing the pilots' names would never be enough, that accepting the crash we had to have for the peace process would be OK if only some of your own service didn't have to carry the can would never be right.
Wrt SFFP's (rather excellent, I concede) post, this bit sums up the thoughts of many:
<<3. Based on the assumptions made by the RO's nobody can tell me why an experienced 4 man crew would ever act in the manner required to confirm the verdict reached. Not a shred of what is assumed fits with SH SOP's and for the life of me I cannot understand why anyone would reach this conclusion. >>
I agree totally – simplistically blaming the crew does not sit right – at all.
But if the desired impression is as the first paragraph above then, working backwards, a verdict of gross negligence is required to get it.
So:
1 why was this result so important?; and
2 why is it still necessary to maintain it?
I suggest that while dispelling doubts on the airworthiness of the (then) new HC2s could have been a reason for (1), with their subsequent successful record (2) should not apply.
If it had been a case of an exercise gone wrong, (1) may have been expedient at the time but, with the determination of this campaign, surely the MOD would have yielded, sharing the blame and reducing the judgment against the pilots? So (2) should no longer hold.
I subscribe to the theory that there could have been possible public unrest in NI if there had been any chance of foul play so at the time (1) held – had the peace process been universally accepted as a good thing and people had moved on (sort of the end justifying the means) then (2) wouldn't be explained – but the peace process is still not universally accepted as a good thing 15 years on so (2) holds – and one would hope that just clearing the pilots' names would never be enough, that accepting the crash we had to have for the peace process would be OK if only some of your own service didn't have to carry the can would never be right.
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A total amateur dipping his toes in.
Could someone explain, in simple language, why two highly qualified pilots (in their SH/SF role) would voluntarily fly into a hillside?
Were they both suicidal? Were they both confused? Or were they both convinced of their actions?
Could someone explain, in simple language, why two highly qualified pilots (in their SH/SF role) would voluntarily fly into a hillside?
Were they both suicidal? Were they both confused? Or were they both convinced of their actions?
Atlantic Cowboy:
Well that's the whole point AC, there was no flare because the aircraft was not under control, hence the unusual combination of power and flight controls and other evidence of flying control abnormalities found in the wreckage and all tidily ascribed to impact effect. Read about it at the HoL Report Link in my previous post. Only don't let anyone catch you doing it, they might doubt your commitment to "Command Integrity" (nice Humphrey-ism that, don't you think?):
Chugalug,
Perhaps you can tell me who made the input to flare the aircraft 4 seconds before impact if it wasn't the pilots.
Perhaps you can tell me who made the input to flare the aircraft 4 seconds before impact if it wasn't the pilots.
128. The Boeing simulation postulations of a ROC of 1000 feet per minute and a speed of 150 knots were essential to the conclusion that a final flare was initiated some 4 seconds before impact. Now that those postulations have been shown to be unattainable, the circumstances and indeed existence of any such flare must be very doubtful. That there was such a flare was crucial to the Air Marshals' conclusion that the crew must have been in control of the aircraft for the last 4 seconds before impact (e.g. QQ 280, 1088). Sir John's calculations (above) give no support to such a conclusion, since they are independent of and in no sense a substitute for Boeing's postulations.
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AC
This has probably been posted before, and I’m sure you considered this, or similar events, when briefing Ministers that you knew exactly what occurred in ZD576, but to my non-pilot eyes this is bloody frightening.
The issues that stand out (to me) are highlighted toward the end. Notably, “complex”, “confusing”, “limited guidance” and, probably quite significantly, 2000’ AGL at the beginning of an incident that lasted 20 mins.
I also note the incident took place over 5 years after Mull, yet perfectly describes events reported by test pilots BEFORE Mull (but which were withheld from the BoI) and were STILL considered a safety hazard. One assumes in those 5 years the Mk2 had progressed from a development aircraft to one of acceptable design maturity (which it certainly wasn’t in June 1994) and the crew had the benefit of an acceptable number of hours experience (as opposed to a quick conversion course, followed by some months back in the Mk1, then having an immature and sub-airworthy Mk2 foisted on them a few days before the final flight).
