Merged: Norfolk Island ditching
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It will still be interesting to some whatever the outcome of this event is.Like I have said in a previous post lets hope we ALL learn from this incident/accident. Aviation is a breeding ground for incidents/accidents it's also a ground for learning.
Whatever the reason as to why this crew found themselves with no options but to ditch the one deciding factor that I always based my decisions on in similar missions was SE flight or Depress flight, both scenarios will take you straight to the bottom of the Pacific if it happened with no Alt's quicker than other poor decision. On missions where range was critical the effective range of any light jet such as the Westwind Etc was based on what you could expect with an engine out or an unpressurized cabin. Obviously both situations would mean a much lower crz Alt & therefore lower TAS & with a fuel flow somewhere similar too two engine burn at Alt. where the Tas was higher & range further.
An Eg. A Std LR35 would consume around 1100 lbs (better in LRC) at high crz Alt under ISA cond's with say 470 kts TAS giving an effective range of around (assuming nil wind for calc purposes only) 2100 NM with basic reserves. Add in an eng failure with a crz Alt of 25K (max for airframe type if I recall) the FF would be somewhere around 1400 lbs per hr on 1 donk (LRC was avail on one donk with less FF but TAS was even less meaning extended exposure to further problems over water) & remembering getting a TAS of 300 kts meansyou get say 1000+ Nm's............you go figure it out! That's why I NEVER planned such a mission unless I had a SE/Depress out option on long over water Pacific hops.
They all walked away (swam) that's the good news here, the rest we wait & learn
Wmk2
Whatever the reason as to why this crew found themselves with no options but to ditch the one deciding factor that I always based my decisions on in similar missions was SE flight or Depress flight, both scenarios will take you straight to the bottom of the Pacific if it happened with no Alt's quicker than other poor decision. On missions where range was critical the effective range of any light jet such as the Westwind Etc was based on what you could expect with an engine out or an unpressurized cabin. Obviously both situations would mean a much lower crz Alt & therefore lower TAS & with a fuel flow somewhere similar too two engine burn at Alt. where the Tas was higher & range further.
An Eg. A Std LR35 would consume around 1100 lbs (better in LRC) at high crz Alt under ISA cond's with say 470 kts TAS giving an effective range of around (assuming nil wind for calc purposes only) 2100 NM with basic reserves. Add in an eng failure with a crz Alt of 25K (max for airframe type if I recall) the FF would be somewhere around 1400 lbs per hr on 1 donk (LRC was avail on one donk with less FF but TAS was even less meaning extended exposure to further problems over water) & remembering getting a TAS of 300 kts meansyou get say 1000+ Nm's............you go figure it out! That's why I NEVER planned such a mission unless I had a SE/Depress out option on long over water Pacific hops.
They all walked away (swam) that's the good news here, the rest we wait & learn
Wmk2
Bottums Up
They all walked away (swam) that's the good news here ...
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There's a story (I think it was in one of Ernest Gann's books) of a Catalina crew flying in IMC over Greenland during World War 2 when their airspeed gradually reduced to near zero despite their having full power applied on the engines. Amazingly, they'd flown - very, very smothly - into a very gently rising snow-covered hill and the aircraft (and very surprised as well as very, very lucky crew) ended up stranded on the snow drift for quite a few days before they were rescued.
Is it possible this incident was along the same lines?
Is it possible this incident was along the same lines?
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Isn't the Westwind equipped with radar altimeter? Wouldn't it be reading out "500 feet", "400 feet", etc, then 'whoop whoop, pull up, terrain" etc when it detected the water? If so, how could a controlled flight into the water without the pilot's knowledge be possible?
If so, how could a controlled flight into the water without the pilot's knowledge be possible?
On pitch black night in low cloud and maybe rain, the landing lights will reflect badly into the cockpit and crew forward vision is seriously affected. And that means highly probable the crew would never see the water surface until too late.
If you have ever driven a car at night on black surfaced road with headlights on and road surface wet, you will note there is very little reflected illumination off the surface of the road. So bad in fact that even a white painted line may not be visible. That is why the crew may not actually see the sea until too late.
Same with weather radar tilted down from high altitude over the ocean. With calm seas you probably will not obtain a clear ground return. However, if seas are rough the radar will often get a bounce back from the concave side of large curling waves.
