Ownership of risk [Archive]

Aurora Australis

29th Mar 2016, 11:54

Hi,
As a Falkland Islands resident, I am interested in trying to understand the reasons for what seems to be a significant change in the operating rules for fixed wing operations into Mt Pleasant Airport over the last year or so.

Some background info for those unfamiliar with the location -
Mt Pleasant Airport was opened in 1985 as a military airfield, and is also the Islands only International airport. It was built in a location that generally has the best weather on East Falkland with respect to cloud base and visibility. The 2000' East-West range of hills just to the North of the field shelter it from low cloud and fog that often affect the North and Northeast coast. The most frequent strong winds are westerly, however the next most common direction is Northerly, and this often results in what is referred to as "rotor streaming", with associated moderate to severe turbulence, and potentially limiting crosswinds.

For thirty years, this did not seem to cause major issues with the regularity of the international flights to the islands. (There are two MoD flights a week from UK via Ascension Island, and one a week from Punta Arenas, Chile, plus various other charter flights). There were occasional delays when extreme Northerlies were forecast, but as far as I understand it, the decision to operate a specific flight was a crew decision.

For about a year or so, the airfield has regularly and frequently been officially closed to all fixed wing traffic whenever there is any turbulence forecast (including P30 Tempo) and the forecasts also seem to have become far more cautious, with the forecast turbulence often not actually appearing.
This has caused significant delays on an almost weekly basis, and has been applied on a very rigid basis, apparently purely on the forecast rather than the actual.

I can understand not departing Ascension for an 8 hour sector with limited alternates if doubt exists. However, I find it surprising that, for instance, the LanChile flight has been refused due to airfield closure rather than allowing it to make its own judgement based on actual at time of arrival (including one time when they were turned back with only about 20 minutes to run). Also, the Oil exploration charter flight was on more than one occasion barred from departing MPA due to airfield closure based on forecast, when the actuals were absolutely fine.

I have heard that the change in rules has something to do with a change in the military rules on "Ownership of risk" (an expression I had not heard before), and that the Ownership used to rest with the aircraft crew, but now rests with the Commander Air Wing, or Station Commander of the military airfield.
MPA cannot be the only airfield affected by such turbulence. At other such locations, are things handled differently? Is this a difference between Civ and Mil, or a difference between Falklands and everywhere else?

There must be a lot of people here who have operated these routes - would you be glad/relieved that the decision is taken out of your hands, or would you want to have the option to make your own decision?

NutLoose

30th Mar 2016, 11:05

bump anyone?

Basil

30th Mar 2016, 13:24

I have heard that the change in rules has something to do with a change in the military rules on "Ownership of risk"
Don't know but you could be right:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/regulatory-article-ra-1210-ownership-and-management-of-operating-risk-risk-to-life

Glad I'm not an Airship who has to read and comply with all this stuff!

p.s. Anyone inferring that the foregoing would apply in wartime would be very misguided to base their actions upon that misconception ;)

Sandy Parts

30th Mar 2016, 14:53

Sounds like a chat with your 'liaison officer' might be in order. There must be someone in the FI Govt who meets regularly with the Station Executive (including OC Ops who will be the person interpreting the rules on behalf of the Stn Cdr).

Arty Fufkin

30th Mar 2016, 18:23

An encounter with severe turbulence and rotors on take off or approach / landing is a dangerous event in my book.

Prob 30 tempo; a 30% chance that it will be there 50% of the time. Not far off the odds you get playing Russian roulette. As for the actual, you won't know it's there or how bad it is until you're in it.

Better to arrive late than dead in my book, I'd say sensible rather than risk averse........

Lordflasheart

30th Mar 2016, 18:51

From the good book - 8.20

"Warning: Moderate to severe turbulence due to rotor activity when wind from North (indicated by 56/// group in the Terminal Area Forecast). No Fixed-Wing operations will be allowed without the consent of the AO or his nominated deputy during periods of forecast rotor activity."

HTH - LFH

glad rag

30th Mar 2016, 21:54

As has been stated above, thats just for your girly Ascots, I have launched F3's from the housey where even the breeze through the opening for the APU stopped the lid coming down due to it's rotation [the canopy not the APU] thank heavens on being able to fall back to RAFG experience; launched the cab and was treated to the finest display of airmanship and flying skill [what else from a QFI] as the crew turned short under the hill, sideslip held whilst flying at an angle in the turn, gaining a minute on the interception.

One of the few moments where the groundies stood in the storm winds and lashing rain, 8 foot tall shouting their heads off [cos we ain't sepitcs, it's a bit unusual, to say the least].

fergineer

30th Mar 2016, 23:39

Glad me old chum, when you were launched in your F3, if it was anything like when the F4 were there we in the Herc tanker were right behind them but them was when we was needing them not feeding them.

Rotors were not a nice thing to have to put up with if you didn't need too.

ExAscoteer

31st Mar 2016, 00:03

Girly Acots? Oh DO **** off!

Without us you would have been particularly ****** in your useless 'flicknife'. :rolleyeyes:

Aurora Australis

31st Mar 2016, 01:00

Thanks for the bump NutLoose, before it faded into oblivion without comment!

Thanks for the link Basil, I had not thought to search the expression. Interesting reading, and I do not claim to have studied it in detail (yet).

I understand the concept and the reasons for Risk Assessment, but wonder if it can be a rather blunt instrument at times. In this case, it has been identified that a risk exists, during certain met conditions, of turbulence worse than might be obvious, that could result in an aircraft accident. The chosen solution seems to be that during any period that the turbulence is forecast, the airfield will be closed, regardless of the actual conditions (thanks LFH for the chapter and verse on that).

Arty, I fully agree that encounters with severe turbulence and rotors are dangerous, and I am not suggesting ignoring the risk. However, is "Risk Assessment" not what our job as professional pilots mainly consists of? We have our individual training, our company/organisation Ops Manuals with all their limitations to guide us. I am interested in how the "Ownership of risk" has migrated from the aircraft crew/airline/operator to the Airfield operator. Are the conditions found at MPA so unique that the decision must be taken away from the crew? How are decisions made at other international airports that suffer similar weather issues - is it an airfield decision or an operator decision. Is this a difference between Civ And Mil?
LanChile regularly operate into very challenging destinations, such as Ushuaia. I am sure there are turbulent conditions when aircraft stop operating, but is it the Airport that decides? (Maybe it is, I do not know).
I agree that with rotors, you cannot predict exactly when they will hit if it is already blowing 350/30-40, but when the forecaster has forecast 330/15-20, Tempo 340/25g35 530003, P30 tempo vrb05 560003, it does not go from 15 kts to 560003 in an instant. It has often been the case during the past year, since the rules changed, that aircraft have been prevented from contemplating a departure based on actual conditions, because the airfield is closed based on what might happen rather than what is actually happening.

Sandy Parts, appreciate your suggestion of a chat to the Liaison Officer, however as a lowly individual (albeit with an aviation background), I don't think I would get much out of it - I suspect from various conversations I have had that there are people representing various operators (Hi-Fly oil charter?, LanChile?), and the FI government who don't seem to be able to get any review of the rules considered.

Dan Winterland

31st Mar 2016, 03:50

It's not new. The Tri-star wasn't cleared for flight in severe turbulence and at least two air-bridges were delayed as a result to my own knowledge - and disgust!

Aurora Australis

31st Mar 2016, 23:08

Hi Dan,
Yes, Tristars were occasionally delayed, but the past year has been totally unlike previously. I have been up and down the UK-FI route in the region of 100 times over the past 30 years. Prior to this year, I can remember maybe five or six times that I had weather related delays. During 2015 I had three consecutive flights with more than 24 hours delay due to airfield closures. Something has definitely changed.
Maybe the way the Met Office processes information has changed. I do not recall when they started using the 5///// turbulence group in the TAFs - my impression is that it is only in the last couple of years. Out of interest, do any of you with wider international experience recall seeing this group being used anywhere other than the Falklands?

