June AAIB - wrong deck landing

[HeliComparator]

I see there is a report on a wrong deck landing (out of Aberdeen) in this month's AAIB report. I have to say that, bearing in mind the large amount of time it takes to get important reports out, one wonders whether the AAIB should be bothering itself with such trivia? Political pressure? One is hard pushed to consider the event an "accident" although I'm sure the weasel words of aviation legislation probably does encompass it. Yes oil companies love to rant and wail about such things but in reality it is almost certainly only a big deal in someone's mind, and an excuse to have a go at a contractor.


Of course the event would have been avoided had they religiously set the FMS to the next waypoint to be landed at, something we did as a matter of course in Bristow because we all know how easy it is to get sucked into thinking a destination is the destination when in fact it isn't. And that really is all there is to be said about it.


However if one is going to go to the trouble of writing a detailed report, one might as well consider all the contributory factors and not just pick the ones to suit. So in fact the crew error was compounded by the incessant waffling on the radio, miscommunication, mistakes and changes of mind by the oil company's personnel. But of course although that is mentioned, it doesn't form part of the reason why the "accident" happened according to the report, but in reality it was of course a large part of the reason. "Accidents" rarely occur from one cause in isolation and usually the accident could have been prevented by removing just one of the several contributory causes.


But of course such an argument wouldn't serve the political aims of the report. Disturb the status quo? Not a chance!

[terminus mos]

So in fact the crew error was compounded by the incessant waffling on the radio, miscommunication, mistakes and changes of mind by the oil company's personnel. But of course although that is mentioned, it doesn't form part of the reason why the "accident" happened according to the report, but in reality it was of course a large part of the reason.

The problem with your attitude HC is that you regard an offshore flight as a flying exercise. But actually, the flight is required to do a job. The requirements of that job change from time to time. Imagine if fixed wing pilots landed at the wrong airport. Its the same thing. If a Pilot can't land on the correct deck and reasonably adapt to the needs of the job, then they should question their career choice or consider retirement. Oh, sorry, you did retire already.

[ericferret]

Why imagine?

Five U.S. aircraft landed at wrong airports since 2012: NTSB | Reuters (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-aviation-landings-idUSKBN0NP21N20150504)

http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/pilots-head-wrong-airports-article-1.1608410

[TWT]

https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/aaib-investigation-to-sikorsky-s-92a-g-vinl

[birmingham]

The problem with your attitude HC is that you regard an offshore flight as a flying exercise. But actually, the flight is required to do a job. The requirements of that job change from time to time. Imagine if fixed wing pilots landed at the wrong airport. Its the same thing. If a Pilot can't land on the correct deck and reasonably adapt to the needs of the job, then they should question their career choice or consider retirement. Oh, sorry, you did retire already.
Terminus mos,

TBF I think HC has a point.

This wasn't an accident as such so while I think it should be a reportable event I don't think it merits a full field investigation.

Perhaps the procedure should be similar to that in a non commercial transport flight i.e. that the operator is required to submit a report. If that had been the case and the operator had adapted procedures to prevent a recurrence all the AAIB would have had to do would be to read, discuss and if satisfied accept the report. The exact same outcome as the full field investigation.

It is different from a fixed wing event in that given that the crews are routinely liasing with each other and that there is a much lower volume of arrivals and departures at much lower speeds the chances of a real "accident" were relatively low.

[HeliComparator]

Imagine if fixed wing pilots landed at the wrong airport. Its the same thing.

Imagine if fixed wing pilots routinely had destination changes mid-way through their flight and had to sort out loads of radio waffle from ground ops about their next payload.

It doesn't happen, which is why FW rarely lands at the wrong airport. So thank you for reinforcing my point!

Yes there is a job to be done, however when things go wrong all aspects should be looked at rather than just blaming the pilots. The processes surrounding passing route and load changes to crew in flight is necessary but currently a long way from optimal.

So is it your contention that the oil companies have no duty to minimise distraction to the pilots in flight? If so, you are part of the problem. A big part.

