Luxair F50 Crash: Pilot's Fault
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I was told this afternoon that the final report will be released on Dec 15. Those who have seen the latest version say its current conclusions are rather direct and very critical to both the pilots and the airline.
wait and see.
wait and see.
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beta rabge selection
Hi,
Looking through the report, I'm still wondering what the position of the power levers was during the last part of the approach.
I can't seem to find whether the levers were in flight idle, or below that.
This is a rather important part, since there is also a mechanical lock on the levers preventing inadvertent selection of power below flight idle.
Did the props go into beta range at gear down selection because the mechanical lock was lifted, and the (non-modified) anti-skid system signalled spin-up? Or was there a fault in the Power lever angle measering as well?
Spuis
P.S. 4000 hours for a turboprop captain doesn't seem inexperienced to me.
Looking through the report, I'm still wondering what the position of the power levers was during the last part of the approach.
I can't seem to find whether the levers were in flight idle, or below that.
This is a rather important part, since there is also a mechanical lock on the levers preventing inadvertent selection of power below flight idle.
Did the props go into beta range at gear down selection because the mechanical lock was lifted, and the (non-modified) anti-skid system signalled spin-up? Or was there a fault in the Power lever angle measering as well?
Spuis
P.S. 4000 hours for a turboprop captain doesn't seem inexperienced to me.
Spuis
There doesn’t seem to be any data for power lever angle on the FDR. However the propeller low pitch parameter indicates that the beta mode was engaged (or available?) for approximately 16 secs; this appears to be coincident with gear lowering, the reason given in the report.
Thus as your post suggests the mechanical lock was lifted and the secondary device was not available due to some other cause yet to be determined. I assume it to be normal practice for the crew to select flight idle, relying on the mechanical lock to prevent beta range in the air. The crew may or may not have been aware of the design weakness that lifts the lock for 16 secs with gear lowering. If the crew believed that the aircraft was modified then the need for awareness during gear lowering was not required. There does not appear to be any evidence that the crew lifted the lock; I could accept that the timing of the low pitch indication with the gear down is circumstantial, but the engine parameters indicated idle, descent was commenced, and flap selected much earlier, thus I hope that the logical conclusion ties the lock to the gear.
Some crew may have detected that the power levers were displaced further rearward than usual, I do not know what the physical dimension is, but many crews in high workload situations have missed similar cues and also ‘forget’ any awareness of design weakness if applicable. Thus at best it may be concluded that the crew were unwise to continue the approach with changing circumstances, but I suspect that there are some of us who have done something similar, and probably all of us wish that we had the wisdom of hindsight after poor judgment.
There doesn’t seem to be any data for power lever angle on the FDR. However the propeller low pitch parameter indicates that the beta mode was engaged (or available?) for approximately 16 secs; this appears to be coincident with gear lowering, the reason given in the report.
Thus as your post suggests the mechanical lock was lifted and the secondary device was not available due to some other cause yet to be determined. I assume it to be normal practice for the crew to select flight idle, relying on the mechanical lock to prevent beta range in the air. The crew may or may not have been aware of the design weakness that lifts the lock for 16 secs with gear lowering. If the crew believed that the aircraft was modified then the need for awareness during gear lowering was not required. There does not appear to be any evidence that the crew lifted the lock; I could accept that the timing of the low pitch indication with the gear down is circumstantial, but the engine parameters indicated idle, descent was commenced, and flap selected much earlier, thus I hope that the logical conclusion ties the lock to the gear.
Some crew may have detected that the power levers were displaced further rearward than usual, I do not know what the physical dimension is, but many crews in high workload situations have missed similar cues and also ‘forget’ any awareness of design weakness if applicable. Thus at best it may be concluded that the crew were unwise to continue the approach with changing circumstances, but I suspect that there are some of us who have done something similar, and probably all of us wish that we had the wisdom of hindsight after poor judgment.
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ALF5071h,
What I was aiming at is the following:
Were the power levers selected below flight idle (thus lifting the mechanical stop, or it being broken), or was there a fault in the PLA pick-up (sensing ground idle with power levers actually being in flight idle.
