I think you will find that my facts about the traps in VMC conditions in Antarctica actually lend weight to the argument that he should have not been there in the first place.
My recent comments here were purely intended to try and correct a recurrent misunderstanding and misrepresentation by some people trying to pin 100% of the blame on the Captain of the conditions faced by the crew and what they saw or didn't see and the conditions they were in.
In my opinion, Captain Collins may have been happy to stay in what was VMC as long as he did as he was not aware of the whiteout hazard, reinforced as out the right of the aircraft he could see the Dry Valleys.
It is my opinion again that he knew the initial descent was against SOP, but others had done it previously, it was likely VMC and so he made a calculated decision to descend and maintain flight under the cloud. In 20/20 hindsight after 25 years, we'd consider this a maverick cowboy manoeuvre but at the time likely tacitly approved by the company as is evidenced by others' previous violations.
Sadly, in making this fateful decision it is likely that he did not consider, amongst other things, external influences in the error chain (change of co-ordinates) and despite his own inexperience in the Antarctic had not been fully made aware of the dangers that lurk in VMC over snow.
Capt Collins needs to shoulder some of the blame. So does the company. So does the NZCAA. As to how to apportion blame? Well that's why we are still discussing this after 2.5 decades.....
Quote ollie...."We have to put it in perspective though, this crash could have been avoided at any stage by the flight crew not descending through the MSA when they were only 'reasonably' certain of their position rendering all of those 'other' mistakes mute."
Gidday Brian....I personally have come to "my-end" of this dicussion,"s"...with the above statement By Ollie.....I,on a daily basis ,judge my performance"s"..my decisions....my actions...and ultimately...my results!!!.....Im still alive.....and thats not to say that Ive not been at fault....but as an idividual,I know the rules and I do know myself(I hope).......I only hope I dont put myself or anyone else is this position.....because through debate and continued debate....we will(and have) learned from this....and we all benefit............I walk away with the feeling that Im comfortable with my thoughts and feelings about the stand Ive taken here ...........we agree to disagree...........kia kaha
Visibility by definition (check ICAO or your CARs) is predicated on being able to see and identify a prominent object by day.
Perhaps you may be able to explain why,in your opinion, even if the crew thought they were in the middle of McMurdo Sound, on the descent track as plotted, they must have been, and known, they were very close to Cape Bird, and Mt Bird and they never sighted these geographical points at any time? even on the descent track they were in fact on, they came to near as dammit over the Eastern side of Cape Bird and never sighted it at all. so obviously they could not have had the required 20km of vis during that descent.
Could all these missed opportunities to visually, accurately, fix their position be put down to white out??.
These are just questions to someone who has experience in this environment, it is my belief that they should not have been there at all, whether they thought they were VMC or not.
Last edited by prospector; 26th Apr 2012 at 08:32.
I said the essence of visual flying is seeing where you are and something where you are going. I chose my words very carefully; I didn't say definition. If you cannot see something where you are going you cannot fly visually, not safely. That is the rule I apply and I don't really care about arbitrary numbers or inadequate definitions.
The whole point of having a person in charge of an aircraft is to deal with unforeseen circumstances. Otherwise you might as well totally automate the whole operation and put an actor up front to placate the sceptics.
Years ago a retired Air NZ pilot told me the story of an old pilot who used to sit in the cockpit and say to himself: Today might be the day it all turns to sh*t, am I ready? An aphorism I do repeat.
We humans should remember the sky is not our environment. We can be there one second and gone the next. Care and attention is my mantra. Stick your Swiss cheese in your fondue, it won't save you.
Erebus expert? . .. hardly.....but nevertheless pretty clear as to who has a good grip and who has not.
The observation has been frequently made, that in common with many others, this accident was the result of a culmination of failures, all of which could be seen as defective links in a long chain of circumstance. To fasten onto one such link, subjecting it to minute scrutiny, to the exclusion of a similar approach to the others, is patently wrong headed.
Like for those deeply insightful armchair experts who refute Justice Peter Mahon's finding out of hand, it would improve the prospect of maintaining reasonable, rational debate if they went out and polished the car. It is impossible to take seriously anyone who disputes the findings of carelessness, neglect and duplicity.
And please, please don't take this as a cue to run up the barricades again to defend or condemn Captain Jim Collins.
Putting the findings to one side though, can anyone produce proof that the enquiry in any way failed in its task of gathering evidence and subjecting it to the most intense scrutiny? To read the report and its appendices closely is to be struck by their comprehensiveness. There is a level of precision and thoroughness akin to what is found when studying those forensic reports that are landmarks of their kind.
As to the validity or otherwise of the findings, maybe it is not too much to hope for that there will eventually be a fairly consistent consensus. There were of course those critics who were shown up to be lacking in any credibility at all. Maybe they were bent on pursuing narrow, self absorbed agendas and, no great surprise, went into denial. Such is the dross of protestations past.
What does continue to occupy those with an academic interest is wrestling with the imponderables and the complexities. In another compartment altogether, there is an unabating profound sadness for those most affected.
