F-18 Crash Deemed Pilot Error After FOD'd Engine Failure on Cat Shot

[SASless]

Here's another one for you....Engine Failure on Takeoff following a Cat Shot.....Pilots survived but wrote off 86 Million US Dollars worth of F-18.

https://www.yahoo.com/news/m/6eaf2704-bc42-3bf4-b5be-8f8741919ff9/ss_debris%2C-pilot-error-caused.html

[air pig]

Surely the error was the FOD, not pilot error. Unless they recovered the airframe and do USN aircraft have FDR/CVRs how can the come to this judgement. Sounds like the Chinook crash on Kintyre. Blame the aircrew.

[Archimedes]

I believe that the board concluded that the aircraft still ought to have been able to recover to the deck, but that pilot error exacerbated the problem, which in turn led to the loss of the airframe.


There is some more detail in this story (http://pilotonline.com/news/military/local/navy-debris-pilot-error-caused-super-hornet-crash-in-persian/article_583b3105-0af1-518d-b972-b83e49f1d887.html)

[sandiego89]

Airpig, sure the FOD started the chain of events, but crew actions contributed. A very unforgiving situation. A few quotes from the linked article:


"The investigation faults the pilot for not being patient enough to use the correct flap configuration, angle of bank and engine throttle speed to safely land with one engine.."


"After a rapid descent, dumping of munitions and fuel, and an uncontrollable deviation to the left as the jet started to regain lift, the weapons system officer made the decision to eject about 2 miles from the ship. It had been less than two minutes since takeoff.."


"During this mishap, there was a rush to initiate a landing sequence with an aircraft that still needed significant time to be properly configured for a single-engine landing."


Debris, Pilot Error Caused 2015 Jet Crash in Persian Gulf: Navy | Military.com (http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/10/27/debris-pilot-error-caused-2015-jet-crash-persian-gulf-navy.html)

[NutLoose]

The investigation faults the pilot for not being patient enough to use the correct flap configuration, angle of bank and engine throttle speed to safely land with one engine.
After a rapid descent, dumping of munitions and fuel, and an uncontrollable deviation to the left as the jet started to regain lift, the weapons system officer made the decision to eject about 2 miles from the ship. It had been less than two minutes since takeoff.

The pilot’s parachute fully opened just before he hit the water. His crewmate’s did not.


His back seater ejecting wouldn't have helped either.

[Splash1983]

No back seater shouldn't necessarily prevent a safe landing! Remember the F4 at Bournemouth Airshow in the 80's whose Navigator ejected when they left the runway, the surprised Pilot diverted to Lyneham and landed safely as a single seat F4!! I remember it landing as I was at the in-laws overlooking the airfield.
Blue water operations to the boat are a bit different, but by sticking to the required processes and taking a bit more time the F-18 may have made it back safely, which is entirely the point of the USN report and findings.
Aviate, navigate, communicate!

[glad rag]

uncontrollable deviation to the left

pilot’s parachute fully opened just before he hit the water. His crewmate’s did not.

moot point but were they ever going to get to the deck and/or survive if they had stayed with the cab?

[Lonewolf_50]

It would be worth it to look up the single engine failure procedures for the F-18, and single engine approach procedures to the CV, if one is going to comment on this aircraft loss, and the decisions the crew did or did not make. As I don't have a NATOPS(F-18) handy ... no comment.


As to FOD: the first hole in the cheese.

[SASless]

Splash....How does the Ejection Seats work on the F-18....is it individually or the first seat trigger pulled sets them both off in sequence?


Single Seat/Single Engine makes it easier yet!

[FOG]

All FW Naval aviation have procedures for engine failure the takeoff evolution. All multi engine platforms calculate the TOLD numbers for worse case engine failure (and in the case of the KC-130 two engine failure) and ability to land safely. The exceptions are the Harrier and F-35.

These procedures are practiced in the simulator at the RAG before ever getting into an actual aircraft. Engine failure during the critical phases of the takeoff were mandatory items on annual NATOPS checks up to a few years ago and I suspect are still required.

