Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)
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The Nimrod Safety Case (NSC), which is not required for legacy systems before the HSAW Act, was carried out because the MOD's JSP indicated that, in general, it would be sensible to gather as much data as possible in order to provide an argument that the legacy aircraft also met the principles required under the HSAW Act.
Let's get something straight, THERE IS NO LEGAL REQUIREMENT FOR A SAFETY CASE. However, many regulated industries require a Safety Case to be produced and submitted for regulatory approval. The MoD has chosen this approach and has been using it for some time for new equipments, it has been well documented in successive issues of Def Stan 00-56. For legacy in-service aircraft, the MoD mandated the production of a Safety Case in (then ES(Air)) Business Procedure 1201.
S_H
I think the point Chug makes is self-regulation is fine so long as one implements the regs properly. MoD has admitted it doesn't, a simple verifiable fact.
Apologies Chug. I spoke out of turn. It's just that self regulation is what I've been used to, and have seen it work on Military Airworthiness. However, in the last 17 years it has not, and I agree with you that it is now almost impossible to resurrect. I certainly wouldn't relish the task. MoD would argue there is provision in the regs for independent assessment, although it is debatable exactly how independent some are. Worse, the regs don't actually require MoD to accept this independent advice or give reasons why they are rejecting it. It will be interesting to read what the Coroner recommends.
Best wishes
Best wishes
I think the point Chug makes is self-regulation is fine so long as one implements the regs properly. MoD has admitted it doesn't, a simple verifiable fact.
The point isn't the discharge of responsibilities by particular organisations or individuals
You cite problems
concerning the Nimrod, Hercules and Chinook fleets and the serious Airworthiness shortcomings revealed
Be careful not to lump together and confuse different complex issues.
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Safety Helmut,
I didn't say there was a legal requirement to do so, neither did the Air Cdre, so far as I know. He simply said (so I'm told) that, in accordance with the principles of the HSAW Act, the JSP required him to provide an argument that the Nimrod was safe. Its not worth debating this particular point anyway. In a nutshell, the MOD shot itself in the foot when it mandated a safety case that was not required by law, which then turned out to be erroneous. Apologies if I gave anyone a wrong impression of what was said.
EdSett, you have produced some of the more informative posts on this thread, but this is Twaddle !
Let's get something straight, THERE IS NO LEGAL REQUIREMENT FOR A SAFETY CASE.
Let's get something straight, THERE IS NO LEGAL REQUIREMENT FOR A SAFETY CASE.
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In a nutshell, the MOD shot itself in the foot when it mandated a safety case that was not required by law, which then turned out to be erroneous.
S_H
JFZ90:
Be careful not to lump together and confuse different complex issues.
Be careful not to lump together and confuse different complex issues.
a military risk/threat decision was made long ago not to bother with some technologies which may or may not have had any effect in any case. This is not really an airworthiness issue in the traditional sense, as bad guys firing bullets/rockets at you is always going to be a dangerous situation with risks that cannot be fully mitigated.
You say regarding Chinook:
The MAR/FADEC issue was a red herring.
My point about who said or did what etc, is not that it is unimportant, of course it is and must be revealed. It is rather that the urgent need is not for investigation or introspection, but total reform of the Provision of Military Airworthiness in the UK. I take note of tuc's conclusion that it is probably beyond resurrection in its present form. In order to mitigate (that word again!) future needless loss of life it must be speedily removed from the MOD and placed in an Independent MAA.
Chug,
We'll have to differ on this one, but I can only reiterate that lumping them together as having 'common failures' is too simplistic.
It is really a red herring though - the status of the MAR was an on-going issue which would have been very damning if it had had a bearing on the incident - but it didn't. I propose not to get into the debate here though - its too emotive - but by the same token that you can argue with me that it could be an issue, it is possible (& easier) for me to argue it wasn't. Suffice to say you can't draw parallels to what happened on Nimrod, and on balance of probabilities, Mull was 99.9% not a airworthiness issue.
