UK AAIB

[Wander00]

BBC South Today are this week including a magazine item on the work of AAIB in their 1330 and 1830 programmes

[Wander00]

Clearly there must be a cat up a tree somewhere, because it did not appear at lunchtime - a bit disappointing

[CoffmanStarter]

Wander ... It was on the 18:30 slot ... A bit of a disappointing piece really :(

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-berkshire-36421816

[Above The Clouds]

Here you go all on Youtube

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[Chugalug2]

Thanks OP, and to ATC for the YouTube links. Inevitably brief given the time restraints of the Regional News slot, but I am always impressed by the professional dedication of the AAIB Inspectors in doing their job; to discover why accidents happen, in order to stop them happening again. A seemingly obvious ambition but one that has been repeatedly frustrated in military aviation by the conflicting effects of "guidance" from above, inexperience, and the denial of evidence to their military equivalents.

The reason that the AAIB is able to carry out its vital task unencumbered by such effects is independence; from the Air Regulator, and from the Air Operators. The MilAAIB was never independent, and is already history. Its replacement, the Defence Accident Investigation Branch (DAIB) comes under the Defence Safety Authority (DSA - part of the MOD), as does the MAA, and thus is still not independent of either Regulator or Operator. So things will just carry on as before...

https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/defence-safety-authority/about

[Lima Juliet]

Chug

Sorry old bean, but that statement on 'independence' does not sound correct. Both the AAIB and CAA are both run/funded by the Department for Transport - therefore they are not truly independent just like the MOD, DSA, MAA and DAIB are interlinked.

The AAIB are an independent unit within the Department for Transport.

The CAA are a public corporation of the Department for Transport.

The Department for Transport (DfT) is a Government ministerial department just like the MoD. There are 19 bodies within the DfT of which the CAA and AAIB are two of them.

So just like the MoD departments they are not truly independent and have to bow to Government department and financial pressures. It's been asked before, please define how you would achieve your Utopian 'independence', remembering that even independent bodies can be corrupt (just look at FIFA!). I don't see any advantages of the DfT, CAA and AAIB arrangement over the MoD, DSA, MAA and DAIB arrangement?

If we wanted both ministries to be 'independent' of each other then surely the AAIB should look at MoD accidents and the DAIB look at DfT accidents? Or run it jointly, as they are almost doing now, like the UK Airprox Board.

LJ

[Chugalug2]

Leon, if the DoT was the operator of the Civil Airfleet your point would indeed me made, but it isn't, so it isn't (if you follow me ;-). The MOD is Operator, Investigator, and Regulator of the Military Airfleet. Doesn't work, as it has so sadly and tragically proved.

Self regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation It Kills!

[tucumseh]

My interpretation of Chug's post is simply that the AAIB, when conducting its business on military accidents, remains independent of the MoD. That it has a different role when doing MoD work is another matter. The real question on a military forum is why the MoD don't do this important work that they prohibit the AAIB from doing.

On numerous occasions the AAIB has demonstrated the worth of this independence, preferring to tell the truth in both their reports and in court. Being the subject of financial pressures does not prevent them telling the truth or being independent. However, lack of independence and being permitted to act as judge and jury in its own cases does permit MoD to lie, regardless of financial pressures.

When you ask how to achieve independence, I'd first ask what you disagree with in the oft-stated proposals made here over the years. Sorry, I presume to speak for Chug but he's already said he agrees with what I said, with one or two minor reservations.

Agree about FIFA, although their corrupt practices don't generally kill!

[Chugalug2]

tuc, thank you for your input. The minor reservations of which you speak must be very minor, for I cannot recall them right now ;-).

Perhaps I should just add that the main problem within the MOD has not been direct political interference, but interference from the principal Air Operator, aka the RAF! Often the first casualty of truth has been the SoS, at least one of which has since placed on record that he was serially misled over Regulatory and Investigation matters from within his own Department of State. Certain RAF VSOs have subverted the work of BoIs and Airworthiness provision, in the latter case to the point of causing a dysfunctional and broken system.

Leon, you ask for my proposals for a different system to the one that now exists, where one VSO, the DG DSA, is responsible within the MOD for, inter alia, both Military Airworthiness Regulation and Air Accident Investigation. Above my paygrade, mate! I merely enter on stage right crying, "Beware the Ides of March", and exit stage left. The reason that I promote the Civil Aviation system is that it clearly works. The Military system doesn't emulate that system for the reasons I gave previously, and clearly doesn't work, so let's fix it!