On the F50 the range from flight to ground idle is approx. 3-4 cm.
We will just have to wait for the entire report.
Spuis
What I was aiming at is the following:
Were the power levers selected below flight idle (thus lifting the mechanical stop, or it being broken), or was there a fault in the PLA pick-up (sensing ground idle with power levers actually being in flight idle.
On the F50 the range from flight to ground idle is approx. 3-4 cm.
We will just have to wait for the entire report.
Spuis
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When 411a talks about experience, I actually concur with his philosophy. While 2800 hrs TOT is not to be sneezed at, his total time and age would suggest that he has not faced a diverse range of operational conditions and experiences, from which maturity evolves.
Being experienced in a narrow spectrum of the industry can lull a driver with lots of TOT into a false sense of accomplishment.
411 sounds (like any pilot who has bent a little metal...) as though he values this diversity in work experience to make calculated risk-assessments - but not in a rushed context. This is an error commonly made by "inexperienced" pilots.
I will expect this to be a causal contribution to the accident.
The Canadian MOT encourages us to learn from the mistakes of others, as we probably won't live long enough to make them all ourselves...
Being experienced in a narrow spectrum of the industry can lull a driver with lots of TOT into a false sense of accomplishment.
411 sounds (like any pilot who has bent a little metal...) as though he values this diversity in work experience to make calculated risk-assessments - but not in a rushed context. This is an error commonly made by "inexperienced" pilots.
I will expect this to be a causal contribution to the accident.
The Canadian MOT encourages us to learn from the mistakes of others, as we probably won't live long enough to make them all ourselves...
16 seconds at Flight Idle, not Beta
Spuis, As I mentioned before, the preliminary report shows the crew reduced power to 0% torque and did not encounter prop pitch below 10 degrees for 16 seconds until the gear began coming down.
Once the first prop went into low pitch, they were in the air for only another 11 seconds if one takes the end of the CVR as time of impact.
Once the first prop went into low pitch, they were in the air for only another 11 seconds if one takes the end of the CVR as time of impact.
ortotrotel
Whilst not disagreeing with your observations on total hours and experience, it would be disappointing for ‘inexperience’ to be given a contributing factor in this or any accident.
At some stage in our flying careers we have been or still are, inexperienced. Thus taking your point to the extreme then all of us may contribute to an accident; that contribution I suggest is not one of inexperience, but of human error.
Inexperienced pilots, either by low hours or by less exposure to a range of situations may make different mistakes from those made by the more experienced pilots. We all make mistakes; it is more likely to be the way that the more experienced pilots mitigate their errors or recover from mistakes that prevents their accidents. Thus the problem for the industry to solve is how to provide the less experienced crews with error detection, mitigation, and recovery techniques. Whilst previously this was seen to be airmanship, regrettably today it requires more rules and procedures with the associated loss of flexibility.
The accident investigation needs to identify the specific errors that contributed to this accident and the causes of the errors.
Whilst not disagreeing with your observations on total hours and experience, it would be disappointing for ‘inexperience’ to be given a contributing factor in this or any accident.
At some stage in our flying careers we have been or still are, inexperienced. Thus taking your point to the extreme then all of us may contribute to an accident; that contribution I suggest is not one of inexperience, but of human error.
Inexperienced pilots, either by low hours or by less exposure to a range of situations may make different mistakes from those made by the more experienced pilots. We all make mistakes; it is more likely to be the way that the more experienced pilots mitigate their errors or recover from mistakes that prevents their accidents. Thus the problem for the industry to solve is how to provide the less experienced crews with error detection, mitigation, and recovery techniques. Whilst previously this was seen to be airmanship, regrettably today it requires more rules and procedures with the associated loss of flexibility.
The accident investigation needs to identify the specific errors that contributed to this accident and the causes of the errors.
“There are no such things as accidents. What we call an accident is the effect of some cause which we did not see” - after Voltaire
Last edited by alf5071h; 16th Dec 2003 at 23:04.
