Harrier in Op CORPORATE

[BATCO]

All
Link to BBC World Service episode of Witness about Harrier in Falklands campaign.
BBC World Service - Witness, The Harrier in the Falklands War (http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p03qr75s)
BBC World Service - Witness, The Harrier in the Falklands War (http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p03qr75s)

Haven't listened to it yet (so hope it's not our favourite FAA guy)
Enjoy
Batco

[Archimedes]

It is our favourite SHAR pilot...

In 1982, a British naval task force sailed to the south Atlantic to retake the Falkland Islands. To provide crucial air cover, the British fleet relied on an unusual and underrated aircraft, the Harrier, We hear from piilot [sic] and author, David Morgan DSC, who flew the Harrier during the conflict.

Oh. You didn't mean him, did you...? ;)

[Courtney Mil]

As it's Dave, I'll give it a listen. Thanks for posting this.

[Heathrow Harry]

Wow! I never realised that UK deployed Harriers in the S Atlantic........

there must be a knowledgeable pilot who can fill us on on all the details....


(ducks rapidly)

[kghjfg]

Without wishing to start WW3, and with the caveat that I'm not fishing for defamatory remarks.

When I read "that" book about harriers in the South Atlantic, I thought the navy came out pretty badly, and the RAF weren't involved until afterwards other than the Vulcan. I thought if factual, it's an interesting if somewhat worrying read. Should I be put right ?

There always seems to be a bit of bad feeling towards the author. Is it possible to say why on an open forum, or is it one of those things that's not really definable in this media.

Just interested.

[thunderbird7]

Because he has a pathological hatred of the RAF that seems to ignore any logic and he is a massive egotist?

[bobward]

KGH,
You could also read Jerry Pook's book Harrier Ground Attack Falklands. That should give you an idea of how the RAF went to work there, and how the Navy senior command didn't seem to understand how to use air power.

[Archimedes]

kghjfg - There are a couple of issues (one of which being that every Pprune thread where he gets mentioned swiftly deteriorates...)

The important thing is to disentangle Cdr Ward the SHAR pilot from Cdr Ward the historian (I use that word in its loosest sense) of air power.

The evidence suggests that the former was a highly capable operator who led his squadron well and whose record during CORPORATE was outstanding.


The evidence also suggests that the latter went from having a bee in his bonnet about the RAF to becoming almost obsessed about the 'light blue' and seeking to do the service down at every possible opportunity. The problem is that many of his comments have subsequently been shown to be misjudged (e.g. regarding the rationale for Op BLACK BUCK - the ultimate irony being that the Chief of the Air Staff argued that the runway should be attacked by Sea Harriers, not the Vulcan...) or just plain wrong (pretty much most of his now-deleted article on the Gulf War on the egregious first incarnation of the Phoenix Think Tank website and a not insignificant chunk of his commentary on other matters - e.g. Nimrod ops during CORPORATE - it's difficult to square his comment regarding them patrolling only around ASI when you're sitting in the National Archives holding the report of the Nimrod crew who got rather close to the mainland in your hand...).

Sadly, his writings seem to have adopted an approach where inconvenient truths are ignored and complex issues simplified if this enables a critique to be made of the RAF. His piece on the PTT about GRANBY included a number of perceived slurs against men killed in action, which was probably the point at which most Ppruners began to take a highly jaundiced view of the man.

Nowadays, I believe that the RN considers him a vexatious correspondent; I know that senior RN officers sigh every time it appears he's made a submission to the select committee, and a brief search of Pprune will see that the man is often played rather than the ball. Given the size of the balls he publishes, a clean tackle can be made without having to have a pop at him, although some argue that there is a case that his personality can't be disassociated from his writings.

Personally, I reckon that history will ultimately remember him for what he did with the Sea Harrier with his writings being relegated to nothing more than a footnote (in time, military historians not yet born will mutter to their students that Cdr Ward did go on to write some odd things in his retirement, but then so did many other retired senior officers [Walter Walker, anyone...?] and then move swiftly on).