For Nimrod it is clear that a design flaw which had a direct bearing on its safety during normal operations persisted in the in-service aircraft - no matter how you dress this up it is 100% an airworthiness issue. The MoD conducted a Safety Case exercise (which as discussed above was not even legally required, but did/does represent best practice) but which still failed to flag up the problem - the flaw goes back along way, probably to the days before the term Safety Case was even dreamt up (anyone know for sure when this term became common, late 80s/early 90s?). There are lessons to learn here, I've never questioned that - but from what I can see they are not necessarily obvious ones.
Hercules is a bit different in that its a capability/threat thing. To draw a simplistic extreme, you could find yourself shot down in combat by a Sukhoi Su-27 while flying your Tornado F-3, or even a Typhoon. In this case you could argue the MoD had been negligent by not sufficiently reducing the mission/combat risk to ALARP - it could have equipped the RAF with F-22s which is a bit of technology that is (perhaps only slightly) more likely to have shot down the Su-27 before being shot down itself. Should ALARP/fitness for purpose/airworthiness apply here to these type of risks? Training and tactics probably play a bigger part than the technology in the outcomes here anyway so where best to invest? You could debate this all day but I hope you can see this is not the same thing at all as an aircraft that may catch fire/expode all on its on during normal operation.
We'll have to differ on this one, but I can only reiterate that lumping them together as having 'common failures' is too simplistic.
I do not say that problem was a factor in the Mull accident
For Nimrod it is clear that a design flaw which had a direct bearing on its safety during normal operations persisted in the in-service aircraft - no matter how you dress this up it is 100% an airworthiness issue. The MoD conducted a Safety Case exercise (which as discussed above was not even legally required, but did/does represent best practice) but which still failed to flag up the problem - the flaw goes back along way, probably to the days before the term Safety Case was even dreamt up (anyone know for sure when this term became common, late 80s/early 90s?). There are lessons to learn here, I've never questioned that - but from what I can see they are not necessarily obvious ones.
Hercules is a bit different in that its a capability/threat thing. To draw a simplistic extreme, you could find yourself shot down in combat by a Sukhoi Su-27 while flying your Tornado F-3, or even a Typhoon. In this case you could argue the MoD had been negligent by not sufficiently reducing the mission/combat risk to ALARP - it could have equipped the RAF with F-22s which is a bit of technology that is (perhaps only slightly) more likely to have shot down the Su-27 before being shot down itself. Should ALARP/fitness for purpose/airworthiness apply here to these type of risks? Training and tactics probably play a bigger part than the technology in the outcomes here anyway so where best to invest? You could debate this all day but I hope you can see this is not the same thing at all as an aircraft that may catch fire/expode all on its on during normal operation.
The common denominator here is the failure to implement the airworthiness regs.
The recent cases where this failure is absolutely clear cut, if only because it is spelt out in the BoI reports (so not just my own opinion), are Nimrod, Tornado/Patriot and Sea King ASaC. I won’t pre-judge C130, but suspect that one is more a fitness for purpose issue, which shares the same processes, procedures and Duty of Care obligation.
It is certainly a factor in the Chinook Mk2, because the evidence clearly shows the regs were not implemented properly. Whether or not this had a direct bearing on the crash nobody will ever know – which is the whole point of trying to have the verdict overturned. But it should not detract from the fact.
I’d say the above is a pretty damning body of evidence, all of it in the public domain. Of the five I’ve mentioned, at least 3 were predictable, predicted and ignored; with the MoD’s own airworthiness advisors having critical concerns about a 4th (Chinook). Yes, you very quickly get to the real problem. Lack of management oversight and leadership, and abrogation of responsibility. Start at 2 Star and work upwards.
The recent cases where this failure is absolutely clear cut, if only because it is spelt out in the BoI reports (so not just my own opinion), are Nimrod, Tornado/Patriot and Sea King ASaC. I won’t pre-judge C130, but suspect that one is more a fitness for purpose issue, which shares the same processes, procedures and Duty of Care obligation.