Lordflasheart

5th Apr 2016, 19:45

The new style "Defence Aerodrome Manual" originates centrally from the MAA in skeleton form, for local completion. Its purpose is "... to provide a mechanism to inform both military and civilian operators of accurate aerodrome data."

The new manuals were first published in late 2014 which might explain the time frame of the OP's perception of certain changes in procedure. That also coincides nicely with Basil's "RA 1210 - Ownership and Management of Operating Risk (Risk to Life)" and the multitude of other RAs that have recently appeared from the MoD.

The MAA was established in 2010 as "..... an independent organisation responsible for regulating air safety across defence." However, in 2015 the MAA became part of the Defence Safety Authority, which -

"..... was launched on 1 Apr 2015 and is headed by Air Vice Marshal [now Air Marshal] Richard Garwood. The DSA brings together the Defence Safety and Environment Authority (DSEA), Military Aviation Authority (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_Aviation_Authority) (MAA) and Defence Fire Safety Regulator (DFSR), to form a single common managed organization under the leadership of a 3-star Director General (DG) - DG DSA."

Back to the original question. I had to search all over for an explanation of the mysterious "56/// group" quoted in theMPA aerodrome manual para 8.20. It seems it's intended to refer to the six-symbol turbulence forecast group in the TAF, that follows the cloud group. Not to be confused with the similar five-symbol 'pressure tendency group' in the RMK section of a METAR, where presumably plain language reports of actual turbulence would also reside.

That the OP referred in passing (but correctly) to 5///// would not therefore seem to be accidental. Thus it might be that a small correction is required in order for MPA's 8.20 to make sense.

TAF Turbulence Group decodes as - First digit 5 indicates Turbulence is forecast.
Second digit indicates both intensity and frequency, on a 0 - 9 scale plus X for Extreme.
The remaining four symbols indicate height, or show as //// to complete the group if no height info is available.

Intensity level 6 - is 'Severe Turbulence in clear air, occasional' while 7 indicates 'Severe turbulence in clear air, frequent.' Moderate versions of the above are indicated by 2 and 3

So the example group 56/// in 8.20 refers solely to "Severe turbulence in clear air, occasional" and is only one of four possible intensities of CAT implied by the accompanying text – viz "Moderate to severe ..." which would if encoded correctly, range from 52//// to 57//// with four slashes, plus 5X//// if it were forecast to be extreme.

As for TAF - I was brought up to understand that the A in TAF stood for Aerodrome, rather than "Area" as used in 8.20.

If the AO decides to shut MPA to fixed-wing operations iaw 8.20, how is that promulgated on the basis of a forecast ? By publicly declaring "Aerodrome Colour State Black" (for a period of time in the future) ? - Or by a longer form of words, perhaps only addressed to prospective operators ? And are rotary-wing crew left to decide for themselves ?

It is possible that MPA's 'Annex HH: Thunderstorm & Strong Wind Procedures' explains some of the above 'anomalies' but I could not find it.

In respect of other stations with known turbulence problems, I could only think of Gibraltar. While not playing down potential weather hazards, there is currently nothing as strong as "No Fixed-Wing operations will be allowed without the consent of the AO ...." in the RAF Gibraltar Aerodrome Manual – even in their Annex HH. Maybe it's because they don't have the power to actually close Gib airfield.

As for asking around, have you tried talking to FIGAS pilots or the Erics ? They should have a much better explanation, extensive local knowledge, and their own independent views, that might be willingly imparted - in private - over a couple of wets.

HTH - LFH

Aurora Australis

8th Apr 2016, 19:02

Thanks for the reply LFH.
I did consider explaining all the codes in my original post, so sorry you had trouble in finding them.

I assume your information at post#6 is verbatim from the book. If so, you are correct that they have got it wrong, on two counts - first that it should be a 6 character group, and second that it states "moderate to severe turbulence....indicated by 56/// group..." where 56 specifically only refers to "severe turbulence in clear air, occasional".

Also, your excerpt states "turbulence due to rotor activity indicated by 56/// group". In my view that is not strictly correct - those codes say nothing about the cause of the turbulence. There will be turbulence to some degree any time the wind at MPA is from the North, but the clue to the fact that it is rotor streaming is not in the 560003 alone, but the fact that it is accompanied by (e.g.)VRB05 - for someone not familiar with the phenomenon, they could be fooled into thinking that the TEMPO VRB05 meant the occasional relief from the bad turbulence of northerly 45kts, whereas it is exactly the opposite - it is when the rotors break off the hill and stream down over the airfield that the wind comes from all directions and is at its most turbulent.

I am very aware of the independent views of the local non-military operators (and the international non-military operators) - it is a subject that has been discussed at length, and no-one I have spoken with understands or agrees with the current policy.
(Incidentally, you are showing your age with your reference to Erics - Bristow have not been the military contractors at MPA since 1998 when British International won the contract, although Bristow have been operating out of Stanley for the past year on the Oil Support contract)

Aurora Australis

4th Nov 2018, 18:26

I started this thread in 2016 in frustration at the way that the military arbitrarily close Mount Pleasant Airport to all fixed-wing movements under certain Met conditions (detailed in the posts above).

However, the thread faded away without really getting to the answer to some of my questions.

This weekend has seen yet another highly disruptive delay to the LATAM connection from Santiago via Punta Arenas, including a 24 hour delay due to turbulence forecast yesterday afternoon (when during the whole period, the strongest wind reported was 18 kts with no gusts), followed by turning the re-scheduled aircraft back when it had only about 25 minutes to run today, due to an updated TAF forecasting the turbulence (this time the actuals being 29 kts with no gusts reported). Todays crew requested over the radio to continue, and assess the conditions for themselves, but were prohibited and turned back.

I would like to try again, and repeat a couple of the questions I asked previously (in bold, below).

"Maybe the way the Met Office processes information has changed. I do not recall when they started using the 5///// turbulence group in the TAFs - my impression is that it is only in the last couple of years. Out of interest, do any of you with wider international experience recall seeing this group being used anywhere other than the Falklands?"

"I am interested in how the "Ownership of risk" has migrated from the aircraft crew/airline/operator to the Airfield operator. Are the conditions found at MPA so unique that the decision must be taken away from the crew? How are decisions made at other international airports that suffer similar weather issues - is it an airfield decision or an operator decision. Is this a difference between Civ And Mil?"

Lordflasheart kindly responded with a comment (above) that he could only come up with Gibraltar, where despite severe turbulence issues, the decision is still not mandated by the Airfield Operator, but (presumably) left to the airline/crew to decide.

I know that LATAM regularly operate through Ushauia, which can be extremely turbulent, but as far as I know, the airfield is not prohibited to traffic by the Airport authority.

I am aware that Madeira suffers from extreme turbulence - how is the decision making done there?

Cows getting bigger

4th Nov 2018, 19:12

Madeira. Firstly they have crew 'qualifying' criteria:

Crew requirements
Initial experience To operate at Madeira Airport, the Pilot-in-command must have a minimum of 200 flying hours as Captain on the concerned type of aircraft, before completing the initial training.
Recent experience To operate at Madeira Airport, the Pilot-in-command must have performed there, on the last six months:

one landing and take-off or,
a flight simulator training comprising a landing and take-off on each runway, on a simulated adverse weather condition or,
a line training flight to Madeira Airport, comprising a landing and take-off, assisted by a qualified instructor occupying the right-hand seat.

