Automation dependency stripped of political correctness. [Archive]

FDMII

2nd Jan 2016, 22:39

The vast majority of aircraft crashes are a direct result of PILOT ERROR.It's more complex than that.

I am also of the opinion that this, (the "certainty" of pilotless, commercial airline flight), is the dead-horse..., but the arguments 'for' pilotless flight must be engaged and examined and not dismissed. History is unkind to such dismissals, but it also forgets when one is right because by then it is ordinary.

While the industry has largely solved original, direct causes of accidents from the 30's on to the mid-80's which were primarily mechanical, system and/or engine failure, weather, navigational error, cockpit/instrument design, CFIT, ATC, mid-air collision and airports & runway design, human factors have understandably been a very difficult nut to crack, particularly post-automation beginning in the mid-80's. When one adopts, "the mind of the machine", one is changed, and in ways that are by their nature, invisible to one. That is what has occurred here, in aviation. That neither necessitates nor obviates pilotless flight. Any examination must be detailed and as much philosophically-conceived as technically and psychologically-conceived.

There is both a logical and a practical inconsistency in argument for pilotless flight that cannot be got around.

No system of human conception is "Spock-like"; any human system will always and already exhibit human limitations, if not in the cockpit crew then from those on the ground. Human factors accidents exist everywhere, not just in the cockpit.

There is no magic, no opportunity for perfection in pilotless flight. There is however, billions to be saved in salaried employees, training, checking, simulators and all that goes with managing a workforce including liabilities and insurance, and that is an entirely separate discussion. History shows us however, that most times, there are "opportunity costs" and outcomes that can remain unforeseen if one is too convinced, that can balance any such changes in the foundations.

Such design and implementation obviously is improved upon through collective work such that the problem of "missing something" in the attempted anticipation of every problem that has/does/will occur in commercial air transportation may be minimized - that is the principle of aircraft manufacture today and is obvious. But such factor cannot be eliminated, and can exceed the human limitations for a working complexity; there will always be certain threshold which will always be slightly less than the very best solutions from the very best minds. At some point, the outcomes will be at the level of committee work instead of insightful, really workable solutions. Bear in mind that aviation has been and continues to be designed for "average", simply because there are very few naturals or "top guns" - cockpit, system and airfoil design must be manageable by "average", whether such solutions are in software protections or technical design. "Average" here, means the Mean of the small set of all airline pilots, not of all pilots, period. Despite recent accidents, it's my opinion that that "average" remains very high indeed in our cockpits - so far.

This is not an argument for or against pilotless flight, but it is an argument against improvements beyond a 10^-9 probability of occurrences of the kind with which we are presently familiar. Whether present in the cockpit or resident on the ground either in an engineering lab or in a drone-like compound, the human factor within complex, potentially-rapidly-changing, high-risk enterprises is essentially the same. What keeps commercial aviation safe is the adoption of a very great distance built between what is operationally acceptable in commercial aviation and what is sometimes necessary in military operations. That factor alone may mitigate against pilotless flight, along with the necessary computing power and equivalent, flawless, (much higher than 10^-9 capability), network reliability.

The "solution" then must submit not to technical argument but in-service arguments and the economics and even the politics of pilotless flight.

In this, I could offer that these advances, (and I accept them as very possible, but not probable) will not take a just few years because of their acceptance by designers, regulatory authorities and even the flying public. Nor is it "simple" to take "all the data" of events and occurrences from which a cognizant digital system would/could "decide anticipatorily", (parse all occurrences in the database then parse the future, as airline pilots routinely do every day), based upon programmed "experience" of all such factors and provide a guaranteed-successful outcome of say, QF32 as described in an earlier post.

Nor can one just enter into the discourse a remark that computers will soon mimic human thought and will, as such, be better than pilots. In aviation, even imagination must have cranes, not sky-hooks, otherwise the argument is merely interesting, but not convincing.

It is a fact that most accidents now are the result of a network of causal pathways largely though not exclusively related to human factors. It is also an obvious fact that pilotless flight is ready now, today, for individual or select missions and tasks. The key is in how congenial may the marriage be between these two key components.

