Dxb-Dme info
Uhm, so which one is it guys?
White Knight: "From what I recall I've always had EFHK as the filed Alternate whenever I've taken a 380 to UUDD... and just to confirm (having checked our 380 airport authorisation tables) none of the other Moscow airports are open to our 380 ops! So EFHK is pretty much the standard fair weather alternate; otherwise we're filing further into Europe or Scandinavia."
Versus:
BigGeordie: "The fair weather alternate is often UUEE, even for the A380. Have a look at GABI."
It's pretty self-evident that there's a f'ing big difference between distance (and ergo the fuel required) between UUDD to EFHK (508 Nm) versus UUDD to UUEE (38 Nm). And if you'd like to visualise it then click in this link. If what you both say is correct, then it begs the question as to why Ops are filling for a 380 to use airfields (as alternates) that are not within the airport authorisation tables (maybe perhaps only for use in an emergency only, but does that cover a diversion) ?
One would suggest that if the crew of EK-131 on the 10th Sept had fuel for EFHK then what happened at UUDD would be no issue, fuel wise... whereas if all they had was fuel for one of the other Moscow airports (plus perhaps a little bit of wife&kids fuel) ?... then a +33 minute low level jaunt with 2 go-arounds might have painted them into something of a fuel corner, though one does hope not.
White Knight: "From what I recall I've always had EFHK as the filed Alternate whenever I've taken a 380 to UUDD... and just to confirm (having checked our 380 airport authorisation tables) none of the other Moscow airports are open to our 380 ops! So EFHK is pretty much the standard fair weather alternate; otherwise we're filing further into Europe or Scandinavia."
Versus:
BigGeordie: "The fair weather alternate is often UUEE, even for the A380. Have a look at GABI."
It's pretty self-evident that there's a f'ing big difference between distance (and ergo the fuel required) between UUDD to EFHK (508 Nm) versus UUDD to UUEE (38 Nm). And if you'd like to visualise it then click in this link. If what you both say is correct, then it begs the question as to why Ops are filling for a 380 to use airfields (as alternates) that are not within the airport authorisation tables (maybe perhaps only for use in an emergency only, but does that cover a diversion) ?
One would suggest that if the crew of EK-131 on the 10th Sept had fuel for EFHK then what happened at UUDD would be no issue, fuel wise... whereas if all they had was fuel for one of the other Moscow airports (plus perhaps a little bit of wife&kids fuel) ?... then a +33 minute low level jaunt with 2 go-arounds might have painted them into something of a fuel corner, though one does hope not.
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Now that I've moved on, let me see if I can analyze where a lot of this fear culture originates. The days of Manchester are long gone, but why is there still a fear culture? Warning letters are not given out like five or six years ago....still the fear.
Captains whether they realize it or not are mentors on most every flight. So they impart some of this fear to their first officers. But why the fear amongst the captains. From what I saw, this starts about a year or two prior to one's upgrade. Life changes quite a bit when you hit the left seat at EK. But prior to the upgrade you get little warnings, don't screw up a check or PPC, don't take too much sick time, stay out of the office, on and on....because if you do, your upgrade will be delayed a year or two. So do you think this paranoia just disappears after a successful upgrade? And the circle continues.
Know of several instances where captain's decisions were based on their copilots convincing them that the captain's decision may delay their upgrade if called into the office.
And really, EK does nothing to quell those anxieties. When using the old FORDEC decision making model, Facts, Options, Risks.....those risks can include the paranoia of what will be the response from the office. The truth of the matter is whatever the reality truly is, the pilot in question's perception, is his/her reality.
The dealings I had with the 3rd floor were always fairly positive. But I was one of the old grizzled captains. So perhaps their perception of me was...he just made a little mistake. But a newly minted captain of limited experience, there might be a little different outcome.
Finally, as a trainer, the upgrade candidates I saw were almost to a man/woman, outstanding. But I cannot say that about the new first officers. I do remember one former 737 captain on his third line training flight who could not do the takeoff review, try as he might. But how did he get that far in the first place?
Well since moving on, I still have a vested interest in what happens at EK because of the incredible friends I made there, well and also I get staff travel benefits so.......Allow me the pleasure to comment once and awhile here. It was getting kind of boring the reading, but that's not a bad thing. Hasta la Vista...