AIR INCIDENT ODI/381/99 CREW REPORT
Chinook Mk2 ZD98l - 18 Squadron. RAF Odiham
5th October 1999, 15l0Z VMC I20kts, +6 deg C, 2000ft AGL
ZD981 was the Lead a/c of a 2 ship formation transiting from Shawbury to Odiham. Approx 10 mins after departing Shawbury, a small jolt was felt throughout the airframe and the capt'n in the RHS noticed that some of his fit instrument power flags briefly showed and the Master Caution Panel (MCP) lights flashed on and then off. A check of cockpit indications was made but all appeared normal.
Approx 2 mins later, similar symptoms were noted again without any subsequent indications of a problem. The jolts were very similar to that felt when the AFCS (Automatic Flight Control System) extendable links centre after a power interrupt and the conversation amongst the crew concentrated on this possibility.
Approx l min later, a series of jolts and power interrupts was experienced and the Captain elected to switch the AFCS off to prevent the a/c jolting.
Approx 2 sees later, the Master Cautions and all the captions on the CAP illuminated dimly. ALL power was lost to the primary flight instruments, including the main Al (Attitude Indicator) and the HSI (Horizontal Situation Indicator), and to the engine instruments. The only services remaining were those powered by the essential battery busbar. A loud hum was also heard through the intercom system which pulsed in phase with the captions of the CAP.
A check round the cockpit was made and all the CBs were checked and confirmed to be OK. The forward LCT (Longitudinal cyclic trim) was seen to be in the fully retracted position so speed was reduced to approx 80kts (Vmax with LCT retracted) as a precaution. The aft LCT indicated just below the ground position.
The Captain ordered all non essential equipment to be switched off and the formation was turned hack towards Shawbury - the nearest Military airfield. A practice Pan was in progress on guard so the formation changed frequency to Shawbury Approach and a PAN was declared.
CB's were checked once more and the crewman checked the TRU vents (Transformer Rectifier Unit) and the external bays for any evidence of a malfunction, but nothing untoward was seen.
The co-pilot attempted to find a relevant page in the FRC (Flight Reference Card) to assist with the diagnosis but none of the cards fitted the indications. The Captain had recently discussed electrical problems with the Brintel Simulator Staff and recalled a similar scenario where isolating the AC and DC cross-ties enabled one of the two electrical systems to be brought back on line. The co-pilot was ordered to trip the No 1 PDP (Power Distribution Panel) DC and AC cross-lies, but this had no effect and the CB was re-set.
The Captain then tripped the No.2 PDP DC then AC cross-ties. Tripping the AC cross-lie resulted in restoration of services from the No PDP. All the Captains flight instruments returned to normal as did the No2 ECU indications but all the services powered by the No.l PDP were still inoperative. The CAP partially cleared with the following captions remaining:
(a) L FUEL PRESS
(b) RECT 1
(c) AFCS 1&2
(d) XMSN OIL PRESS & XMSN AUX OIL PRESS
A check round the cockpit was done and the LCT indications were noted to be in the same positions as before.
With partial electrical power restored and the a/c in a safe configuration heading towards Shawbury, control was given to the co-pilot to enable the Captain to consult the FRC.
A scan of XMSN temps and pressures showed all to be normal, so the XMSN oil and AUX oil captions were dismissed as spurious. However the jump seat occupant wsa ordered to monitor the indications.
CAP indications were now similar to a single TRU failure with no cross-tie and Card 31 was used as reference. The Captain decided not to re-set his cross-tie CB having diagnosed a Bus-Tie fault of some kind.
The cross feed was selected open to start balancing fuel but with no success. The crewman operated the XFEED valves manually which cleared the L Pressure caption and Illuminated the XFEED caption.
An attempt was then made to program the forward and aft LCT in manual with no success indicated.