The Pilot-in-Command is authorized to operate to Madeira Airport (LPMA) for a period of six months starting from the date of issue.
Minimum training requirements

In order to operate at Madeira Airport, the operator must establish and accomplish beforehand a training program concerning the type of aircraft to be used. This training, if performed on local flights, must include at least, landings and take-off by day and night in both directions, emphasising:
the TKOF flight path to runway 23,
the TKOF flight path to runway 05,
the balked landing (go-around initiated in landing configuration from very low height) on both directions,
the let down and approach to both runways,
the operation effect on runway slope and dimensions and associated safety margins.
If the flight is to be performed in a flight simulator, the following procedures must be included in the training program, for each runway:
take-off with engine failure after V1,
relight after engine failure,
VOR approach,
balked landing and go-around,
visual approach,
landing,
weather conditions: wind - the maximums as indicated in paragraph 2.3. Severe turbulence, Windshear and up and down drafts, must be included in the different approaches,
one landing at night must be executed for each runway.
Line training

No line training is required if the flight simulator used is level D. If level C flight simulator is used, line training must be performed with one landing and take-off in Madeira Airport, with an instructor occupying the right-hand seat.

They then have very specific wind criteria:

Wind Limitations
When landing
1. Maximum of two minutes mean Wind Speed Values indicated by the Touchdown anemometer:

In the sector 300° to 010° MAG (clockwise) - 15KT, with the maximum Wind Gust of 25KT
In the sector 020° to 040° MAG (clockwise) - 20KT, with the maximum Wind Gust of 30KT
In the sector 120° to 190° MAG (clockwise), and if Runway in use is 05 - 20KT with a maximum Wind Gust of 30KT, and if Runway in use is 23 - 15KT, subject also to maximum Wind Gust of 25KT as indicated by MID Anemometer.
2. Maximum of two minutes mean Wind Speed Values,including Gust indicated by the MID or ROSÁRIO Anemometers

In the Sector 200° to 230° MAG (clockwise) - 25KT.
b. When Taking-off

1. Maximum of two minutes mean Wind Speed Values indicated by the MID anemometer:

In the sector 300° to 010° MAG (clockwise) - 20KT with no Gust limitations
In the sector 020° to 040° MAG (clockwise) - 25KT with no Gust limitations
In the sector 120° to 190° MAG (clockwise) and if Runway in use is 05 - 25KT with no Gust limitations, and if Runway in use is 23 - 20KT, also with no Gust limitations
NOTE: The limitations above do not supersede any Operators or Aircraft Operations Manual (AOM) limitations if these are more restrictive

Having operated in MPA (albeit the late 80s) and more recently Madeira and the Azores (you want to try Horta or San Jorge with a stonking Northerly!), I'm pretty confident that MPA is a relative walk in the park. I think the real issue is the (non) education of the relatively new military beast, the DDH. Now that people have absolute clarity regarding their personal responsibilities, we're seeing a weakness in teaching and understanding of Risk Management. Consequently, DDHs may be (are?) being overly risk averse. Obviously a very difficult subject but it is my perception that Total Safety has just left kindergarten for Reception and there's still some way to go.

Aurora Australis

4th Nov 2018, 19:57

Thanks for that. Interesting that the specific wind criteria seem to only refer to Actual reported conditions, not Forecasts.

The frustration that many of us (professional pilots who have operated in the Falklands for 30 or more years, albeit not of large fixed-wing aircraft types) have is that the Operators at MPA close the airport based on TAFs, not METARs.
I would have no issue with them delaying or cancelling their own operations based on issues such as logistic/cost problems if an 11 hour flight from Cape Verde (since Ascension is no longer used) ends up having to divert to Montevideo, but it is a different matter for a 2 hour commercial flight from Punta Arenas to be turned around on a forecast when 20 minutes out with no signs of the forecast turbulence actually happening, or a departure being cancelled in similar circumstances when the airfield is flat calm, which has happened on many occasions.

I don't have the figures to hand, but I would estimate that over the last three or four years, something approaching 20% of all international flights to MPA have been delayed by 24 hrs or more.

SASless

4th Nov 2018, 22:10

Good thing no one ever wanted to go to war down there!

India Four Two

5th Nov 2018, 05:12

I missed this thread first time around. I had a quick look at GE and see there are some 500 m hills about 6 nm NW of MPA. Are these the hills generating the "rotors"?

I have extensive experience of flying (in light aircraft, as well as an airline passenger) in the area immediately downwind of the Canadian Rockies. Closing airports in Alberta (or Colorado, Wyoming and Montana, for that matter) on the basis of forecast turbulence would cripple commercial air transport.

The description of the closure criteria at Maderia based on actuals seems eminently sensible.

Consequently, DDHs may be (are?) being overly risk averse.

It looks like a classic case of CYA.

Todays crew requested over the radio to continue, and assess the conditions for themselves, but were prohibited and turned back.

I wonder if the crew were tempted to declare a PAN based on "fluctuating oil-pressure"? :E

flighthappens

5th Nov 2018, 06:32

staircase

5th Nov 2018, 08:10

I will perhaps receive a fair amount of derision for this, but once I had left the service, I was asked what differences I had noticed between civil operation and military.

Apart from the obvious ones such as not being TacEvaled in my airline, or the risk of being shot down, it seemed to me that every time my commercial aeroplane moved it was in the hope of making money. Contrast that with a military aeroplane that costs money to fly.

So my point is, that if you give this decision to the local military commander ask yourself what is in it for him to ‘put his head above the parapet’ and assume the risk?

If there is no accident, then normal operations continue and no one notices. If there is an accident the chances are that his career is finished.

The answer maybe is to take the airfield and make it dual operations. A civil authority to oversee the civil aspect and issue wind limits as at Madeira, and let the military issue their own wind limits.

beardy

5th Nov 2018, 09:43

I recall something that happened some time ago: Following a successful landing in a strong crosswind at Mount Pleasant an ex FAA Air Atlanta 747 captain was summoned to OC Ops office. Said captain entered, sat on a corner of OC Ops desk and said 'hello.' He was interrogated about 747 crosswind limits, his reply was along the lines of 'none of your business.' End of interview.

Cows getting bigger

5th Nov 2018, 09:48

Having jumped across to the civil world some 10 years back, I find that all roads lead to the Company Ops Manual. That's my bible. :)

glad rag

5th Nov 2018, 10:51

It may well be that until policy is revisited by higher authority their hands are tied. Or it may have already been...If the FG want to open up the islands to tourism then a reliable air connection would be a priority,

Aurora Australis

5th Nov 2018, 21:48

I had a quick look at GE and see there are some 500 m hills about 6 nm NW of MPA. Are these the hills generating the "rotors"?

Yes, these are the hills generating the rotors. And please, do not think that I am denying that rotor streaming is real, and that it is hazardous.
What I would question is the frequency that hazardous rotor streaming actually occurs, compared to how often it is forecast.

Now that people have absolute clarity regarding their personal responsibilities, we're seeing a weakness in teaching and understanding of Risk Management. Consequently, DDHs may be (are?) being overly risk averse.

Yes, I think that is the problem - but I would have thought it was the responsibility of the Airfield Operator to make the Aircraft Operator aware of the hazard, rather than to mandate the operating limits.
The trouble is that actually, no-one is taking personal responsibility, as the Airport Operator bases the decision on the TAF, and the TAF is based on the computer met model, so in practice, it is all down to what the computer says. The problem is that the computer predicts a P30 severe turbulence any time there is a hint of a Northerly, and in fact, the rotor streaming is a much more rare occurrence.

It comes down to the "Ownership of risk". I am sure that if the ownership of the risk was given to the Aircraft Operator (as the majority of crews I have discussed it with think makes sense), then on a day with the aircraft fuelled, loaded and ready to go, with a 15kt NWesterly with no gusts, and a TAF of P30 tempo severe turbulence, the aircraft would depart, rather than being held for 24 hours, as has happened on more than one occasion.