Re Safetypee’s request for a web link to the Turboprop version of the PSM+ICR training guide. I cannot find any link via the FAA or CAA, but the following key documents are posted at this site; Turboprop PSM+ICR
PSM+ICR report summary.pdf
engine types.pdf
propeller fundamentals.pdf
asymmetric flight.pdf
simulating engine failure.pdf
I suggest 'right click' and 'Save Target as' for downloads.
PSM+ICR report summary.pdf
engine types.pdf
propeller fundamentals.pdf
asymmetric flight.pdf
simulating engine failure.pdf
I suggest 'right click' and 'Save Target as' for downloads.
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Nov 6th 2002,
A sad day for everyone, the final report can be found here.
Final Report.
Let those who lost lives and their families rest in peace.
We can all learn from this, find better ways and try prevent series of events like these happening.
Brgds.
A sad day for everyone, the final report can be found here.
Final Report.
Let those who lost lives and their families rest in peace.
We can all learn from this, find better ways and try prevent series of events like these happening.
Brgds.
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And if you want to have the additional 114 pages of annexes look here: Report Annexes
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Quote from the final report:
This is in my opinion an important lesson from this accident, and something all pilots of the Fk50 and similar turboprops should review.
Not withstanding the existing recommendations and procedures, it appears that intentional override of the primary flight idle stop on turboprops in flight is not excluded.
The existing design of the Fokker 27 Mk050 does not prevent the selection in flight of the propeller pitch setting below the flight idle regime.
The existing design of the Fokker 27 Mk050 does not prevent the selection in flight of the propeller pitch setting below the flight idle regime.
Last edited by PropsAreForBoats; 12th Dec 2003 at 22:53.
The complete failure of a safety management system.
I am pleased to see that the very comprehensive final report addresses several human factors issues that contributed to the accident. The report identifies blatant errors and places them in context of an operational accident; unfortunately this was not an operational accident and thus the investigation has chosen an inappropriate primary cause. There is also a short fall in the human factors investigation by failing to give an understanding, or at least a theory, as to why the crew shut down both engines.
The report gives the primary cause of the accident thus: (my italics, assuming ‘initial’ means primary from the translation)
Even with the care shown in this report why do investigators in general fall back on the operating crew for being the primary cause of an accident?
This crew was the unfortunate (possibly deficient), last link in the error chain. This accident was waiting to happen; any one of a number of previous crews who, if they too had violated the flight idle restriction (which may have been common practice) during the critical 16 secs during gear selection at low altitude may have lost control. It would at best be speculative to suggest that any other crew would have handled the unique flight characteristics resulting from full in-flight reverse and the associated confusing engine displays in any better way than did the accident crew.
Thus the primary cause from an engineering perspective could have been stated as the loss of control due to both engines giving reverse thrust or a combination of reverse and engine shutdown.
Yet in reality the primary cause was the complete failure of the safety management system, from the authority at one extreme to individual crew at the other. The safety system was riddled with assumptions, allowed violating behavior by both individuals and organisation, and lacked the use of error checking or mitigating techniques.
The aircraft crashed because the right engine remained in reverse, the left engine was shut down, and then the right engine was shut down. The failure to explain or present a theory as to why the crew shut down both engines deprives the industry of further understanding human error. (I accept the difficulties due to lack of recorded data).
As the result of assumption, error, personal failing, and many other reported circumstances, both engines were in reverse in the air. The crew sensed that something was abnormal (seat of the pants), deceleration, pitch down. They certainly heard abnormalities in prop speed (probably the dominant cue) and had confusing engine indications: very high prop rpm, increasing engine speed with flight idle selected. The crew apparently detected the error, the recovery action was unsuccessful (right engine remained in reverse).
Immediately prior to engine shutdown the crew would have had a gross thrust abnormality, the right engine remained in reverse, but the left was recovering to give positive thrust, thus the crew might have been expected to detect a right hand engine failure (dead leg dead engine from rudder input), but why was the left engine was shut down first, and then later the right?
The engine indications were split, the left engine had lower values than the right; there was no evidence that the crew detected an engine failure or called for shut down drills. Thus was the left engine shutdown by mistake?
