G-ARPI - The Trident Tragedy: 40 years ago today
Paxing All Over The World
Groundloop
I was not living in the UK when this happened (aged 14) and only know about it through PPRuNe references over the years.
From the report, linked in this thread:
So there might have been a number of people trying to see but they did not get in the way.
... of the coverage at the time was the news reports that traffic chaos built up very quickly in the area with loads of ghouls converging on the scene.
From the report, linked in this thread:
The field was sufficiently inaccessible to prevent all but the most persistent sightseers from reaching it. The police were successful in controlling spectators, and contemporary reports that members of the public had impeded rescue services by their presence near the scene are not borne out by the facts.
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Fortunatly Aileron Drag for me I was on "Days Off" those days but I remember being told that all the people who worked on it that night had their Authorisations removed and they were in limbo until the pre lim report was made known and that too took quite a while, and the thought of " had something I'd done" caused all those deaths was uppermost in their minds . On the up side A few months later after the report was made public, a printout of the whole flight taken from the F.D.R.was shown to the Ground engineers and it was then we realised how good the evidence within the F.D.R.was, as it showed the whole flight from take off to crash including the flap and droop movements . This comprehensive system was fitted to the Trident so that it was an aid to getting the Auto Land System approved by the then A.R.B.
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Papa India had been damaged in a previous accident when an Ambassador crashed into it on the ground at Heathrow. It had been repaired and returned to service. I believe this event had no bearing on the Staines crash which seems to have been down to crew error in a different era for CRM and systems fail-safes.
Tragic that lives were lost but the industry learned a good deal which has no doubt saved many lives since then.
Tragic that lives were lost but the industry learned a good deal which has no doubt saved many lives since then.
Last edited by roverman; 19th Jun 2012 at 17:16.
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I think I mentioned it before on pprune but about 18months after the Papa India crash I watched an Iraqi Trident start dropping from about 100ft after lifting off from RWY 10R at Heathrow. Pulled the wrong lever along with undercarriage retraction , I guess, and rectified just in time. The controller in the Tower noticed though, but only got a mumble from the pilot in response to 'Iraqixxx, are you OK?'
I was told Papa India was the reason BA skipped G-EUPI when they got their A319s.
It wasn't a flight crew error per se.
It was definitely a management - training accident waiting to happen.
The noise abatement proceedure was contrary to the design, test pilot and BofT test pilot philosphies.
This led to the slat lever being unprotected.
The training was WRONG - P2 was taught to dump the push system as it often falsely operated - which generally was incorrect.
There wasn't a stick push proceedure in our manuals.
We weren't even legally qualified - read the argument in the report between the BofT and Holdstock and then ask why none of P2's group were called to the inquiry.
Ask why there is no reference to Davies being at the inquiry in the report -BofT test pilot and author of handling the big jets.
Eight aircraft were lost by the BEA group in six years, Papa India was the second and the first of four Tridents.
Several captains had tried to off load P2s group of co pilots because they rightly believed that they were not sufficiently trained and were threatened with dismissal.
Absolute shambles of a company and if it had not been publicly owned would have ceased to exist.
It was definitely a management - training accident waiting to happen.
The noise abatement proceedure was contrary to the design, test pilot and BofT test pilot philosphies.
This led to the slat lever being unprotected.
The training was WRONG - P2 was taught to dump the push system as it often falsely operated - which generally was incorrect.
There wasn't a stick push proceedure in our manuals.
We weren't even legally qualified - read the argument in the report between the BofT and Holdstock and then ask why none of P2's group were called to the inquiry.
Ask why there is no reference to Davies being at the inquiry in the report -BofT test pilot and author of handling the big jets.
Eight aircraft were lost by the BEA group in six years, Papa India was the second and the first of four Tridents.
Several captains had tried to off load P2s group of co pilots because they rightly believed that they were not sufficiently trained and were threatened with dismissal.
Absolute shambles of a company and if it had not been publicly owned would have ceased to exist.
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"Yes, I believe that's the case, possibly as a result of criticism ten years previously when a second Whiskey Echo (a 767) was added to the fleet, the original WE (707) having been destroyed in a fatal accident at LHR about 4 years before the Trident disaster."
Or, if you've got a longer memory, there was G-ALWE, a Viscount that crashed fatally at Manchester in 1957.
Or, if you've got a longer memory, there was G-ALWE, a Viscount that crashed fatally at Manchester in 1957.
