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Chuncky_Monkey
14th Mar 2016, 16:13
So this could be topic of which some of you have a number of opinions.... As one of his recommendations Haddon-Cave tabled the idea of a Safety Culture within military aviation and the defence industry that would be developed and monitored by the MAA. The MAA have been with us for a number of years now I wondered if we were feeling their influence in this area or is this one part of HC's report they are still developing....:)

insty66
14th Mar 2016, 19:53
Good first post!

alfred_the_great
14th Mar 2016, 20:08
I am, if it's any consolation.

Rigga
14th Mar 2016, 21:03
...and posting from the West Country too! I wonder where CM works?
Though I left working with the military about three years ago there was a drive to start this off and I think it was going well in the Hangars...driven by a well known company, and dragging a well know force with it, where it touched. But I don't know about the Line and Squadrons.

EAP86
14th Mar 2016, 22:31
The latest MAA Strategy document (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/443422/MAA_Strategy_2015_2020.pdf) has STRATEGIC OUTCOME 3, "To develop a UK DAE with a demonstrably strong and enduring Air Safety culture exemplified by associated behaviours", as one of their 5 top targets. There's a page of text about what they mean which might help put context into the question.

EAP

Two's in
15th Mar 2016, 09:57
Strategic Outcome 3 all sounds like the right stuff, but is it funded and fully resourced? Safety costs money, and the MoD have proven consistently and repeatedly that budgets have a higher priority than lives. Spending within "targets" gets you a more noteworthy performance report that simply not killing people.

Just This Once...
15th Mar 2016, 13:44
I knew the whole process had failed when the argument became 'well, we are flying it so it must be ALARP'.

The post-HC era has, under the ever-looking-the-other-way leviathan of the MAA, ushered in an aircraft that does not meet any recognisable airworthiness standards, has no type certificate and a vacuous Release To Service and a note to the Secretary Of State.

We may have been safer carrying on as we were, as at least we were not burdened by the new process.

All rather disappointing.

Rigga
15th Mar 2016, 18:04
Yes - but, apart from the MAA who ignored the results of the very first Military ARC failing the very first question...Is a safety culture in the RAF working?

Chuncky_Monkey
15th Mar 2016, 18:13
Thank you for your post, I appreciate you time. The next question.... has industry embraced the HC safety culture view or is this something left to the military world..

Rigga - I earned my money in somerset, very close to the other helicopter guys...

15th Mar 2016, 19:42
If HC wanted to remove the Byzantine complexity of air safety management then we have failed miserably - the amount of staff-work in generating ASMPs at every level has created 'paper-safety' where everything must be safe because it is on a list or in a matrix.

It looks like a gigantic a*se-covering exercise which, although it does hold senior officers responsible, doesn't actually make anything safer in the cockpit.

The amount of guff that has to be waded through in order to provide 'assurance' gets in the way of decent pre-flight planning and 'mission-bubbles' especially when everything is computer driven so no-one has any books in their ops rooms when the IT goes phut!

The latest thing to address the MAC RtL is FLARM - a computer database for glider activity which only shows those gliders that have it fitted and is, by its nature, historic and out of date as soon as you leave the ops room.

The only thing more pointless is bow-ties - who on earth thought that made anything safer????

BossEyed
15th Mar 2016, 19:55
Point of Order: FLARM isn't a database to be accessed on the ground; it's a live system similar to a (basic!) TCAS that gives you real time info in the air.

Granted, only for those aircraft (yes, mostly but not solely gliders) that have it fitted, but that's a fair proportion these days - and hey: Every little helps, no?

PowerFLARM shows up Mode A/C/S transponders and ADS-B, too.

Agree with much of your 'paper-safety' thoughts, though.

15th Mar 2016, 21:32
We are required to include it as part of an outbrief by accessing the website - therefore not valid by the time you get airborne.

It might help gliders 'see' each other but it doesn't help a conventional TCAS equipped aircraft see the gliders.

The technology must exist to have smaller and lighter transponders in light aircraft which would be compatible with TCAS users.

BossEyed
15th Mar 2016, 21:43
We are required to include it as part of an outbrief by accessing the website - therefore not valid by the time you get airborne.

Well then, I agree - didn't realise that. That is simply daft. And apparently an example of "Something Must Be Done. That's Something; let's do that"

It might help gliders 'see' each other but it doesn't help a conventional TCAS equipped aircraft see the gliders.

No, but FLARM wasn't designed to do that. It was designed to stop gliders - deliberately flying close in thermals - from bumping into one another, as an affordable, technically achievable and proportionate solution to that particular hazard.