On short finals to land, the LCT were selected to retract for 30 secs IAW FRC35. At this point No2 a/c of the formation informed the Lead a/c that his aft wheels had swivelled through approx 45 degrees. The captain took control and made a vertical Landing followed by a gentle taxi forward to straighten the aft wheels. As weight was placed on the aft wheels a small power spike was seen on the Captains HIS power flag.
As the LCT were in an intermediate position it was decided to clear all the passengers from the a/c prior to shutdown. A visual inspection of the front and rear rotor disc attitudes appeared normal so the Captain elected to conduct a normal shutdown but with No2 PDP AC and DC cross-ties left tripped.
APU start was normal. The No.l generator was selected OFF with no change to indications. As No.2 generator was switched OFF thereby allowing the APU to come on line, all electrical services and indications returned to normal. The LCT were selected to AUTO and the fwd and aft LCTs were seen to trim to the GND position.
As a precaution against possible power spike induced FADEC faults, the ECL (engine condition lever) were selected to 55 degrees prior in ECU (electrical control unit) shutdown and the following codes were noted.
No1 DECU A7, Al, DB
No2 DECU 88
A normal shutdown was then completed with normal response from FADEC. Post shutdown it was noted that the avionics cooler fan had tripped.
This entire incident lasted 20 minutes. Indications were complex and confusing and initially the FRC were of limited guidance. In the end Cards 31, 32, 33 & 35 were consulted. It should he noted that the Brintel simulator training proved invaluable in producing a quick albeit partial solution to the loss of electrical power.
The fault was considered to be a major safety hazard, and had the crew been less experienced or in IMC or at night the outcome might have been considerably different!
This has probably been posted before, and I’m sure you considered this, or similar events, when briefing Ministers that you knew exactly what occurred in ZD576, but to my non-pilot eyes this is bloody frightening.
The issues that stand out (to me) are highlighted toward the end. Notably, “complex”, “confusing”, “limited guidance” and, probably quite significantly, 2000’ AGL at the beginning of an incident that lasted 20 mins.
I also note the incident took place over 5 years after Mull, yet perfectly describes events reported by test pilots BEFORE Mull (but which were withheld from the BoI) and were STILL considered a safety hazard. One assumes in those 5 years the Mk2 had progressed from a development aircraft to one of acceptable design maturity (which it certainly wasn’t in June 1994) and the crew had the benefit of an acceptable number of hours experience (as opposed to a quick conversion course, followed by some months back in the Mk1, then having an immature and sub-airworthy Mk2 foisted on them a few days before the final flight).
AIR INCIDENT ODI/381/99 CREW REPORT
Chinook Mk2 ZD98l - 18 Squadron. RAF Odiham
5th October 1999, 15l0Z VMC I20kts, +6 deg C, 2000ft AGL
ZD981 was the Lead a/c of a 2 ship formation transiting from Shawbury to Odiham. Approx 10 mins after departing Shawbury, a small jolt was felt throughout the airframe and the capt'n in the RHS noticed that some of his fit instrument power flags briefly showed and the Master Caution Panel (MCP) lights flashed on and then off. A check of cockpit indications was made but all appeared normal.
Approx 2 mins later, similar symptoms were noted again without any subsequent indications of a problem. The jolts were very similar to that felt when the AFCS (Automatic Flight Control System) extendable links centre after a power interrupt and the conversation amongst the crew concentrated on this possibility.
Approx l min later, a series of jolts and power interrupts was experienced and the Captain elected to switch the AFCS off to prevent the a/c jolting.
Approx 2 sees later, the Master Cautions and all the captions on the CAP illuminated dimly. ALL power was lost to the primary flight instruments, including the main Al (Attitude Indicator) and the HSI (Horizontal Situation Indicator), and to the engine instruments. The only services remaining were those powered by the essential battery busbar. A loud hum was also heard through the intercom system which pulsed in phase with the captions of the CAP.