Certainly the discussion must remain light on its feet, for technological change is exponential. But the cost of such overall capability as described above for what could be a small reduction in human-factors-fatal-accidents may outweigh the cost of the present system "as-is".

stilton

3rd Jan 2016, 09:43

It's not complicated at all.

Try to design the pilots out of the cockpit (as Airbus has done) and this is the result.

You get systems monitors and automation dependent drones that work fine until things go wrong.

john_tullamarine

3rd Jan 2016, 09:51

Anybody been keeping track of how many times this has been posted in the last 15 months?

No .. but it probably has in one form or another.

Mod concern is to see educational things appear from time to time for the new chums .. the old folk's thoughts are important to the up and coming methinks ?

Tourist

3rd Jan 2016, 09:52

Exactly Stilton, and that is why Airbus has such a terrible accident rate compared to Boeing.

Oh, wait.....

They don't do they......

But that would mean you are talking utter tripe....?

Aviation has got safer in recent years solely due to good engineering. The pilot in both Boeing and Airbus is largely irrelevant to safety and in fact flight.

Recent crashes prove that many pilots are now so poor that when something goes wrong (or even when nothing goes wrong I the case of the SF 777!) the pilots can't cope.

FDMII

3rd Jan 2016, 16:22

Stilton, we may have had the best of times as captains! However, in my view, if young pilots are reading this forum, perhaps it is time to speak frankly regarding loss of skills and becoming a "drone".

Being a drone is a choice, not a mandate. Relinquishing skills and standards is a choice, not a result or a necessary outcome of automation. Awareness of one's skill level is a personal responsibility. It takes conscious effort and continual awareness; that is the price of professionalism.

We are a very, very long way still, from pilotless commercial transports. So, one becomes an "automation dependent drone" only if one permits oneself to be so.

I flew Airbus (320/333/343/345) for fifteen years, and all other manufacturer's types the previous twenty years. They were all ordinary airplanes with their own characteristics. The response to the question "What's it doing now?" was just to disconnect everything, sort it out or fly it a while then reconnect everything when happy. Like many of my colleagues, I hand-flew these airplanes from takeoff to cruise altitude and top-of-descent to landing, often with manual thrust. Did that into LHR, HKG, FRA, SYD for example...not every time as it's busier for the other pilot (who does the heading & altitude selecting on the mode-control panel, etc.).

It makes a difference, even if one is only required to make tiny adjustments to the flight path and thrust. It re-connects one to the airplane, (and to one's profession).

The requirement and the responsibility of a pilot is, still, to know one's airplane. Sometimes that means being aggressive in seeking knowledge and skill. That means not waiting around to be spoon-fed but hitting the books and practising one's profession just like doctors, lawyers and engineers must. One must look in the mirror for who to blame for being afraid to disconnect the autoflight systems.

If one feels, or sees oneself as a "designed-out", unwelcome appendage in the cockpit, one has taken up the wrong profession.

I completely understand RVSM requirements and complex SIDS & STARS which require unfailing accuracy in speed & track. However, where appropriate, one can disconnect everything and still hand-fly to FL290, and one can descend out of 290 and fly the airplane to touchdown.

Why roll over and let loss of skills and thinking happen? Take back the profession and put it where it belongs, in the cockpit, not at someone's desk or in some risk-free office. It's a choice. Even as many airlines require engagement of the autoflight systems as matter of SOPs and there is a risk of getting in trouble with management for disconnecting, one must fight for the opportunity to hand-fly. I've seen that fight take place and changes were made at one carrier including an "automation" policy which permitted/encouraged hand-flying when appropriate.

Even the manufacturers are now seeing the necessity of manual flight. It's still a choice.

grounded27

3rd Jan 2016, 21:34

Nor can one just enter into the discourse a remark that computers will soon mimic human thought and will, as such, be better than pilots. In aviation, even imagination must have cranes, not sky-hooks, otherwise the argument is merely interesting, but not convincing.

Agreed and that was a good read. But... We can program documented human action, much of which has been incorporated into pilot training as we learn from our mistakes to increase reliability of autonomous flight. With any new tech we will learn from failures, one would have to be a fool not to expect them. Should I crawl the rest of my life or risk the chance of falling when I stand up?