The comments above about "crippling commercial air transport", and "a reliable air connection" being a priority, hit the nail on the head. Unfortunately the suggestion of having dual operating authorities at MPA is not likely, due to the small size of the civilian administration here. While the airport is nominally a joint civil/military facility, in practice there is not enough traffic to warrant duplicating resources.

Anyway, from the comments above, it does seem that MPA is unique with respect to the Airport Operator setting the met limits, and limits being rigidly based on forecasts rather than actuals.

Bing

6th Nov 2018, 09:03

The Airfield Operator (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/696282/RA1026_Issue_4.pdf) doesn't own risk under the MAA construct, however they are responsible for providing a Safe Operating Environment for the aircraft that use their airfield. It sounds like they're being overly conservative in their approach to that rather than ensuring the operators have all the information they need to make their own decision.

India Four Two

6th Nov 2018, 10:29

Yes, these are the hills generating the rotors. And please, do not think that I am denying that rotor streaming is real, and that it is hazardous.

AA,

Sorry, bad wording on my part. I didn't mean to imply any denial on your part. I should have written "rotor streaming" as it is a term I have never seen before. Does it mean something different from the rotors associated with lee wave activity?

I have a lot of experience with flying gliders and tow planes in rotors and have a great deal of respect for them. A very experienced tow pilot friend of mine used to say "The rotor is not rough unless you get rolled inverted!"

PS I’ve answered my own question:

https://ams.confex.com/ams/10Mountain/techprogram/paper_40697.htm

alfred_the_great

6th Nov 2018, 11:34

glad rag

6th Nov 2018, 12:21

Cows getting bigger

6th Nov 2018, 13:45

The problem is what risk you are talking about - the risk to the aircraft or the risk to closing the only strategic airhead into a Crown Dependency which has been invaded within living memory.

The Station Commander MPA doesn’t exist to make a commercial pilot’s life easier, he exists to enable the rapid reinforcement of teh Falklands when necessary. And on that basis, this seems an entirely reasonable risk decision.

Err, the Crown Dependancies are Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man. Conversely, the Falklands are a British Overseas Territory. The difference is the former has it's own laws where the latter complies with British law.

The stuff implying "Don't use the runway because we may have to use it" reminds me of the storemen of old. :)

cattletruck

7th Nov 2018, 07:32

the Airport Operator bases the decision on the TAF, and the TAF is based on the computer met model, so in practice, it is all down to what the computer says.

Which met office runs the computer model? Recently I bumped into the ex CEO of the UK Met Office and he talked about how he transformed the role of his forecasters (a word he despises because it implies their job ends for the day after issuing that bit of paper) to become more effective by placing them inside the control centres of their customers to help them develop better decision/knowledge systems in relation to the meteorological information that is available.

Seems to have been hugely successful, the only problem is that there aren't many of these meteorologists to spread around the place so the benefit needs to be substantial to UK interests to get a buy in.

langleybaston

7th Nov 2018, 15:00

Which met office runs the computer model? Recently I bumped into the ex CEO of the UK Met Office and he talked about how he transformed the role of his forecasters (a word he despises because it implies their job ends for the day after issuing that bit of paper) to become more effective by placing them inside the control centres of their customers to help them develop better decision/knowledge systems in relation to the meteorological information that is available.

Seems to have been hugely successful, the only problem is that there aren't many of these meteorologists to spread around the place so the benefit needs to be substantial to UK interests to get a buy in.

from the official Met Office Annual Report this year:

Significant governance and control issues
As a result of a report from a whistle-blower, management undertook both internal and independent reviews. These reports identified management control and governance failings in a limited number of areas of the business, which do not impact on the operations of the Met Office and the services it provides. Major control weaknesses were addressed at that time. Additional internal and independent audits were commissioned in order to investigate further, to establish the full extent of the issues. These audits concluded that the major failings were limited to a narrow area of the business and included lack of enforcement of established controls around travel expenditure and expenses, and a lack of appropriate and comprehensive management response to the concerns raised by staff. These matters were identified as having operational proximity to the former Chief Executive and his employment was terminated with effect from 1 March 2018. Control weaknesses and governance issues identified are being addressed robustly, under my personal oversight, with a view to minimise future impacts.

A and C

7th Nov 2018, 15:02

One afternoon I find myself landing and then taking off in a jet airliner from a compacted snow runway that had had hot sand applied to bring up the braking action with a 180 fare paying pax.

The next day I am prohibited from taking off in an SEP from a military runway in the UK because there is a little frost on the ground.

Risk in the RAF has become based on how hazardous is this to my career and has moved away from sensible aviation decision making. Unfortunately I can see why this is so, the Lawyers circle govenment departments like vultures waiting for something to go wrong in the hope of a big payday. I can quite understand and sympathise with those making the decisions and only another war will change the situation.

cattletruck

8th Nov 2018, 09:25

langleybaston

8th Nov 2018, 16:21

langleybaston, yes I am already aware of his ignominious removal from office, however I found his dedication and enthusiasm for his old organisation to be very strong, so much so that I wouldn't be surprised if he gets his old gig back, much to the chagrin of the jobsworths that are too frightened to embrace his vision. Now aint that the issue here in a nutshell.

I retired voluntarily in 1996 so I don't know what "the vision" is, but if it is about embedding Met staff within their customers' structures, I am all for it.
Such a policy was being quietly and unobtrusively pursued by the RAF and the Met Office in the early 1990s by such mechanisms as Hon Membership of squadrons and semi-automatic Mess membership. Out of the blue, the modest financial incentives for Met staff on detachment to live in Mess were withdrawn. Thus the liaison at meal times and in the bar ceased, and detachees were forced [by very substantial financial considerations] to live in pubs, hotels, bedsits etc. Guess what: at more cost to the Treasury.

Sorry about the digression, but worth clearing up I think.

Could be the last?

9th Nov 2018, 19:30

Noting that the ridge of high-ground to the North of the military airfield is significant and plays a key part in producing Rotors, the ability to accurately forecast the severity and specific location of the turbulence is currently very difficult. Therefore, regardless of what the Met People state, once 56//// is in their forecast it will invoke restrictions. There is however several things that could be done:

- Move the high-ground.....airfield!

- Undertake a more robust investigation into the phenomenon at MPC and generate the facts that will placate key elements of the FIG who are financially disadvantaged by delayed civ air into the military airfield. This research should include physical trials of ac flying in the 56//// conditions with key protagonists on board.

- Complement the met office with better technology to forecast with more accuracy etc, LIDAR??

- Have the FIG spend the revenue generated by fishing licences etc pay for Stanley to be opened fully. Noting that they get the use of the military airfield for more or less free. (Yes they do!)

- Suck it up!

Just my 10 pennies worth.

Cows getting bigger

9th Nov 2018, 19:47

Noting that the ridge of high-ground to the North of the military airfield is significant and plays a key part in producing Rotors, the ability to accurately forecast the severity and specific location of the turbulence is currently very difficult.

Yep, the airfield has only been there for about 30 years. One would think that by now they had enough empirical data to support a sensible risk assessment. Indeed, I stand by to be corrected, but I cannot recollect any wind related incident at MPA.

MPA is benign compared with many other airfields challenged by high ground influenced wind. Here's one I took earlier; the predominant wind is from the right (West) and the nearest IFR diversion is about 2.5hrs away. Someone needs to take a dose of reality and revisit their risk assessment.

https://farm5.staticflickr.com/4803/45800846451_d084d39b60_c.jpg

Cows getting bigger

9th Nov 2018, 21:02

You missed my point. For sure, almost every airfield can provide a scare. My point was that the one above (Flores) is far more tricky than MPA and has no additional limitations applied. MPA seems to have had a big fat dose of Nanny State.

