Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
You will recall that the Reviewing Officers deemed the Pilots to be negligent before the "Waypoint Change" (0.95 NM from impact) - when even the HOL Committee admitted the Pilots were in control of the aircraft.
Every independant examination of the limited facts agrees that the ROs were both out of order, according to the rules they were duty bound to obey, and had a personal interest in diveriting attention from the appalling state of the 'airworthiness' system.
To allow the systemic failures can be understood on the grounds that they judged (or misjudged) budgetary considerations to override safety. To foist this verdict on two JOs who were no longer in a position to defend themselves, is conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.
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Fitter2
<<To allow the systemic failures can be understood on the grounds that they judged (or misjudged) budgetary considerations to override safety. To foist this verdict on two JOs who were no longer in a position to defend themselves, is conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.>>
What about "In order to not to embarrass the service over an exercise gone wrong with great consequences, leaving the two JOs to blame rather than come forward with information is ..."?
<<To allow the systemic failures can be understood on the grounds that they judged (or misjudged) budgetary considerations to override safety. To foist this verdict on two JOs who were no longer in a position to defend themselves, is conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.>>
What about "In order to not to embarrass the service over an exercise gone wrong with great consequences, leaving the two JOs to blame rather than come forward with information is ..."?
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Shame about BEagle - we first met in the early 70's when I was instructing at The School of Refresher Flying RAF Manby. He was doing a quick refresher between OCU's on his way to become a Vulcan Co-Pilot.
CGB
I just turned this on to look for messages etc. If you don't mind I'll have breakfast before replying.
CGB
I just turned this on to look for messages etc. If you don't mind I'll have breakfast before replying.
Last edited by cazatou; 21st Jul 2009 at 07:14.
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BEagle,
I refer you to my post at 5361.
Cameron will find 'overwhelming' reasons not to change the findings of the BOI. As a former serpent, I assure you that Ministers and Prime Minsters listen to the advice they are given. Cameron won't be any different at at all. Why do you think he put a caveat in the response to you?
Regards
AC
I refer you to my post at 5361.
Cameron will find 'overwhelming' reasons not to change the findings of the BOI. As a former serpent, I assure you that Ministers and Prime Minsters listen to the advice they are given. Cameron won't be any different at at all. Why do you think he put a caveat in the response to you?
Regards
AC
I refer you to my post at 5361.
And, like I said, there came a time when MoD abandoned the requirements for experience, competence and engineering qualifications when filling vacancies in the team charged with preparing answers to Mull PQs.
Only one reason for doing that. They wanted people who would simply regurgitate the party line, without actually knowing anything about what they were talking about. How else can you explain the nonsense they wrote?
A simple example - I remain convinced ZD576 was a converted Mk1. But, apparently, I’m wrong. That is not a minor issue. The clear purpose of such a deceit is to create, in peoples’ minds, a false airworthiness baseline of November 1993, so hiding legacy Mk1 problems and the failure of mandated process when creating a new Mk of aircraft.
Lying has only one purpose – to hide the truth. In this case the inescapable truth is that senior officers knew the haste with which the Mk2 was rushed into service, while still in the development stage, was unjustifiable.
If you like.
I've never made any secret about being chopped from the Bucc OCU.
However, I've never been to Manby in my life. SORF left Manby some 4 years before I started my Vulcan training and I don't think that even Cazatou was instructing at SORF for over 6 years....
My post was rather insulting, I admit, and unnecessarily so. Regrettably, I was pretty angry at yet another unsubstantiated comment about the accident. However, I have now toned it down and apologise for my earlier intemperance.
I've never made any secret about being chopped from the Bucc OCU.
However, I've never been to Manby in my life. SORF left Manby some 4 years before I started my Vulcan training and I don't think that even Cazatou was instructing at SORF for over 6 years....
My post was rather insulting, I admit, and unnecessarily so. Regrettably, I was pretty angry at yet another unsubstantiated comment about the accident. However, I have now toned it down and apologise for my earlier intemperance.
Last edited by BEagle; 21st Jul 2009 at 14:14.
Beagle, your frustration is quite understandable.
Only a few pages ago I posted an extract from the testimony of Witness A given to the HoL.