Of course not all the blame for unnecessary workload lies with the oil companies. In the UK we have ridiculous arse covering radio waffle with ATC. No only have they invented a whole layer of complexity to do with ATSOCAS which no other country seems to need, but for the sole benefit of ATC there is endless reading out and reading back of types of service and their limitations which sometimes go in for several sentences. All completely pointless and having no bearing on the flight, just arse covering in case someone at NATS might get sued. Have a listen to the offshore frequencies sometime and work out how much of the comms is useful or has any bearing on the safe conduct of the flight. About 50% or less, I'd say.

[212man]

Perhaps the procedure should be similar to that in a non commercial transport flight i.e. that the operator is required to submit a report. If that had been the case and the operator had adapted procedures to prevent a recurrence all the AAIB would have had to do would be to read, discuss and if satisfied accept the report.

They did....
Information Source: Aircraft Accident Report Form submitted by the
pilot

I do understand how wrong deck landings can occur in particular circumstances, but I'm having a hard time reconciling some aspects of this one including:

180 degrees in the wrong direction
Half the sector length
A jack up rig helideck versus a platform!



Both pilots had their Navigation Displays (ND) selected to ‘sector’, as normal when operating
offshore, resulting in the Buzzard waypoint being outside the 40° arc displayed either side
of the helicopter’s heading

Well, there's a clue then.....

The commander would have preferred
to have been the Pilot Monitoring (PM) for this short multi-sector route: operating the radio,
completing the associated payload information and navigating in this busy, high workload
offshore environment.

High workload? I think that's stretching it a bit. What's to stop him taking control on finals? In multi sector environments like the SNS, Nigeria Eket field, or Brunei there are often multiple control handovers required.

Edit:
There's another one in the same bulletin - much more understandable: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5739954c40f0b61559000006/Agusta_AW139_G-CHBY_06-16.pdf

[RWing]

I think you all need to re-read the full Bulletin report:


1. It is not an accident report, but an INCIDENT report as clearly stated on the top left hand corner of the Synopsis Page.
2. It is not published in isolation; page 47 of the SAME report is about G-CHBY, an AW139 from Humberside having a Wrong Deck landing too... proof that this is not an isolated incident and by companies engaging with the Investigation authorities we can all try and learn from these unfortunate occurrences as a community.


We all know that Wrong Deck Landings are happening throughout the world and for once I enjoyed reading these reports to help recognise a potential situation which could lead to me making the same mistake. I will certainly be checking and double checking in the future!

[EESDL]

Just reinforces sad fact that previous 'wrong deck' lessons had failed to be learnt and the phrase - 'experienced offshore captain' - could be mis-interpreted.
Have to agree with others that this was not a 'busy' sector when compared to other areas and maybe indications that crew 'holding on too tight' - or minds elsewhere........
How did the trigger word 'accident' find its' way into dialogue?

[Sir Niall Dementia]

I haven't flown off-shore since 1999, back then we were under strict instruction that both pilots should identify the installation, and state aloud the name they were reading from the nameplate, or deck.

In the late 80's to mid 90's there were several wrong deck landings, the crews were subjected to the usual ritual humiliation by management and colleagues, and the oil companies complained vociferously, and we all learned lessons and waited for the next incident. Reading these two reports makes me wonder if any of those lessons have sunk in, or if they have just been forgotten.

SND

[212man]

In the late 80's to mid 90's there were several wrong deck landings

I recall a senior captain also managed to land at the wrong golf course, having previously announced loudly in the flight planning room that anybody landing on the wrong deck should consider resigning.....

[Sir Niall Dementia]

212man:ok::ok:

I had forgotten him! His "error" wouldn't have been so bad if the audience had been different.

SND

[RVDT]

In the UK we have ridiculous arse covering radio waffle with ATC. No only have they invented a whole layer of complexity to do with ATSOCAS which no other country seems to need, but for the sole benefit of ATC there is endless reading out and reading back of types of service and their limitations which sometimes go in for several sentences. All completely pointless and having no bearing on the flight, just arse covering in case someone at NATS might get sued. Have a listen to the offshore frequencies sometime and work out how much of the comms is useful or has any bearing on the safe conduct of the flight. About 50% or less, I'd say.

Glad I am not the only one. They seem to be able to successfully provide information to a maximum of about 3 aircraft at any one time.

Its always a joy to get out of the place. Have to say that of all the European countries Germany is the complete opposite. Virtual silence until needed.

