Virgin plane's mid-air near miss with business jet Andrew Heasley March 7, 2012 - 4:18PM Read later Within a fortnight of Australia's air safety bureau announcing a wide ranging investigation into air traffic control failings, it has revealed details of another mid-air near miss involving an airliner.
A Melbourne-bound Virgin Blue Boeing 737 and a business charter jet had been put on a head-on course, this time by defence department air controllers overseeing Newcastle Airport in NSW, which handles miliary and civilian aircraft movements.
The jets were travelling towards each other at a closing speed of more than 1000km/h at almost the same altitude over Newcastle (the Boeing climbing to 5000 feet after taking-off from Newcastle Airport , the business jet descending to 5000 feet to land).
Advertisement: Story continues below At their closest, the two jets came within 122 metres vertically and 1300 metres horizontally of each other — a third of the required safe distances — as the airliner pilots responded to a cockpit collision warning and shed altitude.
The Virgin pilots saw the business jet flash past in front of them; the business jet pilots said they never saw the Boeing 737.
Two air controllers were each looking after one of the aircraft, without communicating with one another, "resulting in both aircraft being assigned the same level [altitude] and with conflicting tracks [flight paths]," investigators said.
An automated near-miss alert function had been disabled on the controllers' screens because military aircraft movements — particularly formation flying — set off too many false alarms.
Alarmed air traffic controllers in Brisbane contacted them to query if they were aware of the impending collision course.
One defence controller belatedly issued a safety alert to the business jet's pilots, but only after the planes had crossed. The other controller did not issue a safety alert to the Virgin pilots.
A 14-month investigation, released today, into the February 1 incident last year found it was one of 10 such near misses by defence controllers in 18 months, exposing significant training deficiencies.
It found gaping holes in the defence department's air traffic controller training: the department did not provide initial or ongoing training to controllers to handle a near miss scenario and did not clearly define aircraft separation responsibilities.
The department has subsequently revised its training content, delivery and personnel testing.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has launched a wide ranging investigation into near misses that have occurred between 2008 and 2011, putting the defence department and the civilian controllers, Airservices Australia, under the microscope.
You have to admit, some military control zones can be a threat, I often brief them as such. Non-sensical vectors, step-down arrivals, poor traffic management and far from accurate weather reporting. Willytown, Townsville and Darwin, in my experience, are disorganised, difficult places to arrive into.
A guy I know suggested..."just turn off your transponder and go in low"
I second RENURPP! Twice, into TL I unfortunately was radar vectored below the Radar LSALT. Only because I frequented the place I questioned the instructions... and the ridiculous, well saw that too. Some base training, to which they approved engine out ops, I was asked to go-around with one at idle at 100'.... because 1 minute prior a jet had landed... go figure the resultant there
It's a big problem and not just in the military. We are just not getting the quality of candidate we used to. There was a pretty big resignation in Canberra the other day, whether it's connected with the review that's happening at the Training Academy (weasel, w@nk words for the training college) who knows?
What will be the result of the ATSB invetigation? I can guess....................
Funny thing is when two professional Pilots are self separating in busy CTAFs this type of crap does not happen.
Suddenly put ATC in the middle and it complicates everything. Combine that with inexperience (like Darwin ATC) and it compounds. I had Darwin ATC once tell me that I should have the traffic in my 3oclock on TCAS (flying metro at time )
I'm not saying CTAFs are perfect, far from it. However when you are talking direct to the other Pilot, you know what each other are doing.
When you put ATC in the middle, often you don't know about each other or what each other are doing.
Funny thing is when two professional Pilots are self separating in busy CTAFs this type of crap does not happen.
Suddenly put ATC in the middle and it complicates everything. Combine that with inexperience (like Darwin ATC) and it compounds. I had Darwin ATC once tell me that I should have the traffic in my 3oclock on TCAS (flying metro at time )
I'm not saying CTAFs are perfect, far from it. However when you are talking direct to the other Pilot, you know what each other are doing.
When you put ATC in the middle, often you don't know about each other or what each other are doing.
Holes in the cheese indeed.
Have you read the ATSB report? Have you thought that maybe the 737 and WW were not the only two aircraft in the sky? In this case, ATC were "getting in the middle" of something like 16x F18s, 1x A320, 4x Hawk, 1x WW24 and 2x737, plus an active circuit at WLM with two or three. I'd love to see that work CTAF. YWLM don't operate on discrete Approach High/Approach Low frequencies unless there is considerable traffic volume, including military fast-movers.
Well all the ATC'ers can jump up and down all they like but there is a real problem, it's obviously been documented and investigations commenced. Airlines, Pilots and the people who pay good money for this service deserve the level of safety that ATC is there for.
It's a little embarrassing at times to read some of these reports, what's more embarrassing are the weasel words that come from those who 'own' this problem.
The need for bums on seats and a training experiment gone horribly wrong has put ASA another 3 or 4 years (probably more) behind training requirements.
I disagree. As outlined in the report AsA did not provide compromised separation recovery training until they experienced their own separation breakdown approximately 12 months earlier.
Additionally, while not mentioned in the report, the Defence compromised separation recovery training was actually under development at the time of the incident in question. This has since been implemented, as it was always going to be, but it is unfortunate that this incident occurred in the interim. As anyone who has worked in training development would know there are often significant lead times involved with changing courses.
With due respect.........bullshit.......training planned but didn't happen, if the training was planned, a recognised need existed, when was it going to happen???
Yes lack of training, facilities etc, then don't blame individuals, blame the system, but again, don't duck the issue that there was a monumental stuff up, a task has taken on which you could not do safely, with the training/ facilities provided.
I guess this is what happens whwn you get good orators at all levels, politics, military etc, talk well, do stuff all.
WTF, what do you say to the families of a mid-air, more talk
In normal business you pay a fee ( airways charges), if you don't get what you pay for, or suffer loss, then the service provider is liable.
As outlined in the report AsA did not provide compromised separation recovery training until they experienced their own separation breakdown approximately 12 months earlier.
Lots of haha's around here...particularly;
Quote:
Originally Posted by ATSB
In response, Airservices Australia, the civilian air traffic control provider involved in that incident, implemented a compromised separation recovery training module for its air traffic control groups
Obviously "implemented" and "commenced" have completely separate definitions. The funny bit is that the ATSB (and journo's, Board members, Senators etc) actually believe it.
) 