With an acute awareness that to touch upon the grief is to see the chasm that opens to swallow the gratuitous, when I think of the toll in human lives, predominantly those who perished on that remote icy, snow-bound slope, but also those who carried to their graves burdens of a magnitude impossible to comprehend, I see in my mind's eye a field of crosses, by which we the living stand in mute, contemplative respect. (Thoughts that only crystalised yesterday, on Anzac Day, ironically.)
Lastly, a little postscript that may be less controversial than some of the foregoing, though unrelated I admit, concerning the free flow of ideas and how counter to that is 'political correctness'. Geoffrey Blainey, an historian, speaker and writer blessed with lucidity and insight, says P.C. is hypocrisy; "the people who say it's sinful to discriminate themselves discriminate."
P.C. is in the same family as those 'isms' against which we should ever be on our guards. This website has become hugely popular, a home away from home it looks like for some of its regulars. Fanaticism? Masochism? (Incidentally, in a gentler age, one of the world's first aviation papers ran a regular column called AIRISMS.)
Thinks - best leave it to Kharon to define chauvinism, onanism , even botulism. Can't think what the 'ism' might be for thread drift.
WANKERISM?
Have to thank ORNERY for his proof reading skills, though his sharpness in line with the Muldoon school of dry invective needs rehoning. Whether he is yet a first master of stone casting is debatable.
". . .. . .seeing where you are and seeing something where you are going"
. . . . . . . . . . at the end of the far queue at the flicks again?
It's for its, mute for moot, council for counsel, predominate for predominant. Perhaps the language gap makes it difficult for some to grasp the Nestle - as the Swiss say.
Nevertheless, there is no discernible disharmony: Air NZ played badly, under the baton of the CAA, first violin ALPA pulling the strings, and left the pilot to face the music.
Like for those deeply insightful armchair experts who refute Justice Peter Mahon's finding out of hand, it would improve the prospect of maintaining reasonable, rational debate if they went out and polished the car. It is impossible to take seriously anyone who disputes the findings of carelessness, neglect and duplicity.
I do not believe anyone in this debate is refuting Justice Mahons findings out of hand. It is only one part, that the Captain was blameless that is being debated. Of neccessity that is concentrated on the decision to descend when and how he did.
To call everyone who disagrees with your opinion an armchair expert is about as productive, and useless, as me calling anyone who disagrees with my position a high chair expert who should be out pedalling his tricycle.
Prospector, re your earlier request, I'd have to look at the map again in detail, overlay times and position and closure rates at 260 odd knots. I'll get back to you.
Ornis, yes, I see your question again and maybe I answered it slightly askew initially, but im used to having to take that position. To answer your specific essence of VMC question, my last flippant comment above shows our positions on it are not far apart. Indeed it's an environment that is best avoided where possible, especially on landing without any surrounding runway infrastructure.
compressor stall. Thank you. I value your contribution and certainly do not disagree in principle.
It seems to me the impasse on this thread is the words "pilot error". I see the pilot as the goalkeeper. Whatever the others in the team are doing, he is on his own. However well or badly the others play, he is the last man standing, the final defence. The outcome depends on him; success or failure. Of course the others can make his life easy or difficult. Maybe impossible.
I do not believe Air NZ made Collins' life impossible. He was not tasked to land at McMurdo Field. That would have been an entirely different matter. I would have excused him in that scenario, given his training.
Captain Collins made choices and he was wrong. Pilot error. In the context of a dysfunctional operation? Absolutely. Disgraceful. Shocking. Inexcusable.
I don't care to apportion blame. I don't need to divide the pie. It's all unsavoury, every piece.
Location: Metung RSL or Collingwood Social Club on weekends!
Posts: 628
Ornis, you are a hypocrite. You state
Quote:
I don't care to apportion blame.
..yet in post#33 you say
Quote:
Before Easter I emailed the NZALPA to ask what proportion of members believed Collins was blameless. I await an answer. Actually, I don't: I already know the answer, more or less.
Those who think Collins blameless should ask themselves why airliners have pilots. To sit on fat wallets in fancy dress, a charade to please bored passengers? To deal with events and problems computers are not human-like enough to solve, perhaps?
"To call everyone who disagrees with your opinion an armchair expert is . .. . . useless."
Point taken, even though I think you think I had particular recent commentators and critics in mind. Not so. If you are wondering about my opinion on Erebus, (and as I said before, I am the last person to claim any expertise), read my earlier posts. I think you will find that by and large on points that have been debated at length, I don't have a hard and fast opinion either way. As stated earlier , among the to and fro of the whole business that keeps the debate alive and interesting are the unresolved paradoxes.
If you read back through the reams of threads over the years, there have been certain kite fliers who've warranted the scathing remark Paul Keating was fond of, referring to an opponent having a sparrow's nest of a brain*.
Had no idea 'armchair expert' would give offence. Skins thick and thin are the norm. (Can't repeat some of the names I've been called. Might be ladies present.)
No offence taken, here anyway. It just that you were assuming armchair experts. I would think there are many hours of left seat experience contributing to the debate.
The ultimate test would be to take a sample of say, 100 of Captain Collins' colleagues at the time, have them each perform this particular flight under the exact same circumstances and observe the outcome.
