KAL's next crash, just around the corner?

[spam in a can]

Firstly apologies for this posting as this is fact and neither KAL bashing nor rumours.. .A B747-400 taking off from Auckland to Fiji commenced it's take-off roll without setting the flaps. The take-off config warning alerted the crew, but they did not stop.(F/O was PF)The F/O was shouting at the Captain to stop but he wouldn't. Instead they selected flaps to 20 degrees during the roll. The flaps only reached 3 degrees by Vr. By 100 feet they had only reached 7 degrees. The only reason they didn't crash was probably because the aircraft was light. When the F/O was asked why he didn't initiate a reject, it was because the ops manual states only the Captain can initiate a rejected take-off. Unbelievably this is the second time this has happened this year.. .Also last week an airbus A300-600 registered 2.4g on landing obviously damaging the undercarriage.. .There have also been several GPWS incidents such as the B747-400 which was on the approach into Manila which descended so low it had a GPWS warning for 16 seconds, but it took the crew 10 seconds before initiating a recovery manoeuver.. .Or the Airbus which initiated a descent instead of a climb as it generated a GPWS warning. Then the crew climbed over the ridge prior to descending down the otherside.. .Or how about the 737 which had a tailstrike on landing. The crew didn't notice the damage on the transit walkround, and flew another sector. . .Or the B747-200 which had part of the trailing edge flap detatch and impact the fuselage, as the crew selected 10 degrees of flap at 1000ft, but at a speed way in excess of the flap limit speed.. .Last month 12 pilots failed their recurrent checks.. .But I read that KAL are codesharing again with Delta and Air France, because they are adequately addressing their safety record, what a joke!. .Next time you see a KAL 747 fly over the M25 on take-off, look to see where the flaps are, because one day.......

[jtr]

What are KAL doing flying Auckland-Fiji in a 400? <img border="0" title="" alt="[Confused]" src="confused.gif" />

[akerosid]

I thought that the 744 (in common with most airliners nowadays) had a system which prevented the setting of t/o power if the flaps/slats had not been set at all? Surely there must have been some system which would have told him to stop? And although this was a relatively short flight, surely there would have been a heavy crew on board, for the onward flight to ICN; what were they doing?

[spam in a can]

You are right there is a take-off configuration warning system which activates the master warning system and provides an aural alert. But the crew unbelievably chose to ignore it, this warning system would have been sounding throughout the take-off roll, yet they still continued.. .The flight operates from Auckland to Nandi (Fiji) and then onto Seoul. The scary thing is, you or your family could be on board the next one and might not be so lucky. Things are better in KAL as I've whitnessed over the last three years. But they are still not good enough and every sector with a local at the controls whilst you're a passenger is a white knuckle ride. Just ask for other pilots own experiences, they are both unbelievable and shocking. KAL should not be allowed to get away with this terrible low standard of operation anymore. I think that Air France and Delta have either been hoodwinked or it's a political decision to codeshare.

[NorthernSky]

A few facts:. .. .First, it's not only KAL who have experienced this recently. Some much better respected carriers are also worried about these issues at present.. .. .Second, for the benefit of akerosid, the system only provides an alert, it does nothing to 'prevent' take-off.. .. .Third, some aircraft have a wide range of flap settings available, for example flap 1 for a normal take-off and flap 15 for a short field. Most (all?) aircraft alerting systems do not check only that the flaps are not up, not that the correct flap setting has been deployed. This really isn't good enough. Bear in mind that there are significant human factors concerns over flap mis-setting. Usually, it must be said, you'll get airborne by the end of the strip, so long as you've got some flap down.. .. .Fourth, (as if it was needed), this is further proof that a two pilot flight deck, in which one pilot is disqualified from taking certain actions, or decisions, is downright dangerous. Regulators who require two pilots in the flight deck should legislate to ensure that they are both doing a worthwhile job. The FO in the incident mentioned, was not.. .. .Spam is right - it's only a matter of where, not if.. .. .Ironically, I can't help feeling that this is one area where press intervention could do some good - anyone from the local papers near Heathrow reading this?

[akerosid]

Thanks Northern Sky; I knew the warning system wouldn't physically prevent the aircraft from departing, but thought the blaring aural warning would suggest that this might not be altogether a wise thing. . .. .However, you mention this wasn't the only airline involved? Who else . . .

[NorthernSky]

'Naming names' would cause me immense grief, I'm sorry to say. That aside, my point is more that there is probably a lot more of this going on than anyone admits, and when the large aluminium death tube hits your house, the last thing to affect the damage it does, is what's painted on the tail.. .. .Whilst we're on the topic of audio warnings, might I mention Mr Boeing's wonderful horn? The same continuous tone is used for takeoff configuration alert as for high cabin altitude. The crews will occasionally hear the tone on the ground when they put the thrust levers forward. They should never hear it in the air. Thus, they 'learn' that the horn is ONLY the takeoff configuration warning, and they forget about its role in warning of high cabin altitude.. .. .How many crews have sat there, wondering why the takeoff configuration warning is going off in the cruise?. .. .Of course, if you don't get your oxygen mask on PDQ, you won't make any more errors.

[Stratocaster]

Reminds me the <a href="http://aviation-safety.net/database/1999/990831-0.htm" target="_blank">B737 LAPA</a> crash in Buenos Aires where they also forgot the flaps.. .. .Except that in that case you can hear the warning horn all the way 'til the CVR stops. 63 people died.. .. .Is CRM part of the Skyteam audit ?

[NorthernSky]

Worth mentioning that one recent event involved an aircraft with a U/S configuration warning. (Major carrier, 737-200, in the UK).

[luddite]

Oops! I didn't realise you were with me that day NorthernSky - did I feel a prat when I finally worked out what that horn was trying to tell me..... . . . <small>[ 03 March 2002, 21:18: Message edited by: luddite ]</small>

[NorthernSky]

Ah, no, Luddite. My interest in and knowledge of this specific issue remains purely theoretical.. .. .Someone else perhaps - and they didn't know either!!!???

[Algy]

12 Feb 2000, 757 heavy landing at El Salvador, same crew flies same aircraft back to Atlanta, line engineeers notice "buckled" fuselage, aircraft nevertheless despatched to LAX, line engineers also see buckled fuselage - further investigation reveals "bent and fractured" structural members in nosegear well. Now who was that, oh yes, that was Delta Air Lines.

[Diesel8]

Well, according to news sources, KAL has filed for anti trust immunity with the US DOJ, to expand their pacific flying. Further, after review by the FAA and Delta, KAL's safety status has been restored.. .. .Flight Safety has apparently taught them how to operate in a safer manner, including CRM.. .. .But, if the rumours and incidences listed here are. .true, then another crash does seem to be coming sooner rather than later.. .. .Algy, I think you need to review KAL's saftey record, 11 majors incidents or accidents in less than ten years and those are only the big ones. Almost all airlines has a safety record better than that, including so called third world airlines.

[Jopa]

spam in a can,. .. ."The only reason they didn't crash was probably because the aircraft was light.". .. .Well, to me, the only reason they didn't crash is because God is great and immense and also because He's a member of SKYPASS, KAL's frequent flyers program.. .. .Cheers,

[Spiraldiver]

I used to work the ramp before I got my wings, and we had the KAL ground contract in YVR. . .. .Their 747's would regularly come in with the entire cargo hold configured improperly. No locks up. The whole pile of containers and pallets sliding back and forth, back and forth.. .. .It usually took a while to reconfigure for departure, so they always ran a little late. And when it started to look like they would miss the ontime dep., a hoard of Korean managers (8-10) would climb into the hold and start pulling at locks. Finding that they could't do anything to speed up the process, they would start to run in circles (no mean feat in the belly of a '47) shouting:. .. ."Put-in ,shut door, Put-in, shut door". .. .At which time we would tell them to leave or we would never sign off their departure.. .. .I see the competence extends right up to the cockpit. Could'nt pay me to fly on them.

[knows]

Just to add to the above; there was a silly article in the FT today, saying that they hadn't had a crash for 2 years and were over their safety fears thanks to new training from Flight Safety! I don't think so.. .. .To think Delta and Air France code share and put pax onto these flights! Crazy.

[overfly]

Hey, I feel privileged - we flew LON / SEL/ Nandi/ AKL and return last autumn and enjoyed the experience.

