ANZ Erebus crash 28 November 1979 - 34 years later.
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Nothing dismissive about my attitude at all; professional pilots and airline management learn from the lessons of the past, move on and improve the profession attempting to avoid repeating these.
Far from being on an ignore list one wonders whether it is understood what a professional pilot is?
Nor does one wish to see the continuous attempts at rewriting history to suit some individuals differing point of view!
Far from being on an ignore list one wonders whether it is understood what a professional pilot is?
Nor does one wish to see the continuous attempts at rewriting history to suit some individuals differing point of view!
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Nor does one wish to see the continuous attempts at rewriting history to suit some individuals differing point of view!
Not this hoary old chestnut again? Been done to death several times; get over it and get on with life.
As to rewriting history, that would appear to be the national trend, in all things, not just Erebus.
It is certainly an accident that will endure in the minds of many. It is too facile to say stop rehashing the past. There will be always aspects of TE901 that will fascinate and exercise the minds of those who have the time and interest to make a thorough study of it. The accessible material is vast. I do not think anyone should make critical comment who has not made their own review. Gordon Vette certainly made his own in depth study of every shred of evidence. His book 'Impact Erebus' was hailed as unbiased, intimate assessment of the key elements.
Whether you think Jim Collins was foolhardy in the last thirty minutes of the flight or not, he was at no time until the GPWS went off uncertain of what he believed his position to be. Furthermore, as Captain Vette tellingly wrote, drawing on firsthand knowledge, Captain Collins was an outstanding pilot without a shred of the gung-ho in his makeup.
Relevant here is the fact that some seem to forget that previous flights to the ice for sight-seeing had made early descents and that other captains had elected not to follow the strict letter of company SOPS, believing they had more than adequate safety margins.
TE901 was led into a trap, the complexities of which will be debated as long as there are those of us for whom air accident investigation holds a special interest.
Whether you think Jim Collins was foolhardy in the last thirty minutes of the flight or not, he was at no time until the GPWS went off uncertain of what he believed his position to be. Furthermore, as Captain Vette tellingly wrote, drawing on firsthand knowledge, Captain Collins was an outstanding pilot without a shred of the gung-ho in his makeup.
Relevant here is the fact that some seem to forget that previous flights to the ice for sight-seeing had made early descents and that other captains had elected not to follow the strict letter of company SOPS, believing they had more than adequate safety margins.
TE901 was led into a trap, the complexities of which will be debated as long as there are those of us for whom air accident investigation holds a special interest.
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As someone who was at the terminal that Wednesday waiting for the 10 to land, I remember it well. I also remember that despite all the blame that was thrown around:
New Zealand 1953 Civil Aviation Regulations, Part 51 (part and sub part forgotten) stated:
The Pilot in Command is responsible for the safety of his passengers, crew and aircraft (strangely not aeroplane and no mention of being responsible for ones' own safety either).
Despite the cover-ups, the atlas (which was exactly the same as the one I had used at school several years earlier) that was used as a "chart", Collins house being broken into and "items removed in the wee small hours" plus all the other cockups made with regard to this flight, Part 51, IMO, lays the blame right where is should. I take nothing away from the man as a pilot but he made a bad decision and the cheese certainly punished him and all those sitting behind him that fateful day.
One of the more sadder aspects of this accident for me was the RNZAF C130 that flew the same flight path as 901 but a mere 500 feet higher and it cleared Erebus.
Can any DC-10 pilots out there tell me how many seconds earlier would it have required for climb power to be applied for the aeroplane to have also cleared the peak and not resulted in CFIT. It seemed to me that from the "whoop whoop pull up" on the CVR transcript it took a long time to react and advance the levers to the forward position and begin to raise the nose. I got the impression Collins may have thought he was being warned of gentle raising terrain and the not the steep incline of a mountain. After all, he did have NO IDEA of where he was.
New Zealand 1953 Civil Aviation Regulations, Part 51 (part and sub part forgotten) stated:
The Pilot in Command is responsible for the safety of his passengers, crew and aircraft (strangely not aeroplane and no mention of being responsible for ones' own safety either).
