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Glo
The reason the requirements are so low is simple. The incentive to join the EK training department is minimal.
The role of trainer in any reputable Company is a role usually reserved for the most dedicated and able individuals. It's a position to aspire to and one in which the remuneration and benefits reflects the expertise that's being provided. Airlines recognise the fact that training provides the basic building blocks of operational knowledge and thus promote a culture of pride within the role. Unfortunately, EK is different.
Although we still have some excellent individuals, we have also lost a large number due to the short sightedness of fearful and incompetent managers. This shortage reflects on the often brutal EK training rosters which eventually leads to discontent and frustration amongst those undertaking such an important role. Their only option is to resign, putting further strain on an already broken system. To fix it, the Company accepts a policy of employing temporary trainers, at the very time we should be retaining the experienced ones. 'Captains', who effectively will have been in the left seat for only 6 months and may never have previously held a command, can now apply for a star to add to their shiny four stripes. With the challenge of a variety of training duties to undertake and prepare for, the most inexperienced trainers will now be setting the bar for those they instruct. In some cases, this will be very low time recruits off turboprops. Because they are part time, they will invariably be less current than the full time instructors and thus, ironically, their knowledge and exposure to training events will be reduced. You only have to see the FDM playbacks on the current RTGS day to see how wrong this policy is.
Now, combine these threats with the current climate which I believe is getting worse rather than better. Not one pilot, hand on heart, would want to compromise safety. We know that some individuals are not suitable for a command but we must also realise that many are, especially if they're afforded the quality of training and encouragement that's often promised but rarely delivered. There simply must be more emphasis on training rather than checking, especially with lower experience levels compared to say ten years ago. We were always being assured that the standards have remained the same but I beg to differ. Why are we now seeing an increasing number of events and why the necessity for the big stick approach? We operate to many challenging airfields, with little or no continuity and cover all the major Continents throughout the World. We have an exhaustive set of procedures, sometimes vague and confusing, occasionally contradictory and quite often, difficult to access. As a pilot, EK is a challenging airline to work for.
If EK focused more on it's core business rather than spending millions on sporting advertising and PR, we might not be in this situation. Decent rosters with little to no restrictions with a reduction in hours to acceptable levels, especially given the challenge of our flight timings and range of FDP's. Yearly increments and salary rises in line with inflation. Perhaps most importantly, a management culture of support rather than punishment and the occasional phone call, rather than a day off meeting for a pointless interview after which a pre written warning letter is produced. Perhaps then not only would we retain a larger number of pilots, thus improving experience levels, but we might also recruit a higher calibre to begin with. Just culture? Far from it in reality. Despite the wonderful and reassuring support from Gary Chapman and Tim Clark that's printed all over the company premises, the real culture is what goes on in the offices.
Unless the Company takes ownership of some of these causal factors, the number of serious events will only increase. You can not ignore fatigue. You can not ignore fear (whether real or perceived) and you can not ignore a demotivated and disengaged workforce. Management MUST take some responsibility for this increasing debacle we face. Failure to do so is not only naive, it's also downright negligent!
Harry
The reason the requirements are so low is simple. The incentive to join the EK training department is minimal.
The role of trainer in any reputable Company is a role usually reserved for the most dedicated and able individuals. It's a position to aspire to and one in which the remuneration and benefits reflects the expertise that's being provided. Airlines recognise the fact that training provides the basic building blocks of operational knowledge and thus promote a culture of pride within the role. Unfortunately, EK is different.
Although we still have some excellent individuals, we have also lost a large number due to the short sightedness of fearful and incompetent managers. This shortage reflects on the often brutal EK training rosters which eventually leads to discontent and frustration amongst those undertaking such an important role. Their only option is to resign, putting further strain on an already broken system. To fix it, the Company accepts a policy of employing temporary trainers, at the very time we should be retaining the experienced ones. 'Captains', who effectively will have been in the left seat for only 6 months and may never have previously held a command, can now apply for a star to add to their shiny four stripes. With the challenge of a variety of training duties to undertake and prepare for, the most inexperienced trainers will now be setting the bar for those they instruct. In some cases, this will be very low time recruits off turboprops. Because they are part time, they will invariably be less current than the full time instructors and thus, ironically, their knowledge and exposure to training events will be reduced. You only have to see the FDM playbacks on the current RTGS day to see how wrong this policy is.