[Heathrow Harry]

He needs to find something else to do

[Bro]

It might be of interest to know how many RAF pilots flew the Sea Harrier during Corporate.

[teeteringhead]

And Peter Squire's DFC write up (London Gazette supplement dated 8 Oct 82) gives some flavour of RAF Harrier involvement - but don't tell Sharky! ........


Distinguished Flying Cross
Wing Commander Peter Ted SQUIRE AFC 608512, Royal Air
Force.
Six GR3 Harriers from 1(F) Squadron embarked in HMS
HERMES on 18th May 1982, and a further four replacement aircraft
were flown direct from Ascension Island to HMS HERMES'
deck 3,500 miles away. During the re-invasion phase of the Falklands
operations, 1 (F) Squadron flew from the ship in a wide variety
of bombing, PR and rocket attacks on targets ashore in the Falkland
Islands in support of ground forces, usually at low level
against defended targets. Wing Commander Squire led his Squadron
with great courage from the front flying 24 attack sorties.
He flew many daring missions, but of particular note was an attack
at low level with rockets on targets at Port Stanley Airfield in
the face of heavy anti-aircraft fire when both he and his wing
man returned damaged. Also a bombing attack on an HQ position
when, on approach, a bullet passed through his cockpit which
temporarily distracted him, but he quickly found an alternative
target and bombed that instead. During overshoot Wing Commander
Squire's aircraft suffered engine failure and was damaged
during crash landing at the forward operating base ashore on 9th
June 1982, but he continued flying after his return to the ship
with unabated zeal. Wing Commander Squire has shown outstanding
valour and steadiness under enemy fire, and has led by brave
example.


I imagine these days it would be a DSO, but we were unused then to operational decorations...... :(

[sandiego89]

I have read the Sea Harrier/Harrier Falklands books by Ward, Morgan and Pook, and I can say I enjoyed them all quite a bit and have re-read all of them over the years (not something I do with many books). Ward's came out well before the others. If you ignore much of the last chapter with all the commentary/politics, I still find it a good read. I salute all who served.

[MAINJAFAD]

And Peter Squire's DFC write up (London Gazette supplement dated 8 Oct 82) gives some flavour of RAF Harrier involvement - but don't tell Sharky! ........

In fact, the only bit of the RAF that Sharky had any time (or praise) for was the Harrier Force.

It might be of interest to know how many RAF pilots flew the Sea Harrier during Corporate.

During the actual fighting 7 in total, broken down as follows

800 NAS - 1.
801 NAS - 1. (Was the Sqn QWI).
899 NAS - 3 (2 to 800 NAS, 1 to 801 NAS). First two confirmed A/A SHAR kills were made by two of these pilots. The third was Dave Morgan (Top scorer).
809 NAS - 2 (both to 800 NAS).

[kghjfg]

Thanks to Archimedes for taking the time to reply with such an informative post. Thanks for the other responses and book recommendations too.

I post a little on another forum, and I don't think anyone there would have given a proper response, the tone of a forum comes from the tone of it's members, so, thankyou.

[stilton]

A fascinating conflict with much bravery from all concerned.


Out of curiosity did RAF Harriers in this conflict carry sidewinders and did they score any air to air kills ?

[sandiego89]

Stilton: Out of curiosity did RAF Harriers in this conflict carry sidewinders and did they score any air to air kills ? 25th Apr 2016 20:54


Stilton, if I recall correctly the RAF GR.3 Harriers did carry sidewinders, but not often, during the conflict. The GR.3's were envisioned to provide air-to-ground coverage and to also augment/replace the Sea Harriers in the air-to-air role as Sea Harrier losses were predicted to be high. For much of the conflict they were allowed to concentrate on the air-to-ground mission and normally flew with cannon on the belly strakes, fuel tanks on the inner wing pylons and air to ground ordinance (several bomb types and rockets) on the outer wing stations. There were no air to air kills by the GR.3's, but a few helo's were destroyed on the ground by GR.3's.


Post conflict the GR.3's did stand as air-to-air strip alert (with Sidewinders) before the runway at Stanley could be extended for use by the Phantoms.

