Military AircrewA forum for the professionals who fly the non-civilian hardware, and the backroom boys and girls without whom nothing would leave the ground. Army, Navy and Airforces of the World, all equally welcome here.
There is “mounting concern” that the military has fallen below the “minimum utility” needed to conduct present and future operations, says the defence select committee. The MPs suggest that the Government sacrificed national security to make savings.
Yemen's navy has foiled a suicide bomb attack on one of its warships off the coast of the Al-Qaeda stronghold of Abyan province in the south, the defence ministry said on its Internet site on Sunday.
"A small high-speed boat tried to approach one of our warships on Saturday at around 21:00 hours local time (1800 GMT)" off Abyan, navy chief Rear Admiral Ruiss Abdullah Mujawar was quoted as saying on the 26sep.net site.
The vessel continued on its course despite warning shots being fired, and "naval forces then fired at the craft, which sank along with its occupants," he said.
The defence ministry said the small boat had been filled with explosives, but gave no information on those thought to have been behind the failed attack.
Abyan is a bastion of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), whose militants have seized several villages since they occupied the provincial capital of Zinjibar at the end of May.
The most infamous Al-Qaeda sea-borne suicide attack in Yemen was on October 12, 2000 and targeted the warship USS Cole in Aden, killing 17 American sailors and wounding 38.
Two years later, a small boat filled with explosives blew a hole in the 500,000-tonne French supertanker Limburg as it prepared to dock, killing a Bulgarian crewman and wounding 12 others.
Al-Qaeda admitted responsibility for that attack also.
AQAP have not gone away. Waterborne IED attacks have also been attempted in Libya by Gaddafi's forces.
not quite true. It does mention that the Lynx carried the raiding party while the yank helicopter watched from overhead (sorry I mean carried out supporting surveillance...)
10/10 for not getting the point. The article was written by a USN aviator, about the utility of armed shipborne helicopters in current operations. The RN/RM involvement was neither here nor there in many ways.
The purpose of this post isn’t to re-tell the story of the event. Both HMS MONMOUTH and USS BATAAN released reports of the incident which can be found in the open press. The PAO’s put hard work into these articles, read them for the story of a successful boarding to retake control of the M/V Caravos Horizon. Instead of rehashing the story, here at the USNI blog we’ll look at the larger picture…what lessons can we learn about counter-piracy and naval irregular warfare?
In October of 2010 I was lucky to be invited to speak as a panelist at the Naval Institute’s History Conference “Pirates on the High Seas” during a discussion of the history of piracy and counter-piracy titled “Blackbeard to the Barbary.” In my opening remarks I highlighted three things that stuck out from the 200+ year history of the USN’s counter piracy missions: Platforms, People, and Partnerships. Specifically, having the right “low end/high end” mix of hardware to do the job, having professional and aggressive junior officers to lead operations, and having competent and willing allies to work with in the region. The combined Anglo-American response to the attack on M/V Caravos Horizon reinforces that these principles are as important in the twenty-first century as they were when Decatur, Porter, and Downes sailed in the nineteenth.
PLATFORMS
When it comes to the hardware involved in this successful operation, a key takeaway is the vital importance of rotary-wing aviation. Irregular operations rarely require the expensive, fast, sexy, high altitude TACAIR jets that you’ll find in Hollywood movies. They need the quiet professionals of the often overlooked naval rotary-wing community. Helicopters embarked on the ships that conduct counter-piracy operations are a force multiplier that provide the ability to respond rapidly, develop critical ISR, and finally to provide overwatch and maritime air support for boarding operations. Sending a ship on counter-piracy or irregular warfare missions without an embarked helicopter significantly degrades the unit’s capability.
The rapid response by the RN Lynx to the scene allowed for the development of early situational awareness which became a key factor for success. The follow on arrival of Bay Raider allowed the ISR net to be cast further away from the attacked vessel. It was able to find two skiffs, which they believed were the suspected “sea bandits.” Our Knighthawk remained overhead briefly as a visible deterrent, and the skiffs turned away from the shipping lanes and headed off at high speed. The two aircraft together could cover hundreds of square miles and help develop situational awareness far beyond the capability of a single surface combatant. When time came for the boarding, the ability to have Bay Raider provide armed overwatch and ISR while the Lynx conducted the insertion was an important element of protecting the boarding party and helping to ensure their success.
