Black Buck 1 "not cricket"

[Navaleye]

According to the Telegraph Here (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/04/30/nflkands30.xml)

[airborne_artist]

And further down the article:

""You have to remember that things were totally different then.

"We really were a peacetime air force."

[LFFC]

It was a fabulous achievement and one that they should rightly be very proud of. I wish that someone could make a film about it!

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/graphics/2007/04/30/nvulcan30.jpg

[JagRigger]

Hmmm - if it were maybe England could win a test match..........

[Rheinstorff]

Black Buck 1 was a tremendous achievement and one that we can take enormous pride in. Sure, the tactical effect may not have been as great as we would have hoped (although it was still pretty good and no doubt commenced the destruction of Argentinean morale on the islands alloing a numerically inferior force to win on the ground), but the operational and strategic effect was undoubtedly highly significant. This was particularly important in keeping Argie fighters at home protecting the home base, instead of dropping bombs on HM ships or providing top cover for those aircraft that were.

[BoeingMEL]

.......to most of us back home. Thanks guys! bm:ok:

[6Z3]

I believe you even got a bomb on the target, which at such a long range is quite remarkable.

[teeteringhead]

And equally to the point, if we could reach the Falklands, we could reach mainland Argentina..........

[Fluffy Bunny]

"The V-bomber was intended only for low-level attacks carrying nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union."

Hmmm ok,

Blue touch paper lit, retreating to a safe distance! :rolleyes: :rolleyes:

[Pontius Navigator]

Fluffy, I believe the comment was perfectly valid in context.

The whole Free Fall Force did indeed have a conventional capability but one which was certainly on the wane by 1982. In the 60s one Vulcan wing covered NEAF and the other covered FEAF. By the 70s the FEAF role had ceased and the NEAF role was vested in the Akrotiri Bomber Wing.

The NEAF role probably ended with the withdrawal from Malta and the return of the Akrotiri Wing to UK. There after force draw down and rationalisation probably reduced the conventional role to insignificance.

The IFR kit had been unused since the Valiant force was grounded but as far as I knew was still operable into the 70s as all aircraft retained the probes as late as 1974.

Certainly on a different force there was an examination of aircraft kit carried but rarely, if ever, used. If it was not used we could save manpower by stopping servicing of the kit. I would guess the Vulcan IFR was a similar casualty.

[BEagle]

I flew the Vulcan quite often under IFR.........

Acronym abuse, Pontius!

[Pontius Navigator]

BEagle, you'll be telling me that Hawker Siddley or British Aerospace built the Vulcan.

It was In Flight Refuelling when Mr Roe designed the system based on the British system of Mr Cobham, none of your Americanisms in those days.

[BEagle]

http://www.flight-refuelling.com/history.htm

..and never 'IFR'!

[Pontius Navigator]

Sorry BEagle, it was IFR and changed to AAR for the obvious reason.

[LFFC]

:rolleyes:

Whatever it was called, it certainly gave the enemy a fright! Can you imagine what 21 "Thousand Pounders" going off a short distance from your tent must have felt like!

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/f/fc/Vulcan.planview.640pix.jpg/250px-Vulcan.planview.640pix.jpg

I think it was the only time the Vulcan was used in anger, but it sure demonstrated what Strategic Capability was all about.

[Art Field]

Worthy of a mention in this context is Dick Russell, the AAR instructor with Withers crew who flew with them on their missions, played an important part in their success but is not always included in the telling and never pictured. He incidently celebrated [not really the right word] his 50th birthday on that trip.

[LFFC]

For those youngsters that can't remember the mission, here's a great site that describes the plan. Operation Black Buck (http://www.raf.mod.uk/falklands/bb.html)

Just keep clicking the icon at the bottom right of the screen.

http://www.raf.mod.uk/falklands/images/bb1bombdamage_t.jpg

[Fluffy Bunny]

PN,
The article makes a single statement, stating that the vulcan was designed for low level attacks. Which as both you and I know wasn't the original intended role for the A/C when first introduced into service, in the years when I wasn't even a malcious twinkle in the milkmans' eye. ;)

[Tourist]

If you look at the picture closely, you will see that it is in fact very like English cricket.
A long thin strip in the middle of nowhere, and people lobbing a number of objects down it, of which very few hit the target.
And then there is the black buck mission.