A check round the cockpit was made and all the CBs were checked and confirmed to be OK. The forward LCT (Longitudinal cyclic trim) was seen to be in the fully retracted position so speed was reduced to approx 80kts (Vmax with LCT retracted) as a precaution. The aft LCT indicated just below the ground position.
The Captain ordered all non essential equipment to be switched off and the formation was turned hack towards Shawbury - the nearest Military airfield. A practice Pan was in progress on guard so the formation changed frequency to Shawbury Approach and a PAN was declared.
CB's were checked once more and the crewman checked the TRU vents (Transformer Rectifier Unit) and the external bays for any evidence of a malfunction, but nothing untoward was seen.
The co-pilot attempted to find a relevant page in the FRC (Flight Reference Card) to assist with the diagnosis but none of the cards fitted the indications. The Captain had recently discussed electrical problems with the Brintel Simulator Staff and recalled a similar scenario where isolating the AC and DC cross-ties enabled one of the two electrical systems to be brought back on line. The co-pilot was ordered to trip the No 1 PDP (Power Distribution Panel) DC and AC cross-lies, but this had no effect and the CB was re-set.
The Captain then tripped the No.2 PDP DC then AC cross-ties. Tripping the AC cross-lie resulted in restoration of services from the No PDP. All the Captains flight instruments returned to normal as did the No2 ECU indications but all the services powered by the No.l PDP were still inoperative. The CAP partially cleared with the following captions remaining:
(a) L FUEL PRESS
(b) RECT 1
(c) AFCS 1&2
(d) XMSN OIL PRESS & XMSN AUX OIL PRESS
A check round the cockpit was done and the LCT indications were noted to be in the same positions as before.
With partial electrical power restored and the a/c in a safe configuration heading towards Shawbury, control was given to the co-pilot to enable the Captain to consult the FRC.
A scan of XMSN temps and pressures showed all to be normal, so the XMSN oil and AUX oil captions were dismissed as spurious. However the jump seat occupant wsa ordered to monitor the indications.
CAP indications were now similar to a single TRU failure with no cross-tie and Card 31 was used as reference. The Captain decided not to re-set his cross-tie CB having diagnosed a Bus-Tie fault of some kind.
The cross feed was selected open to start balancing fuel but with no success. The crewman operated the XFEED valves manually which cleared the L Pressure caption and Illuminated the XFEED caption.
An attempt was then made to program the forward and aft LCT in manual with no success indicated.
On short finals to land, the LCT were selected to retract for 30 secs IAW FRC35. At this point No2 a/c of the formation informed the Lead a/c that his aft wheels had swivelled through approx 45 degrees. The captain took control and made a vertical Landing followed by a gentle taxi forward to straighten the aft wheels. As weight was placed on the aft wheels a small power spike was seen on the Captains HIS power flag.
As the LCT were in an intermediate position it was decided to clear all the passengers from the a/c prior to shutdown. A visual inspection of the front and rear rotor disc attitudes appeared normal so the Captain elected to conduct a normal shutdown but with No2 PDP AC and DC cross-ties left tripped.
APU start was normal. The No.l generator was selected OFF with no change to indications. As No.2 generator was switched OFF thereby allowing the APU to come on line, all electrical services and indications returned to normal. The LCT were selected to AUTO and the fwd and aft LCTs were seen to trim to the GND position.
As a precaution against possible power spike induced FADEC faults, the ECL (engine condition lever) were selected to 55 degrees prior in ECU (electrical control unit) shutdown and the following codes were noted.
No1 DECU A7, Al, DB
No2 DECU 88
A normal shutdown was then completed with normal response from FADEC. Post shutdown it was noted that the avionics cooler fan had tripped.
This entire incident lasted 20 minutes. Indications were complex and confusing and initially the FRC were of limited guidance. In the end Cards 31, 32, 33 & 35 were consulted. It should he noted that the Brintel simulator training proved invaluable in producing a quick albeit partial solution to the loss of electrical power.
The fault was considered to be a major safety hazard, and had the crew been less experienced or in IMC or at night the outcome might have been considerably different!
