Military AircrewA forum for the professionals who fly the non-civilian hardware, and the backroom boys and girls without whom nothing would leave the ground. Army, Navy and Airforces of the World, all equally welcome here.
15% of all helicopters are out of service in the fleet on average it seems.
Shortage of parts or engineering support for such a low ready number?
[QUOTE]UK MoD reveals list of aircraft 'fit for purpose' According to Ministry of Defence (MoD) figures provided to parliament on 5 and 9 January, some 281 of the UK armed forces' 329 helicopters and 44 out of 56 transport aircraft were 'fit for purpose' on average at any time during November 2006. The figures for UK Royal Air Force (RAF), Royal Navy (RN) and British Army Air Corps (AAC) helicopters reflect the condition of those in service as of 18 December 2006 and the figures for transport aircraft reflect the condition of those planned to be in service in March 2007.Aircraft are declared fit for purpose by the MoD if they are available to accept operational taskings and deployment
[Jane's Defence Weekly - first posted to http://jdw.janes.com - 19 January 2007][/QUOTE
Why did the report deal with "planned" serviceable aircraft and not "actual" readiness I wonder?
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
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The total buy of any one aircraft type is intended to allow the unit establishment to be filled.
If 2 sqns each have 12 aircraft it follows that the total buy would be 28-30 aircraft to allow for deep servicing, attrition etc.
If you then report availability against total buy you would get your 15% not available figure. If you reported availability against UE you would get a different figure.
After generation that figure would be near 95%. In day to day in UK it may be far lower with routine servicings, waiting for spares etc.
On deployment, with say 4 aircraft, it does not take an Einstein to realise that availability can swing from 0-100 almost as the Sun goes down.
Two points need to be made about my initial post.... It is a direct quote from Janes with the one exception of the high lighting which I did to emphasize what I consider to be an indictment of the Government Report. The other observation I would make concerns the 85% number for helicopter availability. That seems quite low for a peace time situation where daily flight hours and mission demands are low, easily forecast, and sources of parts are readily available. Civilain operators have much higher rates of availability along with higher numbers of flight hours per aircraft per day/week/month than does the military.
I wonder if the eight Chinooks left set in the hangar because of software issues and the stored AH-64's were included in the report. If not, add those numbers into the equation and see how that also changes the numbers.
A third question arises....are those stored aircraft being used as sources of spare/replace parts for operational aircraft? If that is being done.....then again the numbers are yet again skewed downwards as the source of supply is not a legitimate (think supply chain) source of parts.
The other observation I would make concerns the 85% number for helicopter availability. That seems quite low for a peace time situation where daily flight hours and mission demands are low, easily forecast, and sources of parts are readily available
...and don't forget, there are more MoD officials employed to massage availability stats than there are people employed to fix the helicopters. Numbers are NOT released to Janes' that would cause anyone any level of discomfort or difficulty.
We've all been there at some time, where some arbitrary availability number is required by those in power, and suddenly that becomes the Holy Grail for reported availability.
Before you start Reach.....just how many aircraft have been deployed compared to the size of the fleet? The vast majority of the aircraft remain at home in peace time settings and fly a peace time training routine vice being deployed to combat operations in the field.
A more interesting readiness number would that of the deployed aircraft and units. Are the spares and needed manpower getting to them in order to keep that capability near maximum.
The troops in the field depend upon that support thus the units/aircraft engaged in combat operations needs to be fully supported less the needed support not be there and thus causing bad things to happen to those guys on the ground that need that support.
One recent event stands out in my mind that might suggest there might be a problem in that regard. Either too few aircraft are there to meet operational demands or there were not enough aircraft serviceable thus causing a shortage. If the folks doing the work don't have the sufficient number of tools, spares, aircraft and people....a shortage of serviceable aircraft is the result.
Over fly the ability of the engineers to maintain the aircraft and you might will find yourself without enough aircraft each day. I have seen that first hand expecially when combat damage from groundfire and AA weapons starts adding to the problem.
just how many aircraft have been deployed compared to the size of the fleet? The vast majority of the aircraft remain at home in peace time settings and fly a peace time training routine vice being deployed to combat operations in the field.
What % of the AT fleet is deployed? >60%?, >80%? What % of the SH fleet is deployed? >60%?, >80%?
Quote:
Originally Posted by SASless
Are the spares and needed manpower getting to them in order to keep that capability near maximum.
What Spares What Manpower, have you never heard of LEAN
Quote:
Originally Posted by SASless
The troops in the field depend upon that support thus the units/aircraft engaged in combat operations needs to be fully supported
At least no one will argue with you on that point.
Quote:
Originally Posted by SASless
Either too few aircraft are there to meet operational demands or there were not enough aircraft serviceable thus causing a shortage. If the folks doing the work don't have the sufficient number of tools, spares, aircraft and people....a shortage of serviceable aircraft is the result. Over fly the ability of the engineers to maintain the aircraft and you might will find yourself without enough aircraft each day.
Or to put in simple terms:
We have too few aircraft, too few spares, too few engineers and too many beancounters.
ZH875:
We have too few aircraft, too few spares, too few engineers and too many beancounters.