[aloneincommand]

I don't know what is wrong with a KAL 747 taking off without flaps. Another airline, based just south of Korea, demonstrated few weeks ago that the A-340 can take off, with almost full weight, from a taxiway. They have also taken off without flaps and slats in the A-300 ignoring F/O and aurall warnings, they have flown the A-340 in final app. with landing configuration and TOGA power (not in missapproach) thus exceeding all limiting speeds. They have landed in the wrong runways, etc,etc,etc. The only thing they have not done is Crash again, but........ .. .Could there be any kind of competition between this two Airlines? I mean, to see which one is more lucky.. .Both Airlines have spent an obscene amount of money (which would be welcome in some other Airlines with economical problems) trying to improve their safety with new SOPs, CRM courses, English classes, technical meetings, etc, etc. But, yes, but something is still missing. If any of you guys know the answer, please let them know.. .Have in mind that one of this days you or someone close can buy a ticket with DL and get the ride of their live in a KAL airplane. <img border="0" title="" alt="[Wink]" src="wink.gif" />

[yellow dust]

Not fair, both airlines are really trying their best to raise the standards, you should give them credit where credit is due. For example, both airlines have cut the salary of their foreign pilots. This must surely raise morale and show the locals that they are making progress.

[Iso]

Yellow Dust, you really are safety orient-ated aren't you!

[N380UA]

Blueball. .. .The most experienced guy still crashes. May I bring to your attention to the Springbok 707 which crashed near Windhoek on climb out on 20 April 1968 killing 123 of 128 because the “elder” skipper was unable to read his panel – even while wearing his glasses.

[Stratocaster]

I have to agree with N380UA. We're all humans and never stop making mistakes. Experience doesn't garantee anything... unfortunately.. . <img border="0" title="" alt="[Smile]" src="smile.gif" />

[hellothere]

Spam In a Can:. .. .I hope the rumour is not true.. .. .However, I would like to ask you a Question.... .. .1. How can you tell if the flap is at 3 & 7 ??. .. .2. Are you sure you are a pilot?. .. .I hope you are not a airline pilot. Because you are also a dangerous pilot who doesn't know anything about the system of the aircraft.

[spam in a can]

I think you will find the 747-400 has several computer systems, monitoring 'events'. If not the FDR then the AIMS. Which will give you readouts of such events as I have stated. I think you will find that in my original post that I stated that the flaps were travelling to the take-off setting.. .Yes I am a pilot, almost 16,000 hours in my log book atest to this!

[exeng]

N380UA,. .. .&lt;&lt;the “elder” skipper was unable to read his panel – even while wearing his glasses.&gt;&gt;. .. .Surely that particular has more to do the Captain's A.M.E. than the individual himself. I should have thought that it goes without saying that any pilots recruited for a particular airline will have reasonable vision, regardless of age.. .. .Regards. .Exeng

[hellothere]

spam in a can:. .. .What are you trying to tell us ?. .. .Are you trying to tell us that you don't even have the read out?. .. .Are you trying to tell us that you don't exactly know what happened ?. .. .Oh boy.... .. .I feel bad that Korean Air had so many bad accidents and the accident can happen to any one of us. But spreading the rumour that you don't even know is very dangerous.. .. .I or anybody can spread roumours that is not true.. .. .If the incident really took place, I would like to see the proof. . .. .And if you don't, you are trully a one experienced pilot .

[spam in a can]

Hellothere,. .I think you work for KAL..as well..and trying to find out who I am!

[spam in a can]

Yes you are quite correct. But then the checklists are routinely carried out without checking the actions have been taken. As this case proves. Which is another reason that there will be another catastrophe.

[Spiraldiver]

Further to the above reply asking for information as to why KAL is still having problems. Two points:. .. .1. After a series of accidents involving Eastern airlines about 6 years ago, a study was done on attitudes in the cockpit, taking samples from all over the world. The survey was simple, and asked a question, exclusively to first and second officers. The question was this:. .. .If you had the choice of flying into the side of a mountain, or telling your Captain they are wrong, which would you choose?. .. .Among F/O's and S/O's that were products of eastern culture and training, and who were flying with Eastern airlines, 74 percent chose the mountain.. .. .Among F/O's and S/O's of other cultures worldwide, or pilots of any decent flying with airlines outside of the East, zero percent chose the mountain. . .. .Scares me to death.. .. .Second, I have personally witnessed the effects of this unusual attitude (the Captain is GOD) as I watched the COMING of the CAPTAIN onboard a KAL 747 getting ready for departure. . .. .All the flight attendants lined up and bowed and scraped as the F/O and S/O boarded the A/C. Then they joined the line and all bowed and scraped to the Captain as he (and it's always a he) swaggered up to the cockpit. . .. .Nice CRM.. .. .Having said that, I know someone who took the 5 year buy-in to be one of the occidental grey-hairs at the helm of a KAL '47.. .He made the mistake of asking his F/O to fly the approach into Anchorage, as the F/O was up for promotion to Captain in a few weeks after 12 years with the company.. . .. .The F/O outright missed 5 consecutive clearences to get lower. And in making up for the last one, sent the plane into freefall. The captain took control on final, when it was clear his F/O had no idea how high or how hot he was. They stopped with 50 yards of runway remaining. . .. .On asking his F/O how the hell he could fly that badly, he replied that in his 12 years, he had been offered the controls six times, and landed twiice.Four weeks later he was a Captain.. .. .Flying for KAL in the left seat is essentially like flying single-pilot IFR in a heavy. Always.. .. .The service is nice, but it comes with a heavy price. . .. .Fly safe.

[christep]

If this is true (and frankly it seems incredible to me), then obviously I find it extremely alarming. Please could you provide a source for this survey?

[Viastra]

Spam in a Can and friends,. .. .This sort of slanging away at an airline is very unprofessional and shows very clearly that your attitudes are part of the problem, not part of the solution. Life’s too short. Don’t stay with your old destructive attitudes….turn over a new leaf now and contribute instead of mocking.. .. .Do you know what hubris means? I don’t have my Pocket Oxford with me right now but Microsoft tells me it means : . .. .1. Excessive pride or arrogance. .. .2. The excessive pride and ambition that usually leads to the downfall of a hero in classical tragedy. .. .Let’s not kid ourselves. There isn’t an airline in the world that hasn’t had it’s share of real and “nearly” accidents. Go to any of the accident/incident websites and you’ll see lists that would make your hair stand on end if you didn’t know, as we all should, that there is a vast amount of goodwill and resources in most serious airlines (including Asian ones) devoted to learning from past problems. . .. ._ It wasn’t a Korean carrier that nearly took out some significant hills near SFO a little while ago after an engine failure on a 744.. .. ._ It wasn’t a Korean 757 whose crew talked about all manner of things as they winged their way to sudden mountain top death on descent into Columbia.. .. ._ It wasn’t a Korean carrier that sent an MD-80 off the end of a Little Rock runway in the midst of thunderstorms. .. ._ It wasn’t a Korean captain who ignored a call from his F/E: “Did he not clear the runway-that Pan American?” These were the last words of KLM 747 Flight Engineer William Schreuder. Moments later his aircraft collided with a Pan American 747 still on the runway at Tenerife. The accident was the worst in aviation history.. .. ._ It wasn’t a Korean crew who flew the first 330 glider into the Azores after managing to dump useable fuel overboard. .. ._ It wasn’t a Korean carrier that nearly had their Operator’s Certificate revoked after maintenance so poor that an MD-80 horizontal stabilizer came off in flight in California. .. ._ It wasn’t a Korean crew who conducted a classic “high and fast” approach leading to a landing that ended near a gas station on a Burbank road. .. ._ It wasn’t a Korean crew who destroyed a perfectly good MD-11 freighter in a landing accident at Boston. .. ._ It wasn’t a Korean Captain who tried to abort a go-round in a 744 at Bangkok and destroyed a perfectly good aircraft.. .. ._ It wasn’t a Korean F/O who shut down both engines on a 767 out of Hilo while cross-feeding.. .. .And the sad and bloody list goes on…... .. .Be very careful that the sin of hubris doesn’t catch you out. The above accidents and incidents all happened to large, very reputable carriers and I’m sure they had a few pilots too who thought that they were a cut above the rest of the world. If my grey hair has taught me anything it’s that anytime you feel that sort of superior thinking coming on, double check everything because something bad is about to happen.. .. .There are few airlines in the world doing as much as KAL (or making as much progress) to build a future based on an understanding of past problems. If “Spam in a Can” is serious about building flight safety (instead of knocking the significant progress made by Korean) then he should start using his undoubted CRM capabilities in the cockpit to ensure that the crews he flies with get the benefit of his vast experience.. .. .As you may well have the honour of being of British descent…may I remind you that but a few short years back as time goes, it was a bunch of your well educated, military trained aviation forebears who, rather than speak up, died in the R101 airship disaster. You might say…”Well the British have changed”…and well they might have. Just don’t get in the way of others who are learning from their mistakes.. .. .Spam in a Can, if you want any help with understanding how to turn over a new leaf and support whichever Asian airline pays your bills, send me an e-mail any time ([email protected]) and we can discuss your positive and happier future. I am always happy for my family to travel KAL. They’re in good hands. . .. .Safe flying. .. .Viastra.. .. .p.s. A few comments on the stuff just in from Spiral Diver.. .. .1. KAL don’t have Second Officers. .. .2. The crew don’t bow and scrape to the Captain…all Koreans bow to each other on first meeting formally. It‘s called politeness. (See Pocket Oxford Dictionary). .. .3. I have never, ever, ever, ever seen a Korean national Captain “swagger” on board. A few foreigners do though. . .. .4. Yes, all Captains should all have the humility of, for example, a BA Captain…some fall short though. Sorry.. .. .5. When a plane hits a mountain with a “western First Officer” who had his mouth clamped shut or didn’t see it coming (e.g. AAL at Columbia, DanAir at the Canaries, UAL (nearly!) at SFO) is the impact softer than with an “eastern F/O”? If it comes to that…why do Western F/Os vote one way, but fly another. Or have all the ones who might ever have flown into a ountain already done it?. .. .6. Does the Qantas F/O at Bangkok get kudos for staying quiet as a westerner rather than staying quiet as an easterner might have done? . .. .7. Will the Asian airlines who have expended vast resources to address the CRM issue ever get any credit for honest effort…or is it better to never, ever admit you have a problem. . .. .8. Lets have some ethnic cleansing here and now. Hands up all airlines who have ever had any problem with maintenance, power structures in the cockpit, high terrain, pride and CRM. OK…all those with their hands up leave the building now and stop carrying passengers. All the others…well I wouldn’t fly with them anyway if they have such a slender grasp of reality.