It is certainly a factor in the Chinook Mk2, because the evidence clearly shows the regs were not implemented properly. Whether or not this had a direct bearing on the crash nobody will ever know – which is the whole point of trying to have the verdict overturned. But it should not detract from the fact.
I’d say the above is a pretty damning body of evidence, all of it in the public domain. Of the five I’ve mentioned, at least 3 were predictable, predicted and ignored; with the MoD’s own airworthiness advisors having critical concerns about a 4th (Chinook). Yes, you very quickly get to the real problem. Lack of management oversight and leadership, and abrogation of responsibility. Start at 2 Star and work upwards.
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EdSett,
I think since your post others have re-iterated the MAA / Safety Case / airworthiness issues well enough, but I'd like to pick up on a contradiction in what you have posted:
vs
If the mechanism was robust, a flawed design would not have been certified; or if the orginal design was robust, subsequent modifications would also be safe.
sw
I think since your post others have re-iterated the MAA / Safety Case / airworthiness issues well enough, but I'd like to pick up on a contradiction in what you have posted:
Air Cdre Beber laid out the existing mechanism that provides the airworthiness requirements under BCARs. Regardless of individual opinion regarding a conceived need for a military aviation authority, that mechanism is robust. The mechanism and tools comprised the design, testing and limitations in the Release to Service and all supporting documents. These alone met the BCARs and the Nimrod was certified using the Comet and the Nimrod MR1 as the baseline design to meet the BCARs for certification of the MR2, as a modification of the original model.
very critical in hindsight of the design of the 7 Tank Dry Bay and indicated that BAe produced a flawed design and that the IPT has missed an opportunity (the NSC) to identify that flaw.
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The common denominator here is the failure to implement the airworthiness regs.
It only remains for Mr Haddon Cave to find out who failed.
There was clearly a failure to accurately describe the risk controls in that dry bay.
S_H
Quote:
In a nutshell, the MOD shot itself in the foot when it mandated a safety case that was not required by law, which then turned out to be erroneous. Ed Set
unquote
No Ed, it did not. Assurance of safety under a safety case regime is widely regarded as best practice in this country. Power Generation, Nuclear, Chemical, Rail, ATM, Offshore to name a few, all take this approach. S_H
In a nutshell, the MOD shot itself in the foot when it mandated a safety case that was not required by law, which then turned out to be erroneous. Ed Set
unquote
No Ed, it did not. Assurance of safety under a safety case regime is widely regarded as best practice in this country. Power Generation, Nuclear, Chemical, Rail, ATM, Offshore to name a few, all take this approach. S_H
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JFZ90, as regarding lumping things together, the definition of airworthiness is:
Seems to lump them together nicely.
sw
The ability of an aircraft or other airborne equipment or system to operate
without significant hazard to aircrew, ground crew, passengers (where relevant) or to the
general public over which such airborne systems are flown.
without significant hazard to aircrew, ground crew, passengers (where relevant) or to the
general public over which such airborne systems are flown.
sw
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Safeware,
Thats a good point. However, If you accept that a system is deemed robust if it meets BCARs, then we have to accept that BCARs is/was not robust in its requirements. It seems that the MR2 was accepted as airworthy because the manufacturer was able to maintain certification under a modified MR1 design, because BCARs allowed them to do it. So, on that basis, not even the BCARs were able to prevent the flawed system within the MR2.
Thats a good point. However, If you accept that a system is deemed robust if it meets BCARs, then we have to accept that BCARs is/was not robust in its requirements. It seems that the MR2 was accepted as airworthy because the manufacturer was able to maintain certification under a modified MR1 design, because BCARs allowed them to do it. So, on that basis, not even the BCARs were able to prevent the flawed system within the MR2.