The technology must exist to have smaller and lighter transponders in light aircraft which would be compatible with TCAS users.

ADS-B OUT is probably that solution, but (civil) legislation in EASA land militates against it due to significant cost and hassle with limited direct benefit to those with a limited budget. It's different in US (as ever) due to the direct user benefits of ADS-B IN live in-flight weather/NOTAMs etc.

But we're getting away from H-C now. So responses to first para only probably relevant.

Bob Viking
15th Mar 2016, 21:44
We have increased glider activity in Snowdonia right now. Most (but not all) of them have FLARM fitted. Whilst flying in an ACM sortie yesterday we met one of the few non-FLARM gliders at about 12000'. He clearly didn't show up on TCAS, wasn't visible to Swanwick and wouldn't have shown on the FLARM screen even if we'd been able to see it in cockpit.
Can someone please explain how this system is supposed to help us?!
BV

16th Mar 2016, 06:46
It doesn't - the risk of a mil ac hitting a glider is very real since they are all but invisible - they should be mandated to carry radar reflectors and a proper transponder.

BBK
16th Mar 2016, 09:32
Chuncky M

From what I understand about HC it dealt with failings within the MOD. The civilian airline sector, at least in the UK, is regulated by EASA. The point is that it is an external agency that is the regulator whereas the MOD was self regulating pre HC. Just my understanding of course and I'm sure there are lessons within the HC report that would read across.

Regarding gliders and mandatory transponders I'm not sure what the latest technology can offer but of course the open FIR is just that, open. Lookout, lookout, lookout!

16th Mar 2016, 09:45
Regarding gliders and mandatory transponders I'm not sure what the latest technology can offer but of course the open FIR is just that, open. Lookout, lookout, lookout!

After 32 years of mil flying without TCAS and now 2 years of flying with it, relying simply on lookout just doesn't cut the mustard and TCAS makes you realise how many aircraft you didn't see.

Back to HC - the MoD is still self-regulating under MAA since it is not a truly external agency. There are still games being played with airworthiness and ALARP as the OSD for platforms is used as an excuse for not upgrading systems. The risks appear on a risk matrix, have been pushed up the DH chain as far as possible and declared ALARP due to cost but none of this actually removes the risk to those in the cockpit.

It would be interesting to hear HC's views on the MAA process. Emperor's new clothes anyone?

dewidaniels
16th Mar 2016, 13:35
We have increased glider activity in Snowdonia right now.

That would be an RAFGSA expedition to Llanbedr:

https://members.gliding.co.uk/club-post/easter-expedition-llanbedr-13-19-march-2/
NOTAM interpreted | NOTAM Info (http://notaminfo.com/explain?id=553895/0)

Most (but not all) of them have FLARM fitted. Whilst flying in an ACM sortie yesterday we met one of the few non-FLARM gliders at about 12000'. He clearly didn't show up on TCAS, wasn't visible to Swanwick and wouldn't have shown on the FLARM screen even if we'd been able to see it in cockpit.
Can someone please explain how this system is supposed to help us?!
BV

You wouldn't have been able to tell whether it had FLARM fitted or not, unless your own aircraft were FLARM equipped. I believe that all the RAFGSA fleet are FLARM equipped.

As BossEyed explained, FLARM is a proprietary collision avoidance system originally developed by Flarm Technology GmbH for gliders, but now also fitted to many helicopters and light aircraft (such as the Tutor fleet, I believe). Call it TCAS-lite for gliders, if you like. A FLARM-equipped aircraft won't show up on TCAS.

FLARM Technology | The award-winning collision avoidance system for General Aviation (http://flarm.com/)

The website that [email protected] mentions is presumably Spot the gliders! (http://live.glidernet.org), created by the Open Glider Network (OGN) project. OGN uses a network of ground receivers to track aircraft equipped with FLARM. I believe that OGN also provides a feed to other sites such as Flightradar24.com - Live flight tracker! (http://www.flightradar24.com). OGN is not supported by Flarm Technology GmbH, and in fact there has been animosity between the OGN project and Flarm Technology GmbH, mainly over privacy concerns.

According to List of OGN Receivers - Open Glider Network Project (http://wiki.glidernet.org/list-of-receivers), there is no OGN ground receiver near Snowdonia, so a FLARM-equipped aircraft would not show up on OGN, but would be visible to other FLARM-equipped aircraft.

There does seem to be a plethora of point solutions at the moment - transponders, TCAS, FLARM, LPAT and PilotAware, to name just a few. Some aircraft are fitted with one solution, others with another, and not many of these solutions are inter-operable.

tucumseh
16th Mar 2016, 13:53
It would be interesting to hear HC's views on the MAA process.

