BHS - CHC in Brazil S92 recent event

[patatas]

A S92 from BHS Brazilian Helicopter Services hit the antenna on the final approach to an oil rig SS60 at Macaé, Brazil this morning.


http://i1204.photobucket.com/albums/bb410/cristianoaranda/file-1_zpsou9yrjzp.jpeg

[skadi]

Ooops, I think they were very lucky without tailrotor...

skadi

[patatas]

pjosNPN0m98

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pjosNPN0m98&feature=youtu.be

[helimutt]

Those pax and crew are lucky to be alive. Dear me. :eek::eek:

[malabo]

Still no real substitute for hands, feet and eyes when flying a helicopter. Wonder if the pilots were trying to comply with some illogical FDM mandated profile to avoid a call to the carpet.

If that operator didn't have bad luck they wouldn't have any luck at all.

[212man]

What's that big yellow circle there for, again? Oh - sorry I'm not aloud to mention it ,because everyone else knows better!

[Max Contingency]

Not enough wind to produce wavelets on the water? So no real need to point your tail near an obstruction?

[patatas]

http://i1204.photobucket.com/albums/bb410/cristianoaranda/9C689085-7A6A-4574-845E-6A41BA2A1C46_zpsyvmdufwy.jpg

http://i1204.photobucket.com/albums/bb410/cristianoaranda/4D94CCB5-DCBF-48E4-BD44-B8506EF602FB_zpsjjxkajhd.jpg

[albatross]

What's that big yellow circle there for, again? Oh - sorry I'm not aloud to mention it ,because everyone else knows better!

Well at least the pilots ended up with their butts over the edge of the circle!

Any bets it gets blamed on a lack of a "Helideck Prohibited Landing Sector" Marking?

Just glad everyone is OK...except for, perhaps, a need to change undergarments.

[Kenny G]

Wonder if the pilots were trying to comply with some illogical FDM mandated profile to avoid a call to the carpet.

really? that's how it works. please educate me oh wise one.

[Hot_LZ]

Why on earth was that being landed from the RHS!?

LZ

[Hedski]

Brazil, AGAIN....!!!!!!!

[albatross]

Why on earth was that being landed from the RHS!?

LZ

What seat would you use if you were planning to come to a hover on the port side and transition right onto the deck? Anyhoo the Capt usually sits in the RHS.
A more pertinent question might be why they chose that approach path.

[JBL99]

A more pertinent question might be why they chose that approach path.

I think that's what LZ meant!

[albatross]

I think that's what LZ meant!

And that my friend is "The Elephant on the Helideck" to paraphrase the saying.

Just glad it ended as well as it did.

Amazing that there was not much rotation of the helicopter. Interesting damage to the port side sponson float installation. Wonder what caused that.

[John Eacott]

A S92 from BHS Brazilian Helicopter Services hit the antenna on the final approach to an oil rig SS60 at Macaé, Brazil this morning.


http://i1204.photobucket.com/albums/bb410/cristianoaranda/file-1_zpsou9yrjzp.jpeg

Blimey:looks like the tail rotor drive shaft cut through by main rotors, tail rotor tips shredded, outboard RH horizontal stab sheared, hard landing on the port main.

Only proper action by PiC was the immediate dumping of the lever to prevent the machine spinning.

[Nescafe]

Only proper action by PiC was the immediate dumping of the lever to prevent the machine spinning.

With proper action from the PIC, it wouldn't have happened in the first place!

[Offshore pilot]

The investigation will decide the reason for this incident. Did they have any malfunction while performing the landing is one question ? A landing offshore is based on visual clues. In this case flight path was not normal as for a helideck landing. Seems like the aircraft hit structure and landed hard close to deck edge. Glad everybody could walk away from the aircraft.

[Outwest]

If that operator didn't have bad luck they wouldn't have any luck at all.

Yes, the reason for this is that the machine has not been painted orange yet....that will fix all the problems they have :-)

[SASless]

Dude! They weren't even close to the Circle.....or Deck for that matter!

I sure hope they have a yarn to spin to the Chief Pilot!

[Outwest]

I would think that after the initial contact proper positioning on the circle was the least of their concerns :-)

[SASless]

I was talking about BEFORE the excitement!

It was a good recovery AFTER the excitement!

[Outwest]

excitement!

I bet it was that indeed!