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Edsett,
What you can then come back to is that the mechanism was flawed in its implementation not its principle, something that tucumseh and I have long espoused.
sw
What you can then come back to is that the mechanism was flawed in its implementation not its principle, something that tucumseh and I have long espoused.
sw
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SW, I tend to agree with you and Tuc. However, I would also argue that a system that vests responsibilities of ownership, operation and regulation in the same body will lead to conflict of interest and will fail. I would agree with Chugalug and call for an independent authority.
S_H
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S_H,
But then we get back to the issue I covered a while ago of civil regulation of a military operation that, inevitably, involves risk beyond that which would normally be taken in the civil world. How would a civil regulator view strapping a number of soldiers onto the outside of an Apache and flying them into an enemy fort?
Or should such a civil regulator only concern themselves with the "civil" elements of an aircraft and leave the military stuff to the military?
But then how does one consider military equipment such as AAR, which become a core part of the aircraft?
In an ideal world, it may work. But realistically, would it?
sw
But then we get back to the issue I covered a while ago of civil regulation of a military operation that, inevitably, involves risk beyond that which would normally be taken in the civil world. How would a civil regulator view strapping a number of soldiers onto the outside of an Apache and flying them into an enemy fort?
Or should such a civil regulator only concern themselves with the "civil" elements of an aircraft and leave the military stuff to the military?
But then how does one consider military equipment such as AAR, which become a core part of the aircraft?
In an ideal world, it may work. But realistically, would it?
sw
Safeware, I don't call for a civilian authority per se, rather I call for an independent one, ie independent of the MOD. While it would seem sensible to "nest" such an authority with the CAA, its remit would be to manage and enforce Military Airworthiness. Given the consensus building here that the regulatory system itself is sound, I would propose that it be exported to an MAA manned by a similar mix of those who manage the in house MOD system, ie military (presumably ex in this case to avoid divided loyalty) and civilian. Hopefully the former would develop a more professional application to their work than a single posting presently allows, and both they and the latter would merely encounter support from above in their aim to make for aircraft and systems fit for the work they are put to. As regards the military aspect of their airworthiness, it is entirely fundamental to that fitness. AT aircraft having to fly low, land and take off in enemy infested areas need the basic protection of the likes of ESF. That may or may not be appropriate for their civilian counterparts, it is essential for them. It is an example of where the MAA would have a differing agenda to the CAA and would be complementary to it, not part of it. At the end of the day the task of a military aircraft and its crew is to successfully carry out the task allotted it, if necessary to its own destruction. The MAA would merely attempt to make that success more certain and the survivability of the crew more likely.
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Chug,
But how would it be independent of the MOD? If a SoS is still to have responsibility, then even if the deckchairs were shuffled round within the government, true independence isn't achieved, merely another smokescreen. Civil regulation is demonstrably independent of the manufacturers, owners, operators and customers - that's why it works.
sw
But how would it be independent of the MOD? If a SoS is still to have responsibility, then even if the deckchairs were shuffled round within the government, true independence isn't achieved, merely another smokescreen. Civil regulation is demonstrably independent of the manufacturers, owners, operators and customers - that's why it works.
sw
I don't envisage the SoS for Defence being responsible, independence makes that impossible. Nesting the MAA with the CAA, to share expertise and facilities, would imply sharing the same SoS as them surely?
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Sorry SW, I don't see the word 'civil' in my post.
I have to say that your reply smacks of a 'it's all too hard to sort out attitude' that seems so prevalent. Are you really suggesting that a system involving some level of independent oversight and assurance could not be established ?
As for the question above, to be honest, for someone with your background, I am very surprised. Read some of the more recent posts and have another think about it !
S_H
I have to say that your reply smacks of a 'it's all too hard to sort out attitude' that seems so prevalent. Are you really suggesting that a system involving some level of independent oversight and assurance could not be established ?
But then how does one consider military equipment such as AAR, which become a core part of the aircraft?
S_H