[kenparry]

Out of curiosity did RAF Harriers in this conflict carry sidewinders and did they score any air to air kills ?

In the mid-70s I spent some time in a Harrier desk job. At the time, there were several attempts to get the 'winder fitted to the GR3 for self-defence in the European theatre, but the answer from MoD was always " No, it's not necessary": translation "Not our idea and anyway there is no money". Come 1982, the fit was organised and done in about 3 weeks.

[Mogwi]

Stilton, if I recall correctly the RAF GR.3 Harriers did carry sidewinders, but not often, during the conflict. The GR.3's were envisioned to provide air-to-ground coverage and to also augment/replace the Sea Harriers in the air-to-air role as Sea Harrier losses were predicted to be high. For much of the conflict they were allowed to concentrate on the air-to-ground mission and normally flew with cannon on the belly strakes, fuel tanks on the inner wing pylons and air to ground ordinance (several bomb types and rockets) on the outer wing stations. There were no air to air kills by the GR.3's, but a few helo's were destroyed on the ground by GR.3's.


Post conflict the GR.3's did stand as air-to-air strip alert (with Sidewinders) before the runway at Stanley could be extended for use by the Phantoms.

In actual fact, the No 1(f) Sqn GR3s did not carry sidewinders at all during the conflict, although they were fitted with a rudimentary system to allow them a "boresight" launch capability. The jettison system was also a "lash-up" and was directly responsible for serious injuries to two Sappers when a pair of missiles were jettisoned (by firing) as a GR3 got airborne at Stanley, after the conflict.

Post conflict, No 1(f) flew with AIM9Ls from Stanley, occasionally led by SHARs detached ashore.

[BEagle]

Time for me to read your excellent book again, Mog!

[Shaft109]

Just a quick question from a lurker guys -

Although the GR-3 was obviously a ground attack aircraft how did it compare to the Sea Harrier in the A-A role?

To expand if we'd lost a few SHARs and they had to fill the hole left was there much difference dogfighting wise - Avionics excepted.

[PDR1]

Well one huge difference would be the lack of a radar, which is a heck of a limitation for an A-A combat role...

That's why the sidewinder fit was just a "boresighted" thing - point the aeroplane at the target and hope the missile's seaker head can acquire what you're looking at rather than an integrated solution in which the aeroplane's radar hands over a specific target track to the missile's seeker system before launch.

PDR

[Kitbag]

That's why the sidewinder fit was just a "boresighted" thing - point the aeroplane at the target and hope the missile's seaker head can acquire what you're looking at rather than an integrated solution in which the aeroplane's radar hands over a specific target track to the missile's seeker system before launch.

Don't believe any IR AIM 9 until very recently could be aided by a radar system (except the 9C).

[wiggy]

PDR

Don't forget we're talking about 30 plus years back and at the time there were plenty of radar equipped A-A machines tooling around in Europe and elsewhere with boresight only AIM capability.

This is probably one for the likes of the QWIs like Courtney Mil, because I may be slightly adrift on dates, but as I recall it at the time of the conflict even the UK's radar equipped F-4s, by definition operating in the A-A role, didn't have a off boresight capability for it's Sidewinders, either the AIM-9G's or the (just being introduced to the RAF inventory) Limas, .

Don't know about the SHARs fit.

[PDR1]

You may be right, I will admit that I can't remember what was in the original NAVHARS of the FRS1, but the expanded acquisition modes were definitely in the FRS2/FA2.

But doing CAP without a radar (your own, a ground-based one or an AWACS) would mean relying on purely visual threat identification. The scene of action was over the horizon from the carriers' radars, so the only option would have been to have an FRS1 "stand off" and try to use its radar to direct the GR3s into visual acquisistion. Playing fighter-controller is a heck of a workload for a single-seat fast jet driver!

The whole SHAR A-A doctrine was based on using the radars of two aircraft travelling in opposite directions to minimise gaps in radar coverage (sharky's famous "coordinated pairs" tactic), and you can't use a GR3 in the same way. Obviously you can do SOMETHING, but how effective that would have been against radar-equipped missile-armed fighters is another story!