Proplinerman,
Did BA ever have another EE (Vanguard crash 1965)?
Did BA ever have another EE (Vanguard crash 1965)?
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Scarier still, both were "papa echo charlie" and "papa echo echo" with identical last three.
Last edited by Skipness One Echo; 24th Jun 2012 at 01:53.
At the time of the PI accident I was working in reservations. As General Sales Agents for BEA we were fielding a lot of telephone calls from locals who feared that friends or relatives might have been on board. Eventually we asked BEA to provide a pax list which they did. The time it took for that list to print out on one of those old teleprinters really brought home to us the magnitude of the tragedy.
I remember it because I had just arrived from Lisbon on another Trident, picked up a rental car and got caught in the traffic at Staines. My wife was waiting at a relative's house and heard about the crash well before I was able to contact her. Harold Wilson expressed his disgust at the legions of "ghouls". Those there were, but there were probably more just stuck in the traffic.
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From my own reading, it seems that the traffic congestion was a combination of the relatively undeveloped state of the main roads in the area (mostly single carriageway and quite narrow) and the habit at the time that many families had of taking a drive on a Sunday.
Reading this thread has been very interesting, because despite considerable coverage of the G-ARPI crash in various books I had never before realised either the situation regarding suspicion of the ground engineering staff's actions or indeed that the low hours that Jeremy Keighley possessed on type were at all commonplace at the time.
My own first flight was on a Trident 3B in 1977, as a consequence I have read up on both the Staines and Zagreb incidents and as much else about the Trident as I can.
Did the droop lever on the early mark Tridents ever have a speed guard fitted? I know that there had been several incidents previous to G-ARPI's demise, at least one of which was described as "We just about managed to keep flying until droops were reselected!".
Reading this thread has been very interesting, because despite considerable coverage of the G-ARPI crash in various books I had never before realised either the situation regarding suspicion of the ground engineering staff's actions or indeed that the low hours that Jeremy Keighley possessed on type were at all commonplace at the time.
My own first flight was on a Trident 3B in 1977, as a consequence I have read up on both the Staines and Zagreb incidents and as much else about the Trident as I can.
Did the droop lever on the early mark Tridents ever have a speed guard fitted? I know that there had been several incidents previous to G-ARPI's demise, at least one of which was described as "We just about managed to keep flying until droops were reselected!".
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The droop lever was mechanically locked in the 'extend' position while the flap lever was in a 'flaps-selected' position. When the flaps were selected 'up', the droop-baulk was removed.
That was the only lock in place (no speed-lock), so the flaps on PI had been selected fully up before the droop was moved.
After the accident, the company painted the droop handle with red & white stripes (if memory serves), and we all became utterly paranoid about monitoring LE/TE selections!
That was the only lock in place (no speed-lock), so the flaps on PI had been selected fully up before the droop was moved.
After the accident, the company painted the droop handle with red & white stripes (if memory serves), and we all became utterly paranoid about monitoring LE/TE selections!
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I don't think there were many ghouls. Undoubtedly some but not in great numbers. Most simply couldn't help it.
The Trident came down just south of the A30, a road I used to use all the time. At that point the road had started to rise in preparation for a railway bridge ahead - although a dual carriageway, there were no laybys and the rise above ground level meant that any parking off the road was difficult. Thus one lane was blocked by emergency vehicles and everything stopped in the other, closely followed by the other carriageway. The view to the south was obscured by trees, so you couldn't see what was going on from a vehicle: over a short space of time the emergency services beat their own paths to the wreckage, so most of the response continued to be via the A30. This was a main route in/out of London - no M25, remember, that arrived a couple of miles away a few years later - so even then the traffic was quite heavy. From the opposite direction (inbound, or eastwards) you were up high enough that the wreckage was visible, although at a distance. The tail was the only recognisable piece: it seemed to be there for some months afterwards. Undamaged electricity cables and pylons virtually overhead bore witness to the steepness of the trajectory.