If the crash result was repeated by even one, then statistically it could be argued that the cause was primarily systemic and environmental factors.
My point being that this Captain's training, beliefs and ability represented the average, or even above average, Air NZ pilot of the time. If this assumption is correct then it is not useful to accident avoidance simply argue pilot error when other factors have aligned to overwhelm an 'average' pilot.
Of course we can't actually conduct such an experiment, what with the expense and loss of life etc. But those of us who are approaching the end of our careers without incident should probably acknowledge an element of good luck!
Whiskery. I implied I had a fairly good idea that many airline pilots feel Collins was neither blameless nor deserves exoneration by Parliament.
I do not care to apportion blame, that is, to assign a certain proportion of the blame to Collins, which is what apportion means. I am not keen to say he was X% to blame in the overall scheme of things, but I cannot deny I am on record as saying I think he was at least 51% to blame.
I prefer to judge each participant against a reasonable standard for the task (s)he performed, and the organisation as a whole.
If you can tell me where I err when I state the essence of visual flight is seeing where you are and something where you are going
Ornis, compressor stall has answered with his
Quote:
Visibility by definition (check ICAO or your CARs) is predicated on being able to see and identify a prominent object by day
To give an example of what we used to encounter in the maritime enviroment from time to time.
Conditions 1. High pressure centred over the area 2. No wind 3. Inversion 4. Bushfires that had been burning for some days.
The smoke would be trapped under the inversion creating a "greyout". Exactly the same as "whiteout", the only difference being the colour. No matter where you looked, up, down, sideways it was the same damn colour, and you had no idea what the actual visibily was until you came across one of compressor stalls prominent objects. In our case that might be an oil rig, work boat, or on making land fall when returning home. Except by reference to the altimeter you had absolutely no idea of height. So you can see how you might be set up for a CFIT, or into water in this case. At all times though you had absolutely legal VMC, though depending on the smoke density, visibility might range from the bare minimum, to far in excess.
Helo pilots flying offshore in the Gulf face the same issues brought about by haze.
As compressor stall has said, VFR flight can throw up its own unique hazards depending on your particular area and the nature of your operations.
I liked your succinct
Quote:
Captain Collins made choices and he was wrong. Pilot error. In the context of a dysfunctional operation? Absolutely. Disgraceful. Shocking. Inexcusable.
I don't care to apportion blame. I don't need to divide the pie. It's all unsavoury, every piece.
On the money, particularly the last sentence.
As for "blame", it has no place in a safety orientated organision, or when discussing issues of safety. Thats for lawyers and ambulance chasers. An organisation that has a blame culture merely buries the errors made in denial. Who's going to report safety issues if they know a bullet is the reward.
Brian, I take your point, but I don't think it negates the essence of my "essence". In fact your narrative rather reinforces it, I feel. If you can't see something ahead, you're certainly looking for something, anything!
I have crossed Cook Strait at 500ft under low cloud with much of the land ahead obscured, not "letting go" of that behind until it was sighted, with the texture of the surface below helping to maintain situational awareness. I knew I was over the sea, or I wouldn't have been there.
I absolutely agree with you, in a complex operation like an airline, you have to look at the whole organisation. I do understand why "blame" is an anathema to you. Nevertheless, in everyday parlance, you do something wrong you get the blame. Open reporting within a company is another matter.
HPSOV L. Statistics is as much an art as a science and some might interpret say 1,2 or even 10,20% of "your" pilots failing "your" test as meaning the company has a lot of poor captains - it doesn't disprove pilot error. You might need to take samples from other companies. But the idea is helpful and the conclusion valid: systemic disorder is likely.
I do understand why "blame" is an anathema to you. Nevertheless, in everyday parlance, you do something wrong you get the blame
The trick is though, why do you do something wrong? Why did Captain Collins do what he did? That is a question that can never be answered. However, those in management and the nav department are around to answer why they failed in their respective duties, and the explanations may be very simple. Under manning, belief that any pilot can make a seemingly simple VFR flight, but being unaware of the hazards. Who knows? I would be interested in those sort of answers, but I'm not aware those questions have ever been put. Everyone had an equal hand in the disaster, and it could have been prevented by the intervention of so many.
A point I would love to see answered is, why did the vast majority of crews who made the trip have questions as to when they were permitted to descend below MSA. Chippendale notes that the crews questioned admitted to their confusion. Pity is, none seem to have attempted to clarify the situation on return, hence a red flag was not raised for those who followed. And Chippendale, other than noting that the crews were confused, does not delve into the nature of, or why, the confusion. If it were to be given an answer it may go some way to explaining Captain Collins actions. Did the confusion stem from the term "Cloud Break procedure", rather than "Descent procedure"? Alas, we know not. A simple word can have grave implications.
Good grief: Spare me the Shakespearian nonsense, Brian. Collins was thick, like you are: Couldn’t even pass School C. What you and Compressor Stall say about the definition of “visibility” in VMC minima regs is complete garbage – and you both know it.
But that in itself doesn't make it a bad idea!