Despite the cover-ups, the atlas (which was exactly the same as the one I had used at school several years earlier) that was used as a "chart", Collins house being broken into and "items removed in the wee small hours" plus all the other cockups made with regard to this flight, Part 51, IMO, lays the blame right where is should. I take nothing away from the man as a pilot but he made a bad decision and the cheese certainly punished him and all those sitting behind him that fateful day.
One of the more sadder aspects of this accident for me was the RNZAF C130 that flew the same flight path as 901 but a mere 500 feet higher and it cleared Erebus.
Can any DC-10 pilots out there tell me how many seconds earlier would it have required for climb power to be applied for the aeroplane to have also cleared the peak and not resulted in CFIT. It seemed to me that from the "whoop whoop pull up" on the CVR transcript it took a long time to react and advance the levers to the forward position and begin to raise the nose. I got the impression Collins may have thought he was being warned of gentle raising terrain and the not the steep incline of a mountain. After all, he did have NO IDEA of where he was.
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Can any DC-10 pilots out there tell me how many seconds earlier would it have required for climb power to be applied for the aeroplane to have also cleared the peak and not resulted in CFIT. It seemed to me that from the "whoop whoop pull up" on the CVR transcript it took a long time to react and advance the levers to the forward position and begin to raise the nose. I got the impression Collins may have thought he was being warned of gentle raising terrain and the not the steep incline of a mountain. After all, he did have NO IDEA of where he was.
From the report:
1.16.3 The performance of the GPWS was evaluated and it was assessed that the warning was in accordance with the expected performance in the “terrain closure” and “flight below 500 feet without flaps and undercarriage extended” modes of the equipment (modes 2A and 4 respectively). The profile of the terrain prior to the impact was reconstructed in Air New Zealand’s DC 10 simulator and the performance of the aircraft was evaluated to determine if the collision could have been avoided in response to the warning and that the warning was in fact given at the maximum time before impact that could be expected.
1.16.4 The flights in the simulator indicated that experienced pilots would not have avoided a collision and that the warning given was in accordance with the design specifications of the GPWS.
With sufficient rehearsal it was possible to fly the aircraft away from the approaching slope when an extreme manoeuvre was initiated in response to the onset of the GPWS warning
1.16.4 The flights in the simulator indicated that experienced pilots would not have avoided a collision and that the warning given was in accordance with the design specifications of the GPWS.
With sufficient rehearsal it was possible to fly the aircraft away from the approaching slope when an extreme manoeuvre was initiated in response to the onset of the GPWS warning
NoD
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Relevant here is the fact that some seem to forget that previous flights to the ice for sight-seeing had made early descents and that other captains had elected not to follow the strict letter of company SOPS, believing they had more than adequate safety margins.
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Forget the rules and regulations, let's sit in a hangar and talk. How many pilots would descend in an area they didn't know, where they fully expected to see a mountain close by but couldn't, if they absolutely didn't need to?
The PIC had a mindset and didn't adjust his thinking as circumstances changed. Even when he descended and still couldn't see the mountain he didn't sense the danger (FE did). He relied totally on instruments but was flying VFR.
Was the flight doomed when it left NZ? Most pilots wouldn't have done what Collins did, I hope, even those who "feel" he was blameless.
The PIC was put in a bad place by others but he stuffed up too. Would have helped if he'd done some navigation on the way down: AINS output on chart.
Remember the dead, yes, make excuses for human frailty, yes, but starting another argument you can't win?
The PIC had a mindset and didn't adjust his thinking as circumstances changed. Even when he descended and still couldn't see the mountain he didn't sense the danger (FE did). He relied totally on instruments but was flying VFR.
Was the flight doomed when it left NZ? Most pilots wouldn't have done what Collins did, I hope, even those who "feel" he was blameless.
The PIC was put in a bad place by others but he stuffed up too. Would have helped if he'd done some navigation on the way down: AINS output on chart.
Remember the dead, yes, make excuses for human frailty, yes, but starting another argument you can't win?
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Remember the dead, yes, make excuses for human frailty, yes, but starting another argument you can't win?