[Diesel8]

While Viastra certainly makes some good points, one should also mention that in his narrative, he has compiled quite a list of different airlines. KAL is only one of the Asian carriers that has a rather abysmal safety record and KAL, when taken alone, has had a hull loss about every two to three years in recent times.. .. .Now, we can turn this into something, ethnic cleansing, which it is not, but it is perhaps cultural. We can maybe agree to, that the face loosing concept has no meaning or purpose in the airline industry.Everyone, from the "lowest" ramprat to the "mightiest" captain has a voice and one that, in the interest of safety, needs to be heard when spoken, without the fear of reprisal or ridicule. Does such a system exist at KAL? Recent discussion both here and in other forums does indicate, that is not the case. Further, there are also indications, again from this forum and others, that this attitude is prevalent all the way to the top.. .. .As Viastra has mentioned, KAL is recognizing that there is a problem and is actively trying to change the company culture, but a few classes in CRM is not enough to change, what appears to be a serious issue and it would heed aviation entities well, to keep a very close watch on KAL and for them to be willing to force change, should such not happen in a most timely fashion.

[ironbutt57]

Viastra's comments are accurate, but out of context...the above mentioned incidents are isolated and occurred at several different carriers, the point of this thread is the incidents at KAL, while not extraordinary when compared with the incidents at north american carriers, are a result of corporate/social culture, as opposed to the mistake of aan individual flightcrew....the burbank crew are sacked, the cali/littlerock crew are deceased/ the result of the hearing if any into the take-off config incident would be interesting..if it indeed occurred...(good grief)

[Viastra]

Diesel8 and Ironbutt57. .. .Thanks for your support of some of my points.. .. .For a glimpse of what you might find if you saw the whole picture of what really happens inside a carrier that is addressing the future, not just that which is seen from within the walls of this forum please be assured that KAL has done far, far more than "a few CRM classes" to address the "speak up" CRM issue. If any of the critics work at KAL and haven’t noticed the changes…then you truly are part of a far bigger problem than the supposed “Eastern Culture” problem. You’re part of the “We are superior” problem. And that, sadly, is very, very entrenched in not a few mindsets.. .. .Get out a bit more often and see what’s happening, not just from a computer screen. No airline in the world matches up to your lofty “ everyone will speak up without fear or favour” ideal. Does any company? Enron? Firestone? As I said, look at Qantas and the Bangkok 744 accident. I’ll bet they said they measured up to your standards but when it came to the crunch (literally) they didn’t. But they’ll learn. Hopefully most carriers are doing their level best. As I tried to point out before, the 500 odd people killed in the Tenerife accident would presumably take no joy from the fact that their (also dead) captain was an aberration and that in fact most KLM captains would have listened.. .. .Then comes the comment: . .. . “the result of the hearing if any into the take-off config incident would be interesting..if it indeed occurred...(good grief)”. .. .Good grief indeed! Where the heck do you get off assuming that there wouldn’t be a thorough, well documented appraisal of what went wrong and how it happened? Cover ups might be a well documented and entrenched part of modern western culture but they aren’t part of 2002 life at KAL. How good is your airline’s FOQA program? Did you read yesterday that several of the perpetrators of the Twin Towers horror were flagged as suspicious by airport security then let on board? As was the shoe bomber on AAL out of Paris? Now that’s really thin management at work. Do you think we’ll ever hear: “the results of the hearing if it indeed occurred (good grief)” That’s the biggest aviation disaster in history and yet you remain fixated on Asia. . .. .And just to reassure you, aviation authorities have been monitoring change, and KAL has responded in substance, not just style. I’m sorry that Delta, Air France, the US DOD and DOT, etc etc didn’t ask for your advice. But their web sites are easily found and you can I’m sure pass your pearls on for their edification.. .. .Since recorded history began, one rule has always proven true. “Pride goes before destruction and a haughty spirit before a fall” So be careful. In aviation, the high moral ground has a habit of being very rocky and just a few feet inside that fluffy cumulus you’re dancing around while revelling in your superiority over Asians.. .. .Safe flying.. .. .Viastra.

[Desert Dingo]

Forget the sensitive, new-age politically correct cr@p. It is about time someone told it like it is.. .Spiraldiver made only one mistake when he said "Flying for KAL in the left seat is essentially like flying single-pilot IFR in a heavy. Always." - he forgot to mention there is a saboteur sitting next to the captain. Believe me. I've been there and it was the most frightening period of my flying career. Don't start me on their SOPs...... .Apply rudder trim on B747 for takeoff or landing if crosswind exists.. .FO to push full forward yoke immediately on touchdown so captain can grab nosewheel steering at 120kts.. .Not that any of this was actually in the ops manual. Just that the fleet manager Capt Park/Kim/Lee thought it was a good idea, so everyone did it and nobody would ever dare suggest that maybe he was wrong. Individually very nice people, but their culture is not designed for operating aircraft. (the cross-cockpit authority gradient springs to mind). .I remember a conversation I had with a KAL FO just after the crash at Guam. "Now will you speak up if you see the captain making a mistake?" . ."Yes sir, but only if he is expat captain.". .Another conversation springs to mind.. .After asking FO why he said he would like to fly with expat captains more often the reply was "Because you do not yell at us or hit us like Korean captain".. .True! <img border="0" title="" alt="[Roll Eyes]" src="rolleyes.gif" />

[Diesel8]

Viastra,. .. .I would believe your word over the FAA oversight, AF and Delta.. .. .Delta is reeling from 9/11 and there for will seek any means neccesary to increase profit. In the case of the feds, it is high stake politics and I am sure there was quite a bit of pressure on them by "diplomats".. .. .As far as AF, no clue what their motivation is??