[skadi]

When you stop the video at 0:09, there is no damage in the drive shaft area. So I suggest, that the tailboom blade strike occured during the hard landing. That would explain, why there was no spinning of the helicopter.

skadi

[John Eacott]

When you stop the video at 0:09, there is no damage in the drive shaft area. So I suggest, that the tailboom blade strike occured during the hard landing. That would explain, why there was no spinning of the helicopter.

skadi

Well spotted!

[skadi]

The guy in front of the helicopter at the edge of the helideck also gave handsignals short prior TR contact, but then preferred to duck for cover...

skadi

[RVDT]

MR Strike, TR Strike, Horizontal fails from TR vibration as it doesn't seem to have hit anything.

Heavy landing etc etc. Write off I would say.

Registration noted - PR-CHR - SN 920112.

Get out the barge pole.

Luck - "a purposeless, unpredictable and uncontrollable force that shapes events favourably or unfavourably for an individual, group or cause"

[John Eacott]

MR Strike, TR Strike, Horizontal fails from TR vibration as it doesn't seem to have hit anything.

The stab failure is in direct line with the tail rotor: I'd suggest the debris in the video may be the tips of the TR flying off, and shredding the stab at the failure line.

[skadi]

At least two of the MR bladetips are looking undamaged, so i presume that there was no MR contact with the structure, just one or two blades flapped into the tailboom.

skadi

[KiwiNedNZ]

Question for those who regularly fly long distances offshore - when something like this happens how the hell are they going to fix it. Obviously have to get new blades out there and I doubt its a 5 min flight to where it is. Do you just strap some spare 92 blades to the side of another 92 ??

[212man]

Well spotted!
The other clue is that the TR continues to rotate all the way through to shutdown.

[GKaplan]

Question for those who regularly fly long distances offshore - when something like this happens how the hell are they going to fix it. Obviously have to get new blades out there and I doubt its a 5 min flight to where it is. Do you just strap some spare 92 blades to the side of another 92 ??

Get it on a ship (having removed all blades - using the rig's crane) and sort it out once back onshore :)

[Bravo73]

I don't think that aircraft will be flying anywhere anytime soon. It will probably go home by boat.

[skadi]

The other clue is that the TR continues to rotate all the way through to shutdown.
...but changes the rotation at the end while MR is still turning slowly !

skadi

[212man]

...but changes the rotation at the end while MR is still turning slowly !

skadi
Good spot! I'd turned my attention away. Looks like the drive shaft must have finally disconnected in the last few moments because the TR is clearly being driven initially and is not slowing down on its own.

[Nubian]

Interesting damage to the port side sponson float installation. Wonder what caused that.

Hit the deck hard with sideward movement.

[S76Heavy]

What seat would you use if you were planning to come to a hover on the port side and transition right onto the deck? Anyhoo the Capt usually sits in the RHS.
A more pertinent question might be why they chose that approach path.

Why would you come to a hover anyway except when already well within/over the aiming circle? I don't fly the S92, I fly something quite underpowered so we aim to fly Cat A to the deck. But not hitting solid objects takes preference over complying with the power requirements if we get it wrong.
With little or no wind we approach at as close to 90 degrees to the deck heading as we feel comfortable with. Either seat pilot is fully capable of landing the aircraft within limits. I'm very curious about the reasoning behind this approach.

[albatross]

[QUOTE=S76Heavy;9743102]Why would you come to a hover anyway except when already well within/over the aiming circle? I don't fly the S92, I fly something quite underpowered so we aim to fly Cat A to the deck. But not hitting solid objects takes preference over complying with the power requirements if we get it wrong.
With little or no wind we approach at as close to 90 degrees to the deck heading as we feel comfortable with. Either seat pilot is fully capable of landing the aircraft within limits. I'm very curious about the reasoning behind this approach.[/QUOTE

I just thought that must have been the plan as the aircraft appeared moving right into the camera frame.

We usually have the pilot with the best view of the helideck do the landing so in this case that would have been RHS.

I have no idea what the reasoning was in this case.

[skadi]

Good spot! I'd turned my attention away. Looks like the drive shaft must have finally disconnected in the last few moments because the TR is clearly being driven initially and is not slowing down on its own.

Look at 0:44, you can easily see the rotating end of the interrupted driveshaft. I am still convinced that the taildrive was interrupted when hitting the deck, not before !

skadi

[S76Heavy]

We usually have the pilot with the best view of the helideck do the landing so in this case that would have been RHS.