The problem is in particular with the RAF! It pains me to say that, but avoiding the issue in aviation is fatal, literally! The independence of which I speak is therefore principally from the air operators, ie the Service subsidiaries of the MOD. That is why it must lie outwith the MOD. That is also why the reformed MAA and MilAAIB (or whatever titles they then adopt) must be led by civilian DGs, though staffed with mixed civilian/service personnel. The latter I would suggest should be in a professionally dedicated branch (Air Safety?) to mirror civilian practice.

As to funding, it will come from you and I, the poor British taxpayer! Perfect? No! What is though? The important thing though is to avoid avoidable accidents, thus saving life and maintaining UK Air Power.

[Lima Juliet]

Chug and Tuc

Thanks for your thoughts but I can't see what difference a civilian DG would make. They would be payrolled by the taxpayer via the Treasury - another Government department. If I look at the two comparisons:

Top Level: UK Government

Finance: UK Treasury

Ministerial Level: SoS for Transport (DfT) SoS for Defence (MoD)

Accident Investigation: AAIB (DfT funded) DAIB (MoD funded)

Safety Regulation: CAA (Dft and Operator funded) DSA/MAA (MoD funded)

Operators: Commercial/Private (they pay their regulator!) RN/Army/RAF (a Service so they do not pay their regulator)

So I would opine that actually the civil system could be open to more issues as it's all about MONEY (and never biting the hand that feeds you). Also, the Govt/Treasury wants Commercial Air Transport to succeed as this brings in revenue in tax receipts and commerce. So I really do not believe that the civilian system is as indpendent as you would seem to indicate.

Indeed I really can't fathom out how it could ever be independent as no one will ever do it for free!

LJ

[Chugalug2]

Leon, it isn't about money, it is about people, RAF VSOs to be exact.

The RAF, as the principal military air operator, has a vested interest in the outcome of Military Air Accident Investigations. Because it carried out its own investigations into its own air accidents, it ensured that the outcome of those investigations suited its purposes. Mull comes to mind...

The RAF, as the principal military air operator, resented the ring fencing of Air Safety Budgets, particularly those concerning Airworthiness. When other budgets became overspent, because of the incompetence of certain RAF VSOs, other RAF VSOs set out to quickly subvert the UK Military Airworthiness system, in order to divert the monies. As a result illegal RTS's were issued and knowingly unairworthy fleets were put into squadron service. Inevitably what followed were airworthiness related fatal air accidents. Mull comes to mind...

The attack on military airworthiness was particularly devastating because in order to reduce safety costs and time, the regs were scrapped and the engineers sacked (unless they were prepared to compromise their responsibilities). The continuous paper trail required to confirm and maintain airworthiness was soon lost, and to all intents and purposes the system was destroyed. The grounding of the ACO gliders being the latest manifestation.

Moves to reform the system have foundered because;

a). No-one now remembers how the system used to work,
b). The old regs were so enthusiastically scrapped that new ones are being continuously written in an attempt to re-invent the wheel,
c). The reason that the old system was broken cannot be admitted, either by the MOD, the RAF, or even by Haddon-Cave, so,
d). The MAA, the DS solution born of the Nimrod Report, is based on a lie; that the period of the wilful attack on UK Military Airworthiness was an alleged "Golden Period"!
e). Similarly Air Accident Investigation was placed under the MilAAIB, itself under the MAA. So the regulator, responsible for the airworthiness of UK Military Aircraft, controlled the investigation of military air accidents, including airworthiness related ones. So,
f). The DSA was formed, headed by an RAF VSO DG responsible for both Regulation (via the MAA) and for Investigation (via the DAIB). People, you see?

If BA investigated its own accidents, or could subvert civil airworthiness, would you fly with them? Unsafe military aircraft are a waste, of both life and treasure. They also compromise the very point of military aviation, to close with the enemy and destroy him. If they never get there to do that, or fall foul of the enemy because they are compromised, then that is an own goal. Ours have been rendered compromised because of the actions of certain RAF VSOs; two fleets to date, and 63 deaths avoidable deaths counted in this forum alone. People, you see!

[salad-dodger]

Chugalug, you crawl,out of the woodwork every so often to bump your gums on this subject. The problem is that anyone who has read this forum for a while knows that pretty much everything you know and write on this subject comes from reading pprune, and most of that is from tucumseh's posts. I think we all know that tuc has been there, seen it and done it, and I for one respect his experience. But you have none of this chug. Your cause is a noble one, but as I said, and as we all know, your experience in this area is close to zero.

S-D

[Lima Juliet]

Chug

Have a look at this: Revealed: air deaths cover-up | UK news | The Guardian (http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/jan/14/transport.world)

For ~30 years the operators allegedly knew that DVT was an issue, the CAA medical department and others allegedly knew there was an issue and nothing was done. So if they were so very independent then why was this allowed to continue unchecked? If I follow your rationale then it is deliberate and malicious act (I think that unlikely, and it is more likely just incompetence or grave error).