[Dunhovrin]

Finished reading "Vulcan 607" last night at 0-god-hundred. Couldn't put it down. Get off to Amazon and buy it chaps - an outstanding read about an outstanding mission. To travel all that way at night trapped in a cockpit with TWO navigators. Men Of Steel.
Mini-nav bash aside the book puts all the "One Bomb" naysayers well and truely in their place.

[BEagle]

"The bomb crew in the other plane had won all sorts of bombing competitions, but my guys were very inexperienced by comparison."

So why the hell were they selected to reserve for the first ever V-bomber attack mission?

Or was the real truth that everyone else had already been posted - and they were all that were left? That's certainly what the ex-Scampton crews thought!

[Jimlad1]

Also reading Vulcan 607 - available in buy one get one half price in Books Etc - absolutely fantastic.

Quick Q about 27 Sqn - what did it actually do? I know the phrase maritime radar surveillance - but how did this differ from the role of the Nimrod fleet and how did the Vulcans get the picture back to base - was it real time or delayed? Also where did they operate and why was there no consideration of bringing the sqn assets back into service for the Falklands?

Sorry for tangental question, but fascinated by this little piece of history.

[BEagle]

"Quick Q about 27 Sqn - what did it actually do? I know the phrase maritime radar surveillance - but how did this differ from the role of the Nimrod fleet and how did the Vulcans get the picture back to base - was it real time or delayed?"

The maritime radar reconaissance role was very 'mandraulic'. The ancient old buggers on 27 waffled around at a great height lovingly noting down the surface tracks spotted by the nav team, then turned them into coded messages which the AEO would transmit back to base on UHF or HF.

On 35 Sqn, our secondary role was this accursed boat-spotting. Everyone loathed it - hours of boredom and scribbling enlivened by the odd 'SELFPRO' when we would thunder down to annoy some boat or other bobbing about on the briny. Did that once in the Med (we'd run out of low level fatigue hours) and thoroughly upset some MHQ who'd got a Malta Nimrod covertly following a Sov submarine when along came a Vulcan! Sorry - but they should have warned us first!

The 35 Sqn AEO ('Valerie' Singleton) leader really impressed Midland Radar once. Doing some boat-spotting bore-ex, he started his 'DISPORT opens.....' speech, then droned on for about 15 minutes. At the end of which some ATC mate responded with "This is Midland Radar - I guess that wasn't meant for us?"

[Pontius Navigator]

Jimlad,

The normal maximum range scale for the H2S was 1:1 mil. 543 had a modified Indicator 301 with a 1:2 mil scale. I don't believe it actually changed the maximum range of about 160 miles.

The picture was verbally told back to base or 3rd party if required but not every time, it all depended. It was Operation Instow.

One method was to create a surface plot using the H2S and nav system with the plotter plotting contacts. Every 15 minutes the plot was 'told' back on HF. In high density situations, such as the Med, it could be very busy. In the Indian Ocean, with only 2 contacts in a hour, we could spend more time actually searching.

The plot was told with reference to a reference point and cartesian coordinates. It was possible to classify contacts as small, medium or large.

How this differed from the Nimrod is that the Vulcan would fly at 40000 feet with a radar optimised for high level operations. The Nimrod would also conduct a surface plot and could then visually identify what it found. Range considerations generally restricted the Vulcan to high level but it was also considerably faster than the Nimrod.

The Nimrod OTOH could use its ARAR/ARAX to identify emitters and aid identification of radar contacts.

[HTB]

JimLad

Some of your questions have been answered. 27 Sqn was disbanded shortly before the Flaklands conflict started, the crews being dispersed to a variety of posts, including remaining V Sqns (Vulcans and Victors); some ended up on ground tours, holding posts, staff training, etc.

The Nav Radars (I think there were 9 or 10 of us) were summoned to attend the war to exercise their former skills once it became apparent that the Argentines had a navy of sorts that might pose our lads some problems - principally an aircraft carrier. As the 27 Sqn aircraft had also been shared out, or reduced to spare parts, the MRR missions were flown in the Victor, which had the same radar as the MRR Vulcan.

