Final Report on B737 severe upset and Loss of control by F/O
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To test that the pilot can actually work out what the current situation is then recover. If he can't, then he needs more training.
There may not be an outside horizon, but watching the ADI as the simmo puts you in a UA is effectively the same and makes the whole exercise a waste of time
There may not be an outside horizon, but watching the ADI as the simmo puts you in a UA is effectively the same and makes the whole exercise a waste of time
On the contrary, his eyes would have been wide open on stalks, he would be frightened fartless and maybe hands on the controls over-controlling and even turning or pushing the control column the wrong way. Read the Loss of Control in IMC accident reports - it's all there and no shortage of them. Of course, all this is speculation but the point is he sure wouldn't have his eyes wide shut when the stuff hit the fan.
That being so, what is the point in the simulator of telling the bloke to look down and shut his eyes when in real life it would never happen like that? I believe the real reason some simulator instructors do the heads down and shut the eyes caper before a UA, is a throw back to their own experience in general aviation when they had this happen to themselves when training for their initial instrument ratings under the hood in a Cessna. Rightly or wrongly they simply carried that training over to a simulator.. nothing more, nothing less. Just another myth
What are you folks on about? You can't honestly tell me that you stare at the EADI for the entire duration of the flight. I think its fair to assume that you take your eyes away from the instrument panel in the cruise quite regularly to do tasks such as fuel logs, read the paper, read the company manual, eat food, etc.
So whats to say that while your not looking at the instruments and you are performing other tasks that the aircraft doesn't enter a UA while your in IMC. Then you would be recovering from the same situation that was simulated in the SIM. Heck, you could be the PM during climb out, look away to do a position report while the other guy is hand flying and by the time you get back to monitoring he/she may be in a UA.
Its an important skill to have - that is to identify a UA on instruments and then initiate the correct recovery.
So whats to say that while your not looking at the instruments and you are performing other tasks that the aircraft doesn't enter a UA while your in IMC. Then you would be recovering from the same situation that was simulated in the SIM. Heck, you could be the PM during climb out, look away to do a position report while the other guy is hand flying and by the time you get back to monitoring he/she may be in a UA.
Its an important skill to have - that is to identify a UA on instruments and then initiate the correct recovery.
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Seat Cover Changes
I am just wondering how many seat cover changes they had to accomplish before the next flight or should it be fright!!
Last edited by boaccomet4; 10th Oct 2014 at 16:20. Reason: typo
look away to do a position report while the other guy is hand flying and by the time you get back to monitoring he/she may be in a UA.
Which may be why a number of the major airlines around the world, especially the Middle East and Asia discourage any hand flying as they don't trust their pilots not to get into a UA
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Very small world mentality
Deadcu*t what sort of exposure have you had to flying in Asia (or the rest of the world) and flying with Asians?
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Ergonomics
Maybe I am missing something, but for the position and type of control switch knobs to be brought into this equation seems to me to be a nonsense. They are positioned aproximately 20 cms apart and are entirely different in shape and function. As I read the report the Rudder Trim control is spring loaded to a central position and requires significant torque to hold it in either direction to make the circuit to achieve Left or Right Trim movement. Regardless, what happened to "Identify before Moving" any switch?
Old Fella, I agree that the generally accepted way to be a pilot includes thoughtful contemplation and due caution. That is not the point. What is the point is that humans are fallible, and it is a worthy pursuit to try to eliminate as many ways of making dumb mistakes as possible.
The industry has moved so very far from where we were forty years ago. At every step of the way there was a naysayer decrying the need for GPWS, EGPWS, enhanced radar, windshear warning, HGS, RNP, GPS, EFIS (for crying out loud) etc etc. What is left is sweeping up the remaining crumbs of ergonomic improvements.
The fact that there have been more than one 737 inadvertent rudder trim command incidents indicates that there is room for improvement in either the aircraft or the operator.
The industry has moved so very far from where we were forty years ago. At every step of the way there was a naysayer decrying the need for GPWS, EGPWS, enhanced radar, windshear warning, HGS, RNP, GPS, EFIS (for crying out loud) etc etc. What is left is sweeping up the remaining crumbs of ergonomic improvements.
The fact that there have been more than one 737 inadvertent rudder trim command incidents indicates that there is room for improvement in either the aircraft or the operator.
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You can't engineer out all of stupidity though.
I used to operate a new type which had a PA specific button and a radio transmit button separated by as far as possible in the flight deck, completely different areas, one in line of sight and one not, one used with the left hand and one with the right. I still managed one PA on the radio.
How far do you need to go?!
I used to operate a new type which had a PA specific button and a radio transmit button separated by as far as possible in the flight deck, completely different areas, one in line of sight and one not, one used with the left hand and one with the right. I still managed one PA on the radio.
How far do you need to go?!
Beats me...
Ergonomics and human factors are not my area of alleged expertise. At this incremental, marginal improvement level there are nuances best left to the design experts. Often a perceived improvement in something that is already almost right results in unintended consequences rearing their ugly heads.