I would hope that is industry standard. We do it in any case. But do you hover next to the deck or is it a continuous movement?

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Normally the wind dictates the direction the nose is pointing for the landing. If there is little or no wind the options are increased for a deck like this one to provide tail boom/rotor clearance from obstacles in the undershoot.

However, when forced by the wind to land in the direction they did, the brief should always be for an OFFSET landing:

"Obstacles in the undershoot, I will fly forward until my bum is 90 degrees from the forward edge of the aiming circle, confirm with you that it is (to the PNF), and then cross laterally to the bumline".

Valid only of course if no hazards crosshatching is in play. This should be briefed as an "Offset Landing".

Therein leaving only 2 horizontal profiles to the deck:-

NORMAL - crossing from the DP at 45 degrees from for forward edge of the aiming circle.

OFFSET - crossing at 90 degrees from the forward edge of the aiming circle.

This type of landing is the reason why I personally do not believe that the added complexity of trying to fly a critical "Performance" approach will ever by a sensible option for offshore operations. PC2 With Exposure provides the most flexibility to deal first and foremost with the obstacle environment.

The last serious event like this was the Brent Spar which led to a free descent some 170 feet to the ocean with loss of all on board.

Carrying vertical momentum from the DP is a mistake. You are already accelerating vertically so if a critical power failure occurs the devil has already got a head start on you.

For most PLATFORMS above 200 feet deck height, the DP should be at 40' above the deck height. You can hover there safely with your rotor tips just co-incident with the deck edge and make a final assessment for either PRH or obstacles, and still have a safe flyaway should engine fail, provided you are conforming to the WAT for PC2 with Exposure (OGE Hover AEO).

It s a big mistake to try and carry inertia towards the deck both from a performance perspective and the ultimate requirement to fly a safe trajectory.

Are these two horizontal profiles till being taught to offshore pilots? or, like many other hard earned lessons, have they been forgotten amidst the plethora of confusing requirements about performance?

[albatross]

I would hope that is industry standard. We do it in any case. But do you hover next to the deck or is it a continuous movement?

No I do not hover next to the deck, no that is untrue, I have but those were in exceptional high winds trying to get onto a moving vessel with the helideck on the bow. In normal practice I avoid using the sideways appoach if at all possible. Please forgive me for the inappropriate use of the word hover.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Albatross. Hovering next to the deck is acceptable if you have the height above the water and its necessary. Whatever happens the horizontal profile MUST come first when obstacles are in play.

Unwarranted fear of being too slow is just that, unwarranted. Its better to be slow with virtually no ROD from all perspectives.

The issue gets more complex when the deck is very low and there is little wind. In a sensible operation further restrictions on the WAT to supplement the PC2 Exposure requirements should be in place to offer the safety margin required.

However, commercial considerations at the tender do the most damage to the options available to the pilot in these conditions.

[albatross]

Albatross. Hovering next to the deck is acceptable if you have the height above the water and its necessary. Whatever happens the horizontal profile MUST come first when obstacles are in play.

Unwarranted fear of being too slow is just that, unwarranted. Its better to be slow with virtually no ROD from all perspectives.

The issue gets more complex when the deck is very low and there is little wind. In a sensible operation further restrictions on the WAT to supplement the PC2 Exposure requirements should be in place to offer the safety margin required.

However, commercial considerations at the tender do the most damage to the options available to the pilot in these conditions.

I am aware of that ..I just try and avoid doing it unless it is a necessity. Thank you for your post.
I should know better than to post before I have had my morning coffee. Brain still not up to speed.

[212man]

Look at 0:44, you can easily see the rotating end of the interrupted driveshaft. I am still convinced that the taildrive was interrupted when hitting the deck, not before !

skadi

Finally got to see it on a proper screen! Yes, it would appear so - presumably a main blade strike on deck impact. I also now see the HLO ducking after trying to warn the crew.

Ref Brent spar - there were 7 survivors (all pax) and 6 fatalities. A very good example of how lucky this aircraft's occupants were though, and the pictures seem to indicate it would have been a much bigger fall.

[S76Heavy]

Double Bogey, Albatross: I believe we are more or less in agreement.
However I try to avoid a real hover OGE as much as possible; it takes a lot of power, more opportunity to get disoriented and it does nothing for stability. When heavy I prefer to be high in power and slowly move continuously towards the deck; 45 degree angle being my preferred method in case I cannot get on clear of obstacles into wind. I will not crash into something solid in a misguided attempt to avoid a theoretical risk of an engine failure after commital point.