The missions were mainly Instow (named after a small town in North Devon - town names were allocated to a series of trials), which entailed straifgforward ship counting. The resulting plot (backed up by R88 imagery - radar screen camera) were analysed back on Ascension. Any contacts of note were passed by HF (or later during the Task Groupos' progression south directly to the surface units by UHF).

I beleive the best source of MRR intel was provided by the Naval Attache in BA, who would stroll down to the harbour and count 'em tied up alongside (or note if any had decamped).

Could go on about other techniques, such as ASDID, but I'm having enough trouble staying awake in the current heat wave.

[PICKS135]

Order the book online at
http://www.tesco.com/books/product.aspx?R=9780552152297

Or walk into your local Tesco and get it.
It's available for under £4, and a blooming good read.:ok: :ok: :ok:

[steamchicken]

It was cricket...Australian cricket. Aggressive, technically superb, successful, and not over concerned about the bloody rules!

And yes, if you haven't read Vulc 607 yet, get cracking.

[Jimlad1]

Pontius / Beags - thanks guys, really interesting and informative stuff.

[Union Jack]

"This isn't cricket. It somehow seemed wrong to be dropping 10 tons of bombs on these people who apparently had no idea we were coming," Mr Withers, now 61, remembered.

"It seemed a rather nasty, cold-blooded thing to do."

Flt Lt Withers Vulcan pilot Falklands 1982

"When you are on top of the enemy you look, shoot and it's, 'You die, you die, you die'," Lt Denton said.

"The odds are on our side. I really enjoy it. I told my wife, if I could come home every night then this would be the perfect job."

1st Lt Denton US Apache crew Afghanistan 2007

An interesting contrast in styles, vis a vis Steamchicken's post, and the recent thread re US Apache operations, also derived from the Telegraph.

Jack

[Charlie Griffiths]

Singing to choir there UJ...trying working in their world everyday :ugh:

Anyway, Black Buck, Effects Based Operations at their finest - discuss.

[Pontius Navigator]

JimLad,

A further comment and also the thought for kicking this to the Vulcan thread.

We would do a wide area survelliance, sweeping through at 480k and plot our contacts against reference points and polar coordinates. With lots of passage traffic you could soon see the sea lanes and break out groups such as fishers.

In a sparsely occupied area surveliiance was relatively simple although you would also have to be aware of MEZ which could spoil your day if it had got hot. I can't remember the exact reporting format but something along the lines of "One Mike, 020 CA 75, 1012Z" Not a difficult code to crack as Mike was medium but where was CA?

Now the catch.

If you were in a group of 4 ships and you heard "Group 4, 1 Lima, 2 Mike, 1 Sierra, 5 miles, 010 CA 80, 1020Z" there was a fair chance of CA being 80 miles SSW.

Now one problem with the MRR was we often did not know where own forces were. If we then reported "Group 5, 2 Lima, 3 Mike, 6 miles, 180 CA 50, 1020Z" it didn't take an Einstein to work out a possible 3rd party targetting information.

I think it then became SOP to report groups or possible hostiles on different reference points.

[Cumbrian Fell]

I don't have a copy of Operation FIREDOG at hand, but did the Vulcan deliver ordnance on to Malayan Communist Party positions in North Perak/Bitong/Baling salient c 1960 - operating from Singapore? I would appreciate advice on this...

CF

[Pontius Navigator]

CF, no.

As far as I know the Vulcan did not deploy until Sep 64 and arrived in theatre in Oct 64. I will check Dr Easter's book on Friday if I remember.

Neither the Victor nor the Vulcan Chamfrom deployments dropped any ordnance. Their deterrent presence was possibly enough. Indonesian incursions stepped up sharply after the Vulcans returned to UK in Dec 64.

[XV277]

So why the hell were they selected to reserve for the first ever V-bomber attack mission?

Valiants, Suez??:) :)


Pontius,

Did any of the FE deployments drop weapons in anger? I've seen references to Victors being used.