There have been 'independent' investigations into all manner of things in the past - Hillsborough, Herald of Free Enterprise, Piper Alpha, etc...etc... If you don't believe that money, reputation and human factors didn't skew the outcome then I humbly suggest you rethink. Just look at the change of the recent Hillsborough outcome, and I bet you if it was looked at again then a different set of outcomes would be found or debunked. As long as humans investigate there will be errors, as long as humans manage things, there will be errors. Also, I do not believe that VSOs deliberately kill their own people, they might make errors of judgement or get caught up in a culture that is wrong - but just like any accident it is rarely a deliberate or reckless act, just a stupid set of errors that cost people their lives. Does that make them Saints? No, but it proves they are human!

LJ

[Chugalug2]

Salad dodger, I am content that you feel the cause to be noble. Can we then expect your active support in campaigning for the urgent reform of UK Military Air Safety? Your opinion of me is irrelevant, as I am come to that..

Leon, I am not claiming the civil system to be perfect. I am not claiming that a reformed military system will be perfect. What I do say though is that the very essence of Air Safety is to prevent repetition. That goes for safety systems just as it does for air accidents.

If a system has been fatally compromised by the operator, then it must be placed beyond the reach of that operator. Anything less would be a dereliction of duty, or isn't that seen as an issue these days? The actions of those VSOs goes beyond dereliction, they shame the honour of the Service. Or isn't that seen as an issue these days?

[A and C]

The CAA is funded my me ( and all the other users of its services ).

The AAIB is funded by the DFT.

I would suggest that this independence from the regulator is why the AAIB respected world wide.

May be it is time to have military airworthiness functions split up in the same sort of way.

[Chugalug2]

Indeed A and C, and thank you for reminding us of the source of CAA funding. I too have paid Dane-Geld into its coffers, and grumbled mightily while doing so! I always felt that the grandiosity of the Belgrano should have been replaced by an ex-army Nissen hutted camp somewhere in the Midlands. But that is all by the bye...

I agree about the respect and renown of the AAIB, and look forward to the day when its UK military equivalent is similarly applauded. That won't happen while the operator can moderate its investigations. Similarly with Military Regulation and, as you say, it is just as important that Regulator and Investigator are completely independent of each other as well. The obvious solution to my mind is for the MAA to be sistered to the CAA, and the MilAAIB to the AAIB. Funding for the military "sisters" would be different, but the ethos of the civil components could then be absorbed by the military equivalents and their professional staffs. It can be done, and needs to happen sooner rather than later. The RAF cannot afford to go on grounding any more of its fleets, yet their airworthiness must be assured.

[EAP86]

I believe that at the time of the MAA's creation the question of separation of AW responsibilities was considered. The military and civil aviation environments are different obviously and I heard that this was the key problem. How do you regulate AW in an operational context? You have to consider deployed operations a huge distance from the MAA, you have to consider operational decisions where war fighting and AW are in conflict -- these decisions can't necessarily be delayed by reference back to ABW or HQ.

Any comparisons with the civil approach have to answer the question how the Services operational imperatives are going to be met without interfering with war fighting. I'm sure the MAA would like to hear from anyone who has a feasible solution to offer.

EAP

[Chugalug2]

EAP86, I quite agree that civil and military airworthiness cultures are different. The first prioritises safety above all else, the second uses it to ensure the preservation of the force while not at war, and its survivability when at war. As to the pressures of the battle-field, it is surely possible to arrange the regs so that tactical commanders can counter the regs as required during hostilities (for instance in countenancing troops clinging to the outside of an Apache during a rescue operation!) but be answerable to the MAA after the event. Similarly mods that are in conflict with the regs could be approved by the MAA in time of war (eg retro fitting AAR capability that conflicts with the regs) but would have to be removed again or re-fitted in compliance with the regs afterwards. All this is do-able. What isn't do-able is scrapping the regs when they become an inconvenience and thinking that you can pick up again where you left off decades later. You can't.

[walter kennedy]

AAIB - One case tells you how it has been - MOK.
22 years on and indepemdent analysis has arrived at what should have been the starting point of the investigation.
Directives from the top and a culture of "Omerta" (whatever) within the RAF - what chance any form of AAIB?

[Chugalug2]

The AAIB did not perform the Air Accident Investigation into the Mull of Kintyre tragedy, an RAF BoI did. The AAIB only carried out those tasks required of it by the RAF, and were not allowed to carry out any others.