I could be wrong on this. I was a SHAR and then Harrier II man, but only ever as an engineer - never as a driver.

PDR

[BEagle]

We had Sidewinder Expanded Acquisition Mode (SEAM) around then in the F-4 - but IIRC, the SHAR was supposed to be able to slave the missile seeker heads towards the target using Blue Fox?

Weren't pretty well all South Atlantic air-to-air missile kills achieved visually though?

Incidentally, whatever people might think about him in later years, it's clear that Sharkey and 801 Sqn were far more knowledgeable about the use of Blue Fox and the associated tactics than were their 800 Sqn colleagues...

[Flap62]

Without a radar and a significant speed advantage the GR3 would have been of marginal use on CAP. The Shar could cope with the relative lack of speed by having a reasonable radar to get a firing solution. Rolling out three miles behind Mirages in your GR3 wouldn't give you too many options so the initial intercept to visual pickup would have to be virtually flawless to give any chance of success.

[Courtney Mil]

Kitbag,

All marks of AIM9 were aided by radar. Most basically to allow the shooter to perform an intercept and roll out in range. From the early 80s onwards, to slave the mx seeker head to the target.

Regardless of that, boresite, tone, uncage, shoot works pretty well for that theatre.

But Flap62 is absolutely correct. The GR3 would have been, effectively, a point defence Hawk. It was not what it was designed to do.

[stilton]

Thanks for the information, very interesting.

[Tinribs]

My mate Alan Curtis was one of the pair that set off and were not seen again. Usual guesses as to the cause. He had an interesting CV started in the RAF 55 Sqn Victors in 1966 then went out to NZ on something fast and returned to dark blue. He splashed an Argie Canberra prior to the disapearing trick, prbably with a missile. I had E contact with his daughter last year for some photos because she knew little of his RAF career

[PDR1]

Weren't pretty well all South Atlantic air-to-air missile kills achieved visually though?


The kills might have been, but flying around looking for incoming threats visually is never going to be that effective for anything other than point-defence. Initially identifying and tracking the incoming threat and getting into a position to engage it visually needs a radar!

PDR

[tucumseh]

Incidentally, whatever people might think about him in later years, it's clear that Sharkey and 801 Sqn were far more knowledgeable about the use of Blue Fox and the associated tactics than were their 800 Sqn colleagues...

Someone will know the full answer, but might this be due to a dearth of Blue Fox at the time? It was still in its development phase and 6 of the 8 B Models (B3-B8) were deployed, along with a few very early productions models. B1 and B2 were completely incompatible with the rest and each other, being little more than A Models. As with Lynx (Sea Spray) and Sea King (Sea Searcher) the development was shut down with about a year to go and production launched. On BF, the "Jamming Package" of mods was initiated almost immediately and embodied by 1984. This was an interesting procurement dilemma, as the RN's 3 front line radars were all in development at the same time, all needed an extensive CDS package to finish the work, but the BCs forced the final year's development to be spread over the next 8 years.

As an aside, B3-B8 had an astonishing reliability record, and the next time Ferranti saw most of the LRUs was when returned for the ILIC/Anderwave BF Mk2 upgrade in the late 80s/early 90s. The dog's bollo*ks of a radar, and the best radar company we ever had.

[sandiego89]

Quote:
BEagle......Sharkey and 801 Sqn were far more knowledgeable about the use of Blue Fox and the associated tactics than were their 800 Sqn colleagues...






.........Tucumesh: Someone will know the full answer, but might this be due to a dearth of Blue Fox at the time?........


Also contributing, hadn't 801 just finished up a major exercise where they had worked on their air to air tactics and with the Blue Fox quite a bit?

[MAINJAFAD]

Yep, they had just come off the Invincible after doing a North Atlantic cruise with an Alloy Express exercise off Norway at the end of it. Having a Wizard of a CPO Avionics Tech who could work wonders on any of the radars on the Squadron was more than a bit of a bonus as well.

[PDR1]

Yes indeed, and that was the point at which John Fozzard made his remarkably prescient remark about "All the Sea Harrier needs now is a small war a long way from home to prove its capability" or similar. There were those who wondered whether John had actually *paid* Galtieri to invade...