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This Will Fire Up The Pot !
mainframe ,
You are not quite correct,CASA does not conduct accident investigations off their own back, true. However CASA does not need to wait until the ATSB hands down it's 'final investigation report' to get involved because the ATSB can and does at times ask for and receives a Specialist Technical Inspector to 'assist' the ATSB within the scope of the investigation ( prior to any report ).The CASA Inspector is not conducting an accident investigation, but is assisting as requested by the ATSB by providing specialist knowledge advice.
Utter crap. Air Safety is priority number 1. If you have an issue with 'enforcement' then don't break the rules, pretty simple really. And if you feel you are hard done by, then contact the Independant Industry Complaints Comissioner with your complaint. And after all that if you still think you have been shafted or unfairly treated, then the whole world probably has it in for you !
Yes, that is correct. There were findings aimed at CASA in relation to Lockhart River.
The ATSB's role in accident investigations can and does pinpoint the causal factors of all accidents, and the ATSB apportions blame where blame is due, and that includes the Regulator if they are at fault. However, your taking a cheap shot in regards to Lockhart River on this thread is lame.
That is hypocritical. You just mentioned that CASA copped a 'nailing' over Lockhart River, yet you also say they don't 'take up any regulatory breaches of their own'.
Sounds like sour grapes to me.I agree with you that the Regulator does make mistakes, but name me one Aviation company that has never made a mistake, employed a nimwit, or made a knee jerk reaction to something in haste ? I say it how it is, if the Regulator screws up, I am not shy to point it out. If industry screws up, I am just as happy to point that out also.
CASA does not conduct accident investigations, however they will be waiting for the ATSB reort to determine if they can get involved.
CASA are not particularly interested in air safety, their preference is enforcement.
The final ATSB report will be clinical and make observations and recommendations. (They nailed CASA in the Lockhart River tragedy)
The ATSB's role in accident investigations can and does pinpoint the causal factors of all accidents, and the ATSB apportions blame where blame is due, and that includes the Regulator if they are at fault. However, your taking a cheap shot in regards to Lockhart River on this thread is lame.
CASA will quickly take up any regulatory breaches identified except their own.
Sounds like sour grapes to me.I agree with you that the Regulator does make mistakes, but name me one Aviation company that has never made a mistake, employed a nimwit, or made a knee jerk reaction to something in haste ? I say it how it is, if the Regulator screws up, I am not shy to point it out. If industry screws up, I am just as happy to point that out also.
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The Catalina accident Andu was referring to: Crash 27.1.1943 (20.7.2004)
Not quite as Andu recalled it - the poor ***s weren't IMC, (they had an horizon), but were victims of 'whiteout', not unlike the Mt Erebus tragedy.
Consolidated PBY-5A Catalina
(7278)
This accident occurred while flying over Greenland Ice Cap at an altitude of 4500-ft indicated. This should have given a clearance of 1000-ft according to charts of the area. Weather and snow covered terrain resulted in poor depth perception. Without realizing they were close to the ice, as a horizon was visible and were not on instruments, they suddenly made contact on the upgrade of a 400-ft slope. the pilot immediately applied throttles in an attempt to get into air but was unsuccessful due to the slope. Further attempts to swing plane around in order to take-off down grade were unsuccessful as plane sank into snow and ice. Block and tackle was dropped, but that also proved unsuccessful. The Ice Cap presents an unbroken pure white surface and when the prominent cost of landmarks are not visible, depth perception is extremely difficult, analagons to flying over glassy water in low visibility. It is considered that the fundamental cause of this accident was the almost lack of depth perception. This plane and its crew were strained (stranded?) on the ice cap for fifteen days, but were in constant touch with there base by radio. A plane dropped supplies and salvage equipment. On the 14th day a Danish Rescue party reached them. On the fifteenth day they abandoned there (their?) plane, all confidential publications, the IFF, SBAE and RADAR being destroyed. They returned by foot to the rescue party's came and on the sixteenth day returned to the NORTH STAR. Except for extreme cold, none of the crew suffered any ill effects.
Lt(jg). R. W. Shepard (Pilot)
Lt(jg). A. H. Gilster (co-pilot)
AP2c. M. V. Egert
Amm2c. N. J. Richey, Jr.
Amm3c. W. Blankenship
Rm1c. J. J. Rutowski
Rm3c. E. R. Herbert.