If your point is that the investigation was botched, then we are in violent agreement, Walter. As to what chance the AAIB, they don't need chance, their performance speaks for itself and is the envy of the world, much as UK Military Air Safety was once...

[Lima Juliet]

IIRC the CAA recieve long term 'loans' from the DfT. You are right that they mostly income generate from their operators, however, think about that for a moment. The regulator is paid by the operator to regulate the operator?!! I go back to my statement of 'biting the hand that feeds'. That is why airlines and commercial airports get massive concessions like amounts of airspace for relatively small amounts of movements compared to busy small airfields - indeed if you don't want to pay the CAA to be a 'licensed' airfield by the CAA then it seems you won't get any airspace at all (not even a 2mile ATZ). How's that for safety!!! :eek:

Anyway, going back to military investigation then any fatal military accident or serious injury has to be overseen by a civilian Coroner and the more meaty ones go to Court. Now unless you think these oh-so wicked VSOs have sway over Coroners then you can't get anymore 'independent' than that as they belong to the Ministry of Justice. Thus the cover up conspiracy can be put to bed!

LJ

[MACH2NUMBER]

I see that Keith Conradi has now moved to HSE, is this the same Keith that was on 43 Sqn in the late 80s?

[Chugalug2]

If only, Leon, if only! It seems bizarre to me that your defence of Military Air Regulation and Air Accident Investigation isn't a defence of either, but instead consists of attacking the civilian regulator. I repeat, the issue that has emerged from the various fatal airworthiness related UK military air accident threads in this forum relate to people and their (in)actions rather than funding. Of course it was funding being squandered that perpetrated the attack on air safety funding and hence provision in the first place, but that attack was carried out by those from the operator (RAF VSOs) simply because they could. Similarly they exercised undue influence on Air Accident Investigations carried out anyway by the Operator, principally to ensure that the airworthiness short comings were not revealed.

As to Coroners, they were usually dismissed by simply being misled, shall we say, by MOD witnesses. Air safety is a very arcane subject and the average Coroner or NoK Legal Representative can be easily hoodwinked. The Oxford Coroner to his credit wasn't, and told the Royal Air Force that, to misquote him, "There is something wrong with your bloody aircraft".

You may ridicule my take on the VSOs that caused this scandal, but when I was serving it was an offence against Air Force Law to issue an illegal order, and it was also an offence to obey it. So a VSO ordering subordinates to ignore the regulations but to sign them off as complied with (ie to suborn them) would have committed an offence under Military Law. Or doesn't that apply above 1* these days?

BTW, that allegation has been given in evidence to the RAF Provost Marshal, and to the Deputy Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police. The first deigned not to answer, the second said it was none of her business. Seems it doesn't apply then...

[tucumseh]

If I could just reset this and ask a question posed here about 5 years ago. Would anything the MAA has done over the last six years have prevented any one of failures discussed here? No. I recall predicting that; then being more convinced after I had the opportunity to speak to them nine months after formation. I hate to say this, but there was not one iota of understanding.

The MAA took advantage of an unnecessary period of grace but I believe that ran out the day it was revealed in court that the ejection seat in the Hawk (and others) did not even have a safety case. Not a poor safety case, as in Nimrod - none at all. That, after a series of supposedly forensic audits of all project teams. What the MAA didn't count on, mainly because its very existence is based on a false premise, is that it was long standing policy and practice to deny funding for safety cases; and airworthiness in general. Today, the glider fleets are grounded, but the main effort seems to have been concocting an alternate phrase - flying is paused. As I often say here, look at the recommendations in all the reports, from the late 80s-on, and the common denominator is "maintain the effing build standard". As time passes, the number of people in MoD who could tell you how to do that, and why it is necessary, plummets into single figures. Now, that is bad enough, but it becomes criminal when you sit down with senior staff, explain it, and they make a conscious decision not to do anything. This quite deliberate gamble (not risk acceptance) with aircrew lives has cost us too many. So, I regretfully disagree with the notion that no-one has deliberately compromised safety. They have, and their names are known and are with the authorities Chug mentions.

The most damning thing is we're discussing this here. The subject should be invisible to aircrew. They should have an airworthy aircraft, upon which to form the basis of their fitness for purpose decision. They should not have to think Is my aircraft airworthy? The very fact it has been made public indicates a total breakdown of basic airworthiness management - six years into the MAA's reign. Yes, they had 20 years of neglect to fix, but they haven't started. A few problems have been got rid of, for example by scrapping Nimrod. Much is made of "independence" here. In the airworthiness context, MoD defines this as having a different line management chain. That no internal pressure can be brought to bear. So, MoD are telling us that the raft of RAF officers in the MAA do not have ACAS or CAS in their line management chain. Hmm. Those of Air Rank will have their eye on what lies above, not beneath. I won't repeat my own proposed solution. It is in the mandated regulations. The one area I would change is I'd increase the role of external agencies. In fact, that proposal was taken up in one area of MoD in 2001. Ironic that an Army land (not AAC) programme adopted and adapted airworthiness regs, and still use them successfully, when the Air domain cancelled them without replacement 7 years later. You couldn't make that up.