Centaurus

3rd Jan 2016, 22:58

Being a drone is a choice, not a mandate. Relinquishing skills and standards is a choice, not a result or a necessary outcome of automation. Awareness of one's skill level is a personal responsibility. It takes conscious effort and continual awareness; that is the price of professionalism.

First of all, I apologise for not realising that the article had already been published on Pprune several times. A few days ago was the first time I had seen it. In my view the value of the article is inestimable. .

Secondly, the above highlighted sentence by FDM11 immediately took me back to a similar point made by Captain D.Davies in his book `Handling the Big Jets.` He talks about enthusiasm for flying.

Assuming most current airline pilots have never heard of, or read his book first published in England in 1967, then here is what he wrote in the Conclusion. His advice is as valid today as when he first wrote it.

Quote: "Airline flying really is money for old rope most of the time; but when things get hairy then you earn your pay. The old saying that `Flying is years of boredom punctuated by moments of sheer terror`is always true. As we get older we all become slightly more lazy, slightly more tired - and this is a bit of a trap. The demand of jet transport flying can best be met by enthusiasm. Personal enthusiasm for the job is beyond value because it is a built-in productive force, and those who have it do not have to be pushed into practice and search for knowledge. Enthusiasm thus generates its own protection. This is the frame of mind which needs to be developed for the best execution of the airline pilot's task."
Unquote

Capt Claret

4th Jan 2016, 03:28

I think that was an excellent article and well written to allow non aviators to understand.

Tourist

4th Jan 2016, 04:56

Being a drone is a choice, not a mandate. Relinquishing skills and standards is a choice, not a result or a necessary outcome of automation. Awareness of one's skill level is a personal responsibility. It takes conscious effort and continual awareness; that is the price of professionalism.

I disagree.

Many/most airlines make it impossible to practice proper hand flying let alone anything tricky.

How many times will a captain say "It's max crosswind today, best I hand fly the whole approach to make sure I can still do it if the automatics failed" or "IMC and bumpy today, why don't you hand fly to keep your skills up"?

Never.
Not his fault, the system penalises those that want to practise.

The amount of actual flying done by a modern airline pilot is miniscule.

It is not possible to be good at anything or remain good at anything without practise.

Reading books and 6 monthly sims are not a tenth of what is required to be "good" at something. Airline pilots aim for adequate, and those that believe themselves to be good are merely judging themselves against the standard around them with is very poor.

There is a reason that militaries require a far greater selection of monthly currencies to be operational.

Many pilots believe that because they can run the "script" of the average flight smoothly that they are competent pilots.

They are wrong.
That thing you do every day is not being a pilot.
That script is what you do for your whole airline career to fill time while waiting to be a pilot.

Being a pilot is what happens when you suddenly have to land in the Hudson.
When you lose all Hydraulics.
When your Pitot tubes Ice up.

In my time in Airlines, I only flew with one "good" pilot.
He was frankly incredible.
To this day I have no idea how he managed to maintain the standard of flying he did whilst operating airliners.

I certainly could not maintain the standard that I expect of myself, so I left to fly toys that require my input to fly.

Jwscud

4th Jan 2016, 09:06

I agree tourist. My airline has recently banned FD off manual flight. British Airways does not allow pilots on FBW types to disconnect operative autothrust in flight at all. BA do however allow pilots to book free sim time to practice handling or whatever they want. How long before some accountant gets hold of that and tries to sell the time or whatever? How many locos will follow that positive example?

Where is the opportunity to practice? Manual flight following the flight directors, however much one may try to look through them is not quite as helpful. I agree that enthusiasm is the key, but how many of the next generation are exposed to these forms of ideas? Most of what I have learned in this regard came from old and bold captains (in my case mainly Italians) who could fly the aircraft to its safe limits rather than from my employer, who taught me the SOP manual.

Denti

4th Jan 2016, 09:13

There is a reason that militaries require a far greater selection of monthly currencies to be operational.

Maybe so, but considering that some large european countries let their military fastjet aviators fly up to 75% of their 120 block hours a year in the simulator the question is, how current are they really? But that probably belongs in a different part of this board.

Many/most airlines make it impossible to practice proper hand flying let alone anything tricky.