From the available information it looks eminently recoverable to the CVN, just execute the procedures as done in the simulator previously through at least one cycle.

I know lots of guys that would give themselves simulated EPs (pull power back, etc.) whenever the situation allowed; engine failure on takeoff when leading a flight until formation joined, flying simulated single engine approaches, etc.

Single engine jet? Lost engine on takeoff = lost acft.

S/F, FOG

[Onceapilot]

If, a big IF, this was a case of rushing the proceedures and being blamed for the loss of the jet, I have alot of sympathy with the crew. Certainly, fast-jet Ops are/were run on pumped-up adrenaline and, despite the best efforts of Flight Safety, the pressure is always on to take action, FAST! :ooh:

OAP

[SpazSinbad]

Super Hornet FnA-18E/F NATOPS PDF here at 17.5Mb: https://info.publicintelligence.net/F18-EF-000.pdf

"CHAPTER 14 Takeoff Emergencies
14.1 EMERGENCY CATAPULT FLYAWAY
After catapult launch, several emergencies may cause the aircraft to settle, e.g., slow catapult, AB blowout, degraded engine performance, single engine total loss of thrust, improper trim setting, etc. If settling cannot be stopped immediately, it is necessary to eject without delay. Priorities during emergency catapult flyaway are to establish control of the aircraft, arrest aircraft settle, and accelerate for climbout.

If a settle is detected, the throttles should be advanced to MAX as soon as possible. If the thrust output of one engine is degraded, some yaw and roll should be expected. If one engine is failed completely, significant amounts of yaw and roll result with both throttles at MAX. In this worst case, full rudder pedal and partial lateral stick may be required to oppose yaw/roll and maintain lateral-directional control of the aircraft. Too much rudder pedal is not harmful, but too little rudder pedal may cause controllability problems. Therefore, FULL rudder pedal to oppose yaw/roll is prudent.

Proper AOA control is crucial to maintaining aircraft control and to arresting aircraft settle. AOA must be high enough to minimize altitude loss yet low enough to maintain lateral-directional control. During a nominal, two-engine catapult launch, the aircraft is trimmed to capture and maintain a reference AOA of 12° (hands off). The FCS does allow small overshoots during initial flyaway, but peak AOA should typically be below 13°. Catapult launch bulletins ensure an endspeed at least 15 knots above minimum controllable airspeed (Vmc). Vmc numbers for the F/A-18E/F launch bulletins are defined at 14° AOA, which was selected as a compromise between arresting settle off the bow and controllability. (Increased AOA helps arrest sink but also reduces lateral-directional controllability resulting in higher minimum control speeds.) During single engine, MAX power catapult flyaway, controllability should be sufficient if airspeed is above Vmc.

Under normal circumstances, proper AOA control should be provided by the FCS. However, certain catapult failures (mis-trim, AOA probe splits or failures, FCS malfunctions) may require the pilot to actively control flyaway pitch attitude/AOA. With an AOA malfunction, HUD displayed AOA may be in error, so that pitch attitude becomes the only reliable source of AOA control. For this reason, the recommended flyaway procedure is to maintain 10 to 12° pitch attitude with the waterline symbol without exceeding 14° AOA (AOA tone). This should provide an AOA high enough to arrest the settle yet low enough to retain lateral-directional control.

Depending on aircraft gross weight, stores jettison may be required to ensure a positive single engine rate of climb (SEROC). Immediate jettison of excess weight minimizes altitude loss and, when launching with a lateral weight asymmetry, returns the aircraft to a symmetric configuration, potentially improving lateral-directional controllability.

It is also essential that the flaps remain in FULL until a positive rate of climb is established, as flap retraction increases aircraft settle.

