Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Chugalug2. I thought as much; we are now back to the belief that in the last few seconds the controls jammed in all three axes, together with the power controls, and the R/T failed, and yet the aircraft entered a climb, which, had it been on track, would have meant it cleared the hills ahead by a few hundred feet.
If you really believe that, then be my guest, but I will now leave you to explain it. Regards.
JP
If you really believe that, then be my guest, but I will now leave you to explain it. Regards.
JP
Is that the new finding then, JP? It's certainly new to me! Oh, thanks for reminding me! To the list of evidence found in the wreckage I should have added metal particles in the hydraulic boosters. Cheers!
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Originally Posted by baston
Please read all my posts and you will see that I do not, and never have claimed absolute knowledge. That is as silly as "beyond all doubt".
Originally Posted by baston
They just made a fatal error of judgement.
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.....err no - have another go? 'I think' were my words (the clue is the blue bit). Yours was They just made a fatal error of judgement. Seems like a statement to me.
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BUT we now know that deliberate and planned actions were taking place at the position of waypoint change, actions that were not consistent with any kind of control emergency – and that position was so close in that, in the prevailing conditions, they would indeed have been at fault had there not been a reason for those actions. If you really want to clear their names, you have to uncover what it was that they were doing there.
To re-cap: re recent posts (including annotated maps), it is clear that the navigator in the left hand seat had set up a course 028 on his HoSI which together with the selection of waypoint B on the STANS indicated that they intended to go to the track H-B (as explained previously) after they had done whatever at the Mull. Let us now consider the handling pilot's HoSI: the position of waypoint change was exactly on the 027 radial from Aldergrove VOR extrapolated to way point A and it seems reasonable to assume (as Boeing's dist/time analysis has it), to have held this track over the long leg across the Antrim Hills and the sea and with geographic features on the distant Mull a little foggy, that the handling pilot would certainly have had 027 set on his course selector – this of course would have given him a nice track bar to stick to while the STANS still had waypoint A selected, which was up to the position of waypoint change.
After this point, one would assume that the HP would have reset his course selector to a meaningful heading or just left it on 027 if he had not needed it – he had obviously twiddled it off 027 at that point – it was found on 035 – was 035 in any way meaningful? Let's consider this:
If you inspect the area on a nice clear day, with a compass and allowing for the different magnetic variation from back in 1994, it is apparent that 035 would have been the optimum approach to that LZ, following the short straight line of rocky shore and being along the long axis of that LZ, an obvious line to take to it;
035 from the position of waypoint change passes within 10s of yards of the crash site – and these 10s of yards can be attributed to the start of a slew to the left which was apparently initiated in the last few seconds – so that last leg from the position of waypoint change to the crash site (about a mile) was 035, as set on the HP's HoSI course selector. This required a turn of 8 degrees at the position of waypoint change which is at odds with the map produced at one of the inquiries (see post #3094, page 155) where the MOD had unforgiveably misplaced the position of waypoint change so as to give the impression of the a/c going straight in – eliminating from consideration by those at the inquiry this all important turn.
If you add that the setting on the HP's baro alt subscale would have been appropriate for a QFE at the elevation of that LZ and that one of the RADALT alarms was set appropriately for an imminent landing in marginal conditions, then it rather looks like they were intending landing at that LZ.
Problem is, if they had been confident of the STANS range and bearing to waypoint A at the position that they changed from it they would have known that they were too close at that speed to turn towards the LZ – and the LZ was not on a bearing of 035 at the position of waypoint change – they had turned too soon for it. So in the absence of considering any other influences at this point, we have it that they got close to the Mull, set up the STANS for when they eventually left the area, ignored their proximity to the ground that the STANS had given them warning of, and turned in set up to land at the LZ – but for their speed too close and not lined up with it. Sounds suicidal? - there is an explanation for it:
In the typical conditions that were prevailing in the late afternoon of that day, the shoreline should have been visible at the position of waypoint change but the ground beyond it? – well, imagine a sodden DPM smock in front of a fire with steam billowing off it and you are a fly trying to land gracefully on it and you might get the scene – they were not intending to go over the fug, they were not tying to go through the fug, they were trying to land at a spot at the base of the fug but it would have been fugging difficult to judge their distance off visually if doing a fast approach – they would surely not have had anything visual clearly enough to have dismissed the STANS data! They simply had to have been getting some other information that they would have trusted to be intrinsically accurate and yet which misled them – what and how?