:0)

PDR

[Mogwi]

The AIM9 in the FRS1 could be bore-sighted, slaved to the Blue Fox radar or used in "super scan". This last mode allowed the missile to search a box +/- a few degrees of the nose and + quite a lot of degrees (can't remember how many) above LFD, every few seconds. This effectively allowed it to lock a target that you couldn't get the nose onto. Only trouble was that the software was cobbled together v quickly and it was roll stabilised. This meant that in a hard starboard turn, the missile scanned out of your left ear!

Hey-Ho!

[Wander00]

They also came to Binbrook for DACT with the Lightnings before going South. Great to watch

[exMudmover]

Hi Mogwi,

.......[I]

We did actually,

There was just one day when we had the chance of an AA engagement with the ‘winders. That was 19 May, our one and only ‘training’ day, before we began mudmoving ops, having arrived in theatre on 18 May.

We flew all that day with Limas, practising ACM. All switches had to be made ‘live’ to get acquisitions, but we found no real problem locking on the Lima with boresight aiming. Most of us had already fired a ‘winder on Aberporth, using the same technique. We thought it was a magic weapon.

We were briefed that we could become part of the local Task Group CAP whilst airborne and indeed GOV and the Boss were directed to intercept a suspected enemy B707. Unfortunately it turned away and no intercept resulted, much to our disappointment.

Later on we hoped the Navy might let us join in the CAPs, flying in company with SeaJets if they ran short of airframes, but it was not to be.

Regards

[sandiego89]

Hi Mogwi,

....[INo 1 (F) Sqn GR3s did not carry sidewinders at all during the conflict[/I]...

We did actually,

There was just one day when we had the chance of an AA engagement with the ‘winders. That was 19 May, our one and only ‘training’ day, before we began mudmoving ops, having arrived in theatre on 18 May.

We flew all that day with Limas, practising ACM. All switches had to be made ‘live’ to get acquisitions, but we found no real problem locking on the Lima with boresight aiming. Most of us had already fired a ‘winder on Aberporth, using the same technique. We thought it was a magic weapon.

We were briefed that we could become part of the local Task Group CAP whilst airborne and indeed GOV and the Boss were directed to intercept a suspected enemy B707. Unfortunately it turned away and no intercept resulted, much to our disappointment.

Later on we hoped the Navy might let us join in the CAPs, flying in company with SeaJets if they ran short of airframes, but it was not to be.

Regards


Interesting exmudmover, thank you very much for chiming in.


When you said most had fired a 'winder, was that right before heading South, or in previous work?


Was also curious about the big (300 gallon?) ferry tanks. Did you make any of the long distance flights with them? I recall they affected handling a bit?

[MAINJAFAD]

Was also curious about the big (300 gallon?) ferry tanks. Did you make any of the long distance flights with them? I recall they affected handling a bit?

They were used for the transit from the UK to Ascension (as there are photos of the tanks on the pan at Wideawake next to the aircraft, just before they embarked on Atlantic Conveyor).

4 GR3's were flown to the Hermes directly from Ascension during the last two weeks of the war and the 330 gallon tanks were used on those sorties as well, but were jettisoned before landing on the carrier. The four Harriers that did those sorties also carried a pair of the standard tanks on the outer wing plyons. Where the outer wing plyons 'Wet' and used on the ferry flights or were the standard tanks carried down there 'Dry' just to give the aircraft some tanks to use while being used operationally?

[exMudmover]

Hi sandiego89

Yes we used the big 330gal tanks often on ferry flights. They limited handling and could not be used for any hard manoeuvring or VTOL work. The big gotcha was landing. In the landing config, with nozzles deflected, the ac was quite pitchy and you were limited to a max of 85% power to prevent pitch-up. Not very nice when you were tired after a long ferry flight… I actually experienced a pitch-up once on a night landing at Key West Florida, after a hasty hurricane evacuation from Belize.

MAINJAFAD - IIRC the GR3 outer pylons were dry. Empty 100gall tanks were carried south on all the reinforcement ac because we were running short of them in theatre.

