BA's monitored approach and it's origins or not!
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BA's monitored approach and it's origins or not!
I wrote this piece after reading a thread involving a tail strike and some comments about the disasterous post war history of my first employers.
I can't find the original thread and some of the posts about the "wonderful" BEA invention frankly pure wishful thinking.
It is different perspective of the Brits leaving aluminium strewn around the globe, perhaps the real reason for BEA 's monitored approach and why it was the best of a bad job at the time.
As was noted in the previous thread the Brits had a terrible accident rate post war ...and, for some, for the following thirty years.
Firstly the RAF in effect trained suicide pilots. Inadequately trained and with little prospect of surviving the war. An acceptable loss rate of 4% per bomber operation with the tour lasting 30 missions. Those that survived had the chance to join the Corporations and most of the management in BEA in the early 70s were from this group.
The father of one of the crew members in Papa India was sent on a solo, daylight raid on Berlin during the Battle of Britain - he spent the war in stalgluft drei and participated in the "death walk" - his rear gunner wasn't as lucky.
Brave men who were let down by the system in many ways...single pilot with an escape hatch too small on the Lancaster and we all know what happened after the war although it was kept secret until recently that Bomber Harris refused to carry out the last three major raids, including Dresden unless he had a specific order from Eisenhower and Churchill.
They weren't the only ones as I recall an allied parachute drop in The World at War where several of the British parachutes candled with the poor bastards plummeting to their deaths. The Germans and Americans had reserve chutes.
In the late 50s the Corporations took over AST at Hamble with the first course starting in 1960.
It was a farsighted step which would eventually pay dividends. Entrance qualifications were the same as those for university which 4% of the population gained. It made it the domaine of the middle and upper classes and,of course, was misogynistic, racist with smatterings of religious prejudice as was normal then.
In comparison the RAF demanded only sixth form entrance qualifications but their training could not be compared with that of Hamble; without doubt it was the reason that in one peaceful year they lost 200+ airframes and had a % loss rate on several types that exceeded that of the Starfighter flown by the Luftwaffe.
Other factors are that Johnnie Foreigner had a larger pool of talent available and used exfighter pilots. There is enough information on the net about pilot selection with the best going to fighters yet the corporations were run by bomber command.
Hamble was staffed by predominantly fighters boys and the BEA training organisation was a huge shock to me when I joined BEA in 1971.
BEA MONITORED APPROACH.
I believe it was a poor tool in an even poorer system.
The technicalities were; fully established by 3,000ft...landing configuration and approach speed.
The copilot flew the flight director whilst the analogue auto throttle controlled the speed and was monitored by the captain.
We approached on the back side of the lift/drag curve.
In reality the flight director pointed the beast through the copilot and the throttles did their best to manage the energy.
With wind shear and turbulence it was a balls up and into Gibraltar once the captain had taken over I would overpower the auto throttle and more or less use it as manual thrust anticipating and restricting the changes.
As those who have lots of hand flying know one sets the attitude and control the flight path with power.
One can do it the other way but....25 years on I reverted to BEA procedures when I returned to gliding and pointed the nose at the aiming point and controlled the speed with air brakes...I was quickly sussed.
We only manually operated to CAT 1 although others flew to CAT 2 and I witnessed one genuine CAT 2, manual approach but not in a British aircraft.
BEA had a unique way of operating aircraft which one can read about in the Lane inquiry, this carried on and the checklists were changed in the 777 prang and the LAX incident as happened with Papa India which one can read in the relevant reports.
We also had this thing that everyone was suitable for a command and suitable to fly the biggest and best kite.
There were a few guys, me included, who were frightened of the Trident. This included some management and one national service pilot who went on to be a top management trainer!
So how do you get a successful instrument approach when the skipper can't fly one...give it to the first officer and when you see the runway take over.
BEA and it's associated companies lost eight aircraft in my six years flying for them.