The rudder trim knob is already on its second iteration...I don't think that there are too many variations on cylindrical knobs that would fit. The door release mechanism doesn't need to be a rotary knob, but it does need to be something that cannot be triggered reflexively. The door release switch gets used three times every flight at least...maybe it could be something really unique in a really unique location.
The 737 cockpit is, in the words of an Australian Airlines predescessor, an "ergonomic slum". The grandfathering of a mid-1960's design (which has some commonalities with 1930's aircraft that I have flown) poses a seperate ethical conundrum, but the least they could have done is embrace the present, if not the future, last time around. (I am aware of the contsraints in the scope of improvements in each generation, too. Having flown every variant from the -100 to the -800 I think that the range is too broad for one type certificate.)
As an aside: i am familiar with an early DC-8 accident in which spoilers were inadvertently selected close to the ground with landing flap. The resultant high sink rate ended with a high G impact, a go-around with a disintegrating aeroplane which then caught fire and went in like a lawn dart, killing everyone.
The post-hoc fix was a placard which basically said "do not select speed brakes with landing flaps". The pundits of the day observed that the placard could just as easily have read "do not crash this aeroplane".
Interlocks and guarded switches and the manifold other measures have all been incorporated to protect us and our charges from the tired, distracted, sub-optimum versions of ourselves. I do not think that this is a good time to stop that particular pursuit.
The rudder trim knob is already on its second iteration...I don't think that there are too many variations on cylindrical knobs that would fit. The door release mechanism doesn't need to be a rotary knob, but it does need to be something that cannot be triggered reflexively. The door release switch gets used three times every flight at least...maybe it could be something really unique in a really unique location.
The 737 cockpit is, in the words of an Australian Airlines predescessor, an "ergonomic slum". The grandfathering of a mid-1960's design (which has some commonalities with 1930's aircraft that I have flown) poses a seperate ethical conundrum, but the least they could have done is embrace the present, if not the future, last time around. (I am aware of the contsraints in the scope of improvements in each generation, too. Having flown every variant from the -100 to the -800 I think that the range is too broad for one type certificate.)
As an aside: i am familiar with an early DC-8 accident in which spoilers were inadvertently selected close to the ground with landing flap. The resultant high sink rate ended with a high G impact, a go-around with a disintegrating aeroplane which then caught fire and went in like a lawn dart, killing everyone.
The post-hoc fix was a placard which basically said "do not select speed brakes with landing flaps". The pundits of the day observed that the placard could just as easily have read "do not crash this aeroplane".
Interlocks and guarded switches and the manifold other measures have all been incorporated to protect us and our charges from the tired, distracted, sub-optimum versions of ourselves. I do not think that this is a good time to stop that particular pursuit.
Last edited by Australopithecus; 13th Oct 2014 at 20:42.
In Australia, even the most serious events have not resulted in a loss of control, and were
generally well managed by flight crew. About 70 per cent of stall warnings reported to the ATSB
were genuine indications that the aircraft was approaching the point of stall if the flight crew did
not reduce the aircraft’s angle of attack. The remaining 30 per cent of occurrences were related to
stall warning system problems, although very few of those reported resulted in false stick shaker
activation. Most of the 169 stall warnings reported to the ATSB in the last 5 years that resulted in
genuine stall warning events (usually stick shaker activations) were momentary in duration (lasting
for 2 seconds or less). There were no occurrences reported in this period where a stall occurred,
and no occurrences where the stick pusher activated to prevent a stall occurring. As might be
expected, stall warnings happened in situations where the stall speed increased (due to a
particular (and often unexpected) combination of environmental conditions and flight profile), and
the buffer between the stall speed and the aircraft’s airspeed reduced. The majority of reported
stall warnings (81 per cent) were associated with aircraft tracks in the vicinity of thunderstorms or
other turbulent regions of air, and the greatest proportion of these occurred when the aircraft was
operating at an airspeed close to (or below) the minimum for the current configuration (VRef), at a
bank angle greater than 20°, or when there were sudden and rapid changes in pitch angle or
airspeed.
generally well managed by flight crew. About 70 per cent of stall warnings reported to the ATSB
were genuine indications that the aircraft was approaching the point of stall if the flight crew did
not reduce the aircraft’s angle of attack. The remaining 30 per cent of occurrences were related to
stall warning system problems, although very few of those reported resulted in false stick shaker
activation. Most of the 169 stall warnings reported to the ATSB in the last 5 years that resulted in
genuine stall warning events (usually stick shaker activations) were momentary in duration (lasting
for 2 seconds or less). There were no occurrences reported in this period where a stall occurred,
and no occurrences where the stick pusher activated to prevent a stall occurring. As might be
expected, stall warnings happened in situations where the stall speed increased (due to a
particular (and often unexpected) combination of environmental conditions and flight profile), and
the buffer between the stall speed and the aircraft’s airspeed reduced. The majority of reported
stall warnings (81 per cent) were associated with aircraft tracks in the vicinity of thunderstorms or
other turbulent regions of air, and the greatest proportion of these occurred when the aircraft was
operating at an airspeed close to (or below) the minimum for the current configuration (VRef), at a
bank angle greater than 20°, or when there were sudden and rapid changes in pitch angle or
airspeed.