Suppose, with a PRC112 in hand, instead of being at the LZ you were here:
http://i229.photobucket.com/albums/e...d/DSCF0391.jpg
(That's the LZ down below, the “green triangle”.)
The a/c crossed this point and crashed behind/right further up the slope – the geometry fits if you plot this posn, accounting for ½ mile out in range and turning in too soon.
Suppose you are enjoying being a ********, talking to the HP on the UHF guard frequency (as such sets cater for and which the HP has been said to have had his intercom switched to) perhaps saying that the ground is clear at the LZ and you should see me, etc – then you consider 20 tons at 150 kts is heading for you – no worries, already thought of that, look at this video clip:
DSCF0398.flv video by grauniad - Photobucket
Didn't take long ambling backwards, did it? - just a few seconds for an athletic young man in a hurry. What a perfect bunker – here's a pic with the exposure better:
http://i229.photobucket.com/albums/e...d/DSCF0395.jpg
An oaf like me could hop down easily onto a roomy platform – the knotted rope was for getting to a further deep level to have a look around just in case there was some interesting rubbish.
You don't have to get into this conspiracy stuff – just consider that with the settings found and the planning done (eg manually input waypoints) it looks like they had a LL VFR route planned “handrailing” along Jura but which Flt Lt Tapper amended to include an excursion to the Mull – he had told the other officers who had done much of the routine planning for the sortie that he and his crew had planned “intensively” for this sortie when he pushed for his crew to do it. You don't just do uneccessary excursions at your own whim, especially with those passengers on board, so someone must have approved this higher up. Surely a new inquiry is justified addressing this planning aspect that is so obvious now but has been witheld from previous inquiries? A couple of experienced pilots, when looking at the available data from this perspective, should be able to recognise this and advise the Mull group technically. What have you got to lose?
To re-cap: re recent posts (including annotated maps), it is clear that the navigator in the left hand seat had set up a course 028 on his HoSI which together with the selection of waypoint B on the STANS indicated that they intended to go to the track H-B (as explained previously) after they had done whatever at the Mull. Let us now consider the handling pilot's HoSI: the position of waypoint change was exactly on the 027 radial from Aldergrove VOR extrapolated to way point A and it seems reasonable to assume (as Boeing's dist/time analysis has it), to have held this track over the long leg across the Antrim Hills and the sea and with geographic features on the distant Mull a little foggy, that the handling pilot would certainly have had 027 set on his course selector – this of course would have given him a nice track bar to stick to while the STANS still had waypoint A selected, which was up to the position of waypoint change.
After this point, one would assume that the HP would have reset his course selector to a meaningful heading or just left it on 027 if he had not needed it – he had obviously twiddled it off 027 at that point – it was found on 035 – was 035 in any way meaningful? Let's consider this:
If you inspect the area on a nice clear day, with a compass and allowing for the different magnetic variation from back in 1994, it is apparent that 035 would have been the optimum approach to that LZ, following the short straight line of rocky shore and being along the long axis of that LZ, an obvious line to take to it;
035 from the position of waypoint change passes within 10s of yards of the crash site – and these 10s of yards can be attributed to the start of a slew to the left which was apparently initiated in the last few seconds – so that last leg from the position of waypoint change to the crash site (about a mile) was 035, as set on the HP's HoSI course selector. This required a turn of 8 degrees at the position of waypoint change which is at odds with the map produced at one of the inquiries (see post #3094, page 155) where the MOD had unforgiveably misplaced the position of waypoint change so as to give the impression of the a/c going straight in – eliminating from consideration by those at the inquiry this all important turn.
If you add that the setting on the HP's baro alt subscale would have been appropriate for a QFE at the elevation of that LZ and that one of the RADALT alarms was set appropriately for an imminent landing in marginal conditions, then it rather looks like they were intending landing at that LZ.