It changed with a change of management ...Hamsters and BOAC philosophy.
IMHO for a successful operation one needs realistic SOP, proper training and a culture that encourages criticism.
This wasn't so as we had several management stars who would ignore SOP and basically tell you to shut up if one had the courage to open your mouth.
It is why BALPA was so popular.
BUT we also had some ex WW2 pilots who could fly a raw data, manual own throttles, IMC approach and boy were they a pleasure to watch. It opened my eyes that there are many ways to operate an aircraft but in BEA is was dictated by the lowest common denominator.
As a demonstration of how dodgy the system was a mate of mine, long after I had left for pastures green, flew a manual approach with the captain setting the rpm he called. This was verboten in my time unless one had an engine failure.
The captain was mentally ill and killed himself a few months later but the important part is that he was unusually slow in setting the power which resulted in an even higher pitch attitude and the inevitable tail strike.
Many would say why didn't the copilot overpower the captain but I was taught that one kept ones hands well away from what sir was doing. It nearly killed me two years ago which is another story.
Next post will be on what BOAC did to reduce the aluminium litter strewn around the globe.
I can't find the original thread and some of the posts about the "wonderful" BEA invention frankly pure wishful thinking.
It is different perspective of the Brits leaving aluminium strewn around the globe, perhaps the real reason for BEA 's monitored approach and why it was the best of a bad job at the time.
As was noted in the previous thread the Brits had a terrible accident rate post war ...and, for some, for the following thirty years.
Firstly the RAF in effect trained suicide pilots. Inadequately trained and with little prospect of surviving the war. An acceptable loss rate of 4% per bomber operation with the tour lasting 30 missions. Those that survived had the chance to join the Corporations and most of the management in BEA in the early 70s were from this group.
The father of one of the crew members in Papa India was sent on a solo, daylight raid on Berlin during the Battle of Britain - he spent the war in stalgluft drei and participated in the "death walk" - his rear gunner wasn't as lucky.
Brave men who were let down by the system in many ways...single pilot with an escape hatch too small on the Lancaster and we all know what happened after the war although it was kept secret until recently that Bomber Harris refused to carry out the last three major raids, including Dresden unless he had a specific order from Eisenhower and Churchill.
They weren't the only ones as I recall an allied parachute drop in The World at War where several of the British parachutes candled with the poor bastards plummeting to their deaths. The Germans and Americans had reserve chutes.
In the late 50s the Corporations took over AST at Hamble with the first course starting in 1960.
It was a farsighted step which would eventually pay dividends. Entrance qualifications were the same as those for university which 4% of the population gained. It made it the domaine of the middle and upper classes and,of course, was misogynistic, racist with smatterings of religious prejudice as was normal then.
In comparison the RAF demanded only sixth form entrance qualifications but their training could not be compared with that of Hamble; without doubt it was the reason that in one peaceful year they lost 200+ airframes and had a % loss rate on several types that exceeded that of the Starfighter flown by the Luftwaffe.
Other factors are that Johnnie Foreigner had a larger pool of talent available and used exfighter pilots. There is enough information on the net about pilot selection with the best going to fighters yet the corporations were run by bomber command.
Hamble was staffed by predominantly fighters boys and the BEA training organisation was a huge shock to me when I joined BEA in 1971.
BEA MONITORED APPROACH.
I believe it was a poor tool in an even poorer system.
The technicalities were; fully established by 3,000ft...landing configuration and approach speed.
The copilot flew the flight director whilst the analogue auto throttle controlled the speed and was monitored by the captain.
We approached on the back side of the lift/drag curve.
In reality the flight director pointed the beast through the copilot and the throttles did their best to manage the energy.
With wind shear and turbulence it was a balls up and into Gibraltar once the captain had taken over I would overpower the auto throttle and more or less use it as manual thrust anticipating and restricting the changes.
As those who have lots of hand flying know one sets the attitude and control the flight path with power.
