Flt Simulation

[ZFT]

I have been involved with flight simulation for over 34 years (hence the handle ZFT – zero flight training) and have experienced the tremendous improvements in both fidelity and reliability.

What aspects of modern (level D standard) flight simulators would you, the ultimate end user like to see improved and what additional features would enhance training?

Thank you.

[QAVION]

Hi, ZFT.
I was in a 747-400 simulator a few years ago and it didn't appear to simulate the ability of the IRS's to operate in ATT mode in the air after NAV had been lost. Not sure if it was a level D sim tho'. Is this kind of thing difficult to simulate?

Cheers.
Q.

[Cornish Jack]

ZFT
I'm surprised that you haven't had one of the more recent complaints about Sim fidelity (or lack of it), the lack of representative sound and vibration cues following engine failure. I seem to recall that one particular real-life incident (UAL?) caused concern in that the crew reported that they had not previously experienced the disorientation effects of very heavy vibration, both physical and visual. Given the standard motion systems in use I suspect that to introduce such effects would place a very heavy burden on the mechanical side of things. Such high frequency direction reversals on the jacks whether they are hydraulic or electrical would, I imagine, be difficult to implement but, impossible???.... I would appreciate your comments.

[Synthetic]

Interesting points. The fact that ATT does not work is either an oversight or shoddy programming. All it requires is to stop the part of the IRS software which updates the nav solution and clear down a few validity flags.

Some years ago I was involved in producing an engine seize malfunction for a military sim. There was a blood curdling graunch and the motion nearly tore itself out of the floor. Had the occupants not been strapped in and wearing bonedomes, there would have been injuries. We were rather pleased with ourselves. Off to site and the mod was installed and submitted to the customer for approval. "Do you like it" says us. "Oh yes indeed" says the customer. "Is it realistic" asks us. "Dunno, never happened in real life" Says the customer.:confused:

Basically, there are two ways of getting the information to simulate something -

1/. A mass of instrumentation is installed in the aircraft then you go flying and actually carry out the event.

2/. You ask lots of people what it feels like. You then produce something based on an average of the answers. This is then submitted to customers and is tuned until they are happy.

In the case of an engine catastrophic failure, no one seems keen to let us use method one, and method two is not good because of it's subjective nature. What usually happens is that you can please one pilot but another is less happy. Everyone tends to have a slightly different slant on what should happen.:uhoh:

Still it's fun trying:D

[ZFT]

Thanks for the constuctive responses.

QAVION

On any level C or D simulator, systems simulation should be perfect. On today’s simulators the simulator manufacturers tend to run the same code as the aircraft computers, albeit on a different hardware platform. As a consequence the simulation should behave identically to the aircraft. Even on older simulators, there is no excuse for less than perfect systems simulation, although this requires far greater attention to detail by both the design engineer and the acceptance pilot to ensure simulator characteristics are as aircraft.

As Synthetic stated, Level D performance characteristics are solely dependant upon the quality/availability of accurate data. Today, there are, in my humble opinion only 2 areas of civil simulation that are not possible to replicate, namely sustained G forces and physical pressurisation cues. All other aspects are just a matter of cost as the technology is available.

Cornish Jack

The engine incident you refer to is in some ways a similar situation to unusual attitude training. No airframe manufacturer will or possible can provide real flight test data and therefore the airframe manufacturer provide engineering test data for the sim manufactures in conjunction with their customers to programme what they believe to be a realistic/representative scenario. Although in this specific case one would hope that the FDR information has been utilised to enhance catastrophic engine failure simulation. (UAL has a particularly well respected sim engineering group and I would imagine that they have already addressed this. Perhaps a UAL –400 pilot would comment)

There are two another engine related area of simulation that I think are particularly poor. On current Level D turboprop simulators propeller aerodynamic simulation, especially during pitch changes and engine failures tends to be unrepresentative. And on all simulators, slip ball simulation is basically cr*p. Again these are airframe manufacturers data issue.

[QAVION]

"The fact that ATT does not work is either an oversight or shoddy programming. All it requires is to stop the part of the IRS software which updates the nav solution and clear down a few validity flags. "

As I understand it, Synthetic, IRU's will not give you an accurate ATTitude indication unless you are flying relatively straight and level for a certain period of time. Would a D level sim programmer have to model the IRU's to this sort of detail level (showing slight errors in attitude if the aircraft had not been flying straight and level). Or is this what you meant by "nav solution"?