Problem is, if they had been confident of the STANS range and bearing to waypoint A at the position that they changed from it they would have known that they were too close at that speed to turn towards the LZ – and the LZ was not on a bearing of 035 at the position of waypoint change – they had turned too soon for it. So in the absence of considering any other influences at this point, we have it that they got close to the Mull, set up the STANS for when they eventually left the area, ignored their proximity to the ground that the STANS had given them warning of, and turned in set up to land at the LZ – but for their speed too close and not lined up with it. Sounds suicidal? - there is an explanation for it:
In the typical conditions that were prevailing in the late afternoon of that day, the shoreline should have been visible at the position of waypoint change but the ground beyond it? – well, imagine a sodden DPM smock in front of a fire with steam billowing off it and you are a fly trying to land gracefully on it and you might get the scene – they were not intending to go over the fug, they were not tying to go through the fug, they were trying to land at a spot at the base of the fug but it would have been fugging difficult to judge their distance off visually if doing a fast approach – they would surely not have had anything visual clearly enough to have dismissed the STANS data! They simply had to have been getting some other information that they would have trusted to be intrinsically accurate and yet which misled them – what and how?
Suppose, with a PRC112 in hand, instead of being at the LZ you were here:
http://i229.photobucket.com/albums/e...d/DSCF0391.jpg
(That's the LZ down below, the “green triangle”.)
The a/c crossed this point and crashed behind/right further up the slope – the geometry fits if you plot this posn, accounting for ½ mile out in range and turning in too soon.
Suppose you are enjoying being a ********, talking to the HP on the UHF guard frequency (as such sets cater for and which the HP has been said to have had his intercom switched to) perhaps saying that the ground is clear at the LZ and you should see me, etc – then you consider 20 tons at 150 kts is heading for you – no worries, already thought of that, look at this video clip:
DSCF0398.flv video by grauniad - Photobucket
Didn't take long ambling backwards, did it? - just a few seconds for an athletic young man in a hurry. What a perfect bunker – here's a pic with the exposure better:
http://i229.photobucket.com/albums/e...d/DSCF0395.jpg
An oaf like me could hop down easily onto a roomy platform – the knotted rope was for getting to a further deep level to have a look around just in case there was some interesting rubbish.
You don't have to get into this conspiracy stuff – just consider that with the settings found and the planning done (eg manually input waypoints) it looks like they had a LL VFR route planned “handrailing” along Jura but which Flt Lt Tapper amended to include an excursion to the Mull – he had told the other officers who had done much of the routine planning for the sortie that he and his crew had planned “intensively” for this sortie when he pushed for his crew to do it. You don't just do uneccessary excursions at your own whim, especially with those passengers on board, so someone must have approved this higher up. Surely a new inquiry is justified addressing this planning aspect that is so obvious now but has been witheld from previous inquiries? A couple of experienced pilots, when looking at the available data from this perspective, should be able to recognise this and advise the Mull group technically. What have you got to lose?
Last edited by walter kennedy; 16th Jul 2009 at 23:45. Reason: addition
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Originally Posted by wk
and it seems reasonable to assume (as Boeing's dist/time analysis has it
Like so many, you are reading fact into supposition.
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RE Walter's 5406
If they were not carrying out such a trial as Walter suggests; then they were negligent for flying too fast and too close to high ground in weather conditions that can only be described as, at best, exceedingly marginal.
If they were using the equipment that Walter suggests for an approach to the HLS, then they were negligent for carrying out an unauthorised approach at high speed, in exceedingly marginal weather, to a landing site adjacent to high ground utilising equipment that had no CA Release and no R to S for the Chinook.
If they were not carrying out such a trial as Walter suggests; then they were negligent for flying too fast and too close to high ground in weather conditions that can only be described as, at best, exceedingly marginal.
If they were using the equipment that Walter suggests for an approach to the HLS, then they were negligent for carrying out an unauthorised approach at high speed, in exceedingly marginal weather, to a landing site adjacent to high ground utilising equipment that had no CA Release and no R to S for the Chinook.
Perhaps this, maybe that, if the other....
Perhaps the flying saucer which landed Wally's little green men with their wacky wirelesses caused a rift in the space-time continuum?
'Perhaps' is not a sufficient degree of evidence to support Wratten and Day's flawed verdict - and that's about the only thing about which there is no doubt whatsoever!
Perhaps the flying saucer which landed Wally's little green men with their wacky wirelesses caused a rift in the space-time continuum?