(7278)
This accident occurred while flying over Greenland Ice Cap at an altitude of 4500-ft indicated. This should have given a clearance of 1000-ft according to charts of the area. Weather and snow covered terrain resulted in poor depth perception. Without realizing they were close to the ice, as a horizon was visible and were not on instruments, they suddenly made contact on the upgrade of a 400-ft slope. the pilot immediately applied throttles in an attempt to get into air but was unsuccessful due to the slope. Further attempts to swing plane around in order to take-off down grade were unsuccessful as plane sank into snow and ice. Block and tackle was dropped, but that also proved unsuccessful. The Ice Cap presents an unbroken pure white surface and when the prominent cost of landmarks are not visible, depth perception is extremely difficult, analagons to flying over glassy water in low visibility. It is considered that the fundamental cause of this accident was the almost lack of depth perception. This plane and its crew were strained (stranded?) on the ice cap for fifteen days, but were in constant touch with there base by radio. A plane dropped supplies and salvage equipment. On the 14th day a Danish Rescue party reached them. On the fifteenth day they abandoned there (their?) plane, all confidential publications, the IFF, SBAE and RADAR being destroyed. They returned by foot to the rescue party's came and on the sixteenth day returned to the NORTH STAR. Except for extreme cold, none of the crew suffered any ill effects.
Lt(jg). R. W. Shepard (Pilot)
Lt(jg). A. H. Gilster (co-pilot)
AP2c. M. V. Egert
Amm2c. N. J. Richey, Jr.
Amm3c. W. Blankenship
Rm1c. J. J. Rutowski
Rm3c. E. R. Herbert.
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the Independant Industry Complaints Comissioner
The CASA paid "independant" complaints commissioner was set up as a hurdle you had to overcome to say you had "exhausted all other avenues" of redress before you could make a complaint to the Commonwealth Ombudsman.
CASA are not particularly interested in air safety, their preference is enforcement.
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My Oleo Is Extended:
If CASA are so determined to promote safety, why do they, on one hand, promote Safety Management Systems and a Just culture, and then on the other accept offences of strict liablity?
The two are mutually exclusive, and show that CASA wants to appear to be safety minded (with SMS), but on the flipside are prepared to disregard the basic principles of it by penalising without consideration! Strict liability does not fit with a just culture.
If CASA are so determined to promote safety, why do they, on one hand, promote Safety Management Systems and a Just culture, and then on the other accept offences of strict liablity?
The two are mutually exclusive, and show that CASA wants to appear to be safety minded (with SMS), but on the flipside are prepared to disregard the basic principles of it by penalising without consideration! Strict liability does not fit with a just culture.
From the Preliminary Aviation Safety Investigation Report Ditching – Norfolk Island – 18 November 2009
I do hope ATSB has a subscription to the CAOs, especially CAO 82.0 and someone in the ATSB reads it.
An alternate was required irrespective of forecast conditions. CAO82.0.2.4(a)
At Apia, the pilot in command submitted a flight plan by telephone to Airservices Australia. At that time, the forecast weather conditions at Norfolk Island for the arrival did not require the carriage of additional fuel for holding, or the nomination of an alternate airport.
An alternate was required irrespective of forecast conditions. CAO82.0.2.4(a)
(a) the minimum amount of fuel that will, whatever the weather conditions, enable the aeroplane to fly, with all its engines operating, to the remote island and then from the remote island to the aerodrome that is, for that flight, the alternate aerodrome for the aircraft, together with any reserve fuel requirements for the aircraft; and
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Did anyone else note from the Preliminary Report that it is stated that the PIC was the first to exit the aircraft leaving his injured copilot and passengers to fend for themselves. Sounds like real hero stuff to me if that is what actually happened!
I seriously hope that was not the case, I would like to think he was just a little concerned for the others on board.
BSB
I seriously hope that was not the case, I would like to think he was just a little concerned for the others on board.
BSB
601
Not necessarily so.
You quoted a bit selectively from the CAO.
The relevant part of the CAO is:-
2.3 The
Not necessarily so.
You quoted a bit selectively from the CAO.
The relevant part of the CAO is:-
2.4 For the purposes of subparagraph 2.3 (b), the amounts of fuel are: (my bolding)
(a) the minimum amount of fuel that will, whatever the weather conditions,
enable the aeroplane to fly, with all its engines operating, to the remote
island and then from the remote island to the aerodrome that is, for that
flight, the alternate aerodrome for the aircraft, together with any reserve
fuel requirements for the aircraft; and(a) the minimum amount of fuel that will, whatever the weather conditions,
enable the aeroplane to fly, with all its engines operating, to the remote
island and then from the remote island to the aerodrome that is, for that
flight, the alternate aerodrome for the aircraft, together with any reserve
2.3 The
minimum safe fuel for an aeroplane undertaking a flight to a remote
This means that Para 2.4 has to be interpreted in association with 2.3 (b). If Para 2.3 (a) applies then the fuel required is as per the ops manual.