(my bold)
And yet, we now see that cazatou accuses chugalug2 of being psychic or just repeating Pprune rumours when he quotes what Witness A said, not on Pprune, to the FAI and HoL.
That is the disgraceful level of the man's argument. Perhaps he should become a politician. He certainly has the ego to go with it.
Only a few pages ago I posted an extract from the testimony of Witness A given to the HoL.
852. You heard the question that was put to Squadron Leader Morgan by me. I repeated to him the one question that was put to him by the Board, "what unforeseen malfunctions have occurred on the Chinook Mark II since its introduction?" He listed a number of things in his answer, which were not, at least on the record, pursued. Just so that we understand the flavour of it, how much were these matters the subject of discussion at the time amongst helicopter pilots, these various problems that were apparently manifesting themselves and the problems at Boscombe Down?
A. They occupied our minds to a great degree, my Lord, crew room talk was of little else at the time. The crews felt extremely uneasy about the way the aircraft had been introduced into service. This perception was reinforced by the lack of information contained in the aircrew manual, the poor state of repair of the flight reference cards and such like as well.
A. They occupied our minds to a great degree, my Lord, crew room talk was of little else at the time. The crews felt extremely uneasy about the way the aircraft had been introduced into service. This perception was reinforced by the lack of information contained in the aircrew manual, the poor state of repair of the flight reference cards and such like as well.
And yet, we now see that cazatou accuses chugalug2 of being psychic or just repeating Pprune rumours when he quotes what Witness A said, not on Pprune, to the FAI and HoL.
That is the disgraceful level of the man's argument. Perhaps he should become a politician. He certainly has the ego to go with it.
caz:
Was that "negligence" not due to the "certainty" that the aircraft was in IMC at the "Waypoint Change", caz. Has the MOD not since admitted that there is now no such certainty? On what basis are they still negligent before "Waypoint Change". Please, please don't let it be something to do with breakfast! Are you now saying that even if an emergency (such as a control jam) happened after "Waypoint Change", that the finding stands as far as you are concerned?
You will recall that the Reviewing Officers deemed the Pilots to be negligent before the "Waypoint Change" (0.95 NM from impact) - when even the HOL Committee admitted the Pilots were in control of the aircraft.
Even if there was an emergency after waypoint change (for which there is no evidence) that does not alter the liability of the Pilots because they had already failed in their duty.
Even if there was an emergency after waypoint change (for which there is no evidence) that does not alter the liability of the Pilots because they had already failed in their duty.
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Chugalug 2
In their evidence to the HOL Committee both the Reviewing Officers stated that negligence had occurred by the time the Pilots made the waypoint change. If they were IMC then the flight should have been conducted in accordance with IFR. If they were not in cloud then they had flouted the basic rules of Airmanship by flying too fast and too close towards the cloud covered high ground of the Mull which they subsequently impacted.
You will note in this respect that Mr Holbrook gave sworn evidence to the BOI that the aircraft was flying "in a straight line and in level flight and was proceeding towards.... the cloud localisation covering the Mull." Mr Holbrook estimated the height of the Chinook at "between 200 and 400 ft". You will remember that Mr Holbrook recorded his position as "2NM southwest of the Mull".
The Pilots had plenty of time to decide on a course of action to avoid "the cloud localisation covering the Mull". They failed to do so with tragic consequencies.
In their evidence to the HOL Committee both the Reviewing Officers stated that negligence had occurred by the time the Pilots made the waypoint change. If they were IMC then the flight should have been conducted in accordance with IFR. If they were not in cloud then they had flouted the basic rules of Airmanship by flying too fast and too close towards the cloud covered high ground of the Mull which they subsequently impacted.
You will note in this respect that Mr Holbrook gave sworn evidence to the BOI that the aircraft was flying "in a straight line and in level flight and was proceeding towards.... the cloud localisation covering the Mull." Mr Holbrook estimated the height of the Chinook at "between 200 and 400 ft". You will remember that Mr Holbrook recorded his position as "2NM southwest of the Mull".
The Pilots had plenty of time to decide on a course of action to avoid "the cloud localisation covering the Mull". They failed to do so with tragic consequencies.