If they do clean it up which would be highly improbable they should do the Coast Guard as well while they are at it - banal dribble.

[HeliComparator]

I think you all need to re-read the full Bulletin report:


1. It is not an accident report, but an INCIDENT report as clearly stated on the top left hand corner of the Synopsis Page.
2. It is not published in isolation; page 47 of the SAME report is about G-CHBY, an AW139 from Humberside having a Wrong Deck landing too... proof that this is not an isolated incident and by companies engaging with the Investigation authorities we can all try and learn from these unfortunate occurrences as a community.


We all know that Wrong Deck Landings are happening throughout the world and for once I enjoyed reading these reports to help recognise a potential situation which could lead to me making the same mistake. I will certainly be checking and double checking in the future!

Interesting that you felt the need to create a new forum persona just to post that! Anyway I am all for investigating incidents with the hope of trying to reduce recurrence. But in this case, there has been no significant investigation of all the circumstances, just a "blame the pilots" subtext and not questioning how much of the rest of the circumstance was avoidable. A good opportunity missed but let's face it, AAIB are not best placed to investigate this sort of thing since they have no idea of the environment and clearly don't have the time to find out.

[HeliComparator]

@SND I suggest that is because the main lesson learnt was that the pilot screwed up and that is the end of the matter. No lessons learnt about distractions during critical phases of flight ie during shuttles.

[RWing]

Interesting that you felt the need to create a new forum persona just to post that! Anyway I am all for investigating incidents with the hope of trying to reduce recurrence. But in this case, there has been no significant investigation of all the circumstances, just a "blame the pilots" subtext and not questioning how much of the rest of the circumstance was avoidable. A good opportunity missed but let's face it, AAIB are not best placed to investigate this sort of thing since they have no idea of the environment and clearly don't have the time to find out.

Sorry, been a long-time reader but not a poster. I suppose I have a lot of time on my hands due to not flying much at the moment for various reasons... read into that as much as you wish...;)


I totally agree with you HC; I have a feeling there was more to these events and I wonder if the company investigation reports go into more detail? I certainly hope they do.


My personal feeling is that we will still see more Wrong Deck Landings in the future... watch this space...

[RWing]

I also heard reports of another Wrong Deck Landing which happened West of Shetland as well... I just don't think this problem is going away anytime soon.

[Steve Stubbs]

Helicomparator
.........something we did as a matter of course in Bristow because we all know how easy it is to get sucked into thinking a destination is the destination when in fact it isn't. .......

Remember the S61 and the need to re-slave the main compass after take-off? And there was me remembering the Bristow S61 who took off from ESB on its way to Sumburgh, slaved it 180 degrees out, no gross error check against an NDB, standby compass, or the BBC, or the Sun even, and ended up landing in Bergen. Never mind wrong deck - wrong country!!

We all got it wrong sometime.... But generally managed to get away with it.

[cyclic]

I agree with HC that there is a lot more to these events than just the pilot screwing up. Of course, the reason this appeared in the AAIB bulletin is because of the open and honest reporting culture we have built on the NS. We are under the microscope and it would be great if all players were as open and honest about their failings and mistakes. I hope that the current climate and the attitude that the likes of TM displays doesn't take us back to the bad old days.

[HeliComparator]

Hi Steve

When I mentioned what we did in Bristow it was of course latterly, perhaps only in this decade, due to lessons learnt from wrong deck landings in the past. So I was not implying that Bristow had never had a wrong deck landing or other major cockup such as you mention. We have had loads!

I had one myself in the early 80s as a year 1 copilot on the S61. We had to fly to a semi sub under tow, weather was not too good. And of course navigating by a Decca roll.

So we arrived in the vicinity of where we thought the rig would be (projecting forward its previously reported position using track, speed and time) and there was a radar return. We descended through cloud and became VMC at maybe 500' with the rig under tow in front of us. We called them up, they answered, and we landed. Then we got the call with the different voice "would the aircraft just landed on our heli deck unannounced kindly identify itself?" Oops! Wrong rig. The correct rig, also under tow, was a couple of miles away. It was what Kevin would have described as "SO UNFAIR!" But of course in those days it wasn't a big deal, we just got a bit of a muttering from the chief pilot on return and heard nothing more about it.