Do you know what the Pelair manual specifies. I don't.
An added complication as I see it is "was this flight was a charter or an Ambulance function airwork flight".
If it was a charter then the above rules apply.
If AWK then I do not think they apply. Bear in mind that Section 2 of CAO 82.0 is interpretation not the actual requirement.
CAO 80.0.3 A says:-
aerodrome located on a remote island.
This clearly applies to Passenger carrying charter, not freight charter, aerial work nor private operations.
So what are the real requirements. Frankly, I don't know. I suspect that a definative answer to this might involve Barristers and a Federal Court judge.
Unfortunately this is another case of complex convoluted regulation that has been developed by a reactive regulator rather than a proactive one.
Not having a go at you 601. Rather trying to point out the complexities of the regulatory system that we have to try interpret and fly by.
island is:
(a) the minimum amount of fuel that the aeroplane should carry on that
flight, according to the operations manual of the aeroplane’s operator,
revised (if applicable) as directed by CASA to ensure that an adequate
amount of fuel is carried on such flights; or
(b) if the operations manual does not make provision for the calculation of
that amount or has not been revised as directed by CASA — whichever
of the amounts of fuel mentioned in paragraph 2.4 is the greater.(a) the minimum amount of fuel that the aeroplane should carry on that
flight, according to the operations manual of the aeroplane’s operator,
revised (if applicable) as directed by CASA to ensure that an adequate
amount of fuel is carried on such flights; or
(b) if the operations manual does not make provision for the calculation of
that amount or has not been revised as directed by CASA — whichever
This means that Para 2.4 has to be interpreted in association with 2.3 (b). If Para 2.3 (a) applies then the fuel required is as per the ops manual.
Do you know what the Pelair manual specifies. I don't.
An added complication as I see it is "was this flight was a charter or an Ambulance function airwork flight".
If it was a charter then the above rules apply.
If AWK then I do not think they apply. Bear in mind that Section 2 of CAO 82.0 is interpretation not the actual requirement.
CAO 80.0.3 A says:-
3A Conditions for passenger-carrying charter operations to remote
islands
3A.1 Each certificate authorising charter operations for the carriage of passengers is
subject to the condition that an aeroplane operated under the certificate is to
carry passengers on a flight to a remote island only if:
(a) the aeroplane has more than 1 engine; and
(b) the total amount of fuel carried by the aeroplane at the start of the flight is
not less than the minimum safe fuel for the aeroplane for that flight; and
(c) the alternate aerodrome for the aeroplane for that flight is not an
islands
3A.1 Each certificate authorising charter operations for the carriage of passengers is
subject to the condition that an aeroplane operated under the certificate is to
carry passengers on a flight to a remote island only if:
(a) the aeroplane has more than 1 engine; and
(b) the total amount of fuel carried by the aeroplane at the start of the flight is
not less than the minimum safe fuel for the aeroplane for that flight; and
(c) the alternate aerodrome for the aeroplane for that flight is not an
aerodrome located on a remote island.
This clearly applies to Passenger carrying charter, not freight charter, aerial work nor private operations.
So what are the real requirements. Frankly, I don't know. I suspect that a definative answer to this might involve Barristers and a Federal Court judge.
Unfortunately this is another case of complex convoluted regulation that has been developed by a reactive regulator rather than a proactive one.
Not having a go at you 601. Rather trying to point out the complexities of the regulatory system that we have to try interpret and fly by.
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PCX
I bow to your superior interpretation of the CAO and that 3A is the requirement and 2.3 and 2.4 are "interpretations" for 3A and it would only apply to Charter Ops.
But was it an AWK flight or a Charter flight? ATSB seem to think so
However, this is where the legal eagles will have a field day.
If it was AWK the only persons that should have been carried were the patient, medical personnel and the flight crew.
Persons other than the flight crew are not permitted on AWK fights unless they have a function to the safe operation of the aircraft - medical personnel meet this requirement.
But would a "patient's partner" have a function on the flight?
I bow to your superior interpretation of the CAO and that 3A is the requirement and 2.3 and 2.4 are "interpretations" for 3A and it would only apply to Charter Ops.