The problem was compounded by the short time period; was the right engine shut down because of prop over speed - the failure to recover from beta range. Then why shut down both engines, was each engine was shut down by different crew members? It is the details of these actions that are the key factors that led to the crash.
If both propellers had been recovered to normal flight range then the aircraft may well have continued in a flyable condition i.e. the accident would not have happened; yet this issue is not included in the discussion, or the reason for the right propeller failing to recover from beta range (except in appendix 22). A recommendation should be at least to brief crews that having entered beta range if they then required full power (baulked landing) the power levers should only be moved forward carefully avoiding slamming to the forward stop.
The answers to the human factor issues could reside in the training programs, in previous / basic training, or other experiences including firewalling power levers or rushing engine shutdown, but these aspects were not investigated in depth. For generic information see the the full PSM+ICR report ;human factors issues at 4.2.12 and section 8; ops issues at 4.2.11; training at 7.2 and 7.2.4.
This accident is a lesson for all who think that by passing one defense (flight idle stop) with reliance on another, that they will not be exposed to risk. Whatever the aircraft or engine type, always stay within the limitation of the AFM.
This was a tragic accident that matched most if not all issues that were identified by the PSM+ICR project report. Also the background and the circumstances have been described previously by J Reason in “Human Error” and “Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents”; unworthy epitaphs for those who lost their lives.
The report gives the primary cause of the accident thus: (my italics, assuming ‘initial’ means primary from the translation)
The initial (primary) cause of the accident was the acceptance by the crew of the approach clearance although they were not prepared to it, namely the absence of preparation of a go-around. It led the crew to perform a series of improvised actions that ended in the prohibited override of the primary stop on the power levers.
This crew was the unfortunate (possibly deficient), last link in the error chain. This accident was waiting to happen; any one of a number of previous crews who, if they too had violated the flight idle restriction (which may have been common practice) during the critical 16 secs during gear selection at low altitude may have lost control. It would at best be speculative to suggest that any other crew would have handled the unique flight characteristics resulting from full in-flight reverse and the associated confusing engine displays in any better way than did the accident crew.
Thus the primary cause from an engineering perspective could have been stated as the loss of control due to both engines giving reverse thrust or a combination of reverse and engine shutdown.
Yet in reality the primary cause was the complete failure of the safety management system, from the authority at one extreme to individual crew at the other. The safety system was riddled with assumptions, allowed violating behavior by both individuals and organisation, and lacked the use of error checking or mitigating techniques.
The aircraft crashed because the right engine remained in reverse, the left engine was shut down, and then the right engine was shut down. The failure to explain or present a theory as to why the crew shut down both engines deprives the industry of further understanding human error. (I accept the difficulties due to lack of recorded data).
As the result of assumption, error, personal failing, and many other reported circumstances, both engines were in reverse in the air. The crew sensed that something was abnormal (seat of the pants), deceleration, pitch down. They certainly heard abnormalities in prop speed (probably the dominant cue) and had confusing engine indications: very high prop rpm, increasing engine speed with flight idle selected. The crew apparently detected the error, the recovery action was unsuccessful (right engine remained in reverse).
Immediately prior to engine shutdown the crew would have had a gross thrust abnormality, the right engine remained in reverse, but the left was recovering to give positive thrust, thus the crew might have been expected to detect a right hand engine failure (dead leg dead engine from rudder input), but why was the left engine was shut down first, and then later the right?
The engine indications were split, the left engine had lower values than the right; there was no evidence that the crew detected an engine failure or called for shut down drills. Thus was the left engine shutdown by mistake?
The problem was compounded by the short time period; was the right engine shut down because of prop over speed - the failure to recover from beta range. Then why shut down both engines, was each engine was shut down by different crew members? It is the details of these actions that are the key factors that led to the crash.
If both propellers had been recovered to normal flight range then the aircraft may well have continued in a flyable condition i.e. the accident would not have happened; yet this issue is not included in the discussion, or the reason for the right propeller failing to recover from beta range (except in appendix 22). A recommendation should be at least to brief crews that having entered beta range if they then required full power (baulked landing) the power levers should only be moved forward carefully avoiding slamming to the forward stop.