Now, combine these threats with the current climate which I believe is getting worse rather than better. Not one pilot, hand on heart, would want to compromise safety. We know that some individuals are not suitable for a command but we must also realise that many are, especially if they're afforded the quality of training and encouragement that's often promised but rarely delivered. There simply must be more emphasis on training rather than checking, especially with lower experience levels compared to say ten years ago. We were always being assured that the standards have remained the same but I beg to differ. Why are we now seeing an increasing number of events and why the necessity for the big stick approach? We operate to many challenging airfields, with little or no continuity and cover all the major Continents throughout the World. We have an exhaustive set of procedures, sometimes vague and confusing, occasionally contradictory and quite often, difficult to access. As a pilot, EK is a challenging airline to work for.
If EK focused more on it's core business rather than spending millions on sporting advertising and PR, we might not be in this situation. Decent rosters with little to no restrictions with a reduction in hours to acceptable levels, especially given the challenge of our flight timings and range of FDP's. Yearly increments and salary rises in line with inflation. Perhaps most importantly, a management culture of support rather than punishment and the occasional phone call, rather than a day off meeting for a pointless interview after which a pre written warning letter is produced. Perhaps then not only would we retain a larger number of pilots, thus improving experience levels, but we might also recruit a higher calibre to begin with. Just culture? Far from it in reality. Despite the wonderful and reassuring support from Gary Chapman and Tim Clark that's printed all over the company premises, the real culture is what goes on in the offices.
Unless the Company takes ownership of some of these causal factors, the number of serious events will only increase. You can not ignore fatigue. You can not ignore fear (whether real or perceived) and you can not ignore a demotivated and disengaged workforce. Management MUST take some responsibility for this increasing debacle we face. Failure to do so is not only naive, it's also downright negligent!
Harry
Last edited by harry the cod; 19th Sep 2017 at 16:24.
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harry, well said. 
The fact that any f**kwit can now go and buy themselves a TRI and start selling themselves off as a 'Trainer' shows just how corrupted the whole Training Regime has now become. E.g. Last year I sacked one Captain after he failed his Final Line Check, wherein the guy wasn't just incompetent, he was downright f'ing dangerous, albeit that he had a TRI (which he'd paid for himself, via a certain Lithuanian TRO) stamped within his license.
Regarding the incident in DME, one would have hoped that the good old fashioned airmanship check of the Radio Altimeter(s) versus the Primary Altimeter(s) (and / or Radio Altimeter versus distance to go... topography not withstanding) might have provided a clue that something wasn't quite right ?!.... but then it should be remembered that we're talking here about Emirates, an airline where airmanship is seemingly a dirty word, with an over reliance on the 'automatics', and where it's evidently assumed that so long as you always get the SOP's exactly right then nothing can ever go wrong, can it?!
Incident: Emirates A388 at Moscow on Sep 10th 2017, go around from about 400 feet AGL 8nm before runway
The fact that any f**kwit can now go and buy themselves a TRI and start selling themselves off as a 'Trainer' shows just how corrupted the whole Training Regime has now become. E.g. Last year I sacked one Captain after he failed his Final Line Check, wherein the guy wasn't just incompetent, he was downright f'ing dangerous, albeit that he had a TRI (which he'd paid for himself, via a certain Lithuanian TRO) stamped within his license.
Regarding the incident in DME, one would have hoped that the good old fashioned airmanship check of the Radio Altimeter(s) versus the Primary Altimeter(s) (and / or Radio Altimeter versus distance to go... topography not withstanding) might have provided a clue that something wasn't quite right ?!.... but then it should be remembered that we're talking here about Emirates, an airline where airmanship is seemingly a dirty word, with an over reliance on the 'automatics', and where it's evidently assumed that so long as you always get the SOP's exactly right then nothing can ever go wrong, can it?!