That was the moment that I realised that when you look at a rig, press transmit to get deck availability, get a reply, it is a very alluring and powerful indicator to the psyche that the rig you are looking at is the correct one.

But that was then, and now we have Gps- powered FMS and (since the demise of the Trimble) easy entry of waypoints. There seems less excuse now but nevertheless it happens. And so any report worth it's salt would investigate why the crew didn't put the "To" waypoint in. Was it a one off? If so, why? Was it a company culture thing? And in the case of the 139, having the destination waypoint in, why didn't they use the information? We have no idea. All we know is that the pilots screwed up. Not in the slightest bit useful.

[griffothefog]

The reason these events happen, particularly at night is because there are no visible identification markings on the rig until you are pretty much committed.
Oil companies need to start spending on green light strobes on the deck after you've been given landing clearance. No green strobe, no landing.

[HeliComparator]

The reason these events happen, particularly at night is because there are no visible identification markings on the rig until you are pretty much committed.
Oil companies need to start spending on green light strobes on the deck after you've been given landing clearance. No green strobe, no landing.

Don't be silly, that would eliminate wrong deck landings and then the oil companies would lose a stick to beat the contractors. So it ain't going to happen.

[TeeS]

I'm not convinced the lack of a green strobe would stop us landing as effectively as a red strobe when not cleared to land - I realise there would be complaints about a near permanently flashing light but perhaps a bit of proximity technology could switch it on when a helicopter sized object comes within 50m

TeeS

[Bravo73]

Oil companies need to start spending on green light strobes on the deck after you've been given landing clearance. No green strobe, no landing.

Who turns the light on on a NUI?

[Self loading bear]

The controller on the next manned platform should be able to switch on a green light.
I experienced on the de Dutch shelf at least one oil company which played loud music over the PA on a NUI to scare away the seagulls on the heli deck. This was switched on from a nearby platform.
Strange to hear Andre Hazes coming through your ear defenders above the engine noise.
But it definitely worked. Hazes scares away everybody who is not from Amsterdam. His music corrodes the copper wiring in you stereo!

Okay i have to hide for incoming fire from Amsterdam.
Cheers SLB

[terminus mos]

So is it your contention that the oil companies have no duty to minimise distraction to the pilots in flight? If so, you are part of the problem. A big part.


Rubbish HC. It's the Pilot's responsibility to operate the aircraft, fly the flight safely and to perform the commercial job for which the aircraft is tasked, which includes changing customer requirements. This is called managing the flight.

If the rig or vessel calls the helicopter for a change at a time when the crew is busy, what is wrong with saying "standby or wait"? It's what being an aircraft Captain is all about.

What a shame that that oil companies and passengers are seen as an inconvenience to pilots.

[TeeS]

I don't think many would argue with most of your first sentence TM; however, us humans are designed to make mistakes. I've done a fair few deck landings and luckily have never landed on the wrong one, I've got a few personal processes that I use to minimise the risk because I've got the sort of brain that just screws up if I give it the slightest chance. I have never said 'It won't happen to me' in fact I know it would happen to me if I carried on long enough!

So, on the basis pilots tend to think 'Bugger, that's embarrassing, I've landed on the wrong helideck' the OIM might well think 'Jesus!! that idiot landed on my helideck while I've got scaffolders over the side and was just about to cold flare - we could have been blown to smithereens and lost men over the side'! Isn't it the responsibility of everyone to minimise the risk?

Cheers

TeeS

[SASless]

there was me remembering the Bristow S61 who took off from ESB on its way to Sumburgh, slaved it 180 degrees out, no gross error check against an NDB, standby compass, or the BBC, or the Sun even, and ended up landing in Bergen.

Management Material those two Chaps!:ugh:

[PlasticCabDriver]

The reason these events happen, particularly at night is because there are no visible identification markings on the rig until you are pretty much committed.
Oil companies need to start spending on green light strobes on the deck after you've been given landing clearance. No green strobe, no landing.
Two colour helideck lights, default condition is bright red. When the HLO is happy that is deck is ready, and the crew call for availability, only then does he turn them green.

Crew can see the change from red to green and get a visual confirmation they are at the right deck.

Can't be that difficult.

[Nescafe]

Can't be that difficult.