Ships being a different matter with added movement to compensate for, sometimes a hover OGE is unavoidable. And those decks are rarely 200 ft high.

In this case I fail to see the reasoning for the chosen approach path and the risks accepted.

[212man]

In this case I fail to see the reasoning for the chosen approach path and the risks accepted.

Particularly given the benign wind conditions (as they were for the Brent Spar accident too).

[Kulwin Park]

At least two of the MR bladetips are looking undamaged, so i presume that there was no MR contact with the structure, just one or two blades flapped into the tailboom.

skadi

You can see when the MR blade finally stops, and comes to rest over the Tailboom, the blade tip cap is damaged, and missing a bit. Have a look at the video again in full screen.

[skadi]

You can see when the MR blade finally stops, and comes to rest over the Tailboom, the blade tip cap is damaged, and missing a bit. Have a look at the video again in full screen.

Yes, I've seen it, but as i already mentioned, at least two other bladetips showed no signs of damage...

skadi

[JBL99]

I'm curious, as KiwiNedNZ has said, what happens now?

How long is that going to sit on the heli deck? What does the rig do in the meantime to get people on and off? Could be a long boat ride?

As someone who has NO experience of these sorts of things, how does the process work?

[roundwego]

A few measurements will establish if a smaller helicopter can land alongside the stricken S92 with a couple of engineers, toolkit to remove the blades and a lifting kit. Blades will be removed and the rig crane will lift the aircraft onto a supply boat. Been done many times before.

If a second heli can't land, it's either a winching job or the engineers and kit will come out on a supply boat.

[andycba]

Yes, I've seen it, but as i already mentioned, at least two other bladetips showed no signs of damage...

skadi

It only takes 1, though, to cause damage

[Non-PC Plod]

Yes, I witnessed a Sea King put its rotor disc into a ship antenna. When it made it to the beach for an emergency landing, IIRC one blade had about a foot missing, one had minor damage, and the others were OK. (Imagine the vibration on board!)

[tottigol]

This could be a solution...��http://i.imgur.com/16pVvwu.jpg

[212man]

http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/584490-helideck-aiming-td-pm-circles.html

Captain to copilot, who has just flown his/her first approach in a 92 to an offshore platform, "Son/Lass, you need to land further forward in the circle, else 212man is going to chew your ass".

No, but it appears a solid structure will...

Sorry but these are remarks from a retired or office-bound pilot ......

With some experience and knowledge.....


That said I introduced an Helideck test into a training exercise and it was met with blank stares so the lack of knowledge regarding helidecks is I believe widespread. The fault lies both with the pilot, for the information is available, and the training departments for not ensuring all crews are familiar with the deck markings.

Sadly, we continue to see this.....

Didn't it occurre to any of the hair-splitting deck-positioning regulation-quoting gurus here...

I'd rather spilt hairs than my skull....

[SASless]

When a Retired Pilot with a broad experience level and many thousands of accident/incident free hours offers some advice.....it pays to listen and perhaps learn from the old Pelican!

There is a reason he lived to retire and do so without an incident or accident on his record!

Generally that is he listened to other Old Farts as he was coming up in the trade.

[Winnie]

When a Retired Pilot with a broad experience level and many thousands of accident/incident free hours offers some advice.....it pays to listen and perhaps learn from the old Pelican!

There is a reason he lived to retire and do so without an incident or accident on his record!

Generally that is he listened to other Old Farts as he was coming up in the trade.

This is filled with wisdom!

[noooby]

At least the CPI deployed off the tailboom. Wonder if it activated and sent out a distress message??

[Fareastdriver]

----and there but for the Grace of God would I. The eternal problem for a trainer or supervising captain. Sometimes it goes out of your sight and you have to trust them.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Lycra, it's really hard not to vent at head following your post. It was a gin clear day. The landing brief from the PF should have identified the obstacles in the undershoot and the PNF should confirm his assessment.
From that brief, given in a stabilised approach at a point in space where both pilots can see the helideck environment, the only acceptable approach is OFFSET, i.e. 90 degrees across to the forward edge of the aiming circle.

If that assessment and brief did not conclude the OFFSET approach then they were doomed from that point.