Captains whether they realize it or not are mentors on most every flight. So they impart some of this fear to their first officers. But why the fear amongst the captains. From what I saw, this starts about a year or two prior to one's upgrade. Life changes quite a bit when you hit the left seat at EK. But prior to the upgrade you get little warnings, don't screw up a check or PPC, don't take too much sick time, stay out of the office, on and on....because if you do, your upgrade will be delayed a year or two. So do you think this paranoia just disappears after a successful upgrade? And the circle continues.
Know of several instances where captain's decisions were based on their copilots convincing them that the captain's decision may delay their upgrade if called into the office.
And really, EK does nothing to quell those anxieties. When using the old FORDEC decision making model, Facts, Options, Risks.....those risks can include the paranoia of what will be the response from the office. The truth of the matter is whatever the reality truly is, the pilot in question's perception, is his/her reality.
The dealings I had with the 3rd floor were always fairly positive. But I was one of the old grizzled captains. So perhaps their perception of me was...he just made a little mistake. But a newly minted captain of limited experience, there might be a little different outcome.
Finally, as a trainer, the upgrade candidates I saw were almost to a man/woman, outstanding. But I cannot say that about the new first officers. I do remember one former 737 captain on his third line training flight who could not do the takeoff review, try as he might. But how did he get that far in the first place?
Well since moving on, I still have a vested interest in what happens at EK because of the incredible friends I made there, well and also I get staff travel benefits so.......Allow me the pleasure to comment once and awhile here. It was getting kind of boring the reading, but that's not a bad thing. Hasta la Vista...
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Originally Posted by BigGeordie
The fair weather alternate is often UUEE, even for the A380
A little more digging into the RAIG on the EPT does indeed show UUEE as an A1 Alternate so my bad!
However only UUDD is shown as viable on the alphabetical listing in 1.5.6.33 even though all of the other D, A, AA and CA airfields are shown there! So there is a disparity in the information depending on which part of RAIG 1.5.6 you look at!
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After reading the emails from HA and especially MM, they appear to fail to grasp that even a competent operator can still stumble at EK. The relationship between the employer and the employee here is rare in the industry, due to the palpable influence that EK has on our lives outside of work. Whilst what happened at DME is significant, we all know that an event which is insignificant in comparison, can still merit a visit to the third floor.
This level of influence is seldom seen in most other carriers. Discontent with where you are living in company accommodation or battling to get compensated for a medical bill or seeing your family no longer happy in Dubai, with no viable part time alternative available, are all challenges that link back to the company. There will be many others as well. It could simply be a case of not getting leave when you want it or missing an important family event, which are challenges that would be more common in other operators, yet are still relevant.
I think it is fair to say that when we go to work, none of us wish to perform poorly and no one puts on their uniform with having this objective in mind. Take a competent operator who is tired and flying when their body wants to sleep and is feeling strain from issues in their life outside of work, which EK still has an overbearing input on. The potential result is you now have a competent yet now demotivated pilot and it is this demotivation and tiredness that can bring them a step closer to a line event.
With the ethnicity of the new Flight Ops postholder, I feel we are now farther away than we have been for a number of years from witnessing a Mea Culpa moment in the context of the company, which is needed before we see the relationship reset between the pilot work force and the company.
This level of influence is seldom seen in most other carriers. Discontent with where you are living in company accommodation or battling to get compensated for a medical bill or seeing your family no longer happy in Dubai, with no viable part time alternative available, are all challenges that link back to the company. There will be many others as well. It could simply be a case of not getting leave when you want it or missing an important family event, which are challenges that would be more common in other operators, yet are still relevant.
I think it is fair to say that when we go to work, none of us wish to perform poorly and no one puts on their uniform with having this objective in mind. Take a competent operator who is tired and flying when their body wants to sleep and is feeling strain from issues in their life outside of work, which EK still has an overbearing input on. The potential result is you now have a competent yet now demotivated pilot and it is this demotivation and tiredness that can bring them a step closer to a line event.