A few years ago, I wanted to see what would happen on a real aircraft when selecting from OFF to ATT whilst in motion (to see what sort of displays I would get). I tried selecting ATT whilst an aircraft was being towed from one gate to another. During the period from selecting from OFF (to ATT) to the horizon appearing on the displays, the aircraft made a sharp right turn. As I recall, the attitude display took about about 45 seconds or more to appear. The displays, without motion, normally take about 30 seconds to appear, so the radical movement , I suspect, was confusing the IRS's. Disappointingly, the horizon showed no abnormalities when it did appear (I was hoping for a 45 degree tilt :D) Perhaps IRS's in reality don't display a correct horizon unless you have been flying straight and level for some time?

Anyway, I think I'm moving a bit off topic here, so...

Cheers.
Q.

[Synthetic]

Would a D level sim programmer have to model the IRU's to this sort of detail level?

Absolutely. If the aircraft does it, then the sim needs to to be a useful training tool.

When I made the comment about ATT, I was thinking of the case of the IRU being switched from NAV to ATT, which is a slightly different case. In this case the platform has already been aligned. In your case the platform is forced to align while in motion, which is less accurate, and further degraded by acceleration of the aircraft. Once again, I would expect the sim to reflect this.

In my parlance, the Nav Solution is aircraft position, velocity etc calculated from all of the various nav sensors. By selecting ATT, that particular platform is removed from the calculation

[John Farley]

ZFT

Personally, if I was king for a day I would have all level D sims freeze as the sim went outside the envelope for which the aircraft is cleared. Two reasons for this:

1 To get the attention of the crew in case they did not realise what they had done

2 To stop people using sims to establish what will happen to the aircraft outside the envelope when there is no guarantee that the sim is valid in such circumstances.

I sympathise with Cornish Jack’s need for off putting levels of vibration to be simulated. One US chopper sim I flew did this by shaking the seats rather than the whole cab. You can get very good fidelity like that with minimal mechanical engineering.

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

John

Would it not be more logical to freeze the sim when outside the envelope for which the sim has been validated rather than that for which the aircraft is cleared, the two being by no means the same thing. If, as you said, you were allowed to...

[Synthetic]

ZFT - I am aware that I might be hijacking your thread. Appologies. May I answer Mr Farley and Mad scientist?

[John Farley]

Mad (Flt) Scientist

Sure. Totally agree.

But I do question whether sims really are properly validated outside the flight envelope of the aircraft. Any more than aircraft are flown beyond the design envelope except by chance or error.

The bottom line for me is that with both sims and aircraft a few data points outside the fully investigated envelope don't equal complete knowledge.

But I am sure you know what I mean.

After Nick Warner and his crew were killed in the A330 at Toulouse they found a software routine in part of the autopilot control laws that had up elevator being applied to try to get to a selected height, regardless. And regardless in this context meant even it took the aircraft down to an unflyable speed. The guy who wrote that was acting in isolation. If that can happen in the world's leading organisation for developing such flight software what chance is there that sim programmers don't draw straight lines (or any other unjustified extrapolation that they find handy) when outside the envelope that they believe matters.

Sorry, rant over!

Regards

John

[Reverend Doctor Doug]

ZFT

I would like to see sims with a better representation of inertia. It is difficult to quantifly, but i dont believe that a 3 or 400 tonne aircraft can change direction/attitude as quickly as happens in the sim.
This can also be witness during a crosswind landing. In a real heavy, you can fly into the flare crabbed, then kick it straight with rudder and keep the wings level with aileron and the aircraft will track straigh for a short time due to inertia. In our sims it seems that the aircraft drifts immediately.
Another area is the EFATO. The rolling and yawing rates that are generated by non violent control inputs do not seem to be consistent to what you see when flying the line. Once again i cannot quantify this as i have not had a real engine failure yet on this jet.
In my previous company i had much better knowledge of this area, and the sim was nothing like the aircraft, but that was a much lower level of sim, so my observation are not valid for current simulators.

Doug

[Elliot Moose]

I'd be happy if they could even get the basic stuff to work like a real aircraft! I just spent five weeks wrestling with a supposedly level D sim that would not fly an ILS to 200' minimums if any turbulence was insertedl! Not to mention the fact that any resemblance between the ground handling of the sim and the aircraft was purely limited to the fact that the controls actually moved in the correct direction when inputs were made.