In 2003, 814 NAS deployed aboard RFA Fort Victoria as ar of Operation Telic, for the purpose of ISR and overwatch for the frigate and destroyer borne Lynx. FIACs were the threat then, but small boats present similar detection and idenification problems regardless of whether they are FIACs, pirates, or smugglers. The naval helicopter really is the maid of all work. As the article concludes:
The motto of HSC-28 Detachment TWO is “So Others May Live…Or Die.” Whether as a search and rescue aircraft or a helicopter gunship, DET 2 is a best friend to mariners in distress, worst enemy to those who aim to disrupt maritime security in the regions where we operate. The pride that I feel in being associated with DET 2’s maintenance team, naval aircrewmen, and our pilots is endless. After four and a half months supporting maritime security and contingency operations off the coast of Libya, we have moved southeast, and for the foreseeable future we remain on station…
If only we had more ships with large flight decks AND hangars. Would it not have been better for the Type 45 to have a hangar that could accomodate a pair of Merlins - after all the flight deck is huge? The LPDs Albion and Bulwark had their hangars removed from the design to save money, despite the fact that they have large flight decks.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 3rd Sep 2011 at 15:05.
Perhaps you should do a little research into what happened to the RN's Carriers in the first few months of WW2!!!
Please don't open up that can of worms or people will start asking what happened to the RAF when the Battle of the Atlantic kicked off nearly a year before the Battle of Britain or what happened to the RAF during the Norway campaign, the BEF fiasco in France, the evacuation of Crete, the Channel dash, the sinking of Repulse and POW, etc.
P.S. Did you know that a FAA Skua shot down the first German aircraft of WW2 and that FAA aircraft from HMS Indefatigable shot down the last enemy aircraft of the war? Every day's a school day, eh?
How does one do a quote with "originally posted by....." appearing in the box? Genuine question.
Quote:
WEBF
Perhaps you should do a little research into what happened to the RN's Carriers in the first few months of WW2!!!
I assume that you are talking about the loss of Couragous, lost whilst on anti U Boat operations where her aircraft where performing a visual sweep. Technology such as ASV radar, or other things that were later carried did not exist. She (standing by for correction) was launching aircraft, and had to leave her escorts. I think you are also talking about of loss of Glorious during the Norwegian campaign, a tragedy that is mentioned in sea survival discussions. She was destroyed by gunfire from the two German Battle cruisers. At the time she had no aircraft in the air, which would have spotted two large German units.
Since the RAF had largely run carrier aviation prior to WW2, there were no ex aviators in senior positions, and no voice for the FAA at Admiralty level. The skills and experience to use aircraft effectively did not exist, and had to be built during the war (a lesson from history that we should not ignore). Later on, technologies and experience levels did improve, and the escort carriers performed valuable work and were key in many convoy battles, both against U Boats and long range bombers/reece aircraft.
The point about the value of naval helicopters in current operations stands, as does the point about the odd procurement system that gives us destroyers with large (Chinook size) flight decks but relatively small hangars, and LPDs with even larger flight decks but no hangar.
Yes I did - however, did you know that the CinC Coastal Command of the RAF at the outbreak of WW2 had commanded HMS Empress (one of the Navy's first aircraft carriers) on Christmas Day 1914 in the attack on the German seaplane base at Cuxhaven?
P.S. Did you know that a FAA Skua shot down the first German aircraft of WW2 and that FAA aircraft from HMS Indefatigable shot down the last enemy aircraft of the war? Every day's a school day, eh?
Yes I did - however, did you know that the CinC Coastal Command of the RAF at the outbreak of WW2 had commanded HMS Empress (one of the Navy's first aircraft carriers) on Christmas Day 1914 in the attack on the German seaplane base at Cuxhaven?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick William Bowhill? Good Royal Naval Air Service pedigree. Such a shame he wasn't supported by the Air Ministry. Sorry about this Wikipedia quote but it sums up the situation as well as anything else:
From its formation in 1936 the Command did not receive the support it required to be an effective naval air service...
...the events of April to June 1940 overturned the balance of power, as the Germans conquered Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands, Belgium and France. This allowed the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine to operate from French ports on the Atlantic coast, much closer to the Atlantic shipping lanes. It also put German air power within range of Britain's ports on all of its coasts. The advantage now enjoyed by the Germans allowed them to inflict heavy losses to merchant shipping supplying food and war materials to Britain, potentially threatening to starve Britain. While merchant shipping was suffering these high losses, Coastal Command had proven ineffective at countering air or sea attacks on Allied shipping. In particular, it was ineffective at protecting English Channel convoys, which were forced to abandon operations for a few months, starting in July 1940. RAF Fighter Command was given the task, as it enjoyed the majority of RAF resources at the time.
The strategic air attack and defence predominated in the RAF, despite the warning signs of 1914 to 1918, that U-Boats were going to become a main opponent again, and aircraft were a suitable counter to their operations. Coastal Command became the "Cinderella service" until 1943...
If only we had more ships with large flight decks AND hangars.
When SDSR said we no longer need Nimrod or any sort of MPA, the assumption was made that RN Merlins would be able to perform many of the Nimrod's tasks. Yet the review cut back the number of platforms to support Merlin squadrons - one less CVS (HMS Ark Royal), one less AOR (RFA Fort George), whilst frigate number cuts and the continuing pressure on the fleet reduces the availability of Merlin equipped Type 23s...