[sirwa69]

This is only one of many threads which have touched on the subject of Asian Captains. The upshot of them all is that there should be no place for arrogant pride in any seat up front.. .If you were to take a poll of pilots nationality versus crashes caused by pilot error then it would be no surprise to find out that the safest pilots are Australian. One single reason is that they are not afraid to admit to mistakes and they have no requirement to "save face".. .It is time to create an international standard for pilots and have an international board of competancy run by the UN to which all airline pilots would have to be tested and certified before they could take up any position.. . . . <small>[ 06 March 2002, 10:50: Message edited by: sirwa69 ]</small>

[Spiraldiver]

Viastra: . .. .The point is not whether the ground is softer for some than for others. And I did not say KAL has S/O's. I said the questions were presented to a statistically significant sample of pilots throughout the world. And some of them were S/O's. . .. .You seem to have missed the intent of the question. I hope this was on purpose, because if it wasn't that is very telling in itself. In case you did miss something, I'll spell it out for you. . .. .The question implied two things:. .. .1. Foreknowlege of the rapidly approaching ground on the part of the F/O or S/O.. .. .2. That the Captain in each case believed there was no ground approaching, but was wrong. . .. .3. That action could be taken to avoid a CFIT accident, but would involve a specific type of cockpit communication to do this. Namely; informing that they are in Captain error.. .. .By simply listing scenes of carnage from around the world and opining on the relative softness of the ground there encountered, you obfuscate the issue. And that issue is this: . .. .In some parts of the world there is a large and statistically significant increase in the chances that a particular flight crew would rather stay silent and die (and thereby kill everyone aboard) than speak up in emergent cases of avoidable CFIT. The extension of this is that it is not limited to CFIT occasions, but would apply to all occasions requiring this type of communication. . .. .I did not say that it doesn't happen elsewhere. I said the cultural paradigm elsewhere reduces the chances of it happening. There is a difference which, again, I hope you are willfully not noticing. . .. .In relating my story of the Coming of the KAL Captain, I was simply relating my observations of the effects of that cultural paradigm. You suggest it was just politeness and that I am in error in my interpretation. I suggest it points to an inherent and dangerously insidious attitude, grounded in thousands of years of cultural development , which does not in any way translate into a viable cockpit environment. That same "polite" behavior has deadly effects on CRM. . . . .Now, I won't go into a debate on the relative merits of all the occasions you listed, but you can take AAL in Columbia off the list. Bad PDM, CRM, loss of SA, yes. The F/O's foreknowlege of the oncoming mountain? No. Read the transcript. . .. .I am glad to hear KAL is working hard to change. I hope they succeed. It will be a long and uphill battle. And get this part right; this is not an attack on any culture or people. It is a commentary on relative cultural attitudes and their effects on CRM and PDM in the cockpit. The ongoing dialogue on the issue stands to make everyone safer. . .. .Fly Safe.. .. .PS- ( sry, can't resist) I was there, and he swaggered.

[Spiraldiver]

Oops, that was three things.

[Dan Winterland]

Sirwa 69, that'll be all Aussies - except for the ones that over-ran at Bangkok then! <img border="0" title="" alt="[Eek!]" src="eek.gif" />

[Roadtrip]

KAL continues to have very serious problems. Viastra seem to excuse them as normal by comparing KAL to the rest of the world combined. Truly astonishing. Even more astonishing is that they apparently want a PR fix rather than a change of culture, which is what they need.

[Rongotai]

Spiraldriver wrote:. .. ."I did not say that it doesn't happen elsewhere. I said the cultural paradigm elsewhere reduces the chances of it happening. ". .. .Absolutely right. Not only that, the chances have been quantified (source: "Riding the Waves of Culture" by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner.. .. .Here are some numbers, based on large sample surveys in every major country.. .. .Percentage of employees who believe that respect is based on social background or formal position more than on performance and competence.. .. .South Korea 80%. .Indonesia 76%. .Japan 74%. .China 72%. .HK 68%. .Phillipines 67%. .Thailand 65%. .India 63%. .Singapore 63%. .Germany 60%. .Denmark 51%. .UK 44%. .NZ 38%. .Canada 35%. .Australia 30%. .USA 25%. .Norway 23%. .. .However the highest scoring western country is Spain (87%). The world's highest scoring country is Egypt (96%). Singapore is the lowest scoring of all Asian countries. Norway is world's lowest scoring country.. .. .CRM conceptually has its roots in countries in the bottom half of that table. It is clearly going to have different effects (and different levels of acceptability) in countries in the top half. There is no need to get into discussions about 'good' cultures and 'bad' cultures, or any other racist stuff. It is just objectively self evident that there will be a difference.. .. .So there is a high risk in using CRM, or any other set of western safety management tools, in top of the table countries unless it is modified to take account of the cultural realities in those countries. There are also clearly special flight crew management issues which are MORE LIKELY to occur when you put two people together whose cultural predispositions come from opposite ends of the table.. .. .The cultural differences about who is seen as being responsible for an operational error are a lot more complicated when comparing Asian and western countries - but this message is already too long!

[Percy De Havilland]

A better book on this subject is Geerte Hofstede's - Cultures and Organizations.. .Hampton Turner taught me at uni and as far as lecturers go......he's a very good author.

[Rongotai]

I actually agree, Percy. It just happened to be the one I had to hand!!

[Captain104]

Hello Viastra,. .by all means no bashing intended.. .. .Do I guess right, that you were never involved in pilot training instructing cockpit crews from far east countries?(South Korea, Republic of China, Indonesia a.s.o.). .Believe me, there ARE some cultural aspects to be considered.. .Did you note on the left the header TECH/SAFETY, there you find the KAL-DELTA audit report dated 9/98. Read it and call me back. <img border="0" title="" alt="[Wink]" src="wink.gif" /> . .. .Roadtrip. .Couldn't agree more.. .. .Regards

[Viastra]

Firstly let me apologize if I managed to confuse what seems to have been mainly honest and I hope constructive comment with what seemed yesterday (a long day) a little destructive arrogance. I will try harder to sort the wheat from the chaff in that regard.. .. .This is a very useful airing of views. If it degenerates into “who’s got the worst horror story about when they flew with some instructor or F/O who tried to kill them” then we won’t advance our collective cause much at all. Lets not kid ourselves…if Asian and Middle Eastern airlines had a glut of well trained, respected, experienced safe and CRM competent culturally neutral pilots available then there’d be precious few jobs around for expats. . .. .It would be foolish to say that the culture issue is not big. Even vast. But it is not intractable. I was trying to point out a couple of things:. .. .1. That we should ALL be careful because nothing is worse than any pilot with an inbuilt sense of superiority. That is why I made reference to other accidents.. .. .2. Many airlines (and cultures) are not that far removed from the “Captain/boss/leader/manager/ruler/commanding officer etc is always right” stage. Some cultures found overturning that sort of BS easier than others. Some will be still trying in a hundred years. . .. .3. It may be seen as a trite observation, maybe even “New Age BS” as someone said yesterday. But there is truly a vast effort to change and modernize and it has borne fruit. Not enough yet…not fast enough sure…not in everyone’s heart of hearts of course…but it is in the right direction and having lived in Asia for quite a while now I can certainly see the difference. . .. .My experience suggests that the new generation of university educated and overseas trained (US/Australia etc) F/Os have a much healthier attitude to CRM. If it has taken a goodly number of expats not born to tug forelocks in order to show these younger guys a “new and better way” then so be it. . .. .We see very published history of the methods used by myriad airlines to overcome their past (some long ago) problems in the cockpit. Has anyone written a book on what happened inside KLM after Tenerife? Or what has happened in Qantas after Bangkok? This would be really useful stuff to share.. .. .Cultures can change. I am old enough to remember when very tough seat belt and drink driving laws came into Australia. It has taken a long time to wean the Anzacs off strong beer and fast cars…but it was done. That program at least has been well documented. When my father went to England to fly bombers in 1943 as an Australian Captain with an RAF squadron he found that the English NCO crews (Navs. WOPs, gunners etc) much preferred Australian/Canadian captains to the local product because they figured that the colonials were more likely to think more about staying alive and less about rigidly following orders. I’m very very sure that the world inside the RAF has changed much since then. . .. .It would be nice to get a lot of feedback on how our respective cultures coped with what might have seemed like intractable problems and overcome them. Rather than pretending that one particular group with a lot of Confucian/military baggage can never get over it. Sure they have further to travel but that just means those in a position to change things have to work all the harder. And my observation is (pause to take off rose coloured glasses) that there is much hard work being done, and not all by expats.. .. .Safe flying. .. .Viastra.. . . . <small>[ 07 March 2002, 00:10: Message edited by: Viastra ]</small>

[Pegasus77]

On a side note..... .Why does an FO rather die than say something? . .. .From all the crashes I've heard of I've learned as well, and the biggest crash in history still is the Tenerife 747-KLM-disaster, where both FO and FE knew about what was going to happen and didn't do anything about the captain.. .. .It was the start of good old CRM, but still afterwards several accidents happened, where the FO was right, but didn't want to push the captain and they then crashed. Personally, this lead me to believe (as well as because of my own experiences) that even I as a modern, CRM-minded, FO in a western airline, can come into situations where I don't like to be, but I have promised myself to smack the captain in the face before I let myself die on an airplane. Till now, I once almost had to <img border="0" title="" alt="[Big Grin]" src="biggrin.gif" /> ..... .. .Point is... In the given case the FO clearly knew what was wrong. If I would be in the same seat, and knew what was going on, my wish to stay alive would have pulled the power back, or knocked the captain out of his seat.. .. .Whatever is claimed here in this thread about KAL, safety records, accidents and chain of command, is in the end irrelevant... It is irresponsible, and I dare freely to call it simply WRONG to conduct a flight in this way. It doesn't matter if the wrongness is based on culture or a headache. The captain might have been an asshole, or might have behaved like captains within KAL normally do, the FO really should have done something here.. .. .I can understand there are differences in culture, our colleages at KLM in the right seat can apply take off power themselves, and can initiate a RTO anytime, in my company the FO can't. It's a difference in culture, and in experience as well. This doesn't free me from my responsibility to my passengers, my family and not in the last place to myself. . .. .I don't want to sound heroic, I'm just not willing to give my life for the captains personality.