Aurora Australis

9th Nov 2018, 22:59

Have the FIG spend the revenue generated by fishing licences etc pay for Stanley to be opened fully. Noting that they get the use of the military airfield for more or less free.

CBTL - you make a point of repeatedly referring to it as a military airport. While you are certainly correct that it is operated by the military, it is Mount Pleasant International Airport. It comes under the jurisdiction of the Falkland Islands DCA, and while the majority of the day to day running is done by the military, the justification for building it in the first place was that in addition to allowing the defence of the islands, it would help to make the Falklands economy viable by being an International gateway.
You say regardless of what the Met People state, once 56//// is in their forecast it will invoke restrictions
- at the risk of repeating what I have suggested earlier in this thread, I do not agree with that. It seems reasonable to me not to depart from Cape Verde to a destination that in 10 hours time has a possibility of severe turbulence that would require a diversion to Montevideo, but the way the military apply their rules, regardless of actual conditions at the time, they will not permit an aircraft to depart during a period of forecast 56//// even when the actual conditions clearly are not anywhere near those that produce the turbulence. And also will not allow a civilian flight, airborne with 20 minutes to run, during benign conditions, to make an approach.

And High Spirits, yes there have been go-arounds at MPA due to turbulence, but that is not unique to the Falklands - just look at the number of Youtube videos of bumpy crosswind approaches and go-arounds at Leeds Bradford. (By the way, 5-10 minutes after a go-around before an announcement to the passengers does not seem particularly unusual - they have a few more pressing things to discuss before letting you know what is going on).

Cows getting bigger

10th Nov 2018, 06:14

OK, I'll be more specific. Someone will (should?) have done the math. How many aircraft have steamed-off the side of the runway or punched the undercarriage through the wings? This should be an integral part of the RA in order to identify the likelihood of an event/occurrence/incident. You could argue that go-arounds should be part of this assessment but that question really needs to sit with the aircraft operator (how many approaches, diversion options/risks? etc).

Perhaps Total Safety is part of the issue here? If one is to apply that concept, which is MOD policy, you need to work with all stakeholders which in this case would include the aircraft operators. Funchal is a very good example of risk management. There are endless videos of aircraft going around and some diverting; there are not endless videos of smouldering wrecks.

alfred_the_great

10th Nov 2018, 17:52

Not just commercial pressure, pilot ego seems to be coming into play as well.

BEagle

11th Nov 2018, 06:57

There can also be 'senior officer pressure' which some aircrew are unwilling to challenge....

We were on detachment once; due to the size of the det, we were accommodated off-base in an hotel. On the day we were due to fly back, the weather at base was dire - strong crosswinds out of our limits. So the DetCo decided that we'd stay another night, then RTB the following day when the weather was forecast to be significantly better.

Then we received an order from base (it was from 'Thrombo' the Flt Cdr) ordering us to fly home immediately. The reason being that the Dulles schedule had taken off, so if it was good enough for him, it'd be good enough for us. After a pause to pay the significant hotel cancellation fee ('Thrombo' hadn't thought of that), off we all went. It was someone else's turn to fly, so I was in the back listening on a long lead, but the wind and turbulence when we got back made for a very tricky landing indeed.

I gather that the Boss had A Word with Thrombo after that!

The nastiness of wind and turbulence at MPA shouldn't be underestimated. Also, crews need to check the maximum gust recorded in the previous few minutes rather than the METAR. I once landed in a serious crosswind which was just in limits, but it was hard work. Afterwards I queried the W/V with the MetO, only to be told that the peak gusts had been well outside the limit! Thank for telling us, chaps... If in doubt, get the tower to pass constant W/V values on final approach.

I'd have had no qualms at all about using the short cross RW; we used to practise low approaches and go-arounds on it and it wasn't really all that difficult. Best time to practise was on Saturday mornings, when the bone idle pongo officers were still in their pits instead of being at work as they should have been - the 6-day week had something to do with not having to pay to live/eat in the OM, or something. But you were expected to honour the commitment! A 4 Conway go-around over the DeathStar reminded them that at least some of us were at work!

Could be the last?

11th Nov 2018, 19:04

My understanding is that it becomes MP international Airport.......for about 3 hours on a Saturday afternoon - the terminal is handed over to a civ company to process the Latam and that is it. Services to operate the airfield are still military. I would like to see the FIG, regardless of juristication, get the requisite number of air traffickers, fire personnel, vass, security And other associated staff to run the airfield iaw with CAA regs and therefore potentially own the risk themselves! Ultimately, if they were to contribute to the running costs at a more appropriate level then I would expect that they may get more of a vote, but they don’t!

langleybaston

11th Nov 2018, 21:26

Afterwards I queried the W/V with the MetO, only to be told that the peak gusts had been well outside the limit! Thank for telling us, chaps... If in doubt, get the tower to pass constant W/V values on final approach.

Yes, absolutely. Unless things have changed radically, ATC and the Duty Pilot [if any] act as a cutout/liaison between Met and aircrew, and the Met folk provide ATC with routine obs and pre-agreed "specials". ATC will have/should have its own identical wind readout, but not the time trace {anemograph] that Met have. I think the current METAR coding allows recent peak gusts to be reported.

The thought occurs "does Met know the cross wind limits for each incoming aircraft ?" It certainly should, and the better SMetOs and SATCOs used to make sure that happened.

BruntVaisala

19th Nov 2018, 10:40

And a new twist on this ridiculous situation, it appears that fixed wing aircraft are banned from even flying over Mount Pleasant below 3000ft when there is a Prob 30 of severe turbulence. This is the NOTAM:
19 Nov 2018 0700Z - 19 Nov 2018 1700Z
AD CLOSED TO VISITING FIXED WING AIRCRAFT DUE TO SEVERE TURBULENCE.
NO ZONE TRANSITS BELOW 3000FT AGL.

Interestingly the forecast period for rotors is 0900Z to 1600Z, it appears the airspace as well as the airfield are now being closed for a greater period than the forecast weather itself, what is that all about?

glad rag

20th Nov 2018, 09:05

Lots of "free" time and the internet I would imagine.....:ouch:

Could be the last?

20th Nov 2018, 20:28

BV,

And this is a ridiculous situation why?

BruntVaisala

20th Nov 2018, 23:16

Could Be the Last - turbulence usually occurs with a northerly at MPA, that is a given as is turbulence downwind of almost all the high ground in the Falklands when it is windy, especially with an inversion thrown in.
What we are seeing at the moment is incredible. It has always been in the MPA orders book that there can be severe turbulence with a northerly, recent times have seen it defined a little more with the vague 56003 code. I say vague because all that means is severe turbulence, and only a small chance at that, it is the rotors that are getting individuals excitable.
Very few people (myself included) have any issue with long haul traffic being affected due to the cost of possible diversions. What makes no sense whatsoever is closing the airfield to commercial traffic, especially to an airline (LATAM) who operate daily into South American airfields, many of which I am sure suffer much more turbulence than MPA. Unfortunately (Glad Rag gets it in one) there is too much free time going around and some individuals are trying as hard as possible to ban aviation, or at least fixed wing aviation at MPA.
I know for a fact that none of the local FIGAS pilots have ever been approached regarding their thoughts about flying in and out of MPA and the turbulence that exists, and how it might compare to anywhere else in the Islands. Due to the ability of the Islander, and experience/skill of the pilots, there are very few days when they would decline an approach into MPA. Interesting given that they collectively have thousands of landings between them with the most experienced pilot there now having in excess of 20 years experience in the Falklands.
I guess maybe my last post was ridiculous, but only because it has been superseded. The ridiculous NOTAM published for tonight's wind bans overflight of fixed wing up to 4000 ft despite the code clearly being 5600THREE. Clearly the author of the NOTAM does not believe the met man???? Better to be safe though!!!!
Are you a pilot yourself Could Be, if so I would be curious to know what your aviation experience at MPA is.
Curiously though all of this BS only applies to fixed wing, I would be curious to know from someone in the know why helicopters appear to be unaffected. Oddly the airspace ban also only applies to the MPA overhead, are military aircraft banned from flying downwind of all high ground in the Falklands when turbulence is forecast?