Indeed. At the time a review of progress was promised after 2 years, but that seems to have been an internal MAA/MoD backslapfest.

H-C would point to the fact he criticised implementation of regs, but the MAA/MoD openly disagrees with him and has set about re-writing the regs. The systemic failure to implement has not been addressed. However, given H-C knowingly named and blamed the wrong people, when in possession of the full facts, names, dates and relevant correspondence, he is unlikely to say anything. Actually, I may be partly wrong about full facts because, for some months after the Review started, his e-mail was intercepted by MoD (as the Review office was in an MoD building). It was only when the parents of one deceased crewman went to London and handed evidence to him personally that he saw it for the first time. And I'd still like to know if the MoD Secretariat provided to him offered evidence as a first hand witness to the "savings at the expense of safety". My feeling is he kept quiet, because otherwise he would surely have pointed out the biggest mistake in the report - the 1998 baseline was at least a decade out.

Good points Crab.

EAP86
16th Mar 2016, 22:15
While HC may not have held his own review (difficult for a serving judge?), I believe the MAA has been reviewed/audited at least twice by independent teams of military regulators from various nations. I think the review criteria were the HC findings as distilled by the MAA in the early part of its existence. I haven't looked but I suspect that their reports may be found on the MAA's website.

EAP

BossEyed
16th Mar 2016, 22:35
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/military-aviation-authority-maa-external-audit-panel-meap-report

tucumseh
17th Mar 2016, 09:02
Yes, I read that at the time. I don't want to get into personalities, as the report acknowledges MAA's difficulties with SQEP (but, like H-C, studiously avoids the reason, which gets you VERY close to the root failures and culprits), but if you map the H-C recommendations against MAA actions there is very little correlation. Nor, with respect, do any of the named MoD staff in the report (with one possible exception) have any experience in the practical implementation of the regulations designed to prevent the failures in the first place. That is not their fault - the majority are simply not trained or employed to do the job, in the same way I'm not trained to be a pilot. The nett result is most confuse airworthiness, serviceability and fitness for purpose; talking mainly of the last. You can see this in the very basic errors in many MAA documents, that no MoD Technical Agency would be expected to make. These errors mean some important regs disappear off at a tangent, leading to (e.g.) the observations above by Crab. The simple example I always use is getting the definition of the process that maintains the safety case wrong: which, after all, was what H-C spent 580-odd pages on. In fact, the definition used is essentially the same as DPP(PM) used in 1993 when drafting the ill-fated CDPIs, which were (in part) to replace Controller Aircraft Instructions. The problem of course was, the perfectly good CAIs were cancelled, but so were the CDPIs when they were exposed as crap (by the same Directorate in charge of Chinook, ironically; which in turn illustrates the state of play long before H-C's 1998 nonsense). That left very little advice for new staff, compounded in 1996 by CDP's decision just to do away with engineering staffs. Sorry, I just see all these links because I've had to deal with the fallout. The MAA have a difficult task, not of their own making, and I wouldn't like to work there. Not because I couldn't do the job. But because I wouldn't be allowed to to the job properly.

Chugalug2
17th Mar 2016, 20:21
Tuc:-
The MAA have a difficult task, not of their own making, and I wouldn't like to work there. Not because I couldn't do the job. But because I wouldn't be allowed to to the job properly.

Which just about sums up the farce that is UK Military Air Regulation in 2016. This forum will spawn many more such threads as the Air Cadets Grounded one as the dysfunctional state of UK Military Airworthiness bites ever deeper.

The MAA won't do anything because it can't, for the very reason that tucumseh points to, ie that it is not independent of the MOD. It is for that reason that it embraces Haddon-Cave and its false start date of 1998. The wheels fell off a decade before then, thanks to the illegal acts of certain VSOs. It is to protect them that H-C rewrote history, and why the MAA is founded on a false prospectus. It lacks knowledge and the will to reveal the truth, and contents itself in trying to reinvent the wheel, or in this case perfectly good regulations that merely need to be enforced, if only it knew how.

The Royal Air Force has to bite the bullet and acknowledge that its aircraft, and hence its fighting ability, are badly compromised. The only way to start the process of rebuilding its airworthiness is to face the truth and start afresh by making its regulator and air accident investigator independent of the MOD and of each other. What it does about its VSOs that reduced it to this parlous state is for it to decide, but if it goes on protecting them it cannot regain airworthiness. It must choose, and choose wisely.