Well Put and so true, the sad thing is that even with all the contracting out to civilian firms for the maintenance/upgrade and support, they also have too few spares and too many beancounters (or should that read shareholders wanting to maximise their profits).
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
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Quote:
Originally Posted by junglyAEO
UOR route we now have so many fleets within fleets, across all types, that only certain aircraft are fit for certain purposes.
Actually there is nothing new here.
For many years I have been on aircraft that were, to all intents and purposes, at a fleet standard. On the Vulcan, OTOH, as it was effectively on front line operations in the 1960s, there were many on-going mod programmes all designed to maintain its safety and combat survivability. This of course had a direct impact on the number of airframes available to the front line.
Our bottom line was to have sufficient aircraft to cover all the assigned targets under the SIOP.
At any given moment however there were many aircraft that were 'not fit for purpose' for anything other than a nuclear mission.
We used to plan multiple training sorties as the airframe often dictated the training profile. One some days we might plan as many as 4 sorties as the allocated airframe changed through the day. Eventually it would be a close run thing between running out of crew duty time or the feeder running out of food.
Another issue is that sufficient spares just don't exist, in almost any flying military organization.
Supply priority generally goes to deployed aircraft. Because of that many (or most) of the few available parts are in the pipeline either heading out as installable or being retrograded as repairables. Pipeline time is dead time as nothing can be done with them until they arrive on either end. The solution is obviously to have bought more spares to begin with but convince the peacetime-minded beancounters of that.
It's not unusual to have to canibalize the home fleet extensively to feed that pipeline and that's where availability numbers really go to shite.
That certainly isn't a RAF specific issue. The US Army and USMC are having similar problems. Lots of aircraft sitting on the ramp at home missing parts and lots of material being shipped back and forth.
“As the only part of the acquisition process that actually works is the UOR route we now have so many fleets within fleets, across all types, that only certain aircraft are fit for certain purposes”.
I know what you mean, but if UORs are causing fleets within fleets, then the UOR process is flawed and not fit for purpose. And the IPT is not using the mandated procedures to their own benefit compounded, in your case, by many UORs being fitted under NSM. In my experience, many UORs are only necessary because of poor staffing in the first place. The reason they seem to work, but only in the short term, is because the requirement for through life, end-to-end support is omitted. There is less staffing required in an area (ILS) which is barely understood by MB and mostly carried out (or ignored as the case may be) in DPA/DLO by people who are untrained for the job. The financial shortfall this causes is often a stumbling block for “ordinary” projects. Therefore, the initial procurement is simplified, but look at how many problems are thrown up a couple of years later when kit starts to fail. I recall, on your a/c, being asked to buy some kit under UOR. I asked MB why, given you already had the kit in greater quantity than the UOR sought. They said, because most of it was unserviceable. I asked, so why not repair it at minimal cost (2 or 3 weeks) instead of buying complete replacements (12 months). The answer? Because the original buy was under UOR and so no repair money had been sought. (If you don’t ask, you don’t get). From his viewpoint, it was easier to buy new than repair. (In fact, much of it was “No Fault Found” precisely because ILS had been omitted under that UOR and no servicing instructions, spares or test equipment was available for 1st or 2nd Line). Am I describing a process that is fit for purpose? Of course, the PM is then faced with a choice. Follow orders and knowingly waste money (which is not an offence in MoD), or risk the wrath of God by spending less and delivering something you desperately needed 11 months early. I did the latter and took my bollocking like a man. Did you prophet from my decision?
The other spares problems come about when the UK station (Marham) that is responsible for the turnround of spares from theatre have an axe to grind about their work load. Between 96-99 the hydraulic bay recieved items into the bay and sat on them to make a point, when the bay at Cottesmore requested the list it consisted of 22 Spoiler valve packages, 28 Spoiler actuators, 8 BASOVs, 6 PRVs, 12 Anti G valves, a couple of undercarriages and a few other sundry items. Cottesmore bay had them shifted across and returned nearly 90% of those assets back into theatre within two months. Marham had sat on them for approximately 6-8 months at a time when the Tornado fleet desperately needed them. What happened to the Cpl and management at Marham for this disgrace, they got promoted, go figure.
The solution is obviously to have bought more spares to begin with but convince the peacetime-minded beancounters of that.
Altrnatively, get the U/S stores through the "reverse supply chain" faster and expedite passage through the repair cycle. We still seem to treat Unit returns as low prority and there are still shiny parts of the supply chain that cannot grasp the concept of a valid high SPC "repairable" stores Issue.
Quote:
Originally Posted by StbdD
It's not unusual to have to canibalize the home fleet extensively to feed that pipeline and that's where availability numbers really go to shite.
Oh so true. I can't speak for aircraft but for grey floaty thing STOROBs, they may save on inventory population but squander it on engineering resources. There again, you don't get a RAB charge for clanky/sparky time but you do for the store. As well as fitting the robbed store to the Recipient, effort must be expended on unfitting it from the Donor. In turn, effort is then expended fitting the replacement store to the Donor, eventually.
Last edited by GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU; 28th Jan 2007 at 20:10.
Reason: Finger trouble
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