Most of us had fired a winder on Aberporth during our very hasty work-up for CORPORATE.

[noprobs]

Only the 2 inner pylons were wet, so 100 gal tanks carried outboard were for later use on the inboard pylons. Steve Jennings gives an interesting insight into the introduction of the 330s, and Chris Burwell describes an eventful landing in Goose Bay with them, both in volume 1 of Harrier Boys. Also in there are tales from Mike Beech, one of the pilots that flew down to join the Task Force. They had to jettison the big tanks, something never trialled before then, followed by their first deck VLs. The size of the tanks also limited flap travel.

[The Old Fat One]

Haven't read the whole thread, nor the dudes book, and it's not really an area I want to start a bunfight in, but for the sake of balance I'll say this...

I've read one or two "derisory" remarks from the dark blue about the antics of the Nimrod fleet during the hot part of the Falklands War and bluntly...they are pretty much spot on.

There were some good guys doing good stuff in April/May 1982, but there were also a couple of total knobheads off the leash and this led to a couple of very well known and easily avoided SNAFU's which in true military fashion put everyone into complete denial mode...at the time and ever since.

And I don't need to go to the National Archives to know what went on....ken what I mean ;)

[MSOCS]

Actually TOFO, no. I've no idea what you are referring to.

Please, for the sake of a logical thread flow, could you explain what exactly it is that you're on about?

Genuinely.

[Courtney Mil]

Yeah, I don't get it either. I had a fair bit to do with the Nimrod guys in Ascension at that time (and the Victor guys for obvious reasons and the Herc guys) and I didn't get a sense of anything amiss.

[Mogwi]

Hi Mogwi,

.......[I]

We did actually,

There was just one day when we had the chance of an AA engagement with the ‘winders. That was 19 May, our one and only ‘training’ day, before we began mudmoving ops, having arrived in theatre on 18 May.

We flew all that day with Limas, practising ACM. All switches had to be made ‘live’ to get acquisitions, but we found no real problem locking on the Lima with boresight aiming. Most of us had already fired a ‘winder on Aberporth, using the same technique. We thought it was a magic weapon.

We were briefed that we could become part of the local Task Group CAP whilst airborne and indeed GOV and the Boss were directed to intercept a suspected enemy B707. Unfortunately it turned away and no intercept resulted, much to our disappointment.

Later on we hoped the Navy might let us join in the CAPs, flying in company with SeaJets if they ran short of airframes, but it was not to be.

Regards

Hail exM!

You are, of course correct, I had forgotten the "training" day!

Check 6!

[Archimedes]

Actually TOFO, no. I've no idea what you are referring to.

Please, for the sake of a logical thread flow, could you explain what exactly it is that you're on about?

Genuinely.
It's a reference to my comment in post #8, answering a query by kghjfg. I noted that Cdr Ward's comments about the Nimrod fleet were difficult to reconcile with the records, and TOFO is responding to that.

(For clarity, Ward's argument in at least two lots of his writing utterly rejects TOFO's line 'There were some good guys doing good stuff in April/May 1982' and is that the Nimrod force served no useful purpose in any way, shape or form during Corporate, simply bimbling about just outside visual range of ASI.)

[MSOCS]

Oh, I see, it was Ward's comments. Shame that particular apple fell far from its tree afterwards.

Ground Attack Falklands was a better book IMHO.

[stilton]

What great replies, amazing, thanks Gents for your enlightening information and for your service.

[Tengah Type]

Since we were flying 10 hr AAR sorties in the Victors to support the Nimrods, they must have had exceptional eyesight to be " just outside visual range of ASI ".

[MAINJAFAD]

I may be wrong here, but I suspect the events that TOFO are referring to involve a radar surface search mission off the Argentinian coast by a Nimrod, that reported that the Argentinians had sortied a small naval task group which possibly could threaten the supply lines (not that far fetched seeing that the Argentinian Air Force did attack tankers well to the north of the Falklands with Canberra's and a Hercules fitted with bomb racks on the wing tank pylons). In the end a sub was dispatched to check out the contacts which turned out to be a group of Japaneses trawlers because for some reason the Nimrod didn't attempt to do a visual check). The story is mentioned in both Woodward's book and Mike Clapp's book about the Amphibious Assault forces (which actually covers his AD plan for the AOA, and I suspect had he had the offer of a point defence by Winder equipped GR3 behind the SHAR CAP stations, he would have bitten 1 Squadron's hands off to get it).