Right now (as I understand it) the builders of the sims acquire a "data package" or somesuch for each given aircraft that is supposed to give them all they need to program in all the whozits and whatzits to do their job. Anything outside this, they just seem to go with what makes sense. As a consequence, the same malfunction programmed into two different sims (sometimes those from a different company) can give drastically different warnings, etc.

Somehow the "governing bodies" don't know much about this as they will happily certify based mainly on what the data pack says. I've seen some really basic stuff (like even a gen fail, or a gearbay overheat, or ADC failure) on certified sims give indications that don't even match the basic parameters of what any groundschool graduate has learned. :yuk:

How does this stuff get by? I realize that there is stiff competition in this industry, but why not make certain things universal (although I hate to suggest that the governments should involve themselves)for a given type and make it mandatory that it be included as a part of the flight parameters?

But of course that's just the rantings of somebody who's been away from home too long...........:D

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

Our practice as an OEM is to supply the "minimum" ATG cases as part of the data package. We will also flight match the aerodynamic model to the limits of the available aircraft certification data, recognising that the ATG cases are only a sample of the aircraft. We will also provide additional proof of match data as part of the package to validate any unusual characteristics we think might prove contentious during qualification of the sim.

(I'm mainly talking about the flight model here; I'm not so familiar with our systems simulation approach, and that is certainly more fraught with problems of configuration control; generally once the aircraft is in test the likelihood of a significant change to the basic aerodynamics is small, and we can use most if not all of the developemt data to build our models. Systems may still be evolving up to (or even beyond) the certification date, so there's never really a firm, fixed basis for the systems side of the work.)

To some extent the sim manufacturer has to use "seat of the pants" to fill out the inevitable holes in our data; they know (or should) what sort of thing works for training purposes for cases where we will never have the data. To some extent it's an emperor's new clothes situation, in that past practice ends up validating what you do next, because it 'works'. But that's pretty much a definition of engineering :).

While there are undoubtly things the authorities could do better - and not always in the direction of requiring more validation, there are things they could do to make everyone's job a lot easier while sacrificing nothing in terms of fidelity - there is, of course, a qualitative eval by the authorities, it's not just a matter of matching a few manoeuvres and ticking the box. Of course, if the eval pilot has a different opinion as to how things should be than anyone else.....

[ZFT]

Synthetic,

Please go ahead.

[ZFT]

John Farley

<< Personally, if I was king for a day I would have all level D sims freeze as the sim went outside the envelope for which the aircraft is cleared.>>

John, on just about every sim I’ve even been involved with there is just this freeze function. For want of a better description, ‘Recoverable Crash’ parameters such as excessive G, IAS, Mach, Taxi speeds, Tailstrikes and ‘Irrecoverable Crash’ parameters such as excessive pitch/bank/side force at touchdown are monitored. Typically a Crash page is displayed on the Instructors station when any parameter is exceeded and if not inhibited by Instructor selection, the sim freezes.
Unfortunately from my observations, most instructors do indeed inhibit this feature.

Whilst I have never seen the vibrating seat you describe, it was fairly common for helicopter sims to mount the cockpit on a frame separate from the normal base frame and use a small jack to provide the vibration effect independent of the motion jacks.

Doug

I’m not a Flyt expert. Maybe Mad Scientist who is would respond. Interestingly, whilst there is a tolerance for inertia in sim specs, I can’t seem to find any reference to it in JAR-STD-1A.

All axis rates really should be very representative. As you state, most line pilots will never experience actual engine failures and sim training in this area is their only exposure to this.

Elliot

Appears your sim experience understandably was not a happy one. Sims that perform like this should not remain in service as negative training is received. What does surprise me is that your TRI/TRE didn’t do something about it.

Your comments on systems simulation are very valid. As has been stated before on this thread, there is no excuse for anything less than perfect simulation in these areas. How does this get by? I really don’t know. Assuming it was never correct, the blame must rest jointly between the sim manufacturer, the acceptance team and the initial certification team.
If however the sim fidelity has deteriorated, then my own discipline is solely to blame.
I am very surprised that the sim instructors do not do something about it.

As for your rantings. I disagree. Your comments are entirely justified. Hope you get home soon.

[Synthetic]

Reading between the lines of what is becoming a very interesting thread, I think the problem may lie in the way that sims are procured. There is obviously the impossible (sustained G motion effect) and the imponderable (sim performance outside the explored), but these only accounts for a very small number of niggles about sims.