One can do it the other way but....25 years on I reverted to BEA procedures when I returned to gliding and pointed the nose at the aiming point and controlled the speed with air brakes...I was quickly sussed.
We only manually operated to CAT 1 although others flew to CAT 2 and I witnessed one genuine CAT 2, manual approach but not in a British aircraft.
BEA had a unique way of operating aircraft which one can read about in the Lane inquiry, this carried on and the checklists were changed in the 777 prang and the LAX incident as happened with Papa India which one can read in the relevant reports.
We also had this thing that everyone was suitable for a command and suitable to fly the biggest and best kite.
There were a few guys, me included, who were frightened of the Trident. This included some management and one national service pilot who went on to be a top management trainer!
So how do you get a successful instrument approach when the skipper can't fly one...give it to the first officer and when you see the runway take over.
BEA and it's associated companies lost eight aircraft in my six years flying for them.
It changed with a change of management ...Hamsters and BOAC philosophy.
IMHO for a successful operation one needs realistic SOP, proper training and a culture that encourages criticism.
This wasn't so as we had several management stars who would ignore SOP and basically tell you to shut up if one had the courage to open your mouth.
It is why BALPA was so popular.
BUT we also had some ex WW2 pilots who could fly a raw data, manual own throttles, IMC approach and boy were they a pleasure to watch. It opened my eyes that there are many ways to operate an aircraft but in BEA is was dictated by the lowest common denominator.
As a demonstration of how dodgy the system was a mate of mine, long after I had left for pastures green, flew a manual approach with the captain setting the rpm he called. This was verboten in my time unless one had an engine failure.
The captain was mentally ill and killed himself a few months later but the important part is that he was unusually slow in setting the power which resulted in an even higher pitch attitude and the inevitable tail strike.
Many would say why didn't the copilot overpower the captain but I was taught that one kept ones hands well away from what sir was doing. It nearly killed me two years ago which is another story.
Next post will be on what BOAC did to reduce the aluminium litter strewn around the globe.
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A really good, well balanced piece! Quite an achievement!
ie totally subjective and a chip on both shoulders.
Has Britain ever done anything well, in your humble opinion? Do tell!
ie totally subjective and a chip on both shoulders.
Has Britain ever done anything well, in your humble opinion? Do tell!
Thread Starter
BOAC monitored approach.
In the 60s BOAC had a terrible accident rate and they decided that a major shift in operating procedures was needed.
The main stay was that the first officer had to be equally trained and qualified as the captain to be able to realistically "monitor".
So when I went onto the VC 10 in 1978 I was in for a massive shock and nearly didn't make it. Gone were the days of carrying the captains bag and hinting that he was digging a massive hole...I actually had to make command decisions.
There were several noticeable steps in my education.
Reading an incident report at Hamble where a VC10 did a touch and go in a game park at night.
The next was around 1974 where a 747 did something similar but into a rubber plantation short of KL ...I first read about it in a Heathrow church, God bothering pamphlet; it was adorned with the offending captain, hat under his arm and the text was how God had saved him and lifted the Classic out of the plantation trees. The report stated that the copilot had been recommended for the sack because he didn't intervene during training when the captain got low and slow into LHR. At that stage of my career I wouldn't have dreamed about intervening.
So until I joined the Iron Duck fleet first officers had to do an apprenticeship which involved a Nav ticket (1 year) and a couple of years watching with the odd sector thrown in. To get around the 12 landings p.a. requirement and build up a core of young experienced pilots with a knowledge of training BOAC gave them an instructors rating course at Booker with the infamous Joan Hughes.
So my course in 1978 was to get the VC 10 in part 1 of my license.
This wasn't as simple as it seemed and was a massive step, not in handling but into thinking and acting like a professional pilot.
The first shock was the incredulous look on the captain, FO and FE faces when I asked the training captain if I could start the descent and subsequently to disconnect the autopilot. None of them had come across the flying pilot asking such foolish questions as unlike In BEA the captain would only sign your log book if I carried out ALL of the command decisions.