Those lives will not be forgotten. R.I.P
I also started this thread;
http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-...qantas-18.html
Again, not to create arguments about which airline was best blah blah blah, but for those who are interested, a chance to reminisce about what some of us perceive to be the good ol airline days!
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Paragraph377
How do you feel about the fiasco at Perpignan? AirNZ didn't have the manual from Airbus Industries or understand the basics - like the gear must not be down. Slowing to see if the aircraft stalls - a factory pilot test - and on an approach, just to tick boxes. Were you pleased AirNZ could wriggle and let the poor German pilots take the blame? Did you resign in protest?
Mahon didn't have a clue about flying but AirNZ antagonised him and he flew off the handle.
The accident report was right. The proximal cause was pilot error.
The kindest and most respectful way to remember Collins might be to say that he was a good pilot and a decent man who would have accepted responsibility for what he did.
My disgust and contempt with what ANZ ...
Mahon didn't have a clue about flying but AirNZ antagonised him and he flew off the handle.
The accident report was right. The proximal cause was pilot error.
The kindest and most respectful way to remember Collins might be to say that he was a good pilot and a decent man who would have accepted responsibility for what he did.
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Apples and oranges
How do you feel about the fiasco at Perpignan? AirNZ didn't have the manual from Airbus Industries or understand the basics - like the gear must not be down. Slowing to see if the aircraft stalls - a factory pilot test - and on an approach, just to tick boxes. Were you pleased AirNZ could wriggle and let the poor German pilots take the blame? Did you resign in protest?
Cheers
ahhh .. . toby TP . .. . .I'll drink to that........
The one thing that pains and is a source of enduring disappointment
is the limited amount of compassionate understanding ,
an appreciation at more than a superficial level of the human
frailties that coloured nearly every aspect of the aftermath.
All that running for cover. All that resorting to the blame game.
When the emotion is removed only then do the essentials of dispassionate
examination of the multifarious strands of the history of the case come to the fore.
So much defending the indefensible. You could list a dozen key points as
to the findings and you would find heated disagreement persists about every one , between the advocates of one line of analysis compared with that held to be the truth by the other camp.
The one thing that pains and is a source of enduring disappointment
is the limited amount of compassionate understanding ,
an appreciation at more than a superficial level of the human
frailties that coloured nearly every aspect of the aftermath.
All that running for cover. All that resorting to the blame game.
When the emotion is removed only then do the essentials of dispassionate
examination of the multifarious strands of the history of the case come to the fore.
So much defending the indefensible. You could list a dozen key points as
to the findings and you would find heated disagreement persists about every one , between the advocates of one line of analysis compared with that held to be the truth by the other camp.
You are comparing apples with oranges old friend.
Both cases had a minimum altitude set down in the books and in both cases that minimum altitude was not adhered to. An argument could be made that in both cases a cultural environment existed whereby pilots believed there was not a strong expectation from the powers that be that they would adhere to those minimum altitudes. Who is responsible for the development and maintenance of that airline culture? Pretty hard to nail that one down, is it the janitor? a junior line F/O? A line Captain? The chief pilot? The CEO?
Personally I did see similarities in the two crashes.
For Erebus,little was known about safety cultures and it came down to individual pilots as to their own take on the rules and regs etc, that was not the case by the time the A320 crashed. I have seen an airlines safety culture go from dismal to disciplined with the change of one key person. Incident information shared with tech crew combined with clearly stated expectations and refocused training directly impacts line pilot attitudes within months not years.
Looking to the individual pilots won't prevent further occurrences. Looking to the folk filling key roles where management meets operations can.
In my mind these are the people who could do with more training. When was the last time the management from the CP up were rostered classroom training on how to manipulate their own companies safety culture? Or do we just take it as read that they were born with that skill?
Framer
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Paragraph377
It is the arrogance of AirNZ - framer discusses culture - that I alluded to. The company was completely out of its depth flying to Antarctica and equally out of its depth testing Airbus flight envelope protection.
But my point was this: You express anger that the company tried to wriggle out of accepting (some) responsibility for Erebus, but did you complain that the very same ignorance, incompetence and self-indulgence led to Perpignan, but the German pilots copped the blame - foreigners you didn't know?