In my experience, the situation usualy involves knowledgeable Aircrew who know what they want, and engineers who for the most part, are capable people who take a pride in getting it right. Ideal situation - what can go wrong? Well almost invariably there are at least two layers of bean counters involved in the equation.

I have always found that the shorter the line of communication I have with the end user, the better the job turns out.

Another problem is is the shear magnitude of the task of laying down the exact specifics of every single function of anything as complex as a simulator. May be a solution would be to have 'bedding in' period post acceptance. I think to be fare to both sides, this would have to be chargeable to the customer, but any design change/update required during that time would be at nominal cost rather than at full market premium.

[Cornish Jack]

Interesting point re. the dreaded 'bean counters'. In another life,I was constantly puzzled to find that setting a particular IRS fault was not producing the specified result. It was a long time before a casual remark by one of the Sim Dev engineers revealed the reason.
Because the IRUs were aircraft units, it had been decided to use only two instead of three to save money. The third IR was simulated by software which gave most of the required operating indications BUT NOT the SINGLE unit failure indications - that always came up as a DOUBLE unit failure. Not life threatening, perhaps, but quite frustrating for some time.
In conversation with one of the managers I tried to make the point of the necessity of expenditure on quality training and not cutting corners. I'll leave you to guess the reaction.
It ought to be unnecessary to point out that the cost of poor quality training is measured in body bags.

[Elliot Moose]

ZFT
I think the problem IS the TRE's and POI's et al. Too few of them know anything about a given aircraft. Those that do in fact have a type rating on say a CRJ have ever flown the aircraft or worked with it enough to see these differences. Because I do work with one type every day for the manufacturer, I see these things and investigate (as do my collegues). I also fly the aircraft on a semi-regular basis. The local pilot cops (we deal with every authority in the world) seldom even look at the type unless there is a check or a problem.

Unless we complain, there is no intervention. As far as acceptance, they only deal with "does the malfunction do what the button says it will do?" The sim I was using in AUZ is no longer even affiliated with an operating airline, so there is no TRE involved except when the inspector shows up for the checkride on a crew. At least back home I have the advantage of a whole slew of instuctors, inspectors, etc. to keep things honest all the time.:D Most of the problems arise on the road where the sims are often serviced by local technicians and remote support past that. Then the locals can only report back to the sim manufacturer, and then they investigate when they get a chance, and then if (and only if) there is a discrepancy with the data package, they will fix immediately. If not, they call me back for clarification. Of course by then I'm long gone for another year or so.:yuk:

So the problem still lies with the sim manufacturers themselves. That's why I wish there was a bit of a push for some standardization.

[ZFT]

Elliot,

Maybe I’m fortunate, but the TREs and TRIs that I deal with. both from the airframe manufacturer and customer airlines tend to be both knowledgeable and very critical.
Like you, I also deal with many authorities and again I find them to be generally pretty good.

Simulated malfunction acceptance is a bit more in depth than "does the malfunction do what the button says it will do?" In the initial phase of simulator production a Malfunction Definition Document and Acceptance Test Manuals are supplied to the end user for approval. These documents detail exactly what the malfunction is and exactly what characteristics simulated systems will exhibit. On more modern simulators this Malfunction Defn Doc is even being linked into the Instructors Station help system. This ensures that the instructor knows just what the malfunction will do. (On older devices it’s unfortunately still a paper exercise).

I too wish there was greater standardisation, not just malfunctions, but across a far broader simulation spectrum. Trouble is that different airlines/Fleet Captains have different requirements.

I don’t entirely agree with your comments about local techs and local support. From my experience once a simulator has been in service for a few years, the local sim engineers tend to be far more knowledgeable about their sims than the manufacturer. Of course the standard of maintenance is dependant upon the resources made available to the sim engineers, but that’s another ‘beancounter’ story………..

[Ignition Override]

ZFT: You started an interesting topic which I've not thought about in a while. Before I make a suggestion, or repeat what others have said, just some observations here.

Having been trained just over four years ago for "simple" engine flameouts (requiring an intense workload) etc in the DC-9 Captain's seat, what actually happened on the three hour-plus type rating (checkride) and to others in this plane or on the 737 etc can be a good bit different. My Check Airmen made some mistake when he programmed the sim for an engine failure for V1 or Vr. Although I somehow kept the "plane" straight, the engine thrust went back and forth a few times from full thrust to a partial or zero thrust setting. He apologized for messing up the thing and never gave me another engine flameout. The recent type rides are all through the AQP program, those lucky sob's...they can repeat anything.