Later on the regular copilot got onto the HF after I had been unable to establish two way comms with Bombay and had been told to stop as it interfered with my monitoring. It was lucky that he did as we got very close to a TWA 747 crossing our track over the middle of the Bay of Bengal.
It wasn't all milk and honey though as our Dutch roll exercise was stopped at 30 degrees of bank "because a trainee put the wrong input in at 60 degrees) and I had a problem with a very strange flight control system that an instructor failed to pick up in an hour of circuits and bumps. As in the classroom there are many who do not have the teaching gift and cannot see the implications of distilling their own inadequacies into their subjects.
Such was the high standard expected from first officers that when I asked the captain to declare a mayday and told him that we were doing a 180 nothing was questioned.
So the BOAC monitored approach was that one pilot flew the aircraft down to minimums with a very competent pilot monitoring him who was able to criticise and either call for a go around of take over. The handling pilot did everything although the engineer did have a set of throttles. We flew it manual throttle which gave us a stable platform and we generally were fully established by 1,000'. - in a "heavy" - 2 1/2 times the weight of the Trident.
Incidentally I failed my final check as inside the OM at Jeddah we were unexpectedly given landing clearance on the parallel runway and the skipper thought I was landing too deep. My excuses were that I was suffering from salmonella poisoning - I had spent the last 18 hours on the loo - and I had never attempted nor trained the manoeuvre before.
The afore excuse is one of those things that one is expected to ignore but if it goes wrong as did with Glen Stewart one is hung out to dry.
Although we didn't know it in the flat earth society (BEA) the VC 10 had been carrying out CAT 2 autolands as long as the Trident.
These measures did the trick and the accidents virtually stopped overnight although there were some very lucky escapes but that is aviation.
BOAC or rather BALPA then gave British aviation type differential pay as the 747 fleet was grounded by BALPA for virtually the first two years until an agreement was negotiated. IIRC one of the negotiators was Norman Tebbit at the start of his political career. The engines were sold or hired to other operators at great profit whilst large concrete blocks were suspended from the pylons to stop the wings deforming.
I will post Swissair's procedures which is as unorthodox in some ways as BEA was but they hadn't fought a war and had money and talent to throw at the problem.
In the 60s BOAC had a terrible accident rate and they decided that a major shift in operating procedures was needed.
The main stay was that the first officer had to be equally trained and qualified as the captain to be able to realistically "monitor".
So when I went onto the VC 10 in 1978 I was in for a massive shock and nearly didn't make it. Gone were the days of carrying the captains bag and hinting that he was digging a massive hole...I actually had to make command decisions.
There were several noticeable steps in my education.
Reading an incident report at Hamble where a VC10 did a touch and go in a game park at night.
The next was around 1974 where a 747 did something similar but into a rubber plantation short of KL ...I first read about it in a Heathrow church, God bothering pamphlet; it was adorned with the offending captain, hat under his arm and the text was how God had saved him and lifted the Classic out of the plantation trees. The report stated that the copilot had been recommended for the sack because he didn't intervene during training when the captain got low and slow into LHR. At that stage of my career I wouldn't have dreamed about intervening.
So until I joined the Iron Duck fleet first officers had to do an apprenticeship which involved a Nav ticket (1 year) and a couple of years watching with the odd sector thrown in. To get around the 12 landings p.a. requirement and build up a core of young experienced pilots with a knowledge of training BOAC gave them an instructors rating course at Booker with the infamous Joan Hughes.
So my course in 1978 was to get the VC 10 in part 1 of my license.
This wasn't as simple as it seemed and was a massive step, not in handling but into thinking and acting like a professional pilot.
The first shock was the incredulous look on the captain, FO and FE faces when I asked the training captain if I could start the descent and subsequently to disconnect the autopilot. None of them had come across the flying pilot asking such foolish questions as unlike In BEA the captain would only sign your log book if I carried out ALL of the command decisions.