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S&S,
There was nothing "hidden" in the "burden of proof" requirement for deceased aircrew. It was always intended to absolve them of all blame unless the evidence against them was overwhelming.
If after fifteen years far greater experts than you and I cannot agree on this evidence, there must be (considerable) doubt.
There was nothing "hidden" in the "burden of proof" requirement for deceased aircrew. It was always intended to absolve them of all blame unless the evidence against them was overwhelming.
If after fifteen years far greater experts than you and I cannot agree on this evidence, there must be (considerable) doubt.
It would seem that the Chinook, incredibly important workhouse that it is, has posed a challenge to its crews from the start. The incident that you highlight, tuc, and the professional way that it was handled is yet another example, as if one were needed, of the competence of the crews who fly it. That is why it is so frustrating that the Mull pilots have been dealt with so arbitrarily and harshly when the fault lay far away, IMHO, among much lesser men and women. So to return to Mull:
It seems to me that with a 25kt wind up their chuff it is almost impossible to imagine the transit was in excess of 140kts IAS, indeed from the leaving zone time fix provided much much later by the MOD and the time of impact, the MOD's own timings infer an average IAS far below that. So they were not "flying too fast" as they were probably flying in accordance with VFR to the waypoint and hence not negligent. That further reduces the energy available at the start of the climb, in turn further reducing the ability to perform the flare manoeuvre which wasn't possible even using the AM's/ Boeing's postulated figures. Thus the configuration at impact, as found in the wreckage is more likely to be what it seems, the shattered remains of an aircraft that crashed out of control. For those who have until now been resigned to the likelihood of pilot error but were repelled by the epitaph of Gross Negligence passed in flagrant disregard of RAF procedure, I would simply say please think again. Go to the HoL link in my previous but one post and read between the lines. In particular study the testimony of Mr Cable the AAIB Accident Inspector. I would suggest that here is a man deeply concerned with the RAF Investigation and its outcome. An Investigation that was not his and to which he was merely attached to do the bidding of the BoI. His continual qualification of the BoI conclusions speaks volumes. There was Gross Negligence on that hillside undoubtedly, but it had been deposited into that airframe long before by those who far outranked the JO's that have been the scapegoats for those actions ever since.
Let Right Be Done!
It seems to me that with a 25kt wind up their chuff it is almost impossible to imagine the transit was in excess of 140kts IAS, indeed from the leaving zone time fix provided much much later by the MOD and the time of impact, the MOD's own timings infer an average IAS far below that. So they were not "flying too fast" as they were probably flying in accordance with VFR to the waypoint and hence not negligent. That further reduces the energy available at the start of the climb, in turn further reducing the ability to perform the flare manoeuvre which wasn't possible even using the AM's/ Boeing's postulated figures. Thus the configuration at impact, as found in the wreckage is more likely to be what it seems, the shattered remains of an aircraft that crashed out of control. For those who have until now been resigned to the likelihood of pilot error but were repelled by the epitaph of Gross Negligence passed in flagrant disregard of RAF procedure, I would simply say please think again. Go to the HoL link in my previous but one post and read between the lines. In particular study the testimony of Mr Cable the AAIB Accident Inspector. I would suggest that here is a man deeply concerned with the RAF Investigation and its outcome. An Investigation that was not his and to which he was merely attached to do the bidding of the BoI. His continual qualification of the BoI conclusions speaks volumes. There was Gross Negligence on that hillside undoubtedly, but it had been deposited into that airframe long before by those who far outranked the JO's that have been the scapegoats for those actions ever since.
Let Right Be Done!
Last edited by Chugalug2; 23rd Jul 2009 at 10:38.
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You would have to ask the Chinook crews for confirmation but I seem to recall that anything above 140 kts and the thing shook like a bastard and was very uncomfortable.