[Pontius Navigator]

XV277, not as far as I know and certainly no mention in David Easter's book. In fact most sources do not even mention the 12 sqn deployment.

However you might count the Victor that dropped a single 1000 lb at China Rock and a second at Song Song. I am not sure if they were HE or HES but both bombs were 'scored' heard but not seen. The miss distances were rather larger than the furthest bomb in FI. I believe the offsets had been set in the wrong sense.

[hoofie]

Having read this thread, I managed to find a copy of 'Vulcan 607' at my local library here in Oz. [it's a bit pricey 'down here']
As a humble civi, I had no idea of the complexity of the logistics, planning and execution of BLACK BUCK and had only really read about it in any detail a couple of years ago. I was certainly unaware of what a close-run thing it was.
I can remember as a boy seeing a Vulcan fly over Leuchars and that started my passion for aviation. After reading the book, I can only offer my heartfelt admiration and respect to the crews of both Vulcan and Victors who carried out the missions.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

From Telegraph letters (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?menuId=1588&menuItemId=-1&view=DISPLAYCONTENT&grid=A1&targetRule=0) 5 May 07.

The effects of bombing Stanley runway

Sir - I must balance some well-honed RAF myths with facts ("Bombing Argentines with all the lights on 'just wasn't cricket' ", report, April 30).

Bombed or not the Stanley runway was never long enough to accept fast jets. Until the last night of the war Stanley runway was used continually by enemy Hercules aircraft and often by their Pucara ground attack aircraft.

The Argentine Air Force did not move its mainland-based aircraft further north "so they couldn't take part in the fighting": further north is closer to Ascension Island, whence the Vulcan bombers operated.

Throughout the war those of us on the ground and at sea continued to suffer the consequences of fast jets operating out of Rio Gallegos, a mere 304 nautical miles from Falkland Sound. I have been to Rio Gallegos: it has a very long runway indeed and would have taken considerably more than a couple of inaccurate Vulcan bombing raids to have closed it.

Immediately after the Argentine surrender, I and a Falkland Islander drove the length and breadth of the Stanley runway looking for signs of damage and repair. There were none and the concrete was in as good condition as when I had been responsible for its security in 1978 and 1979.

My friend and I marvelled, not for the first time, at the inventiveness of the Argentine engineers. Certainly the RAF's bombing operations against Stanley airport were strategically useful but of little tactical value to us actually in the Falklands.

War is not cricket. Perhaps the RAF of 1982 had not heard Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher's dictum: "The essence of war is violence, and moderation in war is imbecility."

Lt Col Ewen Southby-Tailyour, Ermington, Devon

[Archimedes]

Much as I respect Lt Col Southby-Tailyour, he seems to overlook a couple of fairly important points:

1. The most prominent supporters of the Vulcan raid were Admirals Lewin, Leach and Woodward. This is a matter of public record.

2. CAS (MRAF Sir Michael Beetham) never claimed that the Vulcan would even hit the runway. He is on record as stating that to close the runway he'd have wanted to use at least 25 Vulcan sorties and preferably 50, and he told the Chiefs of Staff this at the time.

3. The runway was used as an emergency landing ground for damaged Argentine FJ (although the first one to try to use it was the victim of a blue-on-blue)

4. Grupo 8 did not conduct fighter sweeps over the Task Force, having moved out of range of the Task Force. Woodward is on record as having said that the SHAR would have been unable to achieve the effect the Vulcan managed, and that while he obviously doesn't know, he suspects that life for the landing force might have been rather more difficult had the Mirage IIIs not taken their ball off to play elsewhere waiting for an opposition that didn't turn up.

5.Perhaps the RAF of 1982 had not heard Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher's dictum: "The essence of war is violence, and moderation in war is imbecility."

This'll be the same RAF led by a man who'd won the DFC for being involved in bombing seven shades of the proverbial out of Germany; which contained a number of very senior officers who'd also done the same thing; which had maintained the nuclear deterrent (not a soft and fluffy thing last time I looked) until 1969, and which still had a nuclear QRA role in 1982, will it?