No, but think of the immense cost to the rig operator! ;-)

[Never Fretter]

I can understand how an low paid offshore worker who gets given heliadmin as an additional duty with inadequate training and minimal supervision might not realise they are becoming a distraction.

I am disappointed that highly paid ex-aviators sitting in plush onshore oil company offices, who should know better and frequently will boast they do, quickly play the 'pilot error' 'captain's responsible' card to avoid any work for themselves or cost to their employer.

[S76Heavy]

I noticed that both reports are about Line Training flights. Perhaps part of the problem is that the crews tried too hard to be expedient and customer friendly rather than taking some extra time to ensure that everything was as it should be and as they expected it.
There is no shame in taking a few extra minutes to get and stay organised. That is why it is a training flight. And the customers should not complain as it is the only way we can ensure the continued delivery of the service: new people need to be properly trained for the job.

On the S92 case: it would have been so much easier for the LTC to have the trainee fly the machine and just take control for landing. In my experience all pilots assigned to line training can fly the machine, it is the rest that is confusing and overwhelming at first. Don't try to do the one-armed paper hanger trick.

The confusing information from the R/O certainly did not help the crew. I just wonder if the R/Os are trained to understand the workload of a shuttle crew and when it is best to be quiet? Somehow, I don't think so..

As for the deck identification: not always easy to read, especially in poor wx. And there is a tendency to see what one expects to see. So any way to improve identification at larger distance would be welcomed.

[HeliComparator]

Rubbish HC. It's the Pilot's responsibility to operate the aircraft, fly the flight safely and to perform the commercial job for which the aircraft is tasked, which includes changing customer requirements. This is called managing the flight.

If the rig or vessel calls the helicopter for a change at a time when the crew is busy, what is wrong with saying "standby or wait"? It's what being an aircraft Captain is all about.

What a shame that that oil companies and passengers are seen as an inconvenience to pilots.
Thanks for confirming that you are part of the problem. With your breathtaking lack of any concept about how flight safety works, and if you are representative of your breed, we can be absolutely certain that there will be many more future wrong deck landings.

[terminus mos]

Au contraire HC.

How is the big bad oil company Radio Operator meant to know when to call the helicopter crew with information? Make an appointment perhaps?

I have flown some offshore based tasks where the whole routing and payload was given over the radio at a suitable time. A normal change in payload or routing radio call should not be a hazardous flight safety event to any helicopter crew and neither should it be an excuse for a wrong deck landing.

Its how you manage to twist and blame the customer for every mistake which is "breathtaking". Ensuring that the aircraft lands at the correct destination is surely the Commander's responsibility.

[212man]

Wrong Deck Landings - Aerossurance (http://aerossurance.com/news/wrong-deck-landings/)

It will be interesting to see how comprehensive the HeliOffshore guidelines are and whether they find their way into IOGP 390. Given that the current and past Chairs of the IOGP Aviation Committee are members of HO, I assume they will.

I don't see a single cure, as there is not a single cause......

[HeliComparator]

Au contraire HC.

How is the big bad oil company Radio Operator meant to know when to call the helicopter crew with information? Make an appointment perhaps?

I have flown some offshore based tasks where the whole routing and payload was given over the radio at a suitable time. A normal change in payload or routing radio call should not be a hazardous flight safety event to any helicopter crew and neither should it be an excuse for a wrong deck landing.

Its how you manage to twist and blame the customer for every mistake which is "breathtaking". Ensuring that the aircraft lands at the correct destination is surely the Commander's responsibility.
A radio operator should know when, and how, to call the helicopter because they should have had adequate training in the task. However it's clear that many haven't, and this results in confusing, constantly changing, badly phrased, ambiguous and ill-timed transmissions. But then again perhaps they have been trained - by someone like you who says "just tell them what to do, after all we are paying the bills and they'll damn-well do as they're told"

As you say, a single change in payload should not be a particularly hazardous event if timed reasonably. For example, not when the crew are in flight in a shuttle nor within say 5 mins of ETA. Since you like to compare with fixed wing, do you imagine airlines allow their staff to witter on to pilots on approach to Heathrow about Mrs Bloggs who needs a wheelchair?