The first four steps in the procedure are the most important to arrest settle and maintain control of the aircraft. Raising the LDG GEAR handle reduces drag and allows a greater rate of climb; however, attention should not be diverted from maintaining aircraft control to perform this action. The landing gear should only be raised when the first four immediate action steps have been accomplished, controllability is not in question, and raising the gear does not compound the emergency.
NOTE
When the LDG GEAR handle is raised, the on-speed AOA bracket is removed from the HUD.
If flyaway airspeed available -
*1. Throttles - MAX
*2. Rudder pedal - FULL AGAINST YAW/ROLL
*3. EMERG JETT button - PUSH
*4. Maintain 10° to 12° pitch attitude with W symbol.
• Do not exceed 14° AOA (AOA tone).
If unable to arrest yaw/roll or stop settle -
*5. EJECT
• Exceeding 10° to 12° pitch attitude may result in rapid loss of lateral directional control.
• Raising flaps will increase aircraft settle...."
https://info.publicintelligence.net/F18-EF-000.pdf

[SpazSinbad]

From above Super Hornet NATOPS:
"...2.16.4 Ejection Seat System (F/A-18F).
The ejection seats in the F/A-18F are ejected at opposite divergent angles to one another. The rear seat diverges to the left while the forward seat diverges to the right. The amount of divergence is influenced by the weight of the aircrew and the speed of the ejection. The heavier the aircrew and the faster the speed the less the resulting divergent angle. In addition, a sequencing system is installed to allow dual ejection initiated from either cockpit or single (aft) seat ejection initiated from the rear cockpit. A command selector valve is installed in the rear cockpit to control whether ejection from the rear cockpit is dual or single...."
&
"...Single rear seat ejection when initiated from the rear cockpit. Dual ejection (rear seat first) when initiated from the front cockpit.

Dual ejection (rear seat first) when initiated from either cockpit...."

[sandiego89]

Thank you spaz, my computer blocks some pdf's, so glad you cut and pasted those sections.

[SpazSinbad]

Scribd has a few examples of Super NATOPS plus a PCL Pocket Check List:


https://www.scribd.com/doc/34302299/A1-F18EA-NFM-000-NATOPS-Flight-Manual-F-A-18E-F-Super-Hornet

[MightyGem]

Here's a tale of another F18 with a similar problem. This one made it back to the deck.
Tailhooker shares "an exciting night". [Archive] - PPRuNe Forums (http://www.pprune.org/archive/index.php/t-101282.html)

[SASless]

Single engine jet? Lost engine on takeoff = lost acft.

You may be used to briefing Marines....but most here are from other Flying Clubs.

[SASless]

Certainly, fast-jet Ops are/were run on pumped-up adrenaline and, despite the best efforts of Flight Safety, the pressure is always on to take action, FAST!


I guess "thinking" is not one of the requirements then?

[SpazSinbad]

There are many examples of the "OYSTER" F-18C Hornet Night Barricade 'MightyGem' story above on the internet - without a date. A USN LSO Newsletter April 2012 possibly has the correct year 1999 - with alternate date 1998 perhaps - sadly PDF no longer available - more text on request. http://www.hrana.org/documents/PaddlesMonthlyApril2012.pdf
1998/1999 (F/A-18C night event) on CONSTELLATION (CV 64) “Oyster” Osterle[/Carl Oesteri. Paddles]

[NutLoose]

Although it went In about 2 miles from the ship, how far would it have travelled before he had input?, I seem the remember the launch on the F-18 is initially flown by the computer.

[FOG]

SASless,

While the majority of my briefings were indeed USMC I would love to know where the other flying clubs get any thrust without a working engine to provide the thrust. All single engine jets that have lost their engine immediately upon takeoff have gone down.

S/F, FOG

[Rhino power]

...how far would it have travelled before he had input?, I seem the remember the launch on the F-18 is initially flown by the computer.
Pretty sure it's only automated until it's off the end of the ship and airborne (wow switch?)...