[cheese bobcat]

Dear All,

There is and always has been a lot of nonsense talked about the success (or otherwise) of Black Buck 1. The V-Force Vulcans had for almost all the years I can remember been purely nuclear orientated. We were never tested or examined on conventional bombing. When I first heard that the Vulcan was being considered from my wife who had managed to get to the Sunday Express before me (I was washing the car), I laughed!

However, some day or two later I and my crew were in the thick of it. Spare parts for the conventional bombing equipment were being rescued from waste dumps at both Scampton and Waddington and we not only had to practise conventional bombing but the equipment had to be fine tuned. We normally didn't mind a bomb dropping a 1000 yards away! Also, the pilots had to learn in-flight refuelling.

Bombing a runway needs some sort of penetration to render the runway unuseable for a long period. The result of low level bombing even with retarded bombs only scrapes the surface. To drop from 10,000ft, you work out the distance between the bombs in the stick and then skewer your run-in line until there is a chance of perhaps two bombs hitting the runway but certainly one will hit. That the crew of Black Buck 1 managed to get the one bomb that did hit almost in the middle is laudable. They did all that was expected of them and we should all be proud of their achievement.

By the by, 27 Sqn and 617 to a lesser extent used to report their observations of shipping to 1 Group whose moniker was 'Cheese Bobcat'.

[Rigga]

Is it me?
Or did the policeman from 'Allo 'Allo get into the Crew Photo at reply two (2)?

[Junta Leader]

The Vulcan 607 book made me quite unpopular at Christmas! I read the whole book cover to cover within 2 days:ouch: and was completely incommunicado to the rest of the family:{ . I blame Mrs JL for buying it for me. Anyone remember the amount of AFCs from that mission??

JL

[cheese bobcat]

The Captain of the Vulcan, MW, got a DFC and I think the Captain of the final Victor tanker, one BT got one or it may have been an AFC. Both continued flying after the Air Force in civvy street.

[XL391]

There are some people (not here) who will dismiss this feat as a pointless exercise, that it could have been done by anyone and anything and I know a few of them would have said Lancasters should have been used, such is their hatred for the Vulcan. Even before reading Vulcan 607, if you could only understand what all these guys went through to achieve their goal, which they did.
There are lots of people who dismiss the Vulcan, this Mission and, indeed its aircrew and, more than anything, those Victors and all their crews without which it would not have been possible. Like bombing the dams and the attacks on every German city in WW2, the stakes were exactly the same at the target, and once again we had outwitted our enemy using cunning and planning with equipment that was out of date, even in the late 60's. The longest bombing mission of it's time as well, which, again, no small feat. It should rank up there with the greatest... :D :D :D

[oldbilbo]

Just for argument's sake - and from a completely unrelated forum.....

"A fascinating story. Much enjoyed! So let's stir the pot with a little controversy.....

a) The bit about no-one realising that flying in close formation, with the necessary constant throttle adjustments, would result in fuel burn much increased over the info in the Operating Data Manual, is simply not credible.

This simply does not ring true. All aircrew know that constant throttle adjustment results in increased fuel use - and we all know this from driving cars! Besides, the Vulcan crews were 'operational' at low-level penetration - had been for years - and constant throttle adjustment to maintain crucial 'Time Over Target' was the norm. Monitoring fuel burn, and its variations, was and is a critical aspect of flight ops everywhere. This smacks of an order from on high to 'never mind the facts, my mind is made up'....

b) The crew's concerns about the 'Roland' SAM installation are valid. Faulty staff work indicated, firstly, that it was impossible for such a system to be transported to The Falklands. Some 'source' ( probably reconnaissance units on the ground ) spotted it and reported back. Consternation! Reading between the lines further on, suddenly the Vulcan crews weren't much worried after all. Could it possibly be that the SAM installation was 'taken out' by the same Special Forces team that had reported it? If so, they probably didn't last long afterwards....

c) The idea of an aircraft commander simply deciding for himself - without reference to the many layers of 'AirShips' directing every aspect of the operation - that he'd just pop up another couple of thousand feet to do the final Bomb Run, and that it wouldn't matter at all - is ludicrous. Every Target Planner in the English-speaking world would have sweated the midnight hours in determining what altitude was best - and why - and all that would have been fully agreed in advance. This bit smacks of another 'intel' cockup over the effective range of the installed AAA - a common issue that pervades the Service even today.

c) It is telling that the use of a handful of Vulcans to breach the runway at Stanley demonstrated something very significant to the Argie command structure, as did the effective use of submarine capability..... That Britain had retained the capability to mount offensive air operations many ( undetermined ) thousands of miles from a safe base, by means of that great 'force multiplier', in-flight refuelling.