Aurora Australis

21st Nov 2018, 23:35

On the 13th, an aeromedical evacuation aircraft was inbound to MPA from Chile, eta about 2245Z (presumably based on the TAF issued 1924Z - this was before the recent change where MPA extended the closures to include 1 hr before and one hour after any forecast 56//// conditions).

At 2226Z, an amended TAF was issued, with the forecast 560003 now from 2200Z. The aeromed was denied permission to land, despite the actual conditions remaining OK, and had to divert to Argentina.

Throughout the period, there were no gusts reported in the Actuals, and no SPECIs issued. Despite a peak reported wind of 19kts, and a large part of the period reporting less than 5kts, the airfield was closed to landings and departures. I have operated aircraft into Mount Pleasant for over thirty years. The dangerous rotor streaming conditions do NOT suddenly appear when the basic wind is 5 knots.
This is "safety" gone mad!

METAR EGYP 140950Z 33011KT 9999 FEW002 BKN170 10/07 Q0993 BLU NOSIG=
METAR EGYP 140850Z 36012KT 9999 FEW003 BKN150 08/07 Q0994 BLU NOSIG=
METAR EGYP 140750Z 36004KT 9999 VCFG MIFG FEW003 08/06 Q0995 BLU=
METAR EGYP 140650Z 34004KT 9999 FEW007 08/06 Q0995 BLU=
METAR EGYP 140550Z 35004KT CAVOK 08/06 Q0996 BLU=
METAR EGYP 140450Z 02003KT CAVOK 08/06 Q0996 BLU=
METAR EGYP 140350Z 10004KT CAVOK 07/06 Q0997 BLU=
METAR EGYP 140250Z 04008KT 9999 FEW010 SCT250 10/07 Q0998 BLU=
METAR COR EGYP 140150Z 34019KT CAVOK 11/08 Q0999 BLU=
METAR EGYP 140050Z 36016KT CAVOK 10/05 Q1000 BLU BECMG BKN010 GRN=
METAR EGYP 132350Z 35015KT CAVOK 12/04 Q1001 BLU BECMG BKN010 GRN=
METAR EGYP 132250Z 36014KT CAVOK 13/04 Q1002 BLU NOSIG=
METAR COR EGYP 132150Z 33014KT CAVOK 16/02 Q1002 BLU NOSIG=
METAR EGYP 132050Z 33014KT CAVOK 17/03 Q1002 BLU=
METAR EGYP 131950Z 30014KT CAVOK 18/03 Q1003 BLU NOSIG=

TAF EGYP 140448Z 1406/1424 35015G25KT 9999 FEW010 520003 TEMPO 1406/1421 34025G35KT 530003
PROB40 TEMPO 1406/1413 BKN010 PROB40 TEMPO 1406/1421 VRB07KT 560003
PROB30 TEMPO 1406/1410 BKN004 BECMG 1421/1424 24013KT 50////=

TAF COR EGYP 140206Z 1403/1421 35015G25KT 9999 FEW010 520003 BECMG 1403/1405 BKN010
TEMPO 1403/1421 34025G35KT 530003 PROB40 TEMPO 1403/1410 BKN004
PROB30 TEMPO 1403/1421 VRB07KT 560003 BECMG 1411/1414 FEW010=

TAF EGYP 140142Z 1403/1421 35015G25KT 9999 FEW010 520003 BECMG 1403/1405 BKN010
TEMPO 1403/1420 34025G35KT 530003 PROB40 TEMPO 1403/1410 BKN004
PROB30 TEMPO 1403/1420 VRB07KT 560003 BECMG 1411/1414 FEW010
BECMG 1420/1421 31017G27KT 50////=

TAF EGYP 132250Z 1400/1418 35015G25KT 9999 FEW010 520003 BECMG 1400/1403 BKN010
PROB40 TEMPO 1400/1410 BKN004 PROB40 TEMPO 1400/1413 34025G35KT 530003
PROB30 TEMPO 1400/1418 VRB07KT 560003 BECMG 1411/1414 FEW010
BECMG 1413/1416 35020G35KT 520003 PROB40 TEMPO 1413/1418 34030G40KT 530003=

TAF AMD EGYP 132226Z 1322/1415 32015KT 9999 FEW040 BECMG 1322/1401 35015G25KT 520003
TEMPO 1322/1415 34025G35KT 530003 PROB30 TEMPO 1322/1415 VRB07KT 560003
BECMG 1400/1403 BKN010 PROB40 TEMPO 1400/1409 BKN004 BECMG 1411/1414 FEW010=

TAF EGYP 131924Z 1321/1415 32015KT 9999 FEW040 BECMG 1322/1401 35015G25KT 520003
TEMPO 1323/1415 34025G35KT 530003 PROB30 TEMPO 1323/1415 VRB07KT 560003
BECMG 1400/1403 BKN010 PROB40 TEMPO 1400/1409 BKN004 BECMG 1411/1414 FEW010=

L1011effoh

22nd Nov 2018, 11:13

AA, you are quite correct that the rotor will not occur when the forecast wind is for 5 knots. However, I interpret these TAFs in a different way to you, and suspect that the forecaster is trying to show the detachment of the rotor from the hills that moves across the threshold, causing the severe turbulence. Note that the Prob 30 Tempo VRB07 runs exactly during the time period of the 340/25G35 wind forecast so you should read this in conjunction with the basic forecast wind during this period. I have seen the wind trace from the Met Office there showing 35-45kts across followed by a spell of 5 knots wind as the detached rotor moves across the airfield.

Despite this, I agree with you that the movement ban seems to be excessive at the moment. Having also subsequently flown into FNC, I would say that FNC was regularly worse than the conditions at MPA for turbulence, although it is an easy approach at MPA.

Aurora Australis

22nd Nov 2018, 12:02

Hi L1011effoh. Thanks for your input. I guess from your username that you are an ex-Tristar crew member, so its good to hear from someone who may have experienced the conditions in question in a large jet (my experience of operating at MPA is in small and medium fixed wing, and rotary).
I agree with your comments about the interpretation of the TAF, as I said in my earlier post (#13) in the thread -

".....turbulence due to rotor activity indicated by 56/// group". In my view that is not strictly correct - those codes say nothing about the cause of the turbulence. There will be turbulence to some degree any time the wind at MPA is from the North, but the clue to the fact that it is rotor streaming is not in the 560003 alone, but the fact that it is accompanied by (e.g.)VRB05 - for someone not familiar with the phenomenon, they could be fooled into thinking that the TEMPO VRB05 meant the occasional relief from the bad turbulence of northerly 45kts, whereas it is exactly the opposite - it is when the rotors break off the hill and stream down over the airfield that the wind comes from all directions and is at its most turbulent."

So I am aware that it is the supposedly light winds that can have the worst turbulence. However, what I had meant to highlight in the sequence of METARs was that on that day, during the 560003 forecast, for a period of 15 hours of reports, not one showed a wind speed above 19kts, and the majority below 5kts, with no gusts reported. I was not there on that day, but have been on many other similar ones, and even on the worst days when there definitely are rotors, the majority of the time the basic wind will be, e.g.350/35-45, with only the occasional light and variable. Every report being light northerly suggests to me that, as on many other occasions, the conditions were nowhere near as bad as forecast.