That seems something prevalent in anglo saxon influenced flight operations. In other parts of the world manual, flight director off flying is actively encouraged and done quite regularly. However, simulating non normal stuff on commercial flight remains, of course, a big No No.

Tourist

4th Jan 2016, 11:33

Maybe so, but considering that some large european countries let their military fastjet aviators fly up to 75% of their 120 block hours a year in the simulator the question is, how current are they really? But that probably belongs in a different part of this board.

Well, since airlines allow all of what I consider flying to be done in the couple of hours a year in the sim then the military is not doing badly.

It should be pointed out to those without a military background, that military hours are not like civ hours.

A lot gets packed into mil hours, and usual NATO min is 15 per month.

If the SIM is good, then I don't have a problem with it all being SIM based, but I do have a problem with people not actually being kept current and capable.

I floated the idea, semi-jokingly, on another thread about it being possible on a modern fly by computer airliner to curtain off half the cockpit at a time and have one pilot in the cruise run through computer generated scenarios/approaches/emergencies whilst the other monitors the real flight.

That way the pilots will get "actual" experience during the endless dull hours of airline flying, and when something actually happens for real, they might be capable of dealing with it.

The problem, of course, would be the transition from game flying to real if required in a hurry.

Not sure that would be worse than transition from in-flight rest, however.

FDMII

4th Jan 2016, 15:41

Hello Centaurus;

Davies* should be required reading for all airline pilots and especially those joining our ranks today.

Automation should not alter anything, but we have permitted it to do so and blamed automation for our own shortcomings. There is certainly no mystery or trick to flying the Airbus, (or the Boeings, Lockheeds or Douglases).

I see very little of a true, deep enthusiasm which you so aptly describe from Davies. The laments we hear here and elsewhere have become a culture of complaint with regard for tools of navigation and performance that, in the sixties, eventies & eighties, we would have died for..., oh, wait...

It is a mystery to me why knowledge, experience and keenness are dismissed and questions are not asked incessantly until one's practise is as close to perfect as one's capabilities will allow.

I loved the automation, particularly the Airbus - it was a dream to handfly, in all conditions, within the AOM's usual limitations. I understood it and taught it on the A320. The candidate was always made to hand-fly, no autothrust, no flight directors during line indoc. While flying the line I offered to turn/pull/push the knobs while the F/O flew for fun and found almost no takers, particularly with autothrust off.

I thought it was a shameful to admit one didn't understand one's airplane well enough to fly it. Such refusal is an indictment not of the airplane, the designers or the fabulous nav & performance tools now available, but of the pilot him/herself.

That is why the character and nature of accidents has changed over the last decade.

*Handling the Big Jets, D. P. Davies, Air Registration Board 1967, CAA 1975
Google the title for availability - there are some still available from various online booksellers.

RAT 5

4th Jan 2016, 15:49

There is constant talk that pilots need to have an in-depth knowledge of the automatics and a precise understanding of how to use them: i.e. what to use & when to achieve a specific task. That is often covered by SOP's; but in my experience those who use rigid SOP's teach only a small fraction of the options available. Discretion, judgement, often common sense has been diluted by those rigid procedures. As a result only those portions of the automatics necessary to comply with the SOP's are taught. When things go awry, be it nature, ATC or gremlins then many pilots are left clueless. Those other capabilities remain a secret, or there is a belief they are not allowed to be used; in violation of SOP's!
Now basic handling: the TR courses include a very rudimentary basic handling introduction. The same old items that existed in steam driven jets. Look at the LST syllabus form; it's from the dark ages. The only real handling done regularly is raw data ILS, a loss of thrust ILS & G/A & landing, and a low level disconnect on finals after a circle. The rest, turns, steep turns, access/decel are a one off. That's it. After that it's autopilot with FD on. No wonder the students' scans are so below average; they don't have the education.
However, it was the same in B732 days for the TR courses, but the big difference is we went on to the line and flew manual visuals at every opportunity. It was the norm! Thus the skills that had been 'introduced' in TR were honed on the line by practice & repetition. (I'm not in agreement that flying manual in climbs & descents to/from high FL is a real benefit.) It was the last 10,000, manually, into the circuit on to aid-less rwys that taught you the most. ILS's with decent vis & OK cloud base were flown manually. Thus we could 'feel' the a/c and keep scans sharp.
When we went onto EFIS a/c it was astonishing & wonderful, but we (those who bothered) kept those old scan skills sharp and didn't let the FD become god. It was a tool to be used when useful. The culture of visual manual approaches continued. We had foundations and the sensible few kept them in good maintenance. With little use decay would creep in subtly. Dangerous. So, when HAL went AWOL or 'walkabout' we knew it and knew what to do about it. The best computer on the a/c was always between our ears. The rest were tools. Decisions were still made 'upstairs'. We knew what level of automation to use and were not afraid to disconnect. (no children of the magenta line syndrome)