This had been demonstrated frequently....

Quote:
___________________________________________________________

In 1975 ......the Guatemalans began concentrating their troops along the border once again. The British reaction was swift ......six Harrier GR.Mk1A "jump jets“ .....were deployed in a trans-Atlantic flight, supported by Handley Page Victor K.Mk.1A tankers,

___________________________________________________________

It was also known that, just a few years earlier, RAF Buccaneers with in-flight refuelling support had made a demonstration mock attack on a Soviet 'Kiev'-class carrier/cruiser in the Barents Sea near Novya Zemlya, thousands of miles beyond what the Soviets thought were the limits of that aircraft's effective Radius of Action. That exercise gave a sobering 'heads up' to military analysts and planners worldwide.

Perhaps the critical point about Operation Black Buck was the clear demonstration that British Air Power could be extended over the Argentinian mainland assets - using Vulcans and/or Buccaneers - should that be deemed necessary.

d) Comment is made in the book that sufficient navigational accuracy could not be guaranteed, and that this had implications for the conduct of operations. Bluntly, this is not so, and is likely to have been inserted to mask something else. All operational V-bomber crews were trained to navigate by astro to a very high degree of accuracy and reliability ( no GPS then ) - as were the corresponding B-52 SAC crews. Results of NATO Bombing Competitions over many years show clearly the standards reached - and the BLACK BUCK crews were the best available. Even student RAF navigators, regardless of their future postings, were all trained in precision astro-navigation techniques, without which demonstrated abilities they simply failed the Advanced Navigation Course. Then there was the Vulcan OCU......"


Food for thought - and argument?



:hmm:

[wiggy]

OK, I'll nibble at acouple of points (and I don't buy the SF theory over Roland BTW)
The idea of the aircraft commander altering his "pop up"...well frankly the airship weren't there and unlike the Soviet Air Force, RAF aircraft Commanders were not tied to what the "airships" said...
Re Nav accuracy - this has come up before - AFAIK Astro won't work to the required degree of accuracy if the aircraft is subject to frequent heading/speed changes..le.g in/following a formation. Inertial Nav will, hence the fitting of INS to the aircraft, no need for GPS. What's the mystery?

[West Coast]

Beagle, et al

Read the linked material about the Black Buck missions, a few questions.

What type of profile did the tankers follow outside of Indian territory?

What type of missile did the Brazilians pull off the Vulcan?

I was surprised to read the Vulcan climbed at 40 miles out. Certainly not expecting a pop up ala a single seat fast mover, but the distance caught me off guard. Was that the norm given the AD that was expected?

Guess the Vulcan was/is the biggest weasel out there given some of the trolling they did over the islands. I'm sure ORAC will correct me if I'm incorrect.

[trap one]

What type of profile did the tankers follow outside of Indian territory?

Believe all were high level.

What type of missile did the Brazilians pull off the Vulcan?

Shrike

I was surprised to read the Vulcan climbed at 40 miles out. Certainly not expecting a pop up ala a single seat fast mover, but the distance caught me off guard. Was that the norm given the AD that was expected?

Guess the Vulcan was/is the biggest weasel out there given some of the trolling they did over the islands. I'm sure ORAC will correct me if I'm incorrect

Larger Ferret A/C but biggest actual shooter Weasel.

[BEagle]

PN will be able to supply more of the weaponeering information, but as far as I'm aware, the bombs used were basic dumb bombs rather than retarded bombs.

Hence the optimum delivery altitude for effect would require a pop-up manoeuvre.

The pervading thought in those days seemed to be that any radar guided AAA could be successfully jammed by the Westinghouse pod. But the airships had little knowledge of the capabilities of radar-directed AA guns, having withdrawn any such weapons from the UK's aerodrome defences years earlier.