The answers to the human factor issues could reside in the training programs, in previous / basic training, or other experiences including firewalling power levers or rushing engine shutdown, but these aspects were not investigated in depth. For generic information see the the full PSM+ICR report ;human factors issues at 4.2.12 and section 8; ops issues at 4.2.11; training at 7.2 and 7.2.4.
This accident is a lesson for all who think that by passing one defense (flight idle stop) with reliance on another, that they will not be exposed to risk. Whatever the aircraft or engine type, always stay within the limitation of the AFM.
This was a tragic accident that matched most if not all issues that were identified by the PSM+ICR project report. Also the background and the circumstances have been described previously by J Reason in “Human Error” and “Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents”; unworthy epitaphs for those who lost their lives.
Unions oppose FDM
Flight International reports that the unions oppose the introduction of Flight Data Monitoring (accident report recommendation). Why does the union, the flight crews themselves, have objections to the use of a modern safety aid? Don’t they realize that it is their own interest – improved safety?
If they don’t like FDM, then use LOSA; the crews could run that system themselves in a modified form. Use of LOSA could have identified some of the errors in the F50 accident in time to have prevented it.
If they don’t like FDM, then use LOSA; the crews could run that system themselves in a modified form. Use of LOSA could have identified some of the errors in the F50 accident in time to have prevented it.
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411A brings up an interesting issue regarding pilot experience. The European philosophy is a little different when it comes to pilot hiering procedures. If you have 300 TT and can pass the VERY important two day aptitude tests/IQ tests, then you have what it takes. They really don't emphesise to much on flight experience, because you will be TRAINED.
The problem with this is that you will be placed in the right seat as a first officer. You are logging several thousand hours of pilot time but everything is SIC time. We all know how easy it is sitting in the right seat, not having to make any decisions and the decisions you do have to make are always "overlooked" up by a captain.
Than one day you upgraded to captain with a lot of total time but perhaps only a few hundred PIC and you are placed with a 300 hour co-pilot.....now suddenly YOU are the one in charge with nobody to back up your actions.
In the USA things are a little different. There you gain valuable PIC expreience by flying cargo/charter/flight instruction etc. There you learn to be in charge and gain captain experience flying light singles/twins before meeting the airline requirements.
I just got hired flying EMB-145 with 2800 TT and 2600 PIC. Currently flying as captain(single pilot) on King Air 200/100/90 and Navajos.
I have learned to make dicisions whitch in my humble opinion is the hard part....not the flying.
The problem with this is that you will be placed in the right seat as a first officer. You are logging several thousand hours of pilot time but everything is SIC time. We all know how easy it is sitting in the right seat, not having to make any decisions and the decisions you do have to make are always "overlooked" up by a captain.
Than one day you upgraded to captain with a lot of total time but perhaps only a few hundred PIC and you are placed with a 300 hour co-pilot.....now suddenly YOU are the one in charge with nobody to back up your actions.
In the USA things are a little different. There you gain valuable PIC expreience by flying cargo/charter/flight instruction etc. There you learn to be in charge and gain captain experience flying light singles/twins before meeting the airline requirements.
I just got hired flying EMB-145 with 2800 TT and 2600 PIC. Currently flying as captain(single pilot) on King Air 200/100/90 and Navajos.
I have learned to make dicisions whitch in my humble opinion is the hard part....not the flying.
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I see the cause of this accident from this perspective:
we don't train our Captains to be Great Captains.
In the (very) old days, the Captain was capable of coming back after takeoff if he discovered his preferred brand of whisky was not on board...
Ridicolous for nowadays standards, of course.
But it's on this trait of the character that I want to focus here.
The Captain was and felt like a God, the master of his world.
We all know the culture has changed a lot in the last decades, also because many accidents have been attributed to this kind of behaviour, called machismo.
In Tenerife machismo caused the worst accident ever, right?
Hmmmmmmm... wait a minute.
Can't we say that if the American crew had been more macho, more capable of dominating their environment, less afraid of hurting the controller's feelings, instead of worring all the time about what was going on, they would have grabbed the mike and asked directly to KLM " Hey mate, where the **** are you, be careful we're on the active runway behind you!" ?