If you were indeed Tristar crew on the airbridge, do you think that closing the airfield to all fixed-wing purely on the basis of forecast, with no flexibility for aircraft already enroute and close to landing (i.e. the LATAM flight from Punta Arenas) or even for departures, when the conditions are clearly not as forecast, is reasonable?

Edit - apologies, I see above that you already answered that in some way, by saying that you agreed the policy was excessive!

langleybaston

22nd Nov 2018, 14:16

AA, ...................................................

If the forecasts are now produced by non-local Meteorologists, then they will be free from the temptation to make local TAF manipulations designed to lure unsuspecting TriStar crews down from ASI following the decision tree LPD/PNR/continue 'flowchart'. This seemed to be especially prevalent when mail/veg/replacements were inbound on the TriStar.

Not sure what "non-local" means in this context. Unless there has been a poor policy change, my belief is that the forecasts are produced by UK Met staff of Senior Scientific Officer [old-speak!] grade, and with substantial experience, and sitting in the office on the airfield.

If this is not so, that would be a great deterioration in coverage.

L1011effoh

22nd Nov 2018, 16:45

Not sure what "non-local" means in this context. Unless there has been a poor policy change, my belief is that the forecasts are produced by UK Met staff of Senior Scientific Officer [old-speak!] grade, and with substantial experience, and sitting in the office on the airfield.

If this is not so, that would be a great deterioration in coverage.

Sorry, I think I misinterpreted post #32 on a quick read. I'll edit my post.

langleybaston

22nd Nov 2018, 20:06

Sorry, I think I misinterpreted post #32 on a quick read. I'll edit my post.

Don't make the mistake of thinking that I know what I am talking about ........ I know what USED to happen, and what SHOULD happen, but only someone on the spot, or a current Met person, will know the facts.

Remote forecasting for the Falklands sounds virtually impossible ............ by all accounts from my colleagues, forecasting on the spot was very difficult, and we only sent very able people.

BruntVaisala

24th Nov 2018, 12:28

- Undertake a more robust investigation into the phenomenon at MPC and generate the facts that will placate key elements of the FIG who are financially disadvantaged by delayed civ air into the military airfield. This research should include physical trials of ac flying in the 56//// conditions with key protagonists on board.

- Complement the met office with better technology to forecast with more accuracy etc, LIDAR??

Better Tech - absolutely, I believe this may be being looked at.

Physical trials - Now there is an idea! Could even ask the locals, they might have some experience and opinions worth listening to. I fully appreciate that none of them have the wealth of training that the RAF have however I would be willing to bet that the longest serving pilot at FIGAS at the moment has about 2000 landings at MPA alone over the last 20+ years with the previous two longest servers exceeding that. In fact as a collective the FIGAS pilots (current and retired) have well in excess of 120 years collective experience and 120000 landings in the Falklands, probably in excess of 10,000 landings at MPA in every weather condition year around. I am not aware of a single landing incident regarding a FIGAS aircraft at MPA although I am standing by to be corrected on this.

If this experience was to be tapped into along with a common sense approach along the lines of Madeira for inexperienced crews this should be easily resolved.
A simple way of data gathering in the short term if aircraft are prohibited from landing might be for MPA to request transiting aircraft to fly the approach lanes and provide PIREP's.

I would be interested to know how many weather related landing occurrences that have been at MPA. I know of one years ago regarding the hero. On the third, and final, approach they banged it in and required a heavy landing check. The alternative had been to divert to SA. Bizarre thing was they had experienced a similar event the day before but committed aviation again with an almost identical forecast.

The sad reality of this is that due to this over the top reaction to a risk analysis it is far more likely to cause a death to a medical patient awaiting extraction.

By closing the airfield to almost all (helicopters it seems are unaffected by turbulence) prevents the embarrassment of explaining to military personnel why they are not going home today despite the LATAM flight arriving / departing and FIGAS doing likewise.

BruntVaisala

1st Dec 2018, 23:57

Aurora Australis I have just been looking at your post (number 54) and also had a look back at a the other forecasts for your day in question. Interestingly the wind at MPA throughout the period matches the expected surface wind over the sea immediately north of the islands prior to orographic and temperature influence. What is particularly striking is that every METAR put together indicates a very steady met picture that is not at all reflected in the TAF. This suggests to me that the TAF is not worth the paper it is written on, or, that the infamous rotor is indeed sitting over MPA for almost all of that period, which would also prove the TAF to be incorrect.

Does anyone on here have any knowledge on how the met office evaluate themselves? It seems that unless someone is allowed to fly through the area then it is now impossible to evaluate it.

The last couple of years since the runway has been closed to F/W operations (don't see how that can be legal) during the periods of forecast rotors have continuously shown a matching of the TAF aligning with major sporting events on a Saturday and not to actual rotors existing.

I am ready to be corrected but I do not believe a single METAR has been issued during such a period that has displayed 340 25G35 with a TREND of VRB07. This would indicate rotors breaking from the hillside and crossing the airfield. The simple fact of the matter is that the forecasting model in these situations is not fit for purpose.

Could be the last?

3rd Dec 2018, 16:58

langleybaston

3rd Dec 2018, 19:10

,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,

Does anyone on here have any knowledge on how the met office evaluate themselves? It seems that unless someone is allowed to fly through the area then it is now impossible to evaluate it.

,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,

I do not understand the reference to flying with regard to TAFs or indeed METARS. Unless things have changed out of all recognition, wind forecasts and observations are with respect to anemometer height. Flying at 30 feet through the area at 30 ft. sounds intrinsically dangerous.

BruntVaisala

3rd Dec 2018, 20:40

BruntVaisala

3rd Dec 2018, 20:51

BV - AA,

Like I have alluded to, whatever you think of the Met’s output or whether the Airfield Operator is being overly zealous with the restrictions during forecasted rotors it is irrelevant. Ultimately, if you are not happy with the situation and want to own the risk yourselves, get your own airfield!

You clearly have a problem with decisions being queried. I have no problem with the Met output but the reality is that the Operator is being overly zealous with the restrictions being put in place and zero credit is being given to aircraft being operated in and out of Mount Pleasant Airport by crews with a large amount of experience in operating into far more challenging runways. The recent spate of NOTAM's closing the airspace over MPA demonstrated the incoherent and knee-jerk reaction to the "risk", the fact that three different NOTAM's had three different restrictions in a week highlights this.

Aurora Australis

4th Dec 2018, 16:38

I do not understand the reference to flying with regard to TAFs or indeed METARS. Unless things have changed out of all recognition, wind forecasts and observations are with respect to anemometer height. Flying at 30 feet through the area at 30 ft. sounds intrinsically dangerous.

The point I think BV is making is that the TAFs do include a forecast of conditions above anemometer height - the part of the TAF that appears to trigger the closure of the airspace is the 56//// turbulence code, typically for turbulence up to 3000'. The rest of the TAF often does not contain anything suggesting conditions that would cause major concern. Until recently, it was just the runway that was closed - aircraft could still transit the zone during the forecast conditions, and regularly did (without falling out of the sky or losing control......).
As BV said, you would expect the METARs to bear some similarity to the conditions forecast in the TAF, yet frequently (e.g. as per the data copied in my post #54) there is very little correlation. The accuracy of the TAFs is presumably assessed for quality control - (I would be interested to see the Met Offices own assessment of how accurate the MPA TAFs are), but how is the accuracy of the turbulence forecast for the layers above the airfield assessed, without allowing aircraft through?
A subjective assessment by the majority of pilots I know who have used this airspace over the past 30 years is that recently, the TAFs often seem extremely pessimistic, and the actuals often bear no resemblance to the forecast.