-RP

[SpazSinbad]

"...8.2.3.1 Before Taxi Checks. [from above NATOPS]
1. Before Taxi Checks - Perform IAW NATOPS and ensure:
a. FLAP switch - FULL
b. TRIM - SET FOR CATAPULT LAUNCH
Ensure the T/O TRIM button is pressed until the TRIM advisory is displayed (stabilators 4° TEU). Horizontal stabilator trim should be manually set for catapult launch IAW figure 8-1 Tables A thru G. Launches with less than 15 knot excess endspeed require additional trim to compensate for the reduced launch speed. If the aircraft is loaded asymmetrically, lateral trim (differential stabilator with WonW) should also be manually set IAW figure 8-1 Table G. Trim laterally into the light wing (unloaded wing down). The trim settings are designed to keep roll off less than 5° for 3 seconds after WoffW. Obviously, not all possible external store configurations could be evaluated. Therefore, some external store configurations may exhibit more or less roll off at the Table G trim setting. Launches above 15 knots excess would require less lateral trim. Higher excess endspeeds, mis-set trim conditions were tested and the aircraft is easily controlled with lateral stick. The key is to trim in the correct direction, which is unloaded wing down.

Correct stabilator trim is critical to aircraft fly-away performance (hands-off). The stabilator trim setting determines the aircraft’s initial pitch rate and sets the reference AOA that the FCS attempts to hold after launch. Reference AOA is set to 12° when the stabilators are trimmed to 6° TEU or higher. Between 4° and 6° TEU stabilator, reference AOA is steeply changed from 4° to 12°. The recommended launch trim settings are designed to provide the aircraft with a consistent 10° to 12°/sec pitch rate regardless of gross weight, CG, or catapult endspeed. Trim settings above those recommended in tables D and E or launches with greater than 15 knot excess endspeed will maintain the 12° reference AOA but will be characterized by increased pitch rates. Normal catapult launches are characterized by an initial rotation as high as 13° AOA before AOA and pitch rate feedbacks reduce AOA to the reference value. For light gross weight launches, peak pitch rates will be higher and peak AOA’s will be lower due to the Vmc based launch speed. At heavier gross weights, a range of 10° thru 14° AOA can be expected during launch and is the best compromise between minimizing sink-off-bow and ensuring controllability in the event of an engine failure. If stabilator trim is less than 6.5°, the CK TRIM caution will be set when the throttles are advanced above 27° THA (FLAP switch FULL).
c. External fuel tank quantities - CHECK
CAUTION
Do not catapult with partially full external fuel tank(s) (≤2,700 lbs). Fuel sloshing may cause structural damage to the tanks, pylons, and/or airframe.
WARNING
To reduce engine susceptibility to steam ingestion and compressor stalls, transition from MIL to MAX during the catapult stroke shall not be performed except in an emergency.