[Rongotai]

Pegasus,. .. .Flight deck's are only the most dramatic example of a common phenomenon - in crisis there is a strong tendency for cultural conditioning to overcome self-preservation. There are very sound evolutionary reasons for this, and under pressure we all have a tendency to revert to genetically imprinted behaviours. Without this wars would be impossible, but so would society.. .. .Illustrative case - looking at the Delta-KAL audit elsewhere on this board and the descriptions of FO behaviour therein, there will be strong instinctive reasons for a Korean FO to prefer (unconsciously) death and the survival of family honour than personal survival and family dishonour. It may sound crazy, but there is a mountain of confirming research. And precisely because it is instinctive and unconscious it is not susceptible to 'reasonable' solutions.. .. .This is why it is essential to ground any practice in a supportive culture. Without a culture which supports a particular way of behaving, trained for procedures will always be at risk of breaking down just when they are needed most. . .. .There are problems when the desired workplace culture is in tension with the precepts of the national culture - as seems to be the case in the current subject of discussion. There are strategies that can deal with this - but it requires VERY smart managers in flight ops.

[Viastra]

Sorry this is a little long...might be of interest to those who study this subject with a little historical flavour.... .. .The Loss of the 'Victoria' 22 June 1893. .. . . .The best known and most tragic collision beween ships in the history of the Royal Navy was that between the battleship Victoria - the flagship of the British Mediterranean Fleet - and the Camperdown, on 22 June 1893. . .. .On a hot afternoon in the Mediterranean in June 1893 the British Mediterranean Fleet was about to anchor, in formation, off Tripoli [on the coast of Syria - now in Lebanon]. . .. .The fleet, consisting of 10 battleships, or large armoured cruisers, of about 10,000 tons each (and one despatch vessel), had been organised into two divisions. They were formed in these divisions, in line ahead disposed abeam, with the Victoria leading the first division and Camperdown leading the second division. . .. .The fleet was under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir George Tryon, who flew his flag in the Victoria. The second-in-command was Rear-Admiral Markham who flew his flag in the Camperdown. . .. .Admiral Tryon was an expert in fleet handling, and had trained his captains to expect a variety of complicated manoeuvres at any time. He was a great martinet, a large taciturn man who sought counsel from nobody and rarely informed his staff of his intentions. . .. .On this occasion, however, Tryon had discussed his anchoring plan with his Flag Captain, the Staff Commander and Flag Lieutenant. He told them he intended to form up in two columns steering away from the coast with the columns 1,200 yards apart, with ships in column at normal station-keeping distance apart, which in those days was 400 yards. He intended to reverse the course of the fleet by turning the columns inwards, leaders turning together and each ship following in succession the next ahead. He then intended to close the columns to 400 yards apart. Finally he intended to turn the whole fleet together 90 degrees to port, and then to anchor the fleet. . .. .It was intended to be an impressive sight to those on shore who witnessed it, and indeed it would have been. Even in those days it was not often possible to see ten large warships anchoring together. The Victoria would have hoisted a two-flag signal which denoted 'anchor instantly.' The Camperdown would have repeated the hoist, and, as Victoria's signalmen hauled it down, ten blacksmiths armed with hammers would have knocked off the slips holding the cables and down would have simultaneously splashed ten anchors. . .. .The Staff Commander and the Flag Captain remarked to the Admiral that 1,200 yards was insufficient to allow the leading ships to turn together towards each other, and the Staff Commander suggested that 1,600 yards would be better, but even that would have been insufficient. . .. .The Admiral agreed, but later told his Staff Lieutenant to close the columns to 1,200 yards. . .. .The signal was hoisted and the Staff Commander, seeing that 1,200 yards was hoisted, told the Flag Lieutenant that he must have made a mistake as the Admiral had agreed to 1,600 yards. The Flag Lieutenant therefore went to the Admiral, who was in his sea cabin, and queried whether it should be 1,200 yards or 1,600, explaining that "1,200" was flying. The Admiral, somewhat tersely, told him to leave it at 1,200 and to execute the signal as soon as possible. . .. .The fleet was formed accordingly. It should be noted that, when the fleet was formed in columns like this, the normal distance between columns laid down in the manoeuvring instructions was in those days "the distance apart of ships [in this case 400 yards] multiplied by the number of ships in the longest column." In this case the longest column had six ships in it and the distance apart of columns should have been 400 x 6 = 2,400 yds., which would have left plenty of room for carrying out the intended manoeuvre. . .. .The distance between columns was worked out to allow for a favourite manoeuvre in those days - forming a single line by turning leading ships of columns 90 degrees to port or starboard, the remaining ships following their leaders in succession. By this means a single line could be formed - at right angles to the original line of advance. . .. .If the distance between columns was too small then in this manoeuvre the end ships of columns in the direction of the turn might have got muddled up with those of columns not in the direction of the turn, with a consequent risk of collision. If the distance between columns equalled the number of ships in the columns multiplied by their intervals apart, the end of the column in the direction of turn should have fitted perfectly with the leading ship of the column away from the direction of the turn. . .. .The fleet increased speed to 8.8 knots, and shortly afterwards, at 15.00, the Admiral directed his Flag Lieutenant to hoist two signals. One was addressed to the first division and directed it to turn in succession, preserving the order of the fleet, 16 points (180 degrees) to port. The second was addressed to the second division and directed it to turn in succession, preserving the order of the fleet, 16 points to starboard. . .. .The columns were thus to turn towards each other. The signals were made in separate hoists and it would have been possible to execute one signal (by hauling it down) before the other. However - the Flag Lieutenant knew perfectly well what was in the Admiral's mind. . .. .The turning-circle diameters of Victoria and Camperdown, under "tactical" rudder, were each about 800 yards. Thus even the 1,600 yards which the Staff Commander had suggested was only barely sufficient for the manoeuvre. . .. .If the two battleships had used full rudder their turning circle diameters would have been reduced to about 600 yards. It would then have been possible for the two ships to turn inwards without colliding, but with only 20 yards or so to spare. However, the standing instructions were that during manoeuvres tactical rudder should be used. . .. .It must have been obvious to every captain in the fleet that the manoeuvre was an exceedingly dangerous one - yet every ship, with the sole exception of the Camperdown, went "close up" with her answering pennant in full acknowledgment of the signal (it was - and still is - standard practice to keep the answering pennant "at the dip" if the signal is not understood). . .. .Camperdown, being the leading ship in her column, repeated the hoist, but Rear Admiral Markham - aboard her - ordered the repeated hoist to be kept at the dip, signifying that he did not understand the signal. At the same time he ordered that a semaphore signal to the flagship should be made indicating that he did not understand the flagship's signal. . .. .However, the semaphore was never sent. Admiral Tryon - "ever impatient" - ordered Camperdown's pennants to be shown, an expression of impatience which no officer would like, and sent a semaphore signal of his own saying "What are you waiting for?" Rear Admiral Markham, seeing this and having complete confidence in his superior officer, thought that Admiral Tryon would solve the problem somehow. He therefore had his own semaphore cancelled and ordered that the repeated signal be hoisted close up. . .. .At the subsequent court-martial Markham was questioned as to why, given that he knew the intended manoeuvre was dangerous - if not impossible, he had allowed the repeated signal to be hoisted close up? He answered that he had such faith in Admiral Tryon that he thought that he must have some trick up his sleeve. . .. .Markham considered that there were two possibilities - either the C-in-C would execute the order to the Second Division (Markham's column) first and, when this division was safely turned, would turn his own division; or he intended to turn Victoria and the First Division with less rudder and therefore turn outside the Camperdown's division. . .. .Nonetheless when the signal was executed the two divisions were turned simultaneously and Camperdown started turning to starboard, while Victoria started turning to port, with both using tactical rudder. Even then, although it was obvious to all the onlookers that a collision was imminent, both Captains failed to put their inner screws astern, not being prepared to do so without permission from their division commanders. . .. .In fact Captain Burke - the commanding officer of the Victoria - had to ask three times for permission to put his port propeller astern before it was eventually given. . .. .The two battleships met halfway between their respective columns. Camperdown struck the Victoria on the flagship's starboard side, opening up an enormous hole at and below the waterline. Camperdown's ram had penetrated the flagship's side by about 9 feet, at a point about 12 feet below the surface. It struck a transverse bulkhead almost directly and, as the two ships swung together, the breach became enlarged to about 100 square ft. . .. .Just before the impact the order "close watertight doors and out collision mat" had been given aboard the flagship - but only a few doors had been closed when the collision took place. Thus water was able to get into a coal bunker just forward of a stokehold. Victoria began to list to starboard, and the list started to increase more rapidly when the starboard battery began to flood as water entered the broadside gun ports. . .. .As the collision occurred "Collision Stations" was piped aboard Victoria, and the crew lined up four deep on the port side. At first it was hoped to beach the flagship and the gallant men in the engine-room and stokehold were still keeping the machinery running. . .. .However, by now the ship was down by the bows as well as listing heavily. Suddenly the bows went down and the stern rose, with the screws still turning. Victoria foundered soon afterwards - only 13 minutes after the collision. . .. .The order "Abandon Ship" was given just before the end, and the ship's company - which had remained in good order - then broke ranks. The list was by then so heavy that it was difficult to leave the ship - many men were left on board and went down with the ship. In all, 358 were lost, including Vice Admiral Tryon. 357 officers and men were rescued, among them Commander John Jellicoe, the Victoria's Executive Officer, who went on to become C-in-C of the Grand Fleet during the First World War and arguably Britain's greatest Admiral since Nelson. . .. .Admiral Tryon's last words were 'It's all my fault' and at the court martial he was found entirely to blame. No one can tell what was in his mind . . .one perhaps can only assume he had some sort of mental blackout, as he was probably working under a strain. . .. .What is quite inexplicable is how 11 Captains and one Rear-Admiral could all have acknowledged the signal ordering the turn 'received and understood', and how Admiral Tryon's own staff, who knew the manoeuvre to be dangerous, did not expostulate more with him when the signal was hoisted. The only explanation is that both his staff and his Captains had such infinite faith in him that they thought he had some last-minute manoeuvre up his sleeve to save the day. Also, it must not be forgotten that he was a difficult man to approach, and it was perhaps a brave staff officer who queried a manoeuvre he had ordered. . .. .[ Text from John Marriott's "Disaster at Sea" Ian Allan, London 1987pp. 38-43 ]