One of our crews on this fleet had an actual engine problem where the thrust fluctuated at least a few times during climb-out and the crew decided to pull the throttle to idle. One of our FOs had a very similar problem as a Captain in a 737-3 or 400 climbing out of Midway Airport (a bad enough, really lousy, cramped airport to deal with) and said that it took more rudder muscle than he expected-no pun intended here.

Therefore, it might improve safety to have each crew (especially for military crews who might only have 3,000 total hours or less) exposed once a year to such a series of compressor stalls/surges in the sim, because so many problems in any real airplane are not clear-cut, especially with electrical faults or pneumatics.

Having a stuck flight spoiler panel in the sim was quite a challenge, even in night, VMC conditions! I was lucky to keep the thing from rolling more than 70 degrees (the plane suddenly decided to be an A-6 or S-3 dive bomber), after asking a different Check Airman for a flight control problem years ago as FO, just for extra random training for the real world. It was excellent training to have experienced the very awkward flight characteristics.

[Elliot Moose]

ZFT

You wroteIn the initial phase of simulator production a Malfunction Definition Document and Acceptance Test Manuals are supplied to the end user for approval. These documents detail exactly what the malfunction is and exactly what characteristics simulated systems will exhibit. On more modern simulators this Malfunction Defn Doc is even being linked into the Instructors Station help system

Point well taken. But, herein also lies the problem if I understand your words correctly. In my most recent escapade (as well as one before it on the other side of the world). I was dealing with a brand new simulator. The end users in both cases were airlines. Therefore, they end up having some say in what happens when a malfunction is programmed, as well as accepting the final result. In many cases, this is where the lack of knowledge of the systems can be a factor.

As an example: In the sim I dealt with last year, one problem was a simple generator failure. In the CRJ 100/200 a failure of the right generator for any reason (including as a result of engine failure) will result in the loss of the autopilot for about five seconds due to the way that the power feeds into the FCC's. This is (unfortunately) as big a truism for these aircraft as the forces of gravity. Obviously the guy who ordered the sim, the guy who accepted it and the local TRE all forgot this basic bit of groundschool background knowledge, and the sim was put into service (Level D) with no autopilot failure ever with a gen fail. I was the first user of the sim, and snagged it on day one. We "lived with it" for two weeks until the manufacturer sent over some fresh code to introduce the correct result. This was of course wrong/incomplete and we waited another week for the full fix. Several other malfunctions reflected the 700/900 version of the aircraft.

In my recent experience, several similar (although slightly less obvious) faults still exist, even after the airline-owner used the box for over a year, went belly up and the box was casually dry leased for another year, before I showed up. Again, the only help had to come directly from the sim manufacturer even with an expert team on staff that was maintaining at least seven sims. Now, that's not their fault. The fault lies in the fact that the original owner didn't know or care that there were these problems.

I'm sorry for the babbling here folks. I'm just trying to explain what I've already said. Why aren't the manufacturers forced to build to a defined set of standards in these respects when they already are with respect to basic handling, visuals, etc? To me there is a lot more negative training to be had due to incorrect system response than the realism of the airport visual scenes. That would fix almost all of my problems!:ok:

[ZFT]

Ignition Override,

Thank you for your inputs.

There seems to be a consensus that more challenging malfunctions, especially with catastrophic engine failures would be a distinct benefit.

There are a few opportunities to present this type of feedback into the industry with the annual ARINC organised FSEMC conference being one of the best with all users, operators, certification bodies, simulator and airframe manufacturers and their vendors attending.

Attendees have the opportunity to raise issues in advance and maybe if enough pilots via their respective training/sim depts raise this as a topic for discussion, something could be accomplished.

I will of course be reviewing these types of malfunctions here to see just where we can improve quality of training within our organisation

Elliot

<< Why aren't the manufacturers forced to build to a defined set of standards in these respects when they already are with respect to basic handling, visuals, etc?>>
The simple answer is that they are. JAR-STD-1A and AC-120-40B (and others) currently define (fixed wing) standards. Obviously from your recent experiences down under they certainly do not to have been applied correctly in this particular case.

To go back on what has been repeatedly stated in previous posts, there really is no excuse for anything less than 100% fidelity with systems simulation.