What I' m trying to say is that too many Captains today are
weak individuals.
They really have a hard time resisting all the psycological pressures imposed by the system.
I remember when I was an ATR copilot in Europe, I was ashamed by the weaknesses too many Captains demonstrated, even the experienced ones.
The commercial pressures have become so many in this exasperated competitive market, thet it's very difficult to an individual who doesn't have balls to say NO .
Too many accidents have happened because the crew was incapable of saying NO.
Air Florida, dozens of others, and eventually, Luxembourg.
In this last tragedy, the captain was skilled and experienced, but obviously, a weak individual.
Didn't he know that making a detailed briefing before every approach is a must, and especially in CAT II, didn't he know that checking the glideslope (alt vs distance) is a must , didn't he know thet being fully configured with the landing cklist completed before 1000ft in CAT I is a must ???????
Yes, he certainly knew all that.
Selecting reverse in flight was the last stupid action of a desperate individual.
Being strong is hard sometimes, we all know it, and that's where management and senior Captains failed pathetically:
they failed to set an example in everyday operations, to forge young pilots to a certain character, a character capable of saying loudly "Fu*k the schedule, fu*k the fuel consumption, fu*k everybody, I am in command and that's the way I'll do it...".
Nor the Luxair captain nor the copilot had this strenght and ability behind them, and when they accepted the approach clearance they accepted their death sentence.
I'd like to tell a little episode regarding myself, even if I'm a bit embarrassed for obvious reasons, and also for my colleagues:
some months ago, during sim ckrides, our chief pilot put in the same scenario for every crew: engine failure after go around and purposely too early approach clearance for the ILS, about 6 miles from threshold, while in the middle of abnormal cklist and stuff...
Well, after I replied firmly "Negative sir, we are not ready for the approach, we'll call you back when ready in about 3 minutes", he bursted into applause sayind I had been the only one not to fall in the trap (I can imagine what orrible mess followed for my colleagues when they closed to the ILS with still a thousand things to do!).
Embarrassing to tell (no pilot could resist a sense of proudness after such words)
, but what I'm trying to say is: why the hell the others had no force to say NO?
I was fortunate enough to have a strong model, a quite rude Captain who was famous for his bad character, but was definitely a great individual: my father.
The F50 captain also had a Captain father, but certainly of a different nature...
I'm glad he and his son survived the crash, to live forever in shame for those who lost their relatives.
LEM
we don't train our Captains to be Great Captains.
In the (very) old days, the Captain was capable of coming back after takeoff if he discovered his preferred brand of whisky was not on board...
Ridicolous for nowadays standards, of course.
But it's on this trait of the character that I want to focus here.
The Captain was and felt like a God, the master of his world.
We all know the culture has changed a lot in the last decades, also because many accidents have been attributed to this kind of behaviour, called machismo.
In Tenerife machismo caused the worst accident ever, right?
Hmmmmmmm... wait a minute.
Can't we say that if the American crew had been more macho, more capable of dominating their environment, less afraid of hurting the controller's feelings, instead of worring all the time about what was going on, they would have grabbed the mike and asked directly to KLM " Hey mate, where the **** are you, be careful we're on the active runway behind you!" ?
What I' m trying to say is that too many Captains today are
weak individuals.
They really have a hard time resisting all the psycological pressures imposed by the system.
I remember when I was an ATR copilot in Europe, I was ashamed by the weaknesses too many Captains demonstrated, even the experienced ones.
The commercial pressures have become so many in this exasperated competitive market, thet it's very difficult to an individual who doesn't have balls to say NO .
Too many accidents have happened because the crew was incapable of saying NO.
Air Florida, dozens of others, and eventually, Luxembourg.
In this last tragedy, the captain was skilled and experienced, but obviously, a weak individual.
Didn't he know that making a detailed briefing before every approach is a must, and especially in CAT II, didn't he know that checking the glideslope (alt vs distance) is a must , didn't he know thet being fully configured with the landing cklist completed before 1000ft in CAT I is a must ???????
Yes, he certainly knew all that.