What is missing today are those foundations. After the TR courses the closest many get to real handling is base training; but once that is over many don't allow such cowboy flying anymore and then some pilots even become scared to try. OFDM will be watching. OFDM is a good thing, but any decent pilot shouldn't go any where near their triggers. Airbus seem to have woken up to this lack of foundation, but adding more handling to the TR course will only be a solution IF it is carried through onto the line. Therein lies the problem. XAA's can stipulate all the content of the TR's but they can't, or won't, interfere with line SOP's to the extent of manual flying. That is an airline culture, and with most being under the thumb of accountants and not pilots, don't hold your breath.

Back to knowledge of the automatics: IMHO there is not enough REAL education about what major screw ups the automatics can create and what to do about it. (Boeing non FBW). I realise the FBW a/c can be real bucking broncos if they get crossed wires and have a bad hair day. How much the airlines can train in the initial TR is limited otherwise information overload will happen. But, within a 3 year period, IMHO all the nasties and traps should have been experienced; certainly before command is gained. There has to be 1 person on the FD who has seen all this chaos. This needs careful planning of an educated recurrency training, not just tick in the box exercises.
When allowed, I often used to write recurrency training based on real life events. How many airlines have introduced an AF or QZ scenarios in their sim training; even the XL icing problem?

There has to be a very deep fundamental review of TR content and the testing there-of. That has to start in the XAA's as they sanction them for national/EASA licence standards. Is it happening or, is the risk of these events happening, within an acceptable frequency? How many incidents occur that nearly become accidents, and as a result we don't hear about them and the rose tinted glasses stay firmly in place? This is such a critical & vital debate to have, and a sound conclusion reached. The future of pilot training, a/c design and the safety of future passengers depend on it.

Tourist

4th Jan 2016, 15:55

The candidate was always made to hand-fly, no autothrust, no flight directors during line indoc. While flying the line I offered to turn/pull/push the knobs while the F/O flew for fun and found almost no takers, particularly with autothrust off.

I thought it was a shameful to admit one didn't understand the airplane well enough to fly it. Such refusal is an indictment not of the airplane, the designers or the fabulous nav & performance tools now available, but of the pilot him/herself.

That's why the character and nature of accidents has changed over the last decade.

I applaud you for having that attitude, but there is little of that attitude around now.

Nowadays, the company will bite your head off for tripping one of the "gates" which is always more likely when hand flying, so the captains understandably are not keen.

Added to this is the fact that the captains have not been doing it themselves so are further from their comfort zone where they are happy to let the baby copilots explore the edges of the boundaries whilst learning their craft.

There is no reward structure whatsoever in any airline I am aware of for being excellent.

There are only punishments for not being adequate, with adequate being a remarkably low bar.

As long as you meet the minimum standard, you are treated the same as everybody else.

I can think of no other industry in the world that operates like that yet expects a high level of performance.

There is no other profession requiring training, skill and aptitude where progression is based upon joining date rather than excellence.

If piloting skill were rewarded, then perhaps the decline could be halted.

FDMII

4th Jan 2016, 17:07

RAT 5

The notion of "SOPs" has recently, (last decade or so), been taking its cue or borrowing its meaning from SMS & the audit process, which, in my view, are substantially different (and at odds with) the original notion behind SOPs.

By this I mean, SOPs, a) used to be a great guide especially doing memorized abnormal/emergency drills and, b) a huge safety improvement over keeping notes on how each captain one flew with liked things done, which I recall doing in the early days.