So they were in control of the aircraft, flying towards the cloud enshrouded Mull intending as planned to turn left at the "Waypoint Change" but were already Grossly Negligent? Why? Because they were "flying too fast"? How fast was that, caz? The only speed known to any degree of accuracy is the speed deduced from impact damage. Is that the "flying too fast" speed? Why? If you were the BoI President and had done a proper Accident Investigation, that uncovered the Lack of Airworthiness and took into account the evidence of Flight Control malfunction in the wreckage, you would still find the primary cause of the accident to be the Gross Negligence of the pilots before "Waypoint Change" even though they could still have been flying in VMC? Amazing!
the basic rules of Airmanship
....beyond any doubt whatsoever, that is.
Olive Oil
Are they the ones that rule against "flying too fast", Olive? Can you quote them if so?
Chugalug, excuse me for butting in here but do you know what is meant by "Rules of The Air" and do you know what the Rules of The Air are?
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Chugalug 2
I'll answer that one if I may
They are the same rules that say "Don't drive down narrow Country Lanes at or above the maximum permitted Speed Limit in thick Fog."
They are the Rules of Survival.
I'll answer that one if I may
They are the same rules that say "Don't drive down narrow Country Lanes at or above the maximum permitted Speed Limit in thick Fog."
They are the Rules of Survival.
As it seems before waypoint change they were most likely not in fog, thick or otherwise, caz, that doesn't really help. Instead of answering questions that you were not asked, please answer the ones that you were:
Thank you
So they were in control of the aircraft, flying towards the cloud enshrouded Mull intending as planned to turn left at the "Waypoint Change" but were already Grossly Negligent? Why? Because they were "flying too fast"? How fast was that, caz? The only speed known to any degree of accuracy is the speed deduced from impact damage. Is that the "flying too fast" speed? Why? If you were the BoI President and had done a proper Accident Investigation, that uncovered the Lack of Airworthiness and took into account the evidence of Flight Control malfunction in the wreckage, you would still find the primary cause of the accident to be the Gross Negligence of the pilots before "Waypoint Change" even though they could still have been flying in VMC?
Caz
Is it not a reasonable assumption they intended to turn at or shortly after the WP? If a pilot intends to change direction at a waypoint which will take the aircraft away from cloud, it is not mandatory to transfer to IFR.
It is my understanding that, if at any point the Chinook had a latent control jam preventing the helicopter from turning, but the helicopter were continuing on a straight course (i.e. Aldergrove to WP A) the aircrew may not have had any indication that there was a problem. The problem would only become apparent when they tried to instigate a change of course away from dead ahead.
I’m no pilot, but does the above not completely negate the basis upon which the ROs made their decision? Especially given the plethora of evidence available about control jams, their cause (and sometimes unknown cause) and effect?
In their evidence to the HOL Committee both the Reviewing Officers stated that negligence had occurred by the time the Pilots made the waypoint change. If they were IMC then the flight should have been conducted in accordance with IFR. If they were not in cloud then they had flouted the basic rules of Airmanship by flying too fast and too close towards the cloud covered high ground of the Mull which they subsequently impacted.
Is it not a reasonable assumption they intended to turn at or shortly after the WP? If a pilot intends to change direction at a waypoint which will take the aircraft away from cloud, it is not mandatory to transfer to IFR.
It is my understanding that, if at any point the Chinook had a latent control jam preventing the helicopter from turning, but the helicopter were continuing on a straight course (i.e. Aldergrove to WP A) the aircrew may not have had any indication that there was a problem. The problem would only become apparent when they tried to instigate a change of course away from dead ahead.
I’m no pilot, but does the above not completely negate the basis upon which the ROs made their decision? Especially given the plethora of evidence available about control jams, their cause (and sometimes unknown cause) and effect?
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Chugalug 2
There is a known time for them leaving the Aldergove CTZ and a known time for impact. The average groundspeed between those 2 points was 158 kts and groundspeed at impact, whilst attempting an escape manouvre, was conspicuously similar at approx 150 kts(AAIB).
The Yachtsman could see that the Mull was shrouded in cloud and the Chinook passed approx 200 ft above him. It flew straight on, without deviation, until the final desperate attempted escape manouvre.
They were in control of the Aircraft at Waypoint change and they were in control for that final attempted manouvre. There was no evidence of any technical malfunction that could have caused the crash.