5. Longitudinal trim MUST be adjusted for the aft CG shift that occurs during normal fuel burn. The CG can shift as much as 3% MAC (F/A-18E) or 1% MAC (F/A-18F) when Tank 2 fuel drops to approximately 2,200 lb and Tank 1 fuel drops to approximately 1,000 lb. This CG shift can affect longitudinal trim by as much as 7° and must be accounted for to prevent catapult launch with a significant over-trim. Once Tank 1 has dropped to approximately 1,000 lb, fuel scheduling maintains the CG at an essentially neutral position. Table F is a rule-of-thumb for decreasing longitudinal trim based solely on Tank 1 fuel quantity. Decrease baseline longitudinal trim by the ‘‘Trim Delta’’ value down to but in no case less than 7° TEU stabilator.
WARNING
Failure to make Tank 1 fuel quantity trim adjustment will result in an over trimmed condition, which may aggravate aircraft controllability, particularly following a single engine failure.
NOTE
If longitudinal trim must be adjusted after differential stabilator has been input for a lateral weight asymmetry, push the T/O TRIM button, adjust longitudinal trim and re-input differential stabilator.
WARNING
Failure to input differential stabilator trim for catapult launches with asymmetric stores can aggravate aircraft controllability, particularly following a single engine failure....
...WARNING
Due to the close proximity of the FLAP and LAUNCH BAR switches, ensure that the FLAP switch is not inadvertently placed to AUTO. Launching with the flaps in AUTO will result in an excessive settle.
When ready for launch -
14. Salute with right hand. Hold throttles firmly against the detent and place head against the headrest.
Throttle friction may be used to help prevent inadvertent retraction of the throttles during the catapult stroke. If required, it can be overridden if afterburner is needed due to aircraft/catapult malfunction. Immediately after the end of the catapult stroke, the aircraft will rotate to capture the 12° reference AOA (hands-off). To avoid PIO with the FCS, do not restrain the stick during catapult launch or make stick inputs immediately after catapult launch. The pilot should attempt to remain out of the loop but should closely monitor the catapult sequence.
WARNING
To reduce engine susceptibility to hot gas reingestion and compressor stalls, transition from MIL to MAX during the catapult stroke shall not be performed except in an emergency.
Once safely airborne -
15. LDG GEAR handle - UP
16. Clearing turn - PERFORM (if required)
With positive rate of climb and clearing turn complete -
17. FLAP switch - AUTO
NOTE
During catapult launches performed at heavy gross weight, the TEFs may begin to retract prior to FLAP switch actuation (at approximately 190 KCAS) in order to follow the loads alleviation schedule....
...8.2.7.2 Catapult Endspeed Requirements. Catapult endspeeds are established to provide safe flyaway during normal launch conditions and to allow the pilot to maintain aircraft control in the event of a single engine failure. The catapult endspeeds are not based on single engine rate of climb (SEROC) capability, nor do they guarantee single engine flyaway performance. The minimum endspeed requirement is calculated to provide sufficient airspeed and altitude to maintain aircraft control while executing emergency catapult flyaway procedures.

F/A-18E/F minimum catapult launch endspeeds are governed by three limiting factors: Flaps FULL minimum single engine control speed (Vmc), maximum longitudinal acceleration capability, and sink-off-bow. Vmc is the airspeed below which the aircraft is not controllable with a single engine failure. The Vmc airspeed governs the endspeed for most of the gross weight range in both MIL and MAX power (up to 60K MIL and 65K MAX, see figure 8-1, Table B). Vmc is also a function of lateral weight asymmetry; therefore, endspeed must be increased for asymmetric loadings (see figure 8-1, Table C). The catapult endspeed above 60K in MIL is governed by aircraft longitudinal acceleration capability which limits maximum gross weight for MIL power launches (see figure 8-1, Table A). Endspeeds above 65K in MAX are governed by the aircraft CG 10 foot sink-off-bow limit. Actual catapult endspeeds in the Aircraft Launching Bulletins are computed to launch at the minimum endspeed plus 15 knots (Vmin +15) (figure 8-1, Table B and C). FULL flap launches are required to meet wind-over-deck requirements at heavy gross weights. HALF flap launches have not been tested, and would increase launch wind-over-deck by approximately 10 knots.
8.2.7.3 Catapult Launch Flyaway Characteristics. Launches at light gross weights are characterized by higher pitch rate and attitude, higher rate of climb, and lower peak AOA when compared to heavy gross weight launches. Forward stick may be required following the rotation to control pitch attitude as the aircraft accelerates.

There is a noticeable difference in aircraft flyaway characteristics from light to heavy weights due to the transition from the Vmc based launch speeds to either the longitudinal acceleration or sink-off-bow based airspeeds. Heavy weight launches will be characterized by reduced pitch rates and attitudes, and higher peak AOA when compared to the light weight launches. Light buffet may be felt as the aircraft rotates through 11° AOA during launch at heavier gross weights. The longitudinal trim settings will provide the required 10-12°/sec pitch rate and capture a target AOA of 12°; however, peak AOA may reach 15° momentarily. Maintaining hands off the stick during rotation is crucial to optimizing launch performance and reduces the tendency for pilot induced oscillations during rotation and initial flyaway. With normal endspeed and steady deck conditions, the aircraft CG settles up to 3 feet. The pilot perceives the catapult launch to be level, as rotation keeps the pilot’s eye approximately level even though the aircraft CG sinks. With less than 15 knots of excess endspeed, more settle will occur up to a maximum of 10 feet of settle with zero excess endspeed. Launches anticipated with less than the normal 15 knot excess endspeed require additional longitudinal trim to compensate for the reduced launch speed. A 10 knot excess endspeed launch would require 4° additional nose up trim from the nominal settings in figure 8-1, Tables D and E...."
________________________________

Amy Butler from AvWeak a few years back described a change to Super Hornet A/B catapults where the FADEC changes the initial 50% burner at launch to 100% by the end of the catapult for pop stall reasons. This change is incorporated on the F-35C when catapulting in burner. Description is on the F-35 thread I think?