[EAP86]

Tuc, my impression from the initial half dozen years of the MAA's life is that most with Air Rank left the Services at the end of their tours. I can only recall one 1* moving on and he was CS. There may be others, memory isn't what it was.

As an aside the issue of protection against the career threat for regulators was raised with Haddon-Cave during his investigations. Perhaps he offered private advice?It wouldn't surprise if part of the 'interview' included an agreement to leave after the tour.

As another aside, the civil regulator these days is of course EASA. I know that the practice of funding the regulator by taxing the regulated has been raised with the EC as an example of poor regulatory practice. The fact that it makes funding EASA easier seems to be the main motivation for the EC. It has been pointed out to the EC many times that the European rail regulator is wholly funded by the EC which seems nonsensical given that rail is probably intrinsically safer than air.

EAP

[Lima Juliet]

Chug

My argument for the MAA and DAIB does not consists of attacking the civilian regulator.. Indeed, it was you that dragged this up in your post #5:

The reason that the AAIB is able to carry out its vital task unencumbered by such effects is independence; from the Air Regulator, and from the Air Operators.

It was you that crowed about the civil system versus the military and it was I that tried to add balance to that by trying to offer an opinion that the civil system may not be that great by having it's own issues (which I have tried to illustrate). Matey, you can't throw bricks in glasshouses without breaking a few windows!

I know that both you and Tuc have personal grievances with the military system, but as others have said here I think you have made your points to such an extent that they start to appear a little bit 'ranty'. If you can't offer a worthy solution to the current system (even if it's above your paygrade) then it really isn't helpful - from my perspective it lessens your argument as you start to look a little mad-crazed about it all :}

Anyway, I think we can agree to disagree...:ok:

LJ

[Chugalug2]

Leon, this isn't some theoretical discussion about the pros and cons of civilian v military regulation and investigation. The "rant" as you call it is an effort to get those who care about military aviation, and in particular about the Royal Air Force, to accept that it has to face up to some very unpleasant truths. Of course that isn't popular, of course it is easier to have a pop at the messenger instead, but this is too serious and too urgent to dismiss as simply "having grievances with the military system". There isn't such a "military system" because it has been rendered dysfunctional, not by honest mistake but by deliberate and malevolent acts that have been the subject of a cover up at the highest levels.

I don't "crow", I simply point to the record of Regulation and Investigation in the two systems. To my mind the difference is obvious, and that really hurts. The system of RAF Flight Safety in my time was a source of pride, a continuous loop of SORs, collated data, and remedial action, all publicised in magazines, posters, films, newsletters etc. Everyone knew that "Flight Safety Concerns You!".

As tuc says, airworthiness was scarcely mentioned, simply a given. I now understand there was an invisible army of engineers, administrators, equippers, and VSOs that lay behind that given, the reality of that oft heard phrase, "A Duty of Care". That is what was laid waste by malevolence and design. Before dismissing all that as being a little mad-crazed, try to take a long hard look at where Military Regulation is today. It has lost the UK its entire Maritime Air capability, it has just grounded two ACO fleets, it has presided over scandals such as the total lack of a Safety Case for the Hawk Seat, only discovering that after it had killed its pilot, and the issue of an RTS that was so restricted that engine ground runs should not have been carried out, let alone a release into squadron service.

Simply saying that this is old stuff that we've all heard before, as tuc and I go on making the same points, strikes me as cynical as the MOD demanding "new evidence" in the campaign to restore the reputations of the deceased pilots. God forbid that we all have to wait for "new evidence" to happen! You seem to suggest that you know there is a problem, but as I don't present a fully staffed paper to solve it then I'm not being very helpful. I intend to go on not being very helpful until this scandal is admitted to by the RAF (for it is the RAF's scandal more than anything) and measures put in hand to reform UK Military Air Safety. You want a suggestion, that is it, face up to the truth and prevent a recurrence!