[sandiego89]

exMudmover and Mogwi, thanks so much for the replies- great to pull up a bar stool and listen in. I appreciate the info on the handling with the big tanks- they do sound like a handful.

[The Old Fat One]

Yeah, I don't get it either. I had a fair bit to do with the Nimrod guys in Ascension at that time (and the Victor guys for obvious reasons and the Herc guys) and I didn't get a sense of anything amiss.

lol...I was Squadron Training Team specialist on the bit of kit in question, a Combat Advanced (B-cat in old money) Lead Dry and but nobody in theatre in April 82 had more hands on time on said kit than I did.

But yeah, wtf did I know.

MAINJAFAD, you are on the right lines, but I'm not commenting further because individuals could be easily identified and I have no wish to engage with any one on a personal level. This is something that massively p11ssed me of in 1982 and which was quickly covered up thereafter. As usual history has now been changed...as it always is.

And really it's not even the main point. The main point is this...

"the Nimrod force served no useful purpose in any way, shape or form during Corporate, simply bimbling about just outside visual range of ASI"

If that is indeed what the man said (I have no idea) it is largely true. The semi useful stuff we did do, didn't really bring much to the table, and anybody that says that the ops would not have continued exactly as they did, if the Nimrod had stayed at home is talking through their hoop.

So what? The kipper fleet still did the best it could, and it contributed massively to our countries security in so many other theatres, especially the Cold War, which was by an order of magnitude far more important that the Falklands Conflict. Maritime patrol remains central to our nation security and thank goodness it is coming back.

As for the Falklands - one hell of a lot of military folk from all arms did a magnificent job - focus on them

I'm out.

[Archimedes]

With respect, TOFO, I'm not believing anything other than this:


it's difficult to square his [Ward's] comment regarding [Nimrods] patrolling only around ASI when you're sitting in the National Archives holding the report of the Nimrod crew who got rather close to the mainland in your hand...).


Which - as far as I can see - does nothing other than suggest that Cdr Ward's comments about how far away Nimrods got from ASI/were away from the TEZ are wrong.


I merely assumed that it was reasonable to observe that, since there is rather a lot of evidence (archival and anecdotal) that shows that Nimrods went a bit further south than Ward says, it serves as a warning about needing to be cautious about taking everything he says as gospel. Which, of course, was in answer to a question about the quality of his account.


I don't know enough about the efficacy of Nimrod ops to comment about that. Which is why I didn't... (although I presumed that your comment about 'good guys doing good stuff' meant that it wasn't a picture of unredeemed hopelessness).


My apologies if you thought that I was attempting to comment about that via 20:20 hindsight and a small number of some scruffy files at Kew...

[MACH2NUMBER]

I remember deploying with 2 Lightnings to Yeovilton during the FI work up. We flew against Cdr Ward. He got spanked and in debrief he said something on the lines of " You 2 have obviously flown a lot together", in fact it was the first time.
A brave aviator, but IMOP much of his book was opinionated nonsense.

[Marcantilan]

Don't want to hijack the thread, but the Nimrod crews have my admiration.

Anyone recognizes this?

http://i67.tinypic.com/2h5jtwj.jpg

[Tourist]

This may be the strangest thread drift on Pprune for a while.

A solid Nimrodder slagging off their contribution to the Falkland conflict and everybody who was not a Nimrodder refusing to believe him?!?

Personally I have no knowledge whatsoever either way.

[Archimedes]

I'm prepared to believe him - at worst it's a valid perspective so far unchallenged by his colleagues from the time; my point (which seems to have started it. Sorry...) was purely about how far away they got from ASI.

But you're right - it's the most peculiar thread drift we've seen for quite a long time.