But was it an AWK flight or a Charter flight? ATSB seem to think so
Type of Operation: Other Aerial Work
If it was AWK the only persons that should have been carried were the patient, medical personnel and the flight crew.
Persons other than the flight crew are not permitted on AWK fights unless they have a function to the safe operation of the aircraft - medical personnel meet this requirement.
But would a "patient's partner" have a function on the flight?
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So are the so called experts with inside information going to man up and retract some of there statements.(Two liferafts and enough lifevests for all,rapid sinking not allowing time to deploy raft,radio calls made and crew advised of iminent ditching).
Waiting patiently..............
Waiting patiently..............
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Norfolk Island interm report out.
The captain was a hero. Risked life to go to get help.
http://atsb.gov.au/media/1345477/ao-2009-072-prelim.pdf
Why oh why didn't Sully do it right, the way a TRUE hero does, as in this case?
http://atsb.gov.au/media/1345477/ao-2009-072-prelim.pdf
Why oh why didn't Sully do it right, the way a TRUE hero does, as in this case?
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This appeared on abc.net.au at about 3pm AEDT today:
Ditched plane survivors swam to safety: report - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
Ditched plane survivors swam to safety: report - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
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From the report
If this is accurate, (as you'd expect it to be), it means the earlier newspaper report that had a passenger saying there was no pre-ditching briefing was untrue.
Quite a few here and in the earlier thread based their comments on the possibility of it being a CFIT on this earlier newspaper report.
As the aircraft initiated the third missed approach from runway 11, the copilot instructed the passengers to prepare for the ditching.
Quite a few here and in the earlier thread based their comments on the possibility of it being a CFIT on this earlier newspaper report.
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Forget Sully, what about the locals
Ironically headed towards Norfolk
Bypassing Four exits to ensure these two guys were the last off the aircraft.
Dog
Ironically headed towards Norfolk
DOUGLAS DC-3 VH-EDC
Botany Bay, New South Wales
24 April 1994
Botany Bay, New South Wales
24 April 1994
On Sunday 24 April 1994, at about 0910 EST, Douglas DC-3 aircraft VH-EDC took off from
runway 16 at Sydney (Kingsford-Smith) Airport. The crew reported an engine malfunction
during the initial climb and subsequently ditched the aircraft into Botany Bay. The DC-3 was
on a charter flight to convey a group of college students and their band equipment from
Sydney to Norfolk Island and return as part of Anzac Day celebrations on the island. All 25
occupants, including the four crew, successfully evacuated the aircraft before it sank.
runway 16 at Sydney (Kingsford-Smith) Airport. The crew reported an engine malfunction
during the initial climb and subsequently ditched the aircraft into Botany Bay. The DC-3 was
on a charter flight to convey a group of college students and their band equipment from
Sydney to Norfolk Island and return as part of Anzac Day celebrations on the island. All 25
occupants, including the four crew, successfully evacuated the aircraft before it sank.
By the time this initial transfer had been completed, water had already begun to enter the aircraft through the forward fuselage. The pilot in command
therefore instructed the passengers to expedite their evacuation. When the remaining passengers had egressed, the pilot in command and the supernumerary pilot left the aircraft through the rear exit.
therefore instructed the passengers to expedite their evacuation. When the remaining passengers had egressed, the pilot in command and the supernumerary pilot left the aircraft through the rear exit.
Dog
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I look at it this way.
#First out of his seat.
#Attempts to open main door but water flow does not allow door to open.
#Proceeds to hatch and opens hatch.
#Due to f@#k all room in cabin he proceeds out in an attempt to assist people out of the cabin but due to the sinking speed is unable to assist.
# remainder assist themselves and are lucky in doing that as when the second hatch is pulled it is fully submersed and the last one out appears to have to swim for the surface.
I dont think he has done that much wrong there but i guess its easier to join the sheep with the continued below the belt cheap shots hey.
#First out of his seat.
#Attempts to open main door but water flow does not allow door to open.
#Proceeds to hatch and opens hatch.
#Due to f@#k all room in cabin he proceeds out in an attempt to assist people out of the cabin but due to the sinking speed is unable to assist.
# remainder assist themselves and are lucky in doing that as when the second hatch is pulled it is fully submersed and the last one out appears to have to swim for the surface.
I dont think he has done that much wrong there but i guess its easier to join the sheep with the continued below the belt cheap shots hey.