[MateoSix]

All this makes me laugh! I do not disagree with you, but if you point out that KAL is dangerous than you should take a good look at the airlines in México. Before start, I do not want to discriminat or pick on a specific airline. . .. .I used to fly for Mexicana airlines, and I can tell you that there’s hardly any professionalism. I personally have witnessed flight attendants at the controls during a sector flight, some of them are even doing the whole flight (yes, t/o and landing). I guess it has to do with the mentality (“so? What’s gonna happen?). That’s the main reason I prefer flying the corporate jets. At least the pax can see who is flying the plane. . .. .There are lots of other worrying things in México, but this is by far the worst. I wouldn’t recommend anybody to fly with them. And yeah, if you see a female pilot, half of them have been involved in incidents (kept secret of course), and the other half “slept” there way to the cockpit (with … sorry, can’t tell) . .. .I posted a similar thread a few months ago, but Pprune didn’t like.. .. . <a href="http://www.pprune.org/cgibin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=36&t=000520" target="_blank">My deleted post</a> . .Don’t know why, this is true. Don’t understand why good people have to pay for stupidity of others. If anyone in adminstration disagrees, write me, I got nothing to hide.. .. .Mateo

[Wiley]

Pegasus 77, Rongotai‘s got a very good point in his last post re some (many?) people preferring to die ‘with honour’ rather than stand up to a figure of authority. And it’s not solely an Asian trait. Two ‘Western’ examples readily come to mind, one aviation related, the other not.. .. .First, (I can’t remember the details, but I know the crew were all Americans [as in U.S.A.]), was back in the 70’s on a 707 (or maybe it was a 74) freighter. The FO had objected to the Captain’s course of action in an approach in marginal conditions but the Captain and the FE made light of his objections and proceeded with the approach. The last words on the voice recorder were the FO’s, apparently almost pleased with himself for being vindicated: “I told you it wasn’t gonna work.” . .. .There have been some comments regarding Australians being ‘the safest’ because they’re more willing to speak up, so my other example might be worthwhile exploring. (Please bear with me, I do get to the point eventually.) I know it’s not aviation related, and I know it’s from another, very different time frame… But how many Australians haven’t seen the film ‘Gallipoli’, a relatively accurate depiction of a rather seminal event in Australian military history, the battle of the Nek in August 1915? (For those not familiar with it, it starred Mel Gibson when Mel still had a six pack.) . .. .To cut a loooong story short, after three waves of (unmounted) Australian Light Horsemen had been sent over the top in broad daylight in an confined area not much longer than a tennis court, and all three waves had been wiped out almost to a man, many of them not even making it out of their own trenches before they were cut down, an Australian officer obeyed orders and blew his whistle, knowing that the senior officer who had just confirmed the attack order for the fourth wave was acting on totally erroneous information. (Sound familiar, KAL baiters?) . .. .And we in Australia look upon his actions almost with pride, showing that he and his troops, all of whom must have known they were going to their deaths to no good purpose, were made of the ‘right stuff’. What an Asian might call ‘honour’.. .. .I call it (and the actions of many FOs in following potentially fatal orders) the ‘Captain William Calley Sydnrome. (For those of a younger generation, Captain William Calley, followed orders issued by senior officers and entered a Vietnamese village in 1969 with his troops and killed some hundreds of unarmed civilians.) . .. .Why Captain William Calley Sydnrome? Well answer me this: what would have happened if Captain Calley had said ‘no’? Would the world have ever heard of him? Would anyone among the thousands of journalists who toppled rain forests writing about the Mei Lai massacre have been there to defend his ‘failure to obey orders in a combat zone’? Could he have ended up in Leavenworth Prison for twenty years for failing to obey those orders – (or, far more likely, just quietly been posted off to be officer in charge of an outdoor laundry detachment in Alaska – the military equivalent of a permanent First Officer)? . .. .Do you see where I’m going here? In the KAL corporate culture, what happens to a Korean FO who intervenes and saves the day? (And let’s be honest with ourselves – if maybe to a lesser degree, in less rigid corporate cultures that KAL, to any FO who sticks his head above the parapet to the point where he takes over from his captain?) Thanks to his intervention, there wasn’t any accident – he stopped it. But you can bet your silver bippy that won’t be the way many captains would report it to his mates on the 4th floor or its equivalent. My guess is that the word ‘mutiny’ would be mentioned relatively early in the piece.

[Spiraldiver]

Viastra:. .. .And interesting yarn, or should I say yard arm? While the general metaphors on tyranny, ego and blind faith are relevant in some respects, i think the lemmings-over-the-cliff analogy is really only applicable in cases pertaining to military philosophy or applications. Not so much to the airline cockpit.. .. .Too many fundamental differences exist.. .. .Soldiers are paid to follow orders unquestioningly. They know that sometimes following those orders may cause them to die, presumably so others may live. This can get in the way of critical thinking. <img border="0" title="" alt="[Big Grin]" src="biggrin.gif" /> . .. .Airline pilots are paid to question everything and to, above all else, not die - lest others die with them. This encourages critical thinking. . .. .A pilot who is unapproachable, reticent and entirely self-reliant should not be in a multi-crew cockpit. Just as the unfortunate Admiral, who was clearly marginally insane, should not have been in charge of anything but his own dinghy, if even that.. .. .Such pilots are a cancer in the industry and should be cut out, no matter the airline they work for. And no matter where they come from or how they got there. . .. .And when flying with such a cretin, remember, no one will forgive you for allowing them to endanger your life or anyone elses. To stand up, speak your mind and worry about the consequences later is the only viable course of action. . .. .That is the effective reality of modern CRM. If you think it ain't right, you have a responsibilty to say so. If someone says you're wrong, you are obligated to find out why, and who's right, before proceeding. Unfortunately, the Delta review of KAL suggests these basic tenets of CRM are almost never followed by KAL crews. That has to change.. .. .To do anything less is criminal. . .. .And worldwide, there are still a lot of criminals out there.. .. .Fly safe.