Once again, at the risk of labouring the point, none of us locally think that inbound aircraft should land regardless of conditions, but just that there should be some flexibility, particularly when the forecast conditions are nowhere near materialising.
Yesterday, the forecast was for severe turbulence, and I have no doubt it did occur, and would not have been a day to mess with - but the actuals were reflecting this, e.g. 340/30g46, and 320/09 tempo 350/20g30. (The southbound airbridge was delayed 24 hours).

Aurora Australis

4th Dec 2018, 16:56

Like I have alluded to, whatever you think of the Met’s output or whether the Airfield Operator is being overly zealous with the restrictions during forecasted rotors it is irrelevant. Ultimately, if you are not happy with the situation and want to own the risk yourselves, get your own airfield!

CBTL - Mount Pleasant Airfield does not belong to the RAF. It was built, at UK taxpayer expense, to allow for defence of the islands from a belligerent and bullying neighbour, but also to act as the International airport for the Falklands, to allow it to develop economically.

The question remains why the Operator is assessing the risk in a way that seems to be unique, when it appears that there are airports with similar or worse wind/turbulence issues that are not closed in the same way.

Your solution of building another airport would lead to one already under-utilised expensive asset being supplemented by an even more under-utilised one!

Bing

4th Dec 2018, 18:21

BV - AA,

Like I have alluded to, whatever you think of the Met’s output or whether the Airfield Operator is being overly zealous with the restrictions during forecasted rotors it is irrelevant. Ultimately, if you are not happy with the situation and want to own the risk yourselves, get your own airfield!

The airfield operator doesn't own any risk, see RA1020 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/760702/RA1020_Issue_9.pdf), they are responsible for providing a safe operating environment and that should include informing users of any potential adverse weather. The risk owners are the DDHs for the military platforms that operate there and the accountable managers for the civilians who, having been made aware of the rotors issue in the airfield hazard log, then make their own assessment on the risk reduction activities.

Could be the last?

4th Dec 2018, 18:47

Bing,

Correct, however, I didn’t say that the Airfield Operator owns the risk. But, I would argue that he or she would be in a whole world of pain when something goes wrong post a rotors forecast!

langleybaston

4th Dec 2018, 19:33

The point I think BV is making is that the TAFs do include a forecast of conditions above anemometer height - the part of the TAF that appears to trigger the closure of the airspace is the 56//// turbulence code, typically for turbulence up to 3000'. The rest of the TAF often does not contain anything suggesting conditions that would cause major concern. Until recently, it was just the runway that was closed - aircraft could still transit the zone during the forecast conditions, and regularly did (without falling out of the sky or losing control......).
As BV said, you would expect the METARs to bear some similarity to the conditions forecast in the TAF, yet frequently (e.g. as per the data copied in my post #54) there is very little correlation. The accuracy of the TAFs is presumably assessed for quality control - (I would be interested to see the Met Offices own assessment of how accurate the MPA TAFs are), but how is the accuracy of the turbulence forecast for the layers above the airfield assessed, without allowing aircraft through?
A subjective assessment by the majority of pilots I know who have used this airspace over the past 30 years is that recently, the TAFs often seem extremely pessimistic, and the actuals often bear no resemblance to the forecast.

Once again, at the risk of labouring the point, none of us locally think that inbound aircraft should land regardless of conditions, but just that there should be some flexibility, particularly when the forecast conditions are nowhere near materialising.
Yesterday, the forecast was for severe turbulence, and I have no doubt it did occur, and would not have been a day to mess with - but the actuals were reflecting this, e.g. 340/30g46, and 320/09 tempo 350/20g30. (The southbound airbridge was delayed 24 hours).

Thank you. I must make the point that I retired as a Chief Met Officer in the UK Met Office in 1996 and had never heard of a 56//// group. I would have been startled to be asked to predict quantitatively in a TAF something that could not be measured Everything else in a TAF can be checked against the actual [not necessarily a METAR, but certainly a SYNOP.] The non-critical exception is cloud base above the effective range of the relevant devices. Perhaps memory fails me.
I have searched Google but cannot find chapter and verse for the 56 group coding.
It is well understood that turbulence, other than convective, is a mysterious beast. Our investigations into CAT using aircraft reports and aircraft chasers demonstrated that it is like a shoal of fish in the ocean .......... mobile, transient and fickle. This included CAT nearer the surface than jet streams, but we only came up with generalisations such as coastlines, mountain ridges etc. Rotors and lee waves were acknowledged as very very difficult to predict, especially in dry air with no tell-tale cloud. Our numerical models became so good at jet levels that, as a by-product, CAT at these heights became better understood and better forecast, but far from perfect.
I am left wondering what has changed in 20 years regarding low-level terrain-induced shears and turbulence. Understanding? I doubt it. Measuring? I doubt it. Predicting? I doubt it.

Aurora Australis

4th Dec 2018, 20:50

Langleybaston - thanks for that interesting bit of background info on turbulence.
You said I have searched Google but cannot find chapter and verse for the 56 group coding.
I suspect from your background that you may be looking for something more technical (i.e. how the model for generating the forecast turbulence works), but in case you are just looking for the meanings of the codes, this is from the "US Air Force Aircrew Quick Reference to the TAF and METAR codes"

"If forecasted, the turbulence code will be prefixed by the number 5, and will follow the cloud or icing group. To decode, follow these instructions: 1. Look for the turbulence designator “5” that follows the cloud or icing group (520004).
2. The next digit will determine the intensity (520004). See Figure 4.
3. The next three digits will determine the base limit of the turbulence layer in hundreds of feet AGL (520004).
4. The last digit will determine the turbulence layer depth in thousands of feet (520004), so add this value to the base height to determine the top limit of the turbulence conditions.
In the above example, the turbulence forecast will read, “occasional moderate turbulence in clear air from the surface to 4,000 feet.”

Figure 4. Turbulence Intensity Decode Table
0 - None
1 - Light turbulence
2 - Moderate turbulence in clear air, occasional
3 - Moderate turbulence in clear air, frequent
4 - Moderate turbulence in cloud, occasional
5 - Moderate turbulence in cloud, frequent
6 - Severe turbulence in clear air, occasional
7 - Severe turbulence in clear air, frequent
8 - Severe turbulence in cloud, occasional
9 - Severe turbulence in cloud, frequent
X - Extreme turbulence
Note: Occasional is defined as occurring less than 1/3 of the time"

You also said you wondered what had changed in 20 years regarding low-level terrain-induced turbulence. I can only assume that they have developed some new modelling of what they think happens - I am just not convinced from experience and observation that they yet have a model that is "fit for purpose"!

Aurora Australis

4th Dec 2018, 22:14

The airfield operator doesn't own any risk, see RA1020 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/760702/RA1020_Issue_9.pdf), they are responsible for providing a safe operating environment and that should include informing users of any potential adverse weather. The risk owners are the DDHs for the military platforms that operate there and the accountable managers for the civilians who, having been made aware of the rotors issue in the airfield hazard log, then make their own assessment on the risk reduction activities.

Bing - thanks for that. That is how I would have thought it should work. So maybe I am using the wrong terminology when I titled this thread "Ownership of risk". I thought that was what had changed, to make the Airfield Operator so risk averse.
So if as you say above, the accountable manager for the civilian operators should make their own assessment of the risk reduction activities, why is it that when LATAM (LanChile), FIGAS (Falkland islands Government Air Service), HiFly (the oil charter flights back in 2015/16), the Air ambulance flights from Chile, are all willing to make their own decisions on whether the conditions are acceptable, they are still over-ruled by the Airfield Operator?