If you actually listen to some of the chat on the radio offshore especially with more than 1 aircraft on frequency, there can a lot of waffle and inefficiency and unclear comms. Not always, of course, some are better than others. But it is the constant barrage of waffle both on the rig frequency, and the ATC frequency - endless stream of people people having to be told and read back that "you are identified deconfliction service, SSR only to 80 miles, limited cover from below due to altitude" and probably what the controller is having for tea (since that information is just as useful) - that wears one down.
Anyway if the oil companies can't work out who is to fly home, and who is staying offshore, with less than 5 minutes to run, I suggest they might be better off opening a knitting shop and selling wool. They are clearly not competent to be messing around with oil and gas.

[HeliComparator]

Wrong Deck Landings - Aerossurance (http://aerossurance.com/news/wrong-deck-landings/)

It will be interesting to see how comprehensive the HeliOffshore guidelines are and whether they find their way into IOGP 390. Given that the current and past Chairs of the IOGP Aviation Committee are members of HO, I assume they will.

I don't see a single cure, as there is not a single cause......
You are right of course, not a single cause or cure. That is why it is important for both parties (operator and oil co) to consider what their contribution to the problem, and its solution, can be. Rather than the oil co just smugly blaming the operator.

[Steve Stubbs]

Helicomparator

Thinking back I can highlight two of my best fails , one significant and one maybe more illuminating. Remember the (Laybarge 234?) Had a deck with side flaps that had to be raised like a gateleg table. Not knowing that (long before helideck manuals and diagrams became the norm) and on my first flight to it after it arrived, we got there to see this rectangular and long but narrow helideck which we promptly landed on, or rather along, unloading and loading through the cargo door as the airstair door was unusable due to edge proximity!.... Only later did we hear that they had raisable side flaps, we had been given landing clearance and thought that was just the way it was. The transit crew expected us to call for the flaps if necessary, but they had only been used to much smaller beasts that the S61. Its companion laybarge was even worse with the deck being between the various structures and the only approach was at right angles to the heading of the barge.

On deck identification, after a short notice request by Ekofisk to do an inter rig shuttle for them on a day long ad-hoc trip, we spent a lot of time and fuel looking for the 'Henry Gibson' as Ekofisk got more and more frustrated with our inability to see it, until the penny dropped it was the 'Henrick Ibsen' and we just didn't connect the name ...... Red faces all round. The final touch on that trip was a landing back into Aberdeen off the ILS in a reported 300 meters RVR (which was our limit at the time - hand flown, no holds, no autopilots ) and then literally having to follow the taxi lines to find the apron. Some trips you never forget.

[jimf671]

... ... In the UK we have ridiculous arse covering radio waffle with ATC. No only have they invented a whole layer of complexity to do with ATSOCAS which no other country seems to need, but for the sole benefit of ATC there is endless reading out and reading back of types of service and their limitations which sometimes go in for several sentences. All completely pointless and having no bearing on the flight, just arse covering in case someone at NATS might get sued. Have a listen to the offshore frequencies sometime and work out how much of the comms is useful or has any bearing on the safe conduct of the flight. About 50% or less, I'd say.

Interesting. Many years ago I had cause to review CAP 413. I reported that a) It was not a Radiotelephony Manual but an ATC Manual, and b) It was not written in English but in American. I also reported that almost none of its 163 pages assisted with passing information not related to ATC. I note with a heavy heart that the dreadful 163 pages have now grown to a monstrous 372 pages. :ugh:


... If they do clean it up which would be highly improbable they should do the Coast Guard as well while they are at it - banal dribble.

In the light of the position of the European Parliament and the existence of EMSA, the purpose of the Coastguard is to create a purpose for the Coastguard. :E

[HughMartin]

In my career, only one wrong deck landing and one close one.

1. Detached at short notice to southern North Sea in a Bolkow 105. Sent out to the Viking field with one "mother" manned platform and god knows how many unmanned satellites labelled A to X (or something similar). Was sent over to a satellite to pick up a work team on a murky evening, landed and waited. No one appeared so called the mother platform and said "I'm on the X and no one has appeared". "Standby" was the reply followed shortly thereafter by "your passengers are on the X and there is no helicopter there". Embarrassed pause while I tried to re-read the platform name through the the layers of guano. "Oops, will be there in two minutes". Laughs all round, no big deal.