However, if the brief was correct, the LTCs sole mission is to keep the PF moving forward until his arse is in line with the bumline. This is perfectly assessable by careful spatial awareness in the latter stages. Any sense that the PF is trying to cross early must be immediatlety corrected.

To accept a 45 degree crossing with obstacles in the undershoot is Russian roulette and the key to understanding that is knowledge of CAP437 and the minimum safety distances required which in truth, will chill your piss when you are at any time less than level with the bumline.

Hitting an object with your rotor in 8/8s blue! I am sorry there are no excuses and no hiding places.

Knowledge drives technique and the fear knowledge instills, when technique is flawed, should motivate pilots to invest in the SAFEST solution.

That is, if no cross hatching is in play, on deck equal to, or greater than your D value, if you cross the deck with your arse level with the bum line (90 degrees) your tail will be safe. This type of landing should be taught and perfected LONG before the pilot is ever permitted to cross at 45 degrees. The crossing at 45 degrees SHOULD be the exception, when both pilots 100% agree that the undershoot is clear.

This is a Mantra I hammered into my students from day 1.

From what you post, I say poor CRM, poor decision making and failure to understand just how small the safety margins are when you choose to cross at 45 degrees.

Caused, in majority of cases, by over obsessing about engine failures.

[500guy]

Caused, in majority of cases, by over obsessing about engine failures.

Bingo...Nail on the head.

[Bomber ARIS]

knowledge of CAP471


CAP 437 (http://publicapps.caa.co.uk/modalapplication.aspx?appid=11&mode=detail&id=523), perhaps

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Bomber Arris, thanks for the correction, my moral outrage clouded my keyboard. Sorry.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Captain on the left side has 45 years experience in helicopters (41 offshore)[/QUOTE]

If this is true, he was either asleep or unwell or his bucket but of luck has just lasted an extraordinary long time.

[malabo]

76Heavy, Albatross, Double Bogey: yes, a botched approach by a new command upgrade candidate "supervised" by a training captain.

I disagree with Fareastdriver, too simplistic and accepting of the inevitability of bad luck and fate. Not on my watch. And I disagree with lvgra, I've done hundreds of offshore landings with newly minted foreign national pilots, with my seat as high as it would go and loosened seatbelts so I could pull myself up further and be assured it was a safe landing on my correct approach angle and my profile. Which is the same as the three contributors above describe, common sense and all that, but we don't know if that profile and technique is this operator's SOP.

Like the Sumburgh or Irish CG crash I'd be looking at something more systemic rather than subscribe to the theory of only one bad pilot apple in the barrel. The training pilot must be well known in Brazil, qualified, trained and endorsed by the operator to conduct this kind of training and evaluation. The worldwide training system and worldwide SOP of a sophisticated, experienced operator allowed this situation to happen. The question is why?

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Malabo, I agree with you 100 %. No way this can ever be put down to,"Oh well, it was in my blind spot".

The actual trajectory flown, well I might have expected that from a brand new offshore pilot during his initial deck certification. However, from a P1 candidate!!!!!

[Outwest]

Caused, in majority of cases, by over obsessing about engine failures.

Absolutely!! I always said " make sure the AEO landing is safe before worrying about the OEI one"

[Outwest]

Of course with CHC changing SOP's and calls constantly the PF may have been so focused on making sure he made the correct latest calls of the month he missed the antenna....only so much brain power available.

[212man]

Guys, stop speculating, here are some answers to your questions and doubts:
It was a 45° approach made by a pilot in command under supervision; in the 92 there is a few seconds on final approach that the opposite seat looses completely the view of the helideck till it starts seeing it again from his side; the pilot flying enter too early and still not above the helideck at that precisely moment; no vision from LH seat; tail rotor hit the rig radar antenna; stabilizer broke due to strong vibration (flutter, there was no impact); landing was well before the yellow circle because you have to put it on the ground immediately before you start spinning due to the loss of tail rotor; both engines were shut down immediately; tail rotor shaft was cut on the ground due to impact (crash landing); LH sponson damaged due to LH landing gear collapse. ADELT was automatically deployed; Captain on the left side has 45 years experience in helicopters (41 offshore)

A 64 year old Brazilian S92 pilot talking about a Brazilian S92 pilot with 45 years experience - any relation perhaps?

[gulliBell]

...Captain on the left side has 45 years experience in helicopters..