EAP86
17th Mar 2016, 22:02
Tuc, I've observed examples of many of the issues you note, but from my personal perspective, I always come back to the issue of competence (or call it SQEP if we must). The past and present members of the MAA I've met aren't on the whole incompetent neither are they unaware of some of the problems of what they're trying to achieve.

When you look at the civil regulatory approach, its hard not to be slightly impressed by the degree of success it achieves. It isn't perfect by any means but it works well 99% of the time. There were those who hoped that transforming the military approach to take advantage of the best of the civil system, would result in safer operations and far better performance; I was one of those. For a few years the UK MAA have been working with most of their other European equivalents (27 of them) to develop a military regulatory framework based on the principles of the EASA approach. In my eyes the effort has been remarkably successful due in no small part to the leadership shown by the UK MAA.

Most of the nations involved are now at various stages in the implementation of the new framework and the UK MAA is one of these. One of the main principles of the civil system is the emphasis on competent organisations and individuals when it comes to authority on matters of airworthiness. Unfortunately, when it's come to implementation, the leadership of the UK MAA seem to have been swayed by the consideration of what might happen in times of conflict. They could only rely on MOD staff and Service Operators therefore all authority must rest with 'Crown Servants' whether technically competent or not. When challenged on this, the standard response seems to be, well they'll just have to get competent then. I can't help thinking that this will in time just lead to "HC, the sequel".

EAP

Rigga
17th Mar 2016, 23:10
...but you won't get competent people 'In Post' if you keep moving them around from front line to back-office!!
Tuc is right. There is a need for 'specialists', not merely competent or suitably qualified temps. A three week course and two or three years in post won't cut the mustard. The MAA needs career people, not transient people.

tucumseh
18th Mar 2016, 07:21
EAP86

Thank you for your considered reply. I think we are in agreement. The point you make;

UK MAA seem to have been swayed by the consideration of what might happen in times of conflictechoes mine. This is the fitness for purpose argument. There is (seemingly) little understanding that one must first attain airworthiness, and so by definition have a robust process for maintaining airworthiness, before an aircraft is ever in theatre. Airworthiness is a pre-requisite to being in a position of having to make a FFP decision.

Companies like Westland tend to do most of the "attaining" bit very well. MoD has cancelled its only mandated Def Stan setting out the procedures for "maintaining" and no longer teaches the subject. (And because we have sold our workshops, there are no apprentices to teach). Many at the top consider it a waste of money - hence the savings at the expense of safety. It follows the FFP decision at front line cannot be a truly informed one, because he baseline is missing, or at best a moving feast. There is a honking great black hole in the middle.

That is my simplistic explanation, but it is clear where the gap is. It was identified in the late 80s by MoD auditors. It was reiterated umpteen times by Director of Flight Safety between 1992 and 1998. By 2000 most had just given up, and airworthiness depended largely on companies ignoring their contract and instead implementing regulations.

Rigga is right about SQEP/experience. Why is a 2 year post acceptable now, when an unbroken 10-15 years was required before? That is dumbing down. The one thing I'd say about the MAA though - they seem to have taken onboard the root cause of a number of fatal accidents - non-technical staffs being allowed to self-delegate airworthiness authority. I'd say that is their biggest success so far, but I don't like the fact that those who did, and caused so many deaths, are still in post in MoD's upper echelons. It would seem the MAA has no retrospective powers, so let us hope these people have the decency not to set foot in an aircraft project office again. 13th anniversary of two of the examples next week (22nd).

EAP86
18th Mar 2016, 10:39
Tuc, Rigga, agreed!

When I first encountered the MOD in RTO offices many years ago, I was a little in awe at their expertise. Likewise those staffing the old MOD PE Project Offices; everyone knew their stuff. However that was a long time ago and the likelihood that the MOD will go back to a system that assured a steady supply of competent people for all aspects of airworthiness is vanishingly small. If the will was there, I think it could be achieved in the field of continuing airworthiness if only because this is a key area for successful operations and it just needs time. As regards the field of initial/design airworthiness, I suspect that bird has flown and I doubt that the will to recover properly exists; I'm not even sure that the gap to be bridged is that well understood.

For many years, civil regulators have obtained competent resource from the relevant sectors of industry. 'Poacher turned gamekeeper' is alive and well. Similar options aren't easily available to the MOD and the perception that they have to retain authorities in house eliminates perhaps the only alternative viable solution.

Its interesting that over the last few years the French military regulators, DGA & DSAE, have adopted the civil model and have allowed authorities such as the Type Certificate Holder (and the relevant obligations) to reside outside of their MOD staff. I can't imagine the UK MAA giving this further consideration until the current model has been shown to be lacking; 10 years, say?