2. Departed from Aberdeen on a two hour flight to a stationary small ship with a bow helideck. Last thing we did before departure was get an updated position and fed it into the FMS. Arrived on location at dusk with little light, vessel exactly on location according to the FMS, exactly the right shape according to the rig plate, heading as previously described, couldn't see any name due to light conditions etc but helideck landing clearance obtained and as we came over the helideck I noticed a bow mounted mast protruding above the helideck perilously close to the helideck. As PNF, I called "go around". Subsequent radio calls established that during the time since our departure from Aberdeen the ship we were supposed to go to had swapped position with her sister ship. Our correct destination was now about 20 miles from her originally reported position.

In a previous life as a Chief Pilot, I once had to write a letter of defence to a major oil company aviation manager (who I will call ********) for one of my pilots who had a wrong deck landing when flying for this oil company. This manager, who had previously been a Bristow pilot for many years, said he wasn't accepting my letter and that he "wanted blood". Well, he never got blood and when I subsequently recounted this story to a senior Bristow pilot who had known him, I was told that "********" had been involved in many similar events during his time with Bristow and would probably have been sacked had he not left.

[albatross]

Couple of years ago at the end of a long day just heading out for our last flight- phone call
"We need you after you land on ABC to go to YYY unmanned platform to pick up a day crew the rest of your sched remains the same"
New flight log made, rig plate for YYY consulted.
Phoned sched ..co capt standing beside me .."Ok we are now doing ABC then YYY then DDD thence to BBB onwards to GTV then to base ..confirm?"
Sched "yes"
Off we thrundled to ABC ...while on the deck of ABC we got clearance to land on YYY which was only 2 miles away..took off and landed on YYY..flight attendant got out and came back to say nobody on the platform.
Called the infield platform that had given us landing clearance on YYY and said nobody was on the platform.
Reply after a long pause " Oh that crew is on platform YYY-2a"
Did a quick calc and we had the time and fuel to pick them up.
Did so.
The ponderous saftey system ground into motion ..incident entered...endless meetings..huge amounts of electrons used on emails..bow tie diagrams promulgated.. more info required ..this goes on for 2 months
Guess who got zapped for a wrong deck landing?

[SASless]

Any Bristow Hands never land on the wrong UBIT while flying out of Eket?

[tistisnot]

WDL’s have been pondered and pontificated for years with little progress.

Customer areas for confusion if trying to avoid WDL’s:

1. Different name / abbreviation / marking by oil / service company on helideck / structure / vessel
2. Failure to follow CAP 437 guidelines for mounting / displaying / cleaning / illuminating markings
3. Limitation of transposing name into operator / oil company flight planning system / GPS / FMS
4. Last minute changes – not permitted for production ops; safeguards for exploration ops

Helicopter operator best practices:

1. Maintain an up to date rig plate library available to crew / dispatch for flight planning / in-flight
2. Initial and annual helideck inspection to identify shortcomings, put mitigations in place
3. Dispatch staff fully trained to be aware of hazards and pitfalls during planning
4. Do not allow customer / time pressure during planning stage, especially changes (D and T values)
5. Refuse to depart without latest Platform Status Report including position (1 hour max) / PRH
6. Extra fuel for mobile / vessel on move

Flight operations and HLO best practices:

1. Crew to check PSR position of all mobiles against FMS / GPS
2. Crew to check next waypoint course displayed against planning document prior to lift-off
3. Tune in beacon of next landing if available, consult rig library as required to confirm details
4. Contact radio operator approx 30 nms out for wx / admin traffic (standard calls / response)
5. Send radio operator position call at 10 nms
6. On finals 1.5 nms call HLO for deck availability / green / clear - giving direction of approach (you may also wish to "Direct To" to confirm on nav equipment?)
7. HLO confirms by radio aircraft in sight and helideck green thus confirming helideck clear / OFS not infringed / cranes on cradles, unmanned / fire crew in place
8. Crew to BOTH identify the helideck / vessel name before committal point

Nice to haves:

1. Understanding from all parties that if above is not followed – WDL’s are inevitable!
2. Red cross on deck if not available – lights difficult by day, plates?
3. DGPS / other installation identifier