[tucumseh]

Leon

I know that both you and Tuc have personal grievances with the military systemIf, by "grievances", you mean am I pissed that aircrew I knew well are dead because of fraud and maladministration, guilty as charged. If you mean "grievance" in the employment/MoD sense, then be aware that a formal ruling exists, which Ministers cite to this day, that being instructed to make a false declaration about airworthiness is not an offence, and therefore there can be no grievance. (Must admit, we didn't see that interpretation coming). This was fully articulated in a Ministerial briefing of April 2003 by MoD's Director of Personnel, Resources and Development, in which he cited the 2001 written rulings by the Chief of Defence Procurement, Sir Robert Walmsley. That was not the "military" system you'll note, but the "civilian" part of MoD. The two differ. In 1992 AMSO(RAF) regarded refusal to obey the order as a dismissable offence, which is what led to the Director of Internal Audit report of June 1996 advising PUS that astronomical waste was occurring, and the compensatory "savings" were jeopardising airworthiness. (Which is what gave lie to H-C's "golden period" claim. Some may recall a key event occurring in the middle of that period). By contrast, the civilian side says the offence "merely" warrants a formal warning, as it classifies it as insubordination. The current Cabinet Secy/Head of CS wrote to a Minister on 1 Dec 2014 that it would be "inappropriate" to rescind this ruling.

You continue to keep asking for a "worthy solution". I have proposed implementing mandated regulations, with a slight variation on the past practice - which is actually expressly permitted in the regs, so much so an entire Def Stan is devoted to it. If you regard this as unworthy, please let the MAA know which ones it should ditch. But please don't go as far as CDP in 2001, when ruling aircraft need not be functionally safe. We promptly lost two Tornado crew as a result of that one. I stood toe to toe with two 2 Stars and told them the decision would cost lives. One laughed in my face and walked away. The other agreed with me to my face, but then recommended to CDP (4 Star) that he rule against me. He was the Nimrod 2 Star. It only takes a small few to cause havoc. Both decisions were truly malevolent, made worse because on that occasion it wasn't a general discussion, but a complaint about a specific engineering decision - which was then unwittingly repeated by the BoI President after the crash. Unwittingly, because the self-healing MoD system had withheld vital information from the Board. This is what the MAA should be concentrating on, but their lack of independence makes it culturally difficult.

To get back to the AAIB, in civil cases they are required to assess airworthiness matters. In military cases they are prohibited - it is a job for the Board's engineering member, but few know enough to go near the subject and it they try God help them. The honourable exception is the 2003 ASaC BoI, the only one I know which has cited the regs chapter and verse. This dearth of corporate knowledge means I would happily see the full time professionals of the AAIB take on the same role in both domains. It wouldn't be difficult, the only real difference is in terminology.

The other thing I'd say is that when you talk of "independence" you discuss the MoD as a Department of State. In fact, if you study the accident reports discussed here, "independence" broke down at the Local Technical Committee level; in that MoD removed the (line management) independence of the LTCs in 1991, and disbanded the independent HQ committees altogether in June 1993. If anyone wants to check this look at the recommendations in the Nimrod, Sea King ASaC and Tornado ZG710 reports as a good starter for 10. As an aside, the latter decision is what prevented independent assessment of ACAS's illegal Chinook HC Mk2 RTS. (See MoK Review). I hope this helps explain my position.

[Chris Kebab]

MACH2NUMBER - yep, the very same; he probably remembers Leuchars well! Interesting career path.

[BBK]

I met several of the AAIB chaps albeit a few years ago and what struck me about ALL of them was their fierce independence. Their motivation always appeared to be get to the truth of what had happened. The point is that they were NOT part of the organisation they were investigating be it: operators, CAA, ATC, manufacturers etc. Their career paths and certainly not their pay came from any of the entities that they may have cause to criticise although they do not, if I recall, apportion blame as such.

Now I'm guessing that if a military aircraft crashes the investigator will be an operator of the type. I'll stand corrected if that's not the case but can one guarantee the same degree of impartiality if that is the case?

Is the "civvy" system perfect? Certainly not but in this respect the accident investigators probably have a fair greater claim to be independent. Just my two penn'orth.

BBK

[Wander00]

Heck - if I had realised what a hornets' nest my seemingly innocuous post would stir up, I might not have started. I will be more careful in future!

[Engines]

Wander00,

Please don't be too careful - this is a public forum, and attracts some strong opinions. The one small piece of advice I'd try to offer is that everybody who posts here should remain respectful of others' opinions.

Perhaps I can help explain why the issue of the AAIB has aroused strong reactions. The Haddon-Cave report covered an extremely range of issues directly concerning airworthiness. But there was one issue that was rather curiously included, and that was how aircraft accident investigations were carried out.