Later on the regular copilot got onto the HF after I had been unable to establish two way comms with Bombay and had been told to stop as it interfered with my monitoring. It was lucky that he did as we got very close to a TWA 747 crossing our track over the middle of the Bay of Bengal.
It wasn't all milk and honey though as our Dutch roll exercise was stopped at 30 degrees of bank "because a trainee put the wrong input in at 60 degrees) and I had a problem with a very strange flight control system that an instructor failed to pick up in an hour of circuits and bumps. As in the classroom there are many who do not have the teaching gift and cannot see the implications of distilling their own inadequacies into their subjects.
Such was the high standard expected from first officers that when I asked the captain to declare a mayday and told him that we were doing a 180 nothing was questioned.
So the BOAC monitored approach was that one pilot flew the aircraft down to minimums with a very competent pilot monitoring him who was able to criticise and either call for a go around of take over. The handling pilot did everything although the engineer did have a set of throttles. We flew it manual throttle which gave us a stable platform and we generally were fully established by 1,000'. - in a "heavy" - 2 1/2 times the weight of the Trident.
Incidentally I failed my final check as inside the OM at Jeddah we were unexpectedly given landing clearance on the parallel runway and the skipper thought I was landing too deep. My excuses were that I was suffering from salmonella poisoning - I had spent the last 18 hours on the loo - and I had never attempted nor trained the manoeuvre before.
The afore excuse is one of those things that one is expected to ignore but if it goes wrong as did with Glen Stewart one is hung out to dry.
Although we didn't know it in the flat earth society (BEA) the VC 10 had been carrying out CAT 2 autolands as long as the Trident.
These measures did the trick and the accidents virtually stopped overnight although there were some very lucky escapes but that is aviation.
BOAC or rather BALPA then gave British aviation type differential pay as the 747 fleet was grounded by BALPA for virtually the first two years until an agreement was negotiated. IIRC one of the negotiators was Norman Tebbit at the start of his political career. The engines were sold or hired to other operators at great profit whilst large concrete blocks were suspended from the pylons to stop the wings deforming.
I will post Swissair's procedures which is as unorthodox in some ways as BEA was but they hadn't fought a war and had money and talent to throw at the problem.
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In the 60s BOAC had a terrible accident rate
March 1966 Boeing 707 G-APFE broke up in CAT over Mt Fuji.
April 1968 G-ARWE Boeing 707 uncontained engine fire on take-off at LHR.
Hardly a 'terrible' accident rate unless you know otherwise.
Thread Starter
Swissair procedures
Swissair was very different from BA but shared some similarities.
The state airline on a per capita basis was four times the size of BA.
The procedures shared some common ground with both of the corporations.
80% of the pilots were Swiss, all of them were officers in the military.
The company was run by Swiss Germans.The majority were fighter and ground attack pilots.
The training was far more comprehensive than that I had received during both of my conversion courses in the corporations, although I received an abridged line training - ONLY 100 sectors with a SFO until my final line check.
Like BOAC they believed that not all pilots are suitable for command.
Unlike the rest of the known world copilots were not allowed to taxi, takeoff, fly the departure, nor use the brakes.
It was also the first occasion that I was taught comprehensively the pitch, power and configuration method of flying jet aircraft.
The author of Concorde stick and rudder book confirmed that Concorde was taught in a similar vein and this was unique in BA.
I cut my teeth using their procedures on the DC9 marks 32,33f, 34 and 51 virtually simultaneously. They didn't fly the same.
It was the first time that I really learnt how to throw a jet aircraft around and we practised neigh on every day raw data approaches.
One has to remember we had no wind information nor ground speed and the electronics were analog.
Our home base was in a basin surrounded by mountains and as well as katabatic winds we had the foehn - all of the ingredients of wind shear.