EAP

tucumseh
18th Mar 2016, 12:37
EAP86. Well said. I think this an opportune time to remind us of the events behind the two accidents I mentioned that occurred on 22 March 2003.



Sea King – The BoI’s 3 main contributory factors were predictable, and predicted in late 1994. Mitigation plans were drawn up, properly approved and fully funded (one of them was nil cost, the other two mandated policy and funded anyway). Almost immediately (December 1994), DOR(Sea) stated the nil cost one was not to be implemented. I know this, because I was writing the specs that had to be amended. This created a huge difference in form, fit, function and use between AEW Mk2 and what became ASaC Mk7, and is in part what forced the change of Mark number. While the spec reflected the OR decision, the design contract asked that both designs be undertaken, as it was assumed common sense would prevail. It didn’t.


Of the other two, one contract was cancelled in 1998, without replacement, by a non-technical official who had self-delegated technical and airworthiness authority. That is, he deemed the risk not to exist at all, despite the world and its dog saying it did. The last was cancelled by the same official in 2000. This was a safety design issue and he directed that mandated design regs be ignored.



In risk management terms the 3 main defences in depth against the risk (collision) were torn down and cast aside, without replacement; leaving the “accident trajectory” unimpeded. But there was a final defensive barrier to the RN seeing this unsafe build standard – the Critical Design Review. The same official paid the contract milestone for the CDR a week early, then waived the CDR. Boscombe’s formal complaint refers to outstanding safety case issues and critical safety mods. That is, the work remained to be done, but the money was gone. Even so, and with the programme manager’s support, Westland refused to obey the illegal instruction to ignore the regs, as they always do. The official then took it out of Westlands and the PMs hands, sent in an MoD working party and modified the aircraft with an unapproved and unsafe mod. The first trials aircraft was at the safe build standard, the remainder not. MoD denies this, despite pictorial evidence taken by Westland (who aren’t stupid and know when to gather evidence to defend future actions).

What I have described is fraud. It was actively concealed from the BoI and Coroner. The investigation it was notified was halted in February 2004, and MoD now deny it took place despite the evidence submissions being freely available.


Tornado ZG710 – The main engineering contributory factor noted by the BoI, and which in the opinion of the senior Reviewing Officer would have prevented the accident, was notified by Boscombe in 1998; and rejected by the same 2 Star who ignored the above ASaC issues. (Same person as Nimrod, Chinook, Lynx….). This was upheld by the same 4 Star, CDP, in 2001. Both in written rulings, on numerous occasions following appeals. In 2002 a further 2 Star, XD5, also rejected the recommendation for a fleet inspection, which would have revealed the non-compliance with design regs. His Military Advisor, a Major in the Royal Scots, went to great lengths to fight the aircrews’ side, to no avail. That an infantry officer had to do this is a terrible indictment. The same official as above was involved, telling the project office to ignore the specialist engineering advice from Boscombe and aircraft project managers. There was a conscious decision to render the aircraft vulnerable to friendly fire.



I was going to ask what the MAA has done that would have prevented this. But I know the answer, because they have consistently supported the decisions; including briefing Ministers against the specialist engineer who identified and notified all the above risks, on both aircraft. If they really wanted to, they might, just might, make a 2 Star think twice. But as they are not independent I suggest they will continue to support 4 Star and Ministerial decisions that what I describe does not constitute “wrongdoing”. I’m afraid those are the hard, verifiable facts. Of the 9 dead, I knew 3 very well, so feel I have a small personal interest. I know the mother of one, to whom I spoke only the other day, remains utterly distraught, especially at this time of year. She can accept her son died in action. It is the lies and deceit by MoD she cannot bear. The outright lie by a senior RN officer that mandated design regulations are merely “recommendations” and can be ignored at will. JSP553, Military Airworthiness Regulations. The clue is in the name.



Front line should never hear of these attaining and maintaining problems. But as matters stand, the root problem has been ignored and operational commanders have been told to deal with it. That is abrogation on a grand scale. Show me an operational commander who has direct influence over any of the above.

EAP86
18th Mar 2016, 15:49
Tuc, all too depressing. Its been over a year since I last had any working dealings with the MAA but if its any consolation, I believe their Duty Holder concept and the regulations surrounding it were starting bear fruit. The mandate that High Criticality risks were to be reported and escalated on a regular basis seemed to becoming a bit of a success. It was reported that VSOs at 2, 3 and 4 star levels were being alerted to the relevant risks and had to accept them at their level or escalate them further. While it could be argued that this doesn't guarantee compliance, I understand that the MAA's own audits of PTs and Commands made it less likely that issues could be concealed.

EAP