As a prelude, it's possibly not widely known that, until the MAA formed up, the RN was the only Service to have its own professionally qualified Accident Investigation Unit. The AIU was part of the RN Flight Safety and Accident Investigation centre (RNFSAIC), and staffed by engineers and aircrew who had all passed the AAIB course. There were frequent and open communications between the AIU and AAIB, to ensure best practice was shared and adopted. The RN AIU also carried out a joint service role, as the AAIB (who carried out accident investigation when request by the RAF and the Army) could not go to war zones. So, as in the case of Nimrod XV230, the RN AIU was deployed to assist the RAF's investigations into the crash.

The Haddon-Cave report's conclusions on accident investigation were extremely surprising and in my view, inadequately justified and poorly thought out. Despite finding that the accident investigation and the BOI had been carried out in a thoroughly professional and exemplary manner, he concluded that a joint MAAIB had to be established, under the control of the new regulator, and that it should be formed by 'folding in' the RN AIU. He ignored that fact that the RN AIU was already providing a joint service capability, asserting (incorrectly) that the RN had no 'fast jet' experience. I know that the H-C team actually spent around 45 minutes on a visit to the RN AIU, and had clearly made their minds up well in advance. The MAAIB was duly formed up under an Army OF-5 - full Colonel. (The RN AIU had run very successfully under an OF-3. The requirement for an OF-5 was driven solely by the 3 star led MAA structure). Needless to say, the Colonel selected had NO accident investigation qualifications or much experience.

H-C's recommendation that the MAAIB be under the control of the regulator was, in my view, quite astonishing and should have been strongly challenged. It's a quite unique arrangement, and (as far as I know) has no equivalent anywhere. The H-C report also went with the RAF approach to BOIs where the accident investigators are tasked to 'assist' the BOI. (The RN system was that a BOI would request an AIU investigation, which would lead to a wholly separate AIU report which would be issued and passed to the BOI.). Shortly after the MAAIB was stood up, it was being tasked by DGMAA to carry out inspections and activities at air stations that were wholly incompatible with an 'independent' role. I know that the AAIB, who had worked so closely with the RN AIU, were extremely upset at the new arrangements.

I have no doubt that RAF senior officers recognised how important it was to have the H-C report deliver conclusions that would best suit their service, and worked hard to achieve this. It's my opinion (and that's all it is) that they recognised the value of the RNAIU and wanted to take control of it via the DGMAA, who was always an RAF 3 star. (Note that even though the MAA is now headed by a two star RN officer, the RAF have retained a two star appointment as the MAA Director Technical). Meanwhile, time moves on and the MAAIB has now been taken out of the MAA, folded into the new Defence Safety Authority, and merged with the Land Accident Investigators. Under an RAF 3 star. Again.

I understand where Chugalug is coming from, and while I don't always agree with all his points, the example of the MAAIB is one where a better solution has to be available. It can be manned by service personnel, and should be, to ensure that the right technical experience is available. But personally, I'd have it taken away from the DSA, well away from the MAA, and reporting direct to 2nd PUS, or even direct to a Minister. Yes, Chug, I know it's still inside the MoD, but it would be out of the reach of the RAF.

One final thing. I worked with the RAF for many years. Almost all those I worked with (up to around OF-6/7) were utterly professional and a credit to their service. But the attitude of some (not all) of their Very Senior Officers (VSOs) to engineering and airworthiness was, in my own mind, doing a fine Service no good at all. I sincerely hope its changing.

Best regards as ever to those seeking to establish the truth,

Engines

[Wander00]

Engines - you obviously did not notice my tongue wedged firmly in my cheek.............

[Pozidrive]

...There have been 'independent' investigations into all manner of things in the past - Hillsborough, Herald of Free Enterprise, Piper Alpha, etc...etc... If you don't believe that money, reputation and human factors didn't skew the outcome then I humbly suggest you rethink. Just look at the change of the recent Hillsborough outcome...


A bit of confusion there between Inquest and Inquiry? The recent event was a re-run of the Hillsborough Inquest. I don't think anyone would deny the original inquiry and investigation (Taylor) led to a great improvement in the management of safety at sports grounds.

[Chugalug2]

Engines, thanks again for your much appreciated contributions. You and tuc have "been there", unlike me (as I am oft reminded on this forum!), and thus have a far better idea of what will work and what will not work. My only reservation though is the concern to make Regulation and Investigation independent, not only of each other, but of the operator(s) as well. In that regard I see no real difference between the Army, the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force, or the MOD. To use a civil analogy you might similarly list; BA, Iberia, or IAG. All three Service VSOs are present in the MOD and it was mainly RAF VSOs there that perpetrated this mess, although I think I am correct that at least one RN VSO who could have stood in their way did not. Not sure about that, but I don't think that past patterns will necessarily repeat themselves anyway, so future arrangements should prevent all unwelcome attempts to subvert either Airworthiness or Investigation.