I don’t have any knowledge of the CRJ 100/200 sim you refer to, however from the symptoms you describe it would seem that this is not a malfunction issue but rather the basic electrics software model is less than perfect. Electrical systems are one of the easiest to model as just about every aspect is physical and defined. It really is not rocket science to correctly model power generation, control, bus distribution and bus loading. Similarly, it is again quite straightforward to verify the fidelity of these systems during the acceptance phase.

None of this of course helps you, the end user when the sim verification/approval process fails, as it appears to have done in this case.

I wish I knew what the answer is to resolving this. Certainly the problems must be solved before it goes into service as opposed to retrospective action afterwards. Maybe an answer is for the approval authorities to regulate the acceptance team more? Maybe the QTG should be expanded to include more in depth system fidelity checks?

What does confuse me a little is how these sims retain their accreditation each year. A review by the Inspectors of Open Defects and Deferred Defects should highlight these problems.

<< To me there is a lot more negative training to be had due to incorrect system response than the realism of the airport visual scenes>>
I couldn’t agree more. It’s ironic, but more time is spent during annual sim certification renewal on visual luminescence, geometry and scene content than on just about anything else. I say ironic because the majority of sim details are in Cat II or Cat III conditions where the visual is ‘seen’ for only a few, albeit important minutes.

[Elliot Moose]

ZFT

Thanks for all of your patient responses on this subject!:ok: It's nice to know that it's not just a case of me being a bit uptight about this stuff. I really hope I can use the info to speak more intelligently the next time I have a problem. It is really nice to see somebody like you concerned about this stuff from "the other end" of the game.

[ZFT]

Elliot,

Well thank you for your kind words. I think you may be surprised just how conscientious and knowledgeable most sim engineers are. Within this little part of aviation there really are many, many good people, invariably battling against their management to provide the best equipment possible.

Your comment “I really hope I can use the info to speak more intelligently the next time I have a problem” is actually very pertinent to the topic. The more definitive fault reports are, the quicker faults are rectified. Comments such as “The sim doesn’t fly right” may well be accurate, but they are not a lot of help to the sim engineer.

My engineers are all instructed/encouraged to debrief crews exiting the sim and I find that the crews that do take a few moments to ensure fault symptoms are clearly understood by the engineers benefit and even occasionally learn something!!

[Elliot Moose]

Zft
I was recently talking to some co-workers about the fine quality of various simulators which we had used and we were all saying "why are these things getting certified like this?" Much the same conversation points that we have had here.

Eventually one of the FAA standards folks arrived on the scene. Now this is a company employed person who is also an FAA check airman. His take on some of this foolishness basically came down to the following:

Yes the standards are that all systems MUST perform exactly like the real aircraft, and yes handling and control forces must match the real aircraft, etc. Them's the rules! HOWEVER as with so many things in the good old USA the rules only apply as far as your lobby group can prevent them from reaching. Therefore in the case of the world's second largest sim manufacturerer, which is based in the states, and which has HUGE political clout, a lot more gets by than some other manufacturers. For instance a Canadian built sim would not be certified nearly so easily as an American built one. Of course, once a sim gets the FAA's level D stamp you can't really argue that it isn't right, even if in fact it isn't right. A straw vote around the office made it quite clear that my recent experiences with the sim downunder were really nothing when compared to some of the supposed "level D" sims currently operating in the states. Senior training captains talked about being barely able to fly some of these machines, and having malfunctions that barely resembled the actual aircraft systems. Of course once the FAA says okay, an awful lot of other authorities tend to pull out the old rubber stamp and let fly automatically.

Obviously in asia, as in Canada, and other places where the FAA holds much less influence, we can demand and get these more or less utopian ideals about sim training. What you and I expect as basic levels of service are only pipe dreams where lobby dollars and politics are introduced into the equation!

Has anybody else gotten a sense of this?

[SimJock]

An interesting thread chaps..

..another point to bear in mind when you are comparing the sim to the real aircraft is that all aircraft can be built slightly differently for each end user. The sim manufacturers obviously try to cater for these aircraft differences by providing selectable customer options on the simulator but there is a limit to what can be done within the bounds of reasonable cost and sometimes praticality.