Selecting reverse in flight was the last stupid action of a desperate individual.
Being strong is hard sometimes, we all know it, and that's where management and senior Captains failed pathetically:
they failed to set an example in everyday operations, to forge young pilots to a certain character, a character capable of saying loudly "Fu*k the schedule, fu*k the fuel consumption, fu*k everybody, I am in command and that's the way I'll do it...".
Nor the Luxair captain nor the copilot had this strenght and ability behind them, and when they accepted the approach clearance they accepted their death sentence.
I'd like to tell a little episode regarding myself, even if I'm a bit embarrassed for obvious reasons, and also for my colleagues:
some months ago, during sim ckrides, our chief pilot put in the same scenario for every crew: engine failure after go around and purposely too early approach clearance for the ILS, about 6 miles from threshold, while in the middle of abnormal cklist and stuff...
Well, after I replied firmly "Negative sir, we are not ready for the approach, we'll call you back when ready in about 3 minutes", he bursted into applause sayind I had been the only one not to fall in the trap (I can imagine what orrible mess followed for my colleagues when they closed to the ILS with still a thousand things to do!).
Embarrassing to tell (no pilot could resist a sense of proudness after such words)
, but what I'm trying to say is: why the hell the others had no force to say NO?I was fortunate enough to have a strong model, a quite rude Captain who was famous for his bad character, but was definitely a great individual: my father.
The F50 captain also had a Captain father, but certainly of a different nature...
I'm glad he and his son survived the crash, to live forever in shame for those who lost their relatives.
LEM
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Safetypee
For info, Flight International only states what Management said, which is not really the truth. FDM is in use in Luxair for about a year already (737 and E145 fleets).
For info, Flight International only states what Management said, which is not really the truth. FDM is in use in Luxair for about a year already (737 and E145 fleets).
Flight Data Monitoring
KmarK, but another quote was that although data gathering was in use on the 737 and E145 aircraft, the data was not looked at i.e. no monitoring; thus, FDM as a safety tool was not in use.
The use of FDM would not have prevented this accident. There is nothing in the crash FDR data that would have shown the human errors that occurred. Right up to the last piece of data the crash may have been avoided; the loss of FDR data was due to both engines being shut down as was the cause of the accident.
FDRs do not answer why a crew would shut down two engines. An alternative LOSA programme might have detected previous instances of less than ideal CRM, rushed procedures, and deliberate or inadvertent lifting of the idle baulk. Detecting these behaviors and taking corrective action may have avoided the accident.
The use of FDM would not have prevented this accident. There is nothing in the crash FDR data that would have shown the human errors that occurred. Right up to the last piece of data the crash may have been avoided; the loss of FDR data was due to both engines being shut down as was the cause of the accident.
FDRs do not answer why a crew would shut down two engines. An alternative LOSA programme might have detected previous instances of less than ideal CRM, rushed procedures, and deliberate or inadvertent lifting of the idle baulk. Detecting these behaviors and taking corrective action may have avoided the accident.
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I'll basically agree with you LEM,
As too often, I have seen captains unable too say NO, no to the rushed approach,or.. or, or even no to the stupid rostering that are sometime the initial step on the dreaded path to a incident.
Must I confess, to my whole shame, that I have sometime been one of them? It's soo much easier too yield that to fight everybody alone because nowadays safety seems an obscene word with money the only motto.
But the
"I am in command and that's the way I'll do it..." attitude can easily backfire
Authoritarism should (in my opinon) be banned from the cockit with the weakness of character you denonced.
All is a question of balance and circumstances,
Never said it was an easy job
As too often, I have seen captains unable too say NO, no to the rushed approach,or.. or, or even no to the stupid rostering that are sometime the initial step on the dreaded path to a incident.
Must I confess, to my whole shame, that I have sometime been one of them? It's soo much easier too yield that to fight everybody alone because nowadays safety seems an obscene word with money the only motto.
But the
"I am in command and that's the way I'll do it..." attitude can easily backfire
Authoritarism should (in my opinon) be banned from the cockit with the weakness of character you denonced.
All is a question of balance and circumstances,
Never said it was an easy job