Incident: Emirates A388 at Moscow on Sep 10th 2017, go around from about 400 feet AGL 8nm before runway
An Emirates Airbus A380-800, registration A6-EEZ performing flight EK-131 from Dubai (United Arab Emirates) to Moscow Domodedovo (Russia), was positioning for an approach to Domodedovo's runway 14R about to intercept the extended runway center line about 8nm before the runway threshold when the aircraft descended to about 400 feet AGL, initiated a go around climbing straight ahead and crossing through the localizer to safe altitude. The aircraft subsequently positioned for another approach to runway 14R, aligned with the extended runway center line but did not initiate the final descent and joined the missed approach procedure as result. The aircraft positioned again for an approach to runway 14R and landed without further incident on runway 14R about 35 minutes after the first go around (from 400 feet AGL).
Position and Altitude data transmitted by the aircraft's transponder suggest the aircraft was tracking about 190 degrees magnetic when the aircraft initiated the go around at about 1000 feet MSL about 8nm before the runway threshold, which translates to about 400 feet AGL with the aerodrome elevation at 180 meters/592 feet MSL.
Position and Altitude data transmitted by the aircraft's transponder suggest the aircraft was tracking about 190 degrees magnetic when the aircraft initiated the go around at about 1000 feet MSL about 8nm before the runway threshold, which translates to about 400 feet AGL with the aerodrome elevation at 180 meters/592 feet MSL.
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Don & Harry (and others), your posts hit the nail on the head.
There have been several alarming events and an accident in the past 18-24 months. The email I saw today addresses this with changes in the training dept. Indeed, the trend cannot be ignored and It's beginning to look really ugly but the company seem ever reluctant to acknowledge other key issues that are clearly affecting safety.
Not inspired.
There have been several alarming events and an accident in the past 18-24 months. The email I saw today addresses this with changes in the training dept. Indeed, the trend cannot be ignored and It's beginning to look really ugly but the company seem ever reluctant to acknowledge other key issues that are clearly affecting safety.
Not inspired.
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my Salami, good one and you are spot on.
flew on EK as a pax a few months ago and saw the TRE who did my upgrade 2002 in the right hand seat, how such an experienced guy ends up in the right hand seat is beyond me, his captain just had a few hours command time hahaha
flew on EK as a pax a few months ago and saw the TRE who did my upgrade 2002 in the right hand seat, how such an experienced guy ends up in the right hand seat is beyond me, his captain just had a few hours command time hahaha
short flights long nights
Harry, I have to say, I don't always agree with you, but your last post is 100 % spot on.
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And it's eroding the reputation of EK pilots who've moved on! 
EK pilots have traditionally been highly regarded and coveted as hires post-Pit. And for the most part still are. But it gets harder to say with any professional pride your previous job was EK when incidents like this one and the B777 crash reveal the airline to have some serious shortcomings like any other.
Of course anyone who's worked there knows this, but it's starting to get around...for a company obsessed with brand reputation they sure don't have a clue how to maintain it.
EK pilots have traditionally been highly regarded and coveted as hires post-Pit. And for the most part still are. But it gets harder to say with any professional pride your previous job was EK when incidents like this one and the B777 crash reveal the airline to have some serious shortcomings like any other.
Of course anyone who's worked there knows this, but it's starting to get around...for a company obsessed with brand reputation they sure don't have a clue how to maintain it.
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Lot of good posts here, I even agree totally with Glo, who knew that was possible ;-)
But as all of us who have been here a while know, they will just slap another procedural or policy Band Aid on any perceived problem and carry on regardless.
the dogs bark, but the caravan goes on
But as all of us who have been here a while know, they will just slap another procedural or policy Band Aid on any perceived problem and carry on regardless.
the dogs bark, but the caravan goes on
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Is it true that they landed (eventually) with less than 4 tons of fuel onboard (and that they made no mayday call; what with that apparently being less than Final Reserve fuel for an A380) ?