The Trident came down just south of the A30, a road I used to use all the time. At that point the road had started to rise in preparation for a railway bridge ahead - although a dual carriageway, there were no laybys and the rise above ground level meant that any parking off the road was difficult. Thus one lane was blocked by emergency vehicles and everything stopped in the other, closely followed by the other carriageway. The view to the south was obscured by trees, so you couldn't see what was going on from a vehicle: over a short space of time the emergency services beat their own paths to the wreckage, so most of the response continued to be via the A30. This was a main route in/out of London - no M25, remember, that arrived a couple of miles away a few years later - so even then the traffic was quite heavy. From the opposite direction (inbound, or eastwards) you were up high enough that the wreckage was visible, although at a distance. The tail was the only recognisable piece: it seemed to be there for some months afterwards. Undamaged electricity cables and pylons virtually overhead bore witness to the steepness of the trajectory.
The fact that droop and flap had separate selectors moving in the same quadrant was undoubtedly a factor in the PI accident.
One of the more ludicrous "safety" features of the design was that they both had aerofoil shaped handles at the top of their levers - but the droop had a slight dip at the leading edge and the flap had a slight dip at the rear. How many actually examine the shape of a handle before they operate it?
On the Trident 1, the other lethal factor was that selection up of the leading edge device caused an immediate large increase in stalling speed. This was rectified for the later marks.
One of the more ludicrous "safety" features of the design was that they both had aerofoil shaped handles at the top of their levers - but the droop had a slight dip at the leading edge and the flap had a slight dip at the rear. How many actually examine the shape of a handle before they operate it?
On the Trident 1, the other lethal factor was that selection up of the leading edge device caused an immediate large increase in stalling speed. This was rectified for the later marks.
If the aircraft had been operated as designed, tested and certified it wouldn't have crashed.
Why pull off most of the power, whip the flaps up and climb at V2 + 10 at heights as low as 500 feet - bl@@dy stupid.
This left the aircraft wallowing about and the slat lever unprotected.
Rather than ommitting the foolish proceedure which didnt do much for noise abatement except spread it further BEA fitted a baulk and continued flying the same dumb NAB.
As to lack of experience P2 had more hours upon graduation from Hamble than a FO I recently met already checked out on a 737 and posted away from the main base - food for thought?
Crew were scapegoats as often happens.
Why pull off most of the power, whip the flaps up and climb at V2 + 10 at heights as low as 500 feet - bl@@dy stupid.
This left the aircraft wallowing about and the slat lever unprotected.
Rather than ommitting the foolish proceedure which didnt do much for noise abatement except spread it further BEA fitted a baulk and continued flying the same dumb NAB.
As to lack of experience P2 had more hours upon graduation from Hamble than a FO I recently met already checked out on a 737 and posted away from the main base - food for thought?
Crew were scapegoats as often happens.
Paxing All Over The World
With regards to the 'ghouls', see the quote from the report in my post of this thread #21. It tells us that the Prime Minister made a sweeping statement, based on poor evidence. Nothing changes then. 
The M25 was built in sections from 1973 onwards. As far as I can recall and establish (Wikipedia), the Western section including the A30 intersection was one of the last in 1985. I was able to use it for a new job that I had just moved to. The whole ring opened in 1986.
The M25 was built in sections from 1973 onwards. As far as I can recall and establish (Wikipedia), the Western section including the A30 intersection was one of the last in 1985. I was able to use it for a new job that I had just moved to. The whole ring opened in 1986.
The whole ring opened in 1986.
"Build it and they will come."
Last edited by India Four Two; 27th Jun 2012 at 01:50.
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Regarding Blind Pew's comment, "Why pull off most of the power, whip the flaps up and climb at V2 + 10 at heights as low as 500 feet - bl@@dy stupid."
You speak a lot of sense, but in fairness the flaps were retracted and the power reduced at 90 seconds from start of roll. I know there was one departure which called for NA at 70 seconds (can you remember where?), but I don't recall it happening at 500feet.
Having said that, there was the infamous captain who used the flaps only to get into the air, then retraced them at 20feet or so in order to improve the climb-out gradient. Arghhh! Scary stuff.
Some of those guys were brilliant and brave ex-bomber pilots, but should never have been let loose on a swept-wing jet.
You speak a lot of sense, but in fairness the flaps were retracted and the power reduced at 90 seconds from start of roll. I know there was one departure which called for NA at 70 seconds (can you remember where?), but I don't recall it happening at 500feet.
Having said that, there was the infamous captain who used the flaps only to get into the air, then retraced them at 20feet or so in order to improve the climb-out gradient. Arghhh! Scary stuff.
Some of those guys were brilliant and brave ex-bomber pilots, but should never have been let loose on a swept-wing jet.