My simple brain says place both outside the MOD in order to achieve that, though manned by Joint Service (Air Safety Branch?) and Civilian staffs, and wed them to their civilian counterparts for support and technical assistance. Tucumseh prefers outside agencies engaging with solely civilian staffs I think (though I may have that wrong!). Suffice to say, we all want a reformed system to work in rebuilding UK Military Air Safety starting yesterday! It needs a strong independent person with the clout and prestige sufficient to make that happen. The endless committees have failed us all utterly...

[EAP86]

Engines, I have a suspicion that under the original organisational model the MilAAIB had a dotted line around the DGMAA (to PUS2?) to be used in the event that an investigation found issues with the regulators. I might also be mistaken, it was a few years ago...

EAP

[Engines]

EAP,

Thanks for coming back. You may well be right - I do seem to remember that DGMAA had a dotted line to go direct to SofS if 2nd PUS wasn't appropriate.

The latest reorganisation that removed MAAIB from DMAA and passed them over to the new Defence Safety Authority still leaves them as being 'line managed' (according to the MoD press release) by a 3 star, current an AVM. I am afraid that I suspect that the 'SQEP' (God I hate that acronym) profile for this DG post has probably been written to ensure that only an ex-ACAS could actually take it up - the DGMAA job was certainly crafted that way.

It's still (in my personal view, and that's all it is) a severe mistake to have the accident investigators under the line management of the regulators. My view is that dotted lines look pretty, but mean nothing if the regulator is still signing off the personnel reports. The accident investigators need to have a direct line to a senior Minister, again just my view.

Hope this helps, best regards as ever to those trying to work out where they are working this week,

Engines

[Lima Juliet]

Engines

The accident investigators need to have a direct line to a senior Minister, again just my view.

Well said. A positive comment and idea is what I'm looking for! :D:D:D

It sounds like a good one as well. When I worked in Strike Command Flight Safety I had a direct line to the CinC for issues about the Groups. So I like your idea, as I've seen it work well in a lesser environment.

Tuc / Chug - apologies for causing you angst. These are my personal observations on how I percieve things.

LJ

[Chugalug2]

Leon, no need for an apology, but gratefully appreciated anyway. Yours isn't the first nose that I have put out of joint with my "rants", indeed I would have put my own out a few years back! That was before I started learning from tucumseh of the length and breadth of the RAF VSO attack on military airworthiness. It was unbelievable at first, but as the years passed by one sad accident thread followed another; the Parliamentary Hercules, the Baggers Sea Kings, the Nimrod over Afghanistan, the Iraq blue on blue Tornado, the Red Arrows inadvertent ejection and, worst of all, the Mull Chinook, it gradually became clear that the common factor was that the airworthiness system was grossly dysfunctional and that it had been rendered thus deliberately.

The few RAF VSOs that I have conversed with since reject the Lord Philip Report by still claiming that Mull was caused by the negligence (gross or otherwise) of the two deceased pilots. That is the extent of the cover up, 22 years after that dreadful day, a brazen face to the world that rejects the claim that all this was caused from within the RAF Star Chamber. The direct line to your CinC might have worked for Flight Safety, but did you ever tackle him on Air Safety?

It pains me to say this, but is it not time for those who care for the Royal Air Force as it approaches its Centenary to decide if loyalty to such misguided and blinkered attitudes is in the best interests of the Service? It is not enough that many of those responsible have quietly moved off to fresh pastures and sinecure jobs outside. Their actions have brought shame on the RAF, seriously compromised its fighting ability, cost many good lives, and ruined the lives of countless loved ones.

As tucumseh says, evidence has been put forward to Service and Civilian Police alike. It should be reviewed, not ignored. Simple justice demands that at the very least. When this scandal is acknowledged by the RAF it will then grow in stature, and a start can be made in putting this shameful episode behind it.

[EAP86]

Engines, I too hate the MOD's usage of 'SQEP' as it bears little resemblance to it's meaning in the nuclear world where it originated. I blame the safety consultants surrounding the MAA when such decisions were made.

Some time ago I saw a draft of the South African CAA report into the Lightning loss. The investigation had been performed by the CAA's own investigators. It was fairly open about the place of the CAA in the causal chain. Needless to say, the published version was different. Independence is essential.

A couple of years ago EASA circulated a proposal to get involved with accident investigation. The collected response from most involved parties (led by Dave King, ex-AAIB) was very unsympathetic. EASA tails between legs and a minor role in facilitating better links between European investigators.

EAP