The problem is this, Captain. You didn't merely remember the dead, you covertly praised Mahon and scorned Chippindale, and that was unwarranted and provocative. As prospector intimated, some of us value truth - as we see it - above all else. Depressing, really!
You may well feel AirNZ let Jim Collins down, but remember Captain Collins let AirNZ down too. Not only did he break the rules written to safeguard his passengers, he showed poor airmanship - on the day.
We are all deeply flawed. We all need luck and we all need forgiveness.
It is the arrogance of AirNZ - framer discusses culture - that I alluded to. The company was completely out of its depth flying to Antarctica and equally out of its depth testing Airbus flight envelope protection.
But my point was this: You express anger that the company tried to wriggle out of accepting (some) responsibility for Erebus, but did you complain that the very same ignorance, incompetence and self-indulgence led to Perpignan, but the German pilots copped the blame - foreigners you didn't know?
The problem is this, Captain. You didn't merely remember the dead, you covertly praised Mahon and scorned Chippindale, and that was unwarranted and provocative. As prospector intimated, some of us value truth - as we see it - above all else. Depressing, really!
You may well feel AirNZ let Jim Collins down, but remember Captain Collins let AirNZ down too. Not only did he break the rules written to safeguard his passengers, he showed poor airmanship - on the day.
We are all deeply flawed. We all need luck and we all need forgiveness.
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Ornis, yet again you bang on about Perpignan! Why? I am not interested in either making posts or starting threads about that topic. Much the same way I am not interested in posting or making comments on this thread about Pan Am over Lockerbie, the Concord crash, Amelia Earharts missing plane or any other number of bizarre aircraft mishaps off the coast of Bimini.
After 34 years it is fair to say that you Ornis, me, Prospector and some others on here wouldn't change our minds and personal opinions even if our very lives depended upon it, so let it go mate, you've made your point. It is what it is.
After 34 years it is fair to say that you Ornis, me, Prospector and some others on here wouldn't change our minds and personal opinions even if our very lives depended upon it, so let it go mate, you've made your point. It is what it is.
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prospector, stallie and Paragraph,
what Ornis said.
what Ornis said.
The kindest and most respectful way to remember Collins might be to say that he was a good pilot and a decent man who would have accepted responsibility for what he did.
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From a previous.
Also relevant, the weather at McMurdo was well below that required for an instrument let down. That was not the case in the previous flights you mention. The only other flight that struck such weather conditions carried out the pre planned sightseeing to the Dry Valley area, and returned to NZ, the pax had been briefed that if weather conditions were not suitable this is what would happen, and in hindsight, and in my opinion, foresight, it should have happened on the flight in question.
The previous flight that diverted went to the South Magnetic Pole area.
Also relevant, the weather at McMurdo was well below that required for an instrument let down. That was not the case in the previous flights you mention. The only other flight that struck such weather conditions carried out the pre planned sightseeing to the Dry Valley area, and returned to NZ, the pax had been briefed that if weather conditions were not suitable this is what would happen, and in hindsight, and in my opinion, foresight, it should have happened on the flight in question.
The previous flight that diverted went to the South Magnetic Pole area.
Well said Ornis.
I was 10 years old when 901 hit Erebus and remember it well.
Awful.
Many years later having worked at NZ at a senior level, I regrettably concur with the previous poster; at the time I was there its corporate culture was defined by arrogance.
One colleague described it as being like a cult; it had a sense of entitlement and importance far out of proportion to its true status and relevance... reaching it's peak under the previous CEO.
I've struck the same thing at Telecom, Chorus, Telstra to name a few.
However, how that might flow through to flight operations I can't speculate.
My sense was that those who flew were much more pragmatic.
I was 10 years old when 901 hit Erebus and remember it well.
Awful.
Many years later having worked at NZ at a senior level, I regrettably concur with the previous poster; at the time I was there its corporate culture was defined by arrogance.
One colleague described it as being like a cult; it had a sense of entitlement and importance far out of proportion to its true status and relevance... reaching it's peak under the previous CEO.
I've struck the same thing at Telecom, Chorus, Telstra to name a few.
However, how that might flow through to flight operations I can't speculate.
My sense was that those who flew were much more pragmatic.