What you have to do is come up with evidence - not hypothesis - that proves the existence of a major systems failure so serious that it prevented the Pilots from transmitting a Distress Call, Squawking Emergency, activating a Distress Beacon or even getting their Pax to adopt Crash Positions. You would also have to explain how such a malfunction managed to disappear without trace and how it is that there has been no repetition of such a malfunction in the 15 years since this tragedy.
I would point out that no such evidence has yet been produced.
There is a known time for them leaving the Aldergove CTZ and a known time for impact. The average groundspeed between those 2 points was 158 kts and groundspeed at impact, whilst attempting an escape manouvre, was conspicuously similar at approx 150 kts(AAIB).
The Yachtsman could see that the Mull was shrouded in cloud and the Chinook passed approx 200 ft above him. It flew straight on, without deviation, until the final desperate attempted escape manouvre.
They were in control of the Aircraft at Waypoint change and they were in control for that final attempted manouvre. There was no evidence of any technical malfunction that could have caused the crash.
What you have to do is come up with evidence - not hypothesis - that proves the existence of a major systems failure so serious that it prevented the Pilots from transmitting a Distress Call, Squawking Emergency, activating a Distress Beacon or even getting their Pax to adopt Crash Positions. You would also have to explain how such a malfunction managed to disappear without trace and how it is that there has been no repetition of such a malfunction in the 15 years since this tragedy.
I would point out that no such evidence has yet been produced.
Caz, is it not true that the average groundspeed that you quote has been challenged? Was not the boundary time that of a radio call reporting clear of the CTZ rather than exactly crossing it? Was the time of impact from the same time base? I cannot see how as the first must have been an ATC one, the second from the aircraft data base. Whatever the average groundspeed overall, how does this reflect your "flying too fast" speed which is presumably based on IAS and reflects GASO Helicopter Low Level VFR speed restrictions. Is that so and if so what is that max IAS? Is it not also true that the "150 kts" impact speed was not deduced from impact damage by the AAIB, as I thought, but by Boeing's infamous model and your supposed escape manoeuvre inferred by the position of cyclic, yaw and thrust controls. Could these same indications have been rather signs of vain attempts to regain control, together of course with the detached collective spring balance found in the wreckage? Contrary to what you say Mr Cable stated that the possibility of a control system jam could not be dismissed. If that had happened I cannot think of anything more major, with both pilots solely and desperately concerned with regaining control of the aircraft to the very end.
1.3
Caz will trot out the following mantra, as he did when answering, on JP's behalf, an even simpler request for evidence (see Posts 5304 and 5342).
As far as he is concerned, despite IMHO the BoI being flawed, he does not have to prove anything to anybody. Wratten and Days verdict, in his opinion, was correct and proper and therefore until someones finds some new evidence that is positively, undeniably and "without any doubt whatsoever" contrary to Wratten and Days opinion he will not change his position.
Shame Wratten and Day didn't apply the same policy, particularly with regrads to evidence.
Caz will trot out the following mantra, as he did when answering, on JP's behalf, an even simpler request for evidence (see Posts 5304 and 5342).
It is not the case that JP (myself or anyone else) has to produce new evidence to "PROVE" that the finding of the BOI was correct. If, in UK, a criminal case goes to the Court Of Appeal; the Prosecution does not have to produce new evidence to maintain the Guilty verdict. It is up to the Appellant (and that persons Advocates) to produce new evidence that justifies overturning the original verdict in the eyes of the court. The same applies in Civil cases.
Shame Wratten and Day didn't apply the same policy, particularly with regrads to evidence.
In any case, Caz is not a legal expert, as is evidenced by his mantra.
The defence in an appeal merely has the prove that there was a procedural error in the original prosecution to have either the 'guilty' verdict quashed, or a retrial ordered.
The fact that the ROs ignored the requirements of the AP as approved by the Air Board is sufficient.
The defence in this case can also point to the deliberate withholding of vital evidence known to the prosecution.
In a court of law this would have been overturned many years ago.
The defence in an appeal merely has the prove that there was a procedural error in the original prosecution to have either the 'guilty' verdict quashed, or a retrial ordered.
The fact that the ROs ignored the requirements of the AP as approved by the Air Board is sufficient.
The defence in this case can also point to the deliberate withholding of vital evidence known to the prosecution.
In a court of law this would have been overturned many years ago.