The co-pilot flew the monitored approach, generally raw data, manual throttle but with the flight director engaged. This was Swissair's philosophy of best use of equipment.
As others who have flown second generation jets/avionics know the flight director is basically a deviation indicator.
By knowing all of the expected power settings, rates of descent, the airfield wind and observing the crab angle one can often fly a more accurate approach without the FD which was needed for the go around.
Our limit was 200ft but we had a continue phase to 100ft, which was decided by the captain if he had some visual clues at 200 ft and allowed him to take control of a stable aircraft just before the flair.
I will add that we had to have landing configuration selected by 400 feet which in practice meant stable by 300ft. This is not problem if you are sick sufficiently well trained.
There were a couple of other nuances which allowed a higher approach success rate.
In the UK I understood the minimum descent altitude was what it said but the Swiss interpreted it as a decision altitude which meant one looked out at 200 feet then made the decision which gave 30ft plus grace.
We also were allowed to "look and see" if we had any doubts about the reported visibility; i.e. We didn't have an approach ban due to low viz.
I departed Heathrow one night with the Transmissometers covered by a few inches of fog. It closed as soon as we got airborne.
One might think that the flying procedures were extreme but commercial load dictates a safe, comfortable, reliable service; the mix of our clients was testimony that the Swiss achieved this up until the late 80s when LX was becoming dominant on our short haul routes and the final nail was SR111.
The build up of LX tripled my time to command but this was partly due to our salaries - my emoluments for the first year was more than double SFO BA and when I always had a months leave in the school summer holidays to spend some of this loot who is go to complain.
Apologies if I am rehacking some old ground but the earlier tail strike thread had some comments that needed clarification.
The change of BOAC philosophy I got from a senior manager of the time and perhaps I should have wrote incidents; like SR some incidents are kept very quiet and only last week I was told of another by the guy who whipped out the FDR and gave it to the captain to destroy who just happened to be the chief pilot.
Safety is never enhanced by hiding incidents as the Munich and Staines disaster have shown.
The state airline on a per capita basis was four times the size of BA.
The procedures shared some common ground with both of the corporations.
80% of the pilots were Swiss, all of them were officers in the military.
The company was run by Swiss Germans.The majority were fighter and ground attack pilots.
The training was far more comprehensive than that I had received during both of my conversion courses in the corporations, although I received an abridged line training - ONLY 100 sectors with a SFO until my final line check.
Like BOAC they believed that not all pilots are suitable for command.
Unlike the rest of the known world copilots were not allowed to taxi, takeoff, fly the departure, nor use the brakes.
It was also the first occasion that I was taught comprehensively the pitch, power and configuration method of flying jet aircraft.
The author of Concorde stick and rudder book confirmed that Concorde was taught in a similar vein and this was unique in BA.
I cut my teeth using their procedures on the DC9 marks 32,33f, 34 and 51 virtually simultaneously. They didn't fly the same.
It was the first time that I really learnt how to throw a jet aircraft around and we practised neigh on every day raw data approaches.
One has to remember we had no wind information nor ground speed and the electronics were analog.
Our home base was in a basin surrounded by mountains and as well as katabatic winds we had the foehn - all of the ingredients of wind shear.
The co-pilot flew the monitored approach, generally raw data, manual throttle but with the flight director engaged. This was Swissair's philosophy of best use of equipment.
As others who have flown second generation jets/avionics know the flight director is basically a deviation indicator.
By knowing all of the expected power settings, rates of descent, the airfield wind and observing the crab angle one can often fly a more accurate approach without the FD which was needed for the go around.
Our limit was 200ft but we had a continue phase to 100ft, which was decided by the captain if he had some visual clues at 200 ft and allowed him to take control of a stable aircraft just before the flair.
I will add that we had to have landing configuration selected by 400 feet which in practice meant stable by 300ft. This is not problem if you are sick sufficiently well trained.