[SpazSinbad]

Previous page has reference to one PADDLES - but not controlling - on that OMG night. Here we have an unformatted stream of consciousness retelling of the F-18C tale with a foreword from controlling LSO that night: [wot is formatted for youse]
“...Sorry I haven't filled you in on all the information regarding the barricade yet. It has been fairly busy around here. "Oyster" got shot off Cat 1 and fodded both motors. Initially everyone on the ship had thought he had ejected, but after several tense minutes we realized he was still in the plane. He managed to get it to level off at 80' and then eventually milked it up to 150'.

It was roughly 2045 hrs and the wx was approx 1000-1500' sct variable broken (fairly dark). We were initially going to attempt to recover him single engine / half flap when he stated he was only able to maintain 0 vsi (no rate of descent) in full blower with his landing gear up (the one engine he had remaining was having massive compressor stalls that were pretty impressive even at 6miles). He had already jettisoned all of his stores and dumped down to 4.0fuel just to maintain level flight. He was unable to climb even up to 3kto do a waveoff / approach capability check. The deck was ready and we eventually decided to give him an attempt at a normal pass. He had barely commenced when he decided there was no chance. He came up the starboard side of the ship and once again everyone thought that he was going to eject. The **** coming out of his right engine was unbelievable.

Throughout the evolution everyone stayed extremely calm and really pulled together to make good decisions. By now he had burned down to almost nothing on the gas. His capability to arrest his rate of descent once the approach was commenced was believed to be sufficient, but he would have no bolter capability and the decision to barricade him was made. From the time the call to "rig the barricade"; went out on the 5mc to the time it was up and ready was phenomenal. We had just barely enough time to crunch the numbers, give the barricade brief and he was commencing. We cleared the platform - I controlled and Flats backed up. His first approach was high and by the time that he started it down he was getting too far out of parameters and Flats pickled him. My stomach sank as I saw him come by in full blower with the engine making a sickening whine/pop and once again **** coming out like a salvo of flares. He cleared the top of the barricade by 10 -15'.

He was down to .8 on gas and climbed only to 600' for his last approach. I think we all said a prayer for him and he took an early hook into final. I talked to him all the way down. He intercepted glide path at about 1.5 mile and this time I told him that if he needed to sacrifice a couple of knots of airspeed (fast) to keep it on glideslope with the nose to go a ahead and do so, we had plenty of wind (almost all natural). He drifted a little left in the middle and went clara (no meatball - low!) for a second and then flew just a little low all the way in to the ramp. I knew in my heart that all of the big pieces of the jet were going to make it over the ramp and gave him the ";cut, cut, cut"; call. His hook touched down about 15-20' beyond the round-down and he engaged the barricade on centerline. I have never heard anything like the cheers that erupted on the flight deck that night. Everyone on the platform was hugging and almost in tears. Our prayer was definitely answered as "Oyster" popped open the canopy and hopped out. Like I said, the teamwork that went into the evolution was unbelievable. "Oyster" was truly a hero for sticking with the jet. The airmanship he displayed to get that thing back aboard was tremendous and I hope will never have to be matched. Take Care, Max...”

F-18 Story of mats being sucked into engine (http://www.aircraftresourcecenter.com/Stories1/001-100/0003_F-18/story0003.htm)
+
Pilot Story with pictures: http://tailhookdaily.typepad.com/tailhook_daily_briefing/2008/08/a-pearl-from-oy.html