One thing I quickly discovered when I started instructing is that experience is not a reliable measure of competence. Another thing is, older experienced pilots are more likely to fall asleep at the wheel than younger in-experienced pilots. It's when both pilots are asleep at the wheel, whatever their age, that things quickly become perilous, particularly when operating in proximity to unforgiving steel structures. The passengers on that aircraft were lucky. The repair bill for that S92 will be eye-watering.

[Max Contingency]

Im not claiming I could have done any better but I would dispute that there was a "need to throw it at the deck before it started to spin". The majority of damage occurred after the strike through the very hard landing. There Is no evidence of rotation in the video before or during the landing. I am certain that the TR was still providing thrust at the point that the lever was dumped. In the simulator, on pre briefed and anticipated TR failures, at low airspeed, even the quickest pilots cannot prevent some rotation.

[helicrazi]

You've just twanged the whirly thing at the back, I think anyone's reaction so close to a deck would be to slam it down.

If it's not yet spinning, it could be about to, you can't assess the damage from where you are sat. Once it starts spinning, it's too late

[gulliBell]

Im not claiming I could have done any better but I would dispute that there was a "need to throw it at the deck before it started to spin"...

Yep. I dare say that both pilots were probably still engrossed in the "WTF? was that" moment by the time the aircraft arrived at the scene of the accident. The outcome was mostly via good fortune, I doubt there was time for any conscious effort to throw it at the deck, let alone throw it on the deck before directional control was lost. Any pilot action in that last instant was probably purely reactive and instinctive. Collective full down after contact was all that was required, and I'm guessing that's exactly what they did.

[SASless]

Not saying this is the situation here.....but I have seen far too many TRE/IRE's that were in exactly the wrong employment. Length of tooth is not a valid criteria.

We all have a "Sell by Date".....it helps if we figure it out ourselves and do the right thing.....but it is imperative the "System" works to ensure only the genuinely qualified get there in the first place.....and do not overstay their welcome!

Some systems are far too incestrous....with buddies checking buddies who turn around and checks.....the other buddy!






Captain on the left side has 45 years experience in helicopters (41 offshore)

If this is true, he was either asleep or unwell or his bucket but of luck has just lasted an extraordinary long time.[/QUOTE]

[Fareastdriver]

We are condemning the captain without knowing all the facts. What if the antenna wire had been disconnected at the bottom and when the helicopter approached the downwash picked up the loose end and wrapped it around the tail rotor.

Neither of the pilots would have seen that. There was little or no wind so it wouldn't have blown about so the deck crew would not have noticed it either.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

FED if you look on page 1 of this thread, they crossed the deck way short in the undershoot and he hit a RADAR antennae not a whip aerial. Looking at those images I am sorry to say it was an appalling trajectory doomed from the outset.

iIF they had some flight control issue you could cut them some slack. But that's not been mentioned.

SAS - I think you have a valid point there.

[S76Heavy]

Like the Sumburgh or Irish CG crash I'd be looking at something more systemic rather than subscribe to the theory of only one bad pilot apple in the barrel. The training pilot must be well known in Brazil, qualified, trained and endorsed by the operator to conduct this kind of training and evaluation. The worldwide training system and worldwide SOP of a sophisticated, experienced operator allowed this situation to happen. The question is why?
Very true, and that would be step 2 of the investigation. If it becomes clear WHY the pilot chose this way to approach the deck, and if others would have done a similar approach, then it is a systemic failure that leads pilots astray.

Absolutely!! I always said " make sure the AEO landing is safe before worrying about the OEI one"
Very true; I bore my copilots by telling them not to create a real risk just to avoid an imaginary one..hitting something is more likely to kill you than an engine failure during the approach. The statistics prove that.

[gulliBell]

..Very true; I bore my copilots by telling them not to create a real risk just to avoid an imaginary one..hitting something is more likely to kill you than an engine failure during the approach..

Nice, I'll remember that one...same applies to Captains of course, not just co-pilots.

[gulliBell]

..Looking at those images I am sorry to say it was an appalling trajectory doomed from the outset..

Agreed. The pilot occupying the left seat, even if it was an entry-level junior co-pilot, should never over-look such an appalling trajectory. There are never any operational reasons, wind, weather, performance, or whatever, that would excuse such reckless operation. But I do understand brain-fade happens from time-to-time, which is the whole point of having 2 pilots up front. No point of having 2 pilots up front if one does nothing when the other has an episode of brain-fade, particularly during such a critical stage of flight.