There were a couple of other nuances which allowed a higher approach success rate.
In the UK I understood the minimum descent altitude was what it said but the Swiss interpreted it as a decision altitude which meant one looked out at 200 feet then made the decision which gave 30ft plus grace.
We also were allowed to "look and see" if we had any doubts about the reported visibility; i.e. We didn't have an approach ban due to low viz.
I departed Heathrow one night with the Transmissometers covered by a few inches of fog. It closed as soon as we got airborne.
One might think that the flying procedures were extreme but commercial load dictates a safe, comfortable, reliable service; the mix of our clients was testimony that the Swiss achieved this up until the late 80s when LX was becoming dominant on our short haul routes and the final nail was SR111.
The build up of LX tripled my time to command but this was partly due to our salaries - my emoluments for the first year was more than double SFO BA and when I always had a months leave in the school summer holidays to spend some of this loot who is go to complain.
Apologies if I am rehacking some old ground but the earlier tail strike thread had some comments that needed clarification.
The change of BOAC philosophy I got from a senior manager of the time and perhaps I should have wrote incidents; like SR some incidents are kept very quiet and only last week I was told of another by the guy who whipped out the FDR and gave it to the captain to destroy who just happened to be the chief pilot.
Safety is never enhanced by hiding incidents as the Munich and Staines disaster have shown.
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Airclues, I sense that mere facts shouldn't be allowed to interfere with a good, well-stewed rant.
I'm intrigued at how the Munich or Staines incidents (incidents???!!!) were "kept quiet". As I recall both were public in the extreme and caused considerable brouhaha. How do you hush up things like that for Heaven's sake?
I'm intrigued at how the Munich or Staines incidents (incidents???!!!) were "kept quiet". As I recall both were public in the extreme and caused considerable brouhaha. How do you hush up things like that for Heaven's sake?
Thread Starter
BEA management sat on two accident reports which involved degradation of performance due to contamination before the Munich accident.
IIRC One was Canadian and the other Dutch.
Three inquiries concentrated upon blaming the Germans, if you read the transcripts ( including the ones in German) you might get a better understanding.
The Staines inquiry included a back dated stall procedure, false testimony and lack of ANY of P2s course testimonies. This lack of evidence included the non inclusion of letters written by myself and my colleagues who had written to management.
Two of the captains I met last year had taken off directly before and after Key and stated that he had blocked the runway for several minutes.
You might "try" and obtain some of the testimonies under FOI.
An investigator told me that the simulator didn't handle as the aircraft did.
If you know anything about NA SOP then read the report....they were insane.
Finally and more relevant to my post about monitored approach procedures which is why I started this thread - BEAs procedures were NOT the wonderful system made out in the BA tail strike thread, Stan Key had obvious problems flying the Trident and I am quite sure that a better management would not have put the crew together and taken the warnings made by several captains before (and after) the crash.
I posted as I believe that speading knowledge and history may stop man from repeating itself.
IIRC One was Canadian and the other Dutch.
Three inquiries concentrated upon blaming the Germans, if you read the transcripts ( including the ones in German) you might get a better understanding.
The Staines inquiry included a back dated stall procedure, false testimony and lack of ANY of P2s course testimonies. This lack of evidence included the non inclusion of letters written by myself and my colleagues who had written to management.
Two of the captains I met last year had taken off directly before and after Key and stated that he had blocked the runway for several minutes.
You might "try" and obtain some of the testimonies under FOI.
An investigator told me that the simulator didn't handle as the aircraft did.
If you know anything about NA SOP then read the report....they were insane.
Finally and more relevant to my post about monitored approach procedures which is why I started this thread - BEAs procedures were NOT the wonderful system made out in the BA tail strike thread, Stan Key had obvious problems flying the Trident and I am quite sure that a better management would not have put the crew together and taken the warnings made by several captains before (and after) the crash.
I posted as I believe that speading knowledge and history may stop man from repeating itself.