Also, Airbus (for example) seem quite prone to upgrading their avionics fairly frequently, so there is an ongoing cost for sim operators to upgrade the simulators to the latest software revision levels. Failure to do so will result in some sim users experiencing perceived incorrect systems behaviour when in reality it is 'out of date' behaviour. These upgrades can often be costed in millions of dollars, particularly if replacement aircraft black boxes are required and the viability of the simulator, if lightly used, can be called into question. On occasions the certifiying aviation authority will mandate these modifications in order for the sim to retain its certification level. If you buy a new A320 aircraft today it is almost certainly not worth you training on an old sim.

As has been said before in this thread, the key is to make sure you write up any defects or percieved problems in the sim tech log and convey the details directly to an engineer. Some of us engineers are pilots too so we also want it to work as it should.

As for malfunctions.. I find the 'reverser unlocked' in flight is quite an enjoyable one.. big bang, big yaw, big buffet, engine spools down.. s..t now what ?

[Synthetic]

Permit me to speculate for a moment if you will. One day, science will allow us to interface directly to the brain. After that, all the ironwork, instruments, hydraulics and so on will become a relic of the past, and a simulator will be nothing more than a P.C. and a helmet. Advantages - well the obvious, an end to most of the bits that break, power consumption reduced by a factor of thousands etc. But there may be another, in that a lot of the things we cannot simulate such as sustained G etc will become within the scope of the machine. Another will be fear, which brings me to my question.

While a pilot is flying the sim, somewhere at the back of his mind there is in most cases I suspect a thought that goes something like "I am flying a sim. If I mess up really badly, I may lose my job". The same thought whilst flying the real thing goes more "I am flying a plane. If I mess up really badly, I and a large number of people who depend on me will die".

How many Pilots actually suspend disbelief while in the sim? I have seen a few who I suspect do - they emerge at the end of a detail visibly shaken, but most appear ok at the end of the detail. Does the lack of fear reduce the value of simulation?

[ZFT]

Hi Elliot,

Sorry for tardy reply, been rather busy!!

Your post makes quite depressing reading. I haven’t been involved with an FAA certification for about 13 years so I’m not in a position to comment on US specifics.

My own view is that any sim operator that isn’t directly associated with either an airline or an airframe manufacturer cannot provide the ultimate in quality as everything is a compromise across a large user base. SIMJOCK’s post is a very good example of just this problem. Cost is the only factor that is preventing his A320 from being upgraded to current standards. As long as users are prepared to accept it’s current level of fidelity, it will remain “out of date”. Although as he correctly points out, the high cost of sim upgrades may make it impractical for an older device. Of course a reduced lifespan means higher hourly lease rates and customers, especially regional and smaller airlines are not prepared (of perhaps able) to pay higher rates. Additionally, customers are not prepared to accept higher rates for an upgraded sim.

If pilots selected the sim, then maybe this wouldn't be the case, but from my experience, it's non pilots who negotiate training agreements and provided the sim is certified at the required level, whether it has for example EGPWS, TCAS 7 and so on is academic. It comes down to $ every time.

This situation is even worse when a sim manufacturer builds and operates their own sims as is the case with the US sim manufacturers/operator whom I believe you are referring to.

What I still cannot get my head around is that Senior Training Captains accept this situation. The fact that a sim is Level D approved does not mean that crews MUST accept it. If it isn’t up to the required standard, refuse to use it. Certainly my customers do refuse if there is a fault that is deemed to be unacceptable.

[ZFT]

Interesting article from UK Evening Standard newspaper.

"Ryanair sues over simulator 'snags'
James Rossiter, Evening Standard
30 December 2003

RYANAIR, Europe's second-largest budget airline, is claiming more than £800,000 from the maker of its Boeing 737 flight simulators which it says are riddled with faults.


The airline is taking Wightlea Aircraft Simulation of West Sussex to the High Court after 20 technical complaints, described as 'outstanding snags'. Allegations include components in the simulators 'repeatedly blanking' when pilots practised landing, and a snag in take-off practice registered as 'auto throttle keeps disconnecting on take-off roll'.


Chief executive Michael O'Leary has placed two 100-plus orders for Boeing 737s in the past 18 months. Ryanair's case against Wightlea involves a deal struck in spring 2001, and later amended, under which simulators would be ready for use by spring 2002. A late penalty fee of £2,000 a day was allegedly agreed.


The deal fell apart in August when Ryanair complained that the simulators were still not up to scratch. It is pursuing Wightlea for 409 lost days, or £818,000 in damages. Wightlea denies liability".