'Perhaps' is not a sufficient degree of evidence to support Wratten and Day's flawed verdict - and that's about the only thing about which there is no doubt whatsoever!
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BOAC
Yes, I borrowed your blue bit! But yes - they just made a fatal error of judgement seems OK to me on the evidence presented so far. Evidence, not the "what if" lot again!
.....err no - have another go? 'I think' were my words (the clue is the blue bit). Yours was They just made a fatal error of judgement. Seems like a statement to me.
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Beagle
Exactly - you have it in one! Cut out all the conjecture from the "what if" brigade - stick to what is known and there you have it. An aircraft flown into the ground in bad weather that they should have avoided.............
Perhaps this, maybe that, if the other....
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Cut out all the conjecture from the "what if" brigade
“What if” is a recognised, indeed mandated, Safety Management technique. For example, SWIFT – Structured What-If Technique”.
One generates a list of questions based on the experience of the safety engineers, designers, users etc, combined with known Hazards. Then applied to the system or sub-system. (A very simple summary).
The results are recorded and followed up…. Again, both mandated in the airworthiness regs.
So, at what point was this “what if”, or equivalent, technique carried out, recorded and followed up? For example, here’s a question arising from experience gained before the accident;
“What if the DECU connector came loose in-flight?”
Or,
“What if there was a control jam caused by detached springs?”
Or,
“We know the software hasn’t been validated or verified, what if we just ignore this?”
And so on………
The outcome may only be entries in the FRCs. Let’s face it; there were plenty of blank spaces. But, questions and answers there must be. If not, that is gross negligence and dereliction of duty.
All, of course, airworthiness stuff, which many here think irrelevant.
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RE Walter's 5406
If they were using the equipment that Walter suggests for an approach to the HLS, then they were negligent for carrying out an unauthorised approach at high speed, in exceedingly marginal weather, to a landing site adjacent to high ground utilising equipment that had no CA Release and no R to S for the Chinook.
If they were using the equipment that Walter suggests for an approach to the HLS, then they were negligent for carrying out an unauthorised approach at high speed, in exceedingly marginal weather, to a landing site adjacent to high ground utilising equipment that had no CA Release and no R to S for the Chinook.
Since you've commented on this hypothetical approach, I take it that you consider it a possibility?
TN
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BOAC
I believe I have addressed in detail several times why, retrospectively, AAIB and Boeing ascribed a useful (to analysis) accuracy to the position at waypoint change derived from the STANS data (working back from the data at impact correlated with the recoded data to Corran at waypoint change).
The crucial thing is that the pilots did not have the benefit of this retrospective and would not, indeed, have had confidence in that position after a sea crossing and whilst still over sea - such that had some other local point reference contradicted the STANS, say by 1/2 mile or so, they would have preferred to believe the local reference.
I believe I have addressed in detail several times why, retrospectively, AAIB and Boeing ascribed a useful (to analysis) accuracy to the position at waypoint change derived from the STANS data (working back from the data at impact correlated with the recoded data to Corran at waypoint change).
The crucial thing is that the pilots did not have the benefit of this retrospective and would not, indeed, have had confidence in that position after a sea crossing and whilst still over sea - such that had some other local point reference contradicted the STANS, say by 1/2 mile or so, they would have preferred to believe the local reference.
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Cazatou
The equipment is practically self contained and intrinsically accurate and reliable - like sticking a GPS on your car windscreen and plugging it into the lighter - if they thought they were 1/2 mile or so further out then how can you say that they were approaching too fast? - the dist/time calcs (remember the increased tailwind component as they neared the landmass) and engine state indicate that they had started to slow down.
The sets of such equipment delivered in early 1995 were designed to be easily transferred between HC2 Chinooks - how would your formal certification apply to such kit?
The equipment is practically self contained and intrinsically accurate and reliable - like sticking a GPS on your car windscreen and plugging it into the lighter - if they thought they were 1/2 mile or so further out then how can you say that they were approaching too fast? - the dist/time calcs (remember the increased tailwind component as they neared the landmass) and engine state indicate that they had started to slow down.
The sets of such equipment delivered in early 1995 were designed to be easily transferred between HC2 Chinooks - how would your formal certification apply to such kit?