Another reason for the pop-up was the time needed for all those old black dustbins to settle down and compute the release point accurately. You have to remember that nothing other than low level lay down nuclear delivery had been practised for over a decade by the Vulcan force.

Unfortunately, unlike SAC, the V-force in those days did not have a real strategic non-nuclear role - so everything had to be sorted out from half-remembered procedures of years earlier, plus a fair bit of 'TLAR'....

As for fuel burn, very little was known of the additional burn when in formation for such long periods - AAR had disappeared from the V-force nearly 20 years earlier. But one hears that 'Caligula', a staff officer of not much known ability, used the low-weight peacetime training fuel burn figures as he was too stupid to know how to use the performance ODM. Hence on at least one occasion, 21 x 1000 lb ended up in the ocean when the actual fuel burn was discovered to be much higher than his figures.....

I understand he then was then on the receiving end of a 'conversation' with the AOC of epic proportions. No-one had any sympathy for him though.

[Art Field]

Further to the fuel burn problem, not only was the Vulcan maintaining formation for most of the deployment but every time it refuelled it went back to max weight and therefore to the top of the burn rate. This was so different to the set piece percentage fuel loads they were used to that they found it difficult to adjust to the need for very precise fuel planning. In mitigation everything was happening at such a fast pace,

Being really picky, the Belize deployment was flown by the first of the Victor K2's, mainly crewed by 232OCU staff.

[50+Ray]

Fuel Burn
It is my understanding that whenever refuelling happened the receiver was topped right up. So for a considerable time the Vulcan was actually above Max AUW, where it was noticeably thirstier. The other factor was that crews were normally operating at between FL410 and FL450. Since AAR was being done in the high twenties/low thirties the engines burnt more and the groundspeed was less. The relevant pages of the ODM were not looked at in my 7 year stretch on Vulcans, as we just did not operate like that.
I am surprised that enough real information was not gleaned from the transit down to Ascension to increase the amount of fuel put in the air on the night of Black Buck 1, but lessons would seem to have been applied on the later missions.

[RS30]

Oh dear...Beagle, Beagle, Beagle. Using phrases like dumb or retarded may cause offence...surely the PC term is free fall.:E

[Pontius Navigator]

Having looked at the ODM recently for a different purpose, not to hand atthe moment, but I suspect that most of the flight might have been conducted outside the ODM envelope.

The upper weight entry point on the ODM was, IIRC, 220,000lb so if there were pages for the speed and height used the fuel burn would have been tabulated.

As for throttle adjustment. The V-force practised tracking and timing every trip high or low level. A measure of this could be that some crews with smooth throttle handling could squeeze another 5k or 30 minutes out of the beast. Harvey Moore (mentioned before) once squeezed 7 hr 15 min by the expedient on minimal throttle variation, cruise climb and flying near endurance rather than range speed.

What had surprised the crews, lessons not previously learnt, was that they could get as good a speed as the Victors and a lower fuel burn by flying near the Trop whereas the standard Vulcan mantra had been to fly in the low 40s but this required more fuel to climb and a less efficient burn. Only near the equator with a higher trop was higher better.

As for the popup at 40 miles.

The maximum high definition radar range was 45 miles but you would have needed an aiming point about the size of that 617 Sqn's dogs appendages and good accuracy.

By delaying switch on to less than 45 miles you had a better chance of painting a recognisable bit of land.

Now given a release range of 3 miles and an absolute minimum level and stable run of one minute the aircraft would have had to level off at about 9 miles. A climb to 20000 feet would take about 2 minutes or another 12 miles so the latest popup point would have been 21 miles give or take.

Now the aircraft had been running on IN/DR for perhaps 7-8 hours at an accuracy of possibly 2-3 miles per hour. The IN might have been out be as much as 14-24 miles. Clearly if the IN had been that inaccurate but you poped up at '21' miles you might have been only 7 miles from the target. Prudence, in a low threat environment, would suggest an earlier popup.

We can contrast that with a nuclear popup to 10000 feet from just 9 miles. In that case it was a high threat environment but the nav kit would have been updated and accurate to no more than 2 miles and probably even a matter of yards.