Rather like a very famous film star, Walter, when she was good she was very very good, but when she was bad....! From the evidence given by Sqn Ldr Burke and Witness A (not to the BoI of course, not wanted there!) the Chinook Mk2 was very Jekyll and Hyde then. "So what's changed since?", we keep getting taunted with. Well a lot clearly, but what was done about the DECU connector, the FADEC software and the contents of the "broom cupboard" so prone to shedding vital springs etc and then being vulnerable to the very same loose articles, I have no idea. But I know some people who would, the MOD. That is the organisation responsible for the appalling lack of airworthiness of the Chinook Mk2 when it was released to RAF service despite the protestations of, amongst others, the OC RWTS at Boscombe Down. They are the ones who would have realised the enormity of their Gross Negligence after this tragedy and set about doing what they should have done before, instead of granting an RTS to this aircraft, ie making it airworthy. Would they have highlighted that action? Given that they deliberately obscured the RTS condition of the aircraft in the Accident Investigation and deflected attention instead towards the pilots who were labelled as solely responsible for all 29 deaths, what do you think? How the paperwork could be hidden I have no idea, but the corporate memory developed Alzheimer's Disease over Nimrod and Hercules without any problem, and I suspect much the same thing was managed here. BTW I know that I have morphed the RAF High Command into the MOD above. To all intents and purposes that is how I see it. Command stops at the Station gates in the RAF, above that level it is a beaurocracy bent on enforcing "policy". AOC, AOC in C, etc, etc are impressive titles but a case of lesser fleas etc, IMHO. What I am clear about is that this aircraft, along with its sister Mk2's was not airworthy. It was if you like an accident looking for a place to happen. In my view it found it, but of course I don't know for sure. Despite all the above it could have simply been a case of CFIT, it could have been an authorised visit to the Mull LZ that went wrong, planned or otherwise as you propose, Walter. We don't know. What we do know is that the ludicrous proposal of W&D, that the aircraft was flared and hence under control immediately prior to crashing, was wrong. Despite being "reverse engineered" obligingly by Boeing for them it just doesn't work. Even the attempt to show that the pilots were "flying too fast" before waypoint change hence not complying with VFR (for they were still VMC then) doesn't work. There was no Gross Negligence by the pilots and that slur should be dropped forthwith. There may have been pilot error, that should be investigated. There may have been an authorised clandestine "exercise" behind this tragedy, that should be investigated. There was definitely Gross Negligence by the Airworthiness Authority, the MOD, in allowing this unairworthy type into RAF service. That must be investigated and a solution found to guarantee military airworthiness again. In short this accident must have a proper and fair Accident Investigation, for the same reason others should, to prevent further accidents. It is already 7+10+14 lives too late by my calculations.
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Chugalug 2
You consistently fail to acknowledge in your Posts regarding the Investigating Board that it consisted of 2 experienced Chinook Pilots and a Chinook Engineer. They were well versed in the problems that had arisen during the introduction of the Mk2. They were unable to find any evidence that the pilots were NOT in control of the aircraft prior to impact. On the contrary, the aircraft attitude at impact indicated a belated attempt at an escape manouvre.
You also ignore the Finding that the Pilots were negligent in that they had neither slowed down, climbed to a safe height nor turned away from the high ground BY WAYPOINT CHANGE.
The Pilots possesed the necessary degree of skill and knowledge to maintain safe flight. They failed to do so, which led inevitably to the finding of negligence.
You consistently fail to acknowledge in your Posts regarding the Investigating Board that it consisted of 2 experienced Chinook Pilots and a Chinook Engineer. They were well versed in the problems that had arisen during the introduction of the Mk2. They were unable to find any evidence that the pilots were NOT in control of the aircraft prior to impact. On the contrary, the aircraft attitude at impact indicated a belated attempt at an escape manouvre.
You also ignore the Finding that the Pilots were negligent in that they had neither slowed down, climbed to a safe height nor turned away from the high ground BY WAYPOINT CHANGE.
The Pilots possesed the necessary degree of skill and knowledge to maintain safe flight. They failed to do so, which led inevitably to the finding of negligence.
