Human factors research on pressured decision-making

[AdamsA11]

I am a Human Factors MSc student at Coventry University carrying out research on the factors that affect a commercial airline pilot's decision-making in go-around and rejected take-off situations.


I am conducting a survey that I would like to be completed by pilots who will have knowledge and appreciation of the technical elements of these decisions, and also commercial considerations. If you would like to give 25 minutes of your time to help gather valuable data, please click this link, your participation will be much appreciated.


https://coventry.onlinesurveys.ac.uk/factors-affecting-pilot-decision-making_v2


A short personality questionnaire will be followed by scenarios based on real-life events, where you will be asked to consider what your decision would have been in that situation. You will be debriefed on the outcome of these events after taking the survey.


Thanks for reading this post!


A. Adams


This survey has been checked and approved at PPRuNe Towers

[slast]

Adams11, if you send me a personal message I may be able to help you find some background info.
Steve Last

[Uplinker]

All done.

However, showing what the six "guinea pig" pilots would have done in each scenario before we complete our own replies surely carries the risk of us being influenced by "risky shift"?

[AdamsA11]

Hi Uplinker - that's a good point. We wanted to include the decisions of the trial survey pilots' to replicate a group survey setting, but had to weigh it up against the risk of influencing responses, as you say. We may reconsider this for any future versions of this survey, so thanks for your feedback.

[Jwscud]

Done. I am very aware of the details of two of the incidents in question, which may have influenced responses.

The accident to N303GA in particular is very well known and most respondees will know more details than provided potentially skewing responses to that question.

[RR_NDB]

Hi Adams,

Very interesting and important issue.

There are other studies being considered not just on "go-around and rejected take-off "?

Dealing wit Resilience?

Mac

[Derfred]

Hi Ann,

I have completed the survey. Interesting.

Feedback: I found the last scenario to be of very limited value, because of information not provided that would have been availble to the crew at 500 feet:

1. Airspeed. You stated that airspeed was "high" but did not say how high. That is critical to a go-around decision.

2. Glideslope/glidepath. You stated that the runway looked "normal" to the Captain but did not provide information of what the ILS glideslope was indicating, nor vwhat the vsual approach path indicator (eg PAPI, if there was one) was indicating. Both of these elements would also be of critical importance to a go-around decision.

I note that you stated in your pre-amble that certain information would intentially be withheld for the purposes of the survey, but personality, or that of of one's colleague can hardly be overwhelmingly relevant with the omission of these critical elements in a go-around decision.

Best of luck with your research, Fred.

[AdamsA11]

Hi pilots - Many thanks to all who did the survey, really appreciate you taking the time to help.


Thanks also for the feedback on scenarios - when the survey is closed I'll post a full reply, so as not to muddy any incoming survey responses. Any more feedback or questions about the survey can also be directed to me at [email protected] and I will discuss them here along with the survey results at a later time.


One or two more sets of data would comprehensively hit the target for number of participants in this study. So please, if you haven't already and you have the time, do take a look.


https://coventry.onlinesurveys.ac.uk/factors-affecting-pilot-decision-making_v2


Cheers!


Anna Adams

[Derfred]

Feedback: I found the last scenario to be of very limited value, because of information not provided that would have been availble to the crew at 500 feet:

I might have made an error there, from memory I was referring to scenario 5 rather than the "last" scenario.

Regards, Fred

[barit1]

. . . used in psychology to refer to an irrational obsession that so dominates an individual's thoughts as to determine his or her actions.

[AdamsA11]

Hi,


Thanks everybody for your comments. The response has been very good, we have more than ample participants and a preliminary analysis of the data is showing interesting results.


Every extra set of data will increase the study's validity, so if there is anyone who was considering taking the survey, please do so soon - the survey will open for a few more days.

https://coventry.onlinesurveys.ac.uk/factors-affecting-pilot-decision-making_v2


I'm looking forward to sharing any findings here in a few weeks time, and responding in detail to the points and ideas that have been made. (although Fred - I can say now that you were definitely referring to scenario 5, which is the last scenario.)


Best,


Anna

[FlightDetent]

I enjoyed my time over the questionnaire. Most fun was assuring the answers matched my real predicted self and not the projected image of who I'd like to be.

The overall impression is that of a keen, thorough, growing professional behind the work. Recommended.

[1jz]

Very nicely done survey.. Let's hope you make a good paper out of the data. ��

[Landroger]

Many years ago, I worked with a Physicist, who had a flat mate who worked as a Psychologist at the Department of Aviation Medicine. Farnborough I think. Apparently he was peripherally connected in an 'incident' that involved at least four RAF Jaguar pilots.

The Jaguar outfit were taking part in (I think) 'Red Flag', the then big annual Air Exercise in Nevada. The team set off on a bombing mission in their usual formation until they were 'jumped' by some Air National Guard F16's. Jag's being Jag's, they did what Jag's did in the circumstance and they 'vanished into the weeds', leaving the disappointed ANG still mooching around above a thousand feet. The team complete their bombing mission without further intervention and return to base.

Upon landing, they are confronted by their CO and the Station Commander in high dudgeon and a County Sheriff who is apoplectic and approaching critical mass. He complained that these 'God Damn Limey flyboys had frightened the juice out of one of his deputies driving along a desert highway and torn down several hundred yards of telegraph wires!'

The pilots immediately and unequivocally denied ever having flown low enough for such a thing and were quite genuinely shocked. However, examination of some of the aircraft showed the inescapable evidence. Yards of telegraph wire hanging from several of the airframes. Worse, it was hanging from the vertical stabiliser!

An inquiry was ordered, the pilots grounded and it looked bleak indeed for their careers, but all four insisted they had done nothing wrong. Back in the UK my friend's friend became involved and interviewed the aircrews several times. All claimed they had been comfortable, flying in relatively simple terrain at the usual peacetime exercise altitude which, the Psychologist was interested to learn, was achieved visually. There is little time to consult instruments at that speed and height. After more research and a brain twisting change of thinking, he had the answer.

RAF fast jet pilots train in the UK and northern Europe and reference their height to the trees, many of which stand a hundred to a hundred and twenty feet tall in huge forests. From the cockpit, at 250 feet, the trees look "this high".

The problem is; there are no trees in Nevada - only Mesquite and that is "this high!" :eek:

The pilot's were admonished not to do it again and returned to flying - a major psychology lesson learned. :ok:

Landroger