[moggiee]

I never got to fly the Vulcan, sadly, but I was deeply impressed by Black Buck and found Vulcan 607 a riveting read.

On the question of fuel burn, was it necessary to fuel to such a high level each time? Would it not have been better to try to keep the weight a little lower and fuel burn lower too?

I know that the old wisdom is that you can never have too much fuel - but maybe in this case you could!

[Pontius Navigator]

moggiee

I don't have any figures however remember all the fuel was airborne.

As, say, 50k was offloaded from the tanker its burn would go down as the receiver's burn would go up. As it is a simple question of chemical energy conversion it depends who was burning the fuel more efficiently.

By filling the receiver to full you could also despatch an empty tanker back to Asi much earlier. For instance if the Vulcan had been filled to 50k and not 70k the tanker could have continued south for another hour (10k) and offloaded 30k to the Vulcan and would now need an extra 10k to get home. His buddy, either way, would continue with the Vulcan. On this sum the extra fuel required would have been 20k.

Also, if the tanker was sucking for 20 minutes, bucking etc, this would have 'wasted' 20 minutes bucking fuel and the time to prod.

If instead they had gone for lower uploads you might have 2 x 10 minutes of bucking fuel and 2 x prod manoeuvre too.

Lots of very deep questions which, with a year or two of trials Boscombe could probably come up with the definitive answer.

[moggiee]

Thanks PN. As an shiny 10 chap, I didn't consider the tanker fuel burn.

On the subject of it being "not cricket" - surely the answer answer is that "they started it so should not have been surprised when we hit back!"

[Pontius Navigator]

moggiee, no facts as I never tanked, did do the course though. Just supposition. Interesting to see if the likes of D*** B******l see this. He was in the ARC for ever.

[Art Field]

As a general rule, fill to full is the best use of a tanker offload. Certainly a large receivers burn will increase significantly during the whole of the period which includes pre-positioning. The on-load rate, however, will drop as tanks fill so the last few lbs may well be unproductive with the receiver burning fuel as fast as he gets it. Choice of level,speed etc is ideally picked to obtain best overall fuel consumption for the whole formation, not necessarily the best for the receiver and not always best weather-wise.
The Black Buck missions involved so many refuels, both Victor/ Vulcan and Victor/Victor, all essential for success and fraught with equipment problems, South Atlantic high level haze and turbulence and sheer pressure on the crews. In those circumstances it was vital to get the maximum value out of every successful contact.

[Wader2]

A question about the alleged Bearded BSs RT call.

Where was the task force at the Black Buck closest point of approach?

Did the SHAR actually fly at night which would have been necessary if it was on CAP?

Where was the CAP station and at what height?

Was it in LOS with FI?

If the SHAR CAP was below the RT horizon and the TF was to well to the seaward side of the islands then it is unlikely that the Argentines would have picked up the call unless they had an Elint aircraft up.

Now if by chance the Argentines had had a defensive CAP airborne that night, unlikely I know, then the BBS RT call might have been quite welcome by BB.

So, could the RT call have been made?
Might the bomber be relieved, or at least interested, to know that escort/sweep was available?

Or is that too tactically advanced for that time?

[BEagle]

Only an utter tw.t would break RT silence under such circumstances!

Which he did......

[Wader2]

BEagle, only playing devils advocate as I don't for one moment think that he might have considered the points I was asking.

However was it feasible that they could have arranged a standoff CAP with the potential for escort/sweep?

[BEagle]

The last thing a lone bomber crew would want on such a covert raid would be some little wetjet with a couple of 9 limas and 30 minutes of endurance getting in the way.......

[Wader2]

You know that. I know that. But . . .

Care to PM me with Caligulas name? I don't know the nic but might know the person.

I knew someone in a different group who suffered severe psychological stress at ASI, PST disopered etc etc or it could have been DTs :E

[BEagle]

Anyone who was on 44 Zimbabwe Air Legion in the late 70s would now......

Ask 50+Ray, for example!

A clue - think of a scrawny black bird. And I don't mean Naomi Campbell!

It was only a rumour at the time, so may well have been a myth.