Don't you love anonymous forums where you can make damning accusations like this and not be held responsible for it? If you don't know the facts don't spread ****e
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According to the radar trace, from the lateral point of initiating the first go-around (and of which, btw, it doesn't look like they flew the one that is published, or even close - be that either the ILS or RNAV - for R14R) until the time of being back at that same lateral point on the approach (but by then having then completed 2 go-arounds) looks to have taken approximately 33 minutes... that's a long time, at low altitude, in a big jet, and that's why one might be tempted to wonder just how much fuel they would still have had onboard once they'd landed?... hopefully more than enough.
Last edited by Old King Coal; 20th Sep 2017 at 14:11. Reason: Info provided by White Knight (below) made some of what I'd written conjecture.
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White, well let's hope that that's the case here too, i.e. enough fuel onboard at the start of the approach to divert to an airport over 1 hour away. 
Aside: Note to self, I must stop working for airlines that expect one to arrive with only fumes in the tanks (you can see how it colours my thinking?!)
Aside: Note to self, I must stop working for airlines that expect one to arrive with only fumes in the tanks (you can see how it colours my thinking?!)
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And just to confirm OKC (having checked our 380 airport authorisation tables) none of the other Moscow airports are open to our 380 ops!
So EFHK is pretty much the standard fair weather alternate; otherwise we're filing further into Europe or Scandinavia.
So EFHK is pretty much the standard fair weather alternate; otherwise we're filing further into Europe or Scandinavia.
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Uhm, so which one is it guys?
White Knight: "From what I recall I've always had EFHK as the filed Alternate whenever I've taken a 380 to UUDD... and just to confirm (having checked our 380 airport authorisation tables) none of the other Moscow airports are open to our 380 ops! So EFHK is pretty much the standard fair weather alternate; otherwise we're filing further into Europe or Scandinavia."
Versus:
BigGeordie: "The fair weather alternate is often UUEE, even for the A380. Have a look at GABI."
It's pretty self-evident that there's a f'ing big difference between distance (and ergo the fuel required) between UUDD to EFHK (508 Nm) versus UUDD to UUEE (38 Nm). And if you'd like to visualise it then click in this link. If what you both say is correct, then it begs the question as to why Ops are filling for a 380 to use airfields (as alternates) that are not within the airport authorisation tables (maybe perhaps only for use in an emergency only, but does that cover a diversion) ?
One would suggest that if the crew of EK-131 on the 10th Sept had fuel for EFHK then what happened at UUDD would be no issue, fuel wise... whereas if all they had was fuel for one of the other Moscow airports (plus perhaps a little bit of wife&kids fuel) ?... then a +33 minute low level jaunt with 2 go-arounds might have painted them into something of a fuel corner, though one does hope not.
White Knight: "From what I recall I've always had EFHK as the filed Alternate whenever I've taken a 380 to UUDD... and just to confirm (having checked our 380 airport authorisation tables) none of the other Moscow airports are open to our 380 ops! So EFHK is pretty much the standard fair weather alternate; otherwise we're filing further into Europe or Scandinavia."
Versus:
BigGeordie: "The fair weather alternate is often UUEE, even for the A380. Have a look at GABI."
It's pretty self-evident that there's a f'ing big difference between distance (and ergo the fuel required) between UUDD to EFHK (508 Nm) versus UUDD to UUEE (38 Nm). And if you'd like to visualise it then click in this link. If what you both say is correct, then it begs the question as to why Ops are filling for a 380 to use airfields (as alternates) that are not within the airport authorisation tables (maybe perhaps only for use in an emergency only, but does that cover a diversion) ?
One would suggest that if the crew of EK-131 on the 10th Sept had fuel for EFHK then what happened at UUDD would be no issue, fuel wise... whereas if all they had was fuel for one of the other Moscow airports (plus perhaps a little bit of wife&kids fuel) ?... then a +33 minute low level jaunt with 2 go-arounds might have painted them into something of a fuel corner, though one does hope not.