[L1011]

Culture is too broad a subject to be really addressed in this often puerile forum.. .. .Go read Hofstede, Trompenaars, Reason, Helmreich and Merritt. Then make your own conclusions. Know the positives and neagtives of your own culture and modify your behavior accordingly. Predjudice is no substitute for knowledge.. .. .NO one culture (none, zero, not US nor UK or anyone else) has the ideal mix of attributes for flying airplanes. In fact overly "masculine" behavior is potentially dangerous in itself, and 98% of pilots are male, right?. .. .Rant over. Some really interesting posts, nice to see.. .. .Back to lurking. <img border="0" title="" alt="[Cool]" src="cool.gif" />

[grange.guzzler]

Spiraldiver and others. Many quote the "Delta Report". As has been pointed out on this forum many times, the so called Delta report is NOT. The report to which you refer is a set of personal observations of a guy who was appointed as one of many to carry out audits on Delta's behalf. The observations as presented were forwarded to Delta and were considered along with many others in the preparation of the REAL DELTA REPORT. You and none here have seen that report. It was a confidential document circulated at the highest levels of KAL and Delta.. .The observations to which you refer were produced by a pilot with the purest of motives but with no previous check and training experience and very little in the way of guidlines with which to conduct the audit. . .An analysis of that pilots findings will reveal a very personalised version of what is right and what is wrong. For instance (from memory) the reporter made a big deal of the fact that a pilot had flown an approach with his armrests down. Well I recently observed that same reporter flying both a takeoff and a landing with his armrests down. Suprise suprise, he did it quite sucessfully and his "irresponsible actions" did not endanger the operation. . .. .The moral of the story: be very careful with the information you wish to use and quote as authorative, some of it is a lot less than it is cracked up to be.. .. .To the gentleman who suggested that Viastra had no experience in training or checking in an asian cockpit. Dead set wrong pal. If you are in the area you would be well advised to heed his somewhat lenghty words.

[4Greens]

Viastra et al:. .Very good book on the whole subject - "Attitude or Latitude" by Graham Braithwaite of UNSW. Starts off looking at OZ safety but encompasses cultural attitudes as well. Published by Ashgate of UK

[Huck]

1. The ridiculed f/o was on an Alaska Airlines flight into a bush strip, where the captain got high and hot. The f/o kept hinting and outright saying that the captain (the PF) was screwing up. He was ridiculed by the F/E, who at one point told the captain, "Know the difference between a copilot and a duck? A duck can fly!" At one point he also said, "Don't worry, the fox has got it wired." I like to use this line when somebody is starting to mess it up.. .. .2. Never forget, the KLM F/O at Tenerife actually pulled the throttles back to idle once after the captain had advanced them. He just didn't do it a second time. I once attended a day-long CRM seminar on that subject - cases where a crewmember knew something was wrong, and even acted on it, but at some point gave in - with terrible consequences.

[Spiraldiver]

GG, . .. .Thx, I didn't know that. It is quite a different matter if it is interpreted as subjective document. ie. one crew on a bad day with a nitpicker just looking to find stuff wrong. . .. .*Pause*- while I eat a grain of salt and re-read the non-report.. .. .Salty interpretation- There are some pretty damning observations in there all the same, regardless of who it was written by, or why it was written (the ILS and visual app. stuff comes to mind). But there is a volume of micro-managed interpretation as well (perhaps caused by flying in a jumpseat for too long?). . . . .Personally, I like to read such reports so I can file away the information and use it in an effort to never make those mistakes myself. By talking about their mistakes , I talk about my own, or ones I might make. And thereby avoid them (hopefully). . .. .Fly safe.

[Loc-out]

I remember not too long ago, a representative of a certain "flag carrying" airline, boasting that they had never had a prang. One month later, they had one.. .. .Many years ago, I was involved in a type of aviation that was far more hazardous, than I am at present. Anyhow, to cut a long story short, we had this pilot who was not quite as young or as good as several of the aces around at the time. Two of the most vocal and critical of this individual, who laid wages on how long he would survive, were themselves killed within 2 years in aircraft (pilot error) accidents. Coincidence?. .. .What I suggest to some of you, is to leave the safety audits to the experts and the barrack room lawyers should wind their necks in.

[Pegasus77]

Rongotai & Wiley,. .. .As I am much interested in all sectors of HF and HPL, I already knew of the "I told you so"-case. Offcourse that reaction is only human, but that is what the whole science of HF consists of.. .. .There might very well be a cultural element, where a Korean pilot prefers to die to save his honor (and that of his family); only thing I do is calling it WRONG. It has no place on a flight deck.. .. .But the most interesting point you are bringing up is the 'mutiny'. I couldn't agree with you more. Even in modern western fully-CRM-rated airlines there is a tendency not to tell things to the management, because you never know how many friends the captain has.. .This especially counts for training captains, who all know eachother, and can decide about your career in 1 base check.. .. .I threw myself into the battle about a captain, who IMHO did fully irresponsible and really dangerous things. . .Offcourse I had a debriefing with him myself after the flight, and because he didn't show any understanding for my points of view, I decided that it was my duty to go to the management with the story.. .. .Luckily in my company it was all solved in a professional way, and afterwards I get along with the captain in question just fine. . .. .The astosnishing thing is, a few weeks later I met an FO-colleage, who just a week before myself flew with the same captain, got in exactly the same fight, and after the flight got into his car, and was glad not to be flying with the guy again. I was surprised by so much carelessness.. .. .What I think is important, that the same mistake is not made twice. I learned from the Tenerife-disaster, as well as I learned from the 'the copilot is a duck' or the 'sorry Dave, we lost a wing'-stories. All contain a number of human errors, from which the entiry flying community can learn. All those stories are known to our Korean colleages, and also to all other professional pilots in the world, who culturally tend to listen first and then die. . .. .There was an Italian airplane in Switzerland, where the FO called for a go-around, and the captain said 'nooooo, we'll make it', and 3 seconds later everybody died. . .It is my professional duty to learn from this story, and to prevent it from happening again. The same counts for every captain and copilot in the entire world. . .. .A few weeks ago I read a text from an older captain, who complained about the new generation of flightcrew, who were supposed to be boring, too serious, not going out, not drinking, not screwing cabin crew etc. This, he stated, could affect the safety, because the atmosphere in the crew would be less good.. .. .I am proud to be a modern, boring, serious pilot (who loves his drink sometimes!).. .Old traditions are there to be changed, sometimes, and the same counts for old cultures. I don't think I'm discriminating if I call the listen&die-culture simply wrong. . .. .There is no question about cultural differences, but PLEASE let someone within KAL, and all other affected airlines, open up a CRM/HF-office, let him/her be fully backed up by the management and not be afraid by old captains who claim too much authority.

[Rongotai]

Pegasus,. .. .you say:. .. ." There might very well be a cultural element, where a Korean pilot prefers to die to save his honor (and that of his family); only thing I do is calling it WRONG. It has no place on a flight deck.". .. .Of course you are correct. But my point is that you don't achieve the necessary changes in behaviour simply by knowing that you are right, or by writing out SOP's predicated on your being correct.