With the ethnicity of the new Flight Ops postholder, I feel we are now farther away than we have been for a number of years from witnessing a Mea Culpa moment in the context of the company, which is needed before we see the relationship reset between the pilot work force and the company.
short flights long nights
Excellent post Emma. It should be a sticky.
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With the ethnicity of the new Flight Ops postholder, I feel we are now farther away than we have been for a number of years from witnessing a Mea Culpa moment in the context of the company, which is needed before we see the relationship reset between the pilot work force and the company.
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Wrong JAARule
My annual pay review post references from May 2008 - which is when I started keeping records - hired well before then.
Now do you remember when ATC took on the FltOps & ENG'g position?
Nice try - now keep your eye on the ball and stop looking for shyte because myself and others have called you to task for your usual negative drivel.
Last edited by fliion; 21st Sep 2017 at 14:46.
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and don't forget
years ago - to be preceise back in 2013 and 2104 it had been a requirement to be on the 330/340 - before that 700 hours in 340 - to be eligible to go on 380 and be promoted
today guys with NO wide body expirence get their upgrade in half the time than a former 340 FO having barely 2500 hours in the company.
not to say that the former 330/340 exceeding almost the 4000 number in here and getting nothing than the excuse of being delayed because of the missing 380 hours. thanksfully those (in-expirenced) FO are getting promoted over the senior FOs will join the training sooner or later and telling all of us how to fly.
at the point where a requirement became a punishment the wheels started to fall off.#
years ago - to be preceise back in 2013 and 2104 it had been a requirement to be on the 330/340 - before that 700 hours in 340 - to be eligible to go on 380 and be promoted
today guys with NO wide body expirence get their upgrade in half the time than a former 340 FO having barely 2500 hours in the company.
not to say that the former 330/340 exceeding almost the 4000 number in here and getting nothing than the excuse of being delayed because of the missing 380 hours. thanksfully those (in-expirenced) FO are getting promoted over the senior FOs will join the training sooner or later and telling all of us how to fly.
at the point where a requirement became a punishment the wheels started to fall off.#
Last edited by WB1900; 23rd Sep 2017 at 07:02.
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for all of u who believe more checking and more pressure will solve the problem
How many airlines in Europe had a hull loss or came evidently close to it in the last 10 years.
they all changed in a way that common sense of a pilot is the most important item to a safe operation. not one near accident can be connected to fear.
even further that these company count on training not on checking and more checking if something goes overboard. and if so they try to learn from it.
try to get a flight data readout in a europe company - they will give it to you without any questions because u had a suspicion.
EK will punish u just for asking and they will take every effort to find something to blame u instead of taking it as an effort to improve and clarifing a suspicion.
sofar while other airlines indentified proplem EK is creating them.
lets name it
Melbourne, Moscau, Seychells all of near disaster
EK521 - disaster
given the fact the time frame of these events is narrowing dramatically, as the releases of more and more threats against pilots are. just given the fact that the time inbetween events is narrowing, should provide a wakeup call to those are responsible. it is not benefitting to avoid them if a phsycho doctor makes assements over human error sources - communicates them in SEP, CRM courses, and encouraging pilots to write reports, which will never be acknowledged to be incorporated.
as we can see and using our too much emphasized term of "Root Cause Analysis" will should be able to identify the biggest threat in this company. and i also blame those Aussis which still not talk enough for a flight and still want level 4 knowledge questions in the tec quiz
Airbus and Boeing are aware of the situation of technology resiliance - they have installed international workshops with airlines and authorities and try to find new ways of training and SOPs to incorporate new technologies with pilot skills.
i am quite shure that safety has a breaking point over capitalism and personal professionalism will not be endless to cover it.
there is enough room to endanger your career which must not happen while the gear is up.
dear collegues stay safe
How many airlines in Europe had a hull loss or came evidently close to it in the last 10 years.
they all changed in a way that common sense of a pilot is the most important item to a safe operation. not one near accident can be connected to fear.
even further that these company count on training not on checking and more checking if something goes overboard. and if so they try to learn from it.
try to get a flight data readout in a europe company - they will give it to you without any questions because u had a suspicion.