[Captain104]

Interesting remarks, high level comments. If someone understands PPRuNe not only as bingo entertainment, that's what I like to read and participate in! Compliments gentlemen.. .. .My hobbies concerning profession as IP were facts and personal experience.. .Talking about instructing asian cockpits, I posted before, there are "cultural aspects to be considered." . .. .This does not exclude all those talented fine asian pilots I had the honour to train. But it. .also includes those cockpit aspirants I had to. .cope with, who had a hell of a lot problems to. .just approach an attitude I could accept bearing CRM in mind. Not more, not less.. .. .Dear GrangeGuzzler,. .I'm the gentleman you refer to. Obviously, Viastra didn't need assistance. I respected his views and enjoyed his posts. If he trained asian cockpits too, nice. I just guessed.. .. .Your other arguments are not very convincing for me. You joined pprune in August 2001?. .In this tread you adressed "spiral diver and others" by posting "as has been pointed out on this forum for many times, the so called Delta report is NOT.". .On this rainy day here, I was digging deep into past forums until August 2001. The only one who questioned the Delta audit in two posts where YOU!!!. .In the tread "FAA DOWNGRADES KOREAN CARRIER SAFETY RATING"(18th Aug) you warmly defended KAL management and more strange to me, did the same in the thread "KOREAN PILOTS IN JAIL"(19th Aug) in a situation, our Korean fellows could have used support in their strike. Remember "KAL AND ASIANA"(Sept/01)?. .. .You state, that an ordinary pilot from Delta(without any background) just observed some flights of KAL, wrote something up and passed that on to higher floors.. .Excuse me Sir, I think this is ridiculous: Even if you substract 90 % of this audit, the remaining 10 % are scaring for me. Forget the armrests and 3 other small points.. .Just the opposite, reading the summery of this "deaf and blindfolded Delta audit fool", my nose and all senses smell exactly what he means and wants us to know. Anyone who trained not only in pprune treads but also in reality senses what I refer to.. .. .Why all this digging, discussion and engagement?. .It aims for the ideal cockpit, in which CRM is not only a training item to cope with but assuring safer operation for all. 90 % of the First Officers I had the pleasure to fly with hopefully will do a better job concerning CRM, that I expect and it makes me happy. . .. .Thank you SPAM IN A CAM for posting.. .MATEOSIX, flying Mexicana, do you think I could try to change my dachshound against the stewardess on LH seat on approach? At least he is. .motivated if there is a sausage in the cockpit and will do his best! <img border="0" title="" alt="[Big Grin]" src="biggrin.gif" /> . .Regards. . . . <small>[ 08 March 2002, 14:20: Message edited by: Captain104 ]</small>

[Pegasus77]

Rongotai: Basis IMHO lies in company culture. SOPs are a good start to change it, and management providing a platform in which the comments of an FO and other people concerned are valued is the next step. . .. .And the "I know I am right-attitude" can be dangerous, that's what this is all about. <img border="0" title="" alt="[Big Grin]" src="biggrin.gif" />

[Rongotai]

Agreed again, Pegasus. .. .SOP's are necessary, but not sufficient - and that is often the mistake that is made.. .. .Company culture is pre-eminent - but it is more difficult and involves more skillful management where SOP's and/or company culture are in tension with aspects of national culture.. .. .Also - globally accepted 'best practice', such as CRM, must always be introduced in ways that address the specifics of company and national culture.

[Anti Skid On]

This near miss highlights the value of CRM IMHO!. . <a href="http://www.aaib.detr.gov.uk/formal/gwjan/gwjan.htm#Human" target="_blank">Here!</a>

[grange.guzzler]

Capt 104. You miss my point. The so called Delta report available on this forum is NOT! My purpose in pointing this out is that by attaching the Delta stamp of approval, users are giving this personal view far more weight than it desrves.. .The report to which you refer does make many valid points and it would be a fool that denies there are many problems afoot in the subject airline. However it is as I suggested, very much a personal view of a gentleman ill equipped to undertake the role to which he was appointed and who does not even observe procedures whose ommision causes him to criticise others. He is not a Delta pilot. He is a KAL pilot of non Korean ethnic origin, who has worked for KAL sine 1997. He had no previous experience in training and checking and has been overlooked for such positions since his infamous release of the "Delta Report". I will hasten to add that he is a person with the purest of motives, but is seen by many to be a tad misguided.. .. .WRT to my time of registration. Not relevant. For various reasons many of us have had many nom de plume's over the years.. .. .In the meantime I suggest you and others listen to people like Viastra who are actually working hard to fix the problems that do exist. They (and there are several) are doing a magnificant job in turning a basket case into a viable and vibrant entity. They are at the coalface and daily striving for change. Not a small part of that change requires the goodwill of the Korean pilots. Ill informed and out of date (by several years)comments from clowns like ironbutt and others do not make the task of these gentlemen any easier. Give them a break and give them a little space to work their way through these matters. Any coward can stand on the side and throw petrol (or avtur) on the fire. It takes someone with guts and determination to take the bull by the horns and actually address the problems that do exist.. .. .Keep safe. .. .GG

[Mad Dog Driver]

Viastra,. .. .I commend your valiant effort to try to enlighten us with your so-called exposed accident rate by the western world. But if you are going to put facts on the board, then at least be fair about it. Sure if we combined all the accdents over the years over the western world, then surely, KAL's accident rate would be miniscule by comparison.. .. .However you failed to evaluate the "per capita" numerical value into the equation. Look at the link below.. .. .<a href="http://www.airdisaster.com/statistics/" target="_blank">http://www.airdisaster.com/statistics/</a>. .. .This will give you stats on the number of fatalities of an air carrier. With all the major US carriers combined, it does comes close to KAL's statistics, but AA, CO, DL, NW, & UA combined have 72 million flights vs. KAL's 1.3 million. . .. .So your "lawyer" style of revealing half the truth to your benefit is somewhat skewed.. .. .However, KAL's problems seem to be magified due to the high exposure of expats. CAL recently took off a taxiway, hardly a feat of competence when there were 3 pilots in the deck. Certainly there are problems that needs fixing, but to what avail ? <img border="0" title="" alt="[Confused]" src="confused.gif" /> . .. .But in the meantime, it is sure fun to have a pint/yard and talk about it in the bar. <img border="0" title="" alt="[Wink]" src="wink.gif" /> <img border="0" title="" alt="[Big Grin]" src="biggrin.gif" />

[GrandPrix]

Took off behind KAL (JFK-Seoul)mid 1990's.. .they never contacted departure or center.. .Probably flew the whole route on JFK tower freak.

[yellow dust]

Points are made that the FO should not keep silent in the face of a captain's error, if the safety of the airplane and occupants is in doubt.. .. .What about the (foreign but not necessarily) pilots who work for the airline(s) concerned? Should they not also speak up, or will the next passenger deaths be partly their fault?

[Rollingthunder]

This is getting muddled.. .. .I don't fly on KAL.. .I strongly advise my family members to not fly Korean.. .I don't need to tell the folks I work with.. .. .It will take a couple of years of exemplary operational performance to change my mind, at the least.. .. .Risk Management and your life.

[Pegasus77]

Yellow dust:. .. .Only a few years ago in accident reports the factor "management" was used for the first time. I would not point a finger at pilots 'who should know better', because they are not from such a Korean culture. As long as they speak up on their own flights, they are doing their jobs. And I guess, they want to keep that job, so it will be hard to speak up within the company. . .. .Guess stating that the management and also the law are more responsible than a single pilot, would make sense?

[MateoSix]

Capitan 104, don't understand why your grin... Next time you fly to Mexico with Lufthansa and you connect you WILL fly with Mexicana, although you'll have a lufthansa ticekt. This is sad for STAR ALLIANCE.. .. ."... but what should go wrong?". .. .Pendejos!

[Captain104]

Mateo Six,. .what you posted(FA's at the controls for a complete flightsector) seemed to me like a story from another star. Should your statement reflect reality my grin would freeze immediately.. .. .Regards Sir

[MateoSix]

Capitan, . .. .then you better get ready for sub-zero temperatures... Email me if you want, or ... dare?. .. .Regards,. .. .Mateo

[Captain104]

I dare. Regards

[Skol]

Did anyone mention KAL's recent accident at AKL when they damaged an outboard engine in 10 kts of crosswind? The aircraft was ferried to China for repairs

[ETOPS MAN]

Did anyone mention last weeks little mistake of KAL taking a wide berth when turning onto 05R at NZAA, not staying on the lead on markings?. .Fortune will have it, that the WIP barrier was down. If it had not been down, there was a very good chance of contact with the wingtip!!. .Interesting times lay ahead when NZAA 05L/23R comes into service?!

[Rongotai]

When considering why KAL is more prone to these sorts of incident it is worth considering that in an 80 country survey South Korea and the United States were at exact opposite ends of the table in responses to this statement:. .. ." It is more important to do things in your own way, even if things go wrong as a result.". .. .USA - 25% of respondents agreed.. .South Korea - 80% of respondents agreed.

[spam in a can]

The Auckland landing incident was caused by the Korean F/o compensating for an 8kt crosswind by kicking off the drift and putting the incorrect aileron into wind so rolling the aircraft in the flare, drifting off centreline and scraping a pod, and damaging the raised runway edge lights. The skipper was extremely experienced on the 747, but it happened too quick he said. Because until you get to the flare normally everything seems okay when the F/o is flying, but it's the last 50ft where it all goes t..s up. Often there's no flare, or there's no looking out the window for perspective. Unbelievably some will try to flare on the flight director. These guys then become skippers themselves!