EK will punish u just for asking and they will take every effort to find something to blame u instead of taking it as an effort to improve and clarifing a suspicion.
sofar while other airlines indentified proplem EK is creating them.
lets name it
Melbourne, Moscau, Seychells all of near disaster
EK521 - disaster
given the fact the time frame of these events is narrowing dramatically, as the releases of more and more threats against pilots are. just given the fact that the time inbetween events is narrowing, should provide a wakeup call to those are responsible. it is not benefitting to avoid them if a phsycho doctor makes assements over human error sources - communicates them in SEP, CRM courses, and encouraging pilots to write reports, which will never be acknowledged to be incorporated.
as we can see and using our too much emphasized term of "Root Cause Analysis" will should be able to identify the biggest threat in this company. and i also blame those Aussis which still not talk enough for a flight and still want level 4 knowledge questions in the tec quiz
Airbus and Boeing are aware of the situation of technology resiliance - they have installed international workshops with airlines and authorities and try to find new ways of training and SOPs to incorporate new technologies with pilot skills.
i am quite shure that safety has a breaking point over capitalism and personal professionalism will not be endless to cover it.
there is enough room to endanger your career which must not happen while the gear is up.
dear collegues stay safe
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This is all very concerning. Have we gotten to the bottom of the matter yet? We need to know the cause of this near disaster so that we can learn and not make the same mistake ourselves.
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wrt
And what drives that is greed by both companies, wherein the EK Commercial Department are hoping that - via the way the search engines work - they might pickup some FZ pax looking for 583 to Dhaka and likewise the FZ Commercial Department are playing the same game... and damn the consequences wrt flight safety and callsign confusion, just so long as they might get a few more bums on the seats within their respective aircraft. Loads of other airlines do this too... and it's bloody disgraceful ! 
Lets not forget that every day an EK583 departs from Dhaka and a FZ583 lands in Dhaka after a short while. it is shocking that in the same group of companies the same call sign has been carefully selected while flying in a unique corridor where the 2 ATC don't talk to each other and 2 different clearances are given simultaneously on 2 different frequencies.
short flights long nights
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https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=199901
https://www.bea.aero/en/investigatio...e-interrompue/
https://www.bea.aero/en/investigatio...e-interrompue/
Last edited by Talparc; 26th Sep 2017 at 22:45.
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Originally Posted by Panther 88
Finally, as a trainer, the upgrade candidates I saw were almost to a man/woman, outstanding. But I cannot say that about the new first officers.
Originally Posted by Panther 88
I do remember one former 737 captain on his third line training flight who could not do the takeoff review, try as he might. But how did he get that far in the first place?...
We have so many pilots now who are perfect narrators of calls, are brilliantly up-to-date with the latest changes of them, are computers experts for everything related to crew apps and EPT... but are miserable when it's time to operate controls, understand AOA or perform a simple mental calculation, so scared they are of their own shadow...
I also disagree with the colleague saying " trainers are not here to spoon feed the trainees" Well, I have been a trainer for years - and for me a type-rating (also called a conversion course here) is the opportunity to learn the aircraft, how it flies (maybe, probably differently from the previous types the trainee has flown) what could be the pitfalls - otherwide, when would be the opportunity to learn it ? and it was my pleasure to teach. Problem is that so many trainers lack the real academic and technical knowledge ... checking calls in their latest versions, any moron can do it ...
We will have to be patient to know more, as always. Like JoBurg and others, it will be issued once half of the pilots will have forgotten about it.
But once again, DME is an easy destination, just have to stick to a very simple SOP regarding QNH and feet /meters... I've seen F/O selecting meters (not required) and when challenged, giving me the answer " it's for gross calculation, situation awareness " - looking great, but pitifully wrong ...
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KD
I agree with a lot in that well written and common sense post but one genuine question. Why would selecting meters be frowned upon? Perhaps I'm missing something but I always have it set when operating through Chinese airspace. Charts are the first referral, meters selection is a reminder to verbalise my RT in meters, not Flight level and as a gross error check.
Harry
I agree with a lot in that well written and common sense post but one genuine question. Why would selecting meters be frowned upon? Perhaps I'm missing something but I always have it set when operating through Chinese airspace. Charts are the first referral, meters selection is a reminder to verbalise my RT in meters, not Flight level and as a gross error check.
Harry