That changed after a fatal accident resulted from two different ways of arming the spoilers which killed 109 passengers & crew. That's when the notion of SOPs (and their enforcement) was adopted at that air carrier.

Today SMS and the audit process have emphasized documentation and equivalence in terms of performance. An audit process checks what is written and audits what is done, and if it is not done precisely the way it is written there is a "finding", which must be responded to within a certain time period.

In aviation, such narrowness is a problem.

As with all good ideas that are overtaken by perhaps well-intentioned, over-enthusiastic adherents or those who are satisfying their superiors, the audit process clamps down the SOP process such that a perceived and real need to deviate from SOPs say, in an emergency, is assessed as a "failure" rather than an understandable need to act.

This is particularly a problem today with the profession and standards so dumbed down as to actually need such a rudimentary reaction. But the audit process discourages & even punishes thinking and acting according to one's experience.

I would be the first to state that audits are a necessary process within an SMS environment and that strict adherence to SOPs IS a necessary requirement when flying transport aircraft.

But a slavish adherence to SOPs in the face of circumstances which demand an alteration of SOPs actually increases risk of an accident.

Of course, such an approach requires experience, in-depth knowledge and that old-fashioned concept known as "airmanship". There is less of that today, so strict adherence, with little expectation of thought, is the requirement and that's what audits focus on.

One cannot account or quantify thought or even creative imagination in such a system, yet aviation is as much if not more an art than science.

Another thing - the notion that the aircraft commander IS the legal commander responsible for the safety of the flight, and in the end is the sole decision-maker on board the aircraft is gradually being made subservient to the audit process where such authority is "modified". Certainly the commander must answer for each and every action, but the assessment of such action must be based upon a broader set of "rules" than mere standard documentation.

These are subtle human factors issues as much as they are structural issues within a changing aviation system which is finding itself needing to be less accommodating to the notion that SOPs are more of a guide than a strict rule, simply because many pilots today don't know the difference. Such rapidly-growing aviation systems as we are seeing are a known factor in increased risk simply because training systems can only convey the basics while only time-in can provide the necessary experience to be an airline pilot.

RAT 5

4th Jan 2016, 17:24

There is no reward structure whatsoever in any airline I am aware of for being excellent.
There are only punishments for not being adequate, with adequate being a remarkably low bar.

Indeed Tourist: IMHO I've seen mediocre from my day become the adequate today. Very sad.
In the 80's, in one of my airlines, the command pass rate was apalling low, until it was eventually realised that too many of the training dept. were trappers & not guiders/encouragers/developers. Once the selection process was improved and the up-grading restructured made more realistic the pass rate rose to where it would be expected to be. That was in the days when 7years/5000hrs was the threshold. I wonder how it's is working today with 4years/3000hrs quite common?
One other factor I have noticed is SFI's being 2 year experienced F/O's rather than more seasoned pilots, even captains, as in the older days. IMHO a 2 year ex-cadet SFI might be nothing more than an SOP lecturer and supervisor. I wonder if students, with real problems of a wide spectrum, handling, understanding of MCC/jets/automatics etc. can be provided with quick effective guidance.
If training needs to go back to basics, and then include more understanding of automatics, can this be achieved with low experience SFI's? There are, indeed, good teachers in their ranks, but the knowledge data base can only be a little more than what was gained in their own TR course a couple of years previous.

What are the opinions in different airlines and countries about the average experience of SFI's?

safetypee

4th Jan 2016, 18:24

FDMII; references, :ok: automation, :ok: SMS, :ok: SOPs, :ok:
As much as we should support the use of excellent references in aviation, the practicality of modern operations (life the universe, and everything), is that they are unlikely to be read; or SMS application after risk assessment, or ill-conceived SOPs applied correctly, – horses to water etc.

We have to accept that ‘aviation’ has changed; it has evolved and continues to evolve as influenced by society and the operational environment, which includes the availability (need) and use of automation.
We require automation, mainly to take over tedious manual tasks, routine calculations, or for high accuracy path following, but that should not mean that we depend on automation for all the process of flying, particularly thinking. The latter requires that we must pay greater attention to the overall flight regime, management of the flight, management of the aircraft and of automation, management of ourselves.
Thus the safety issue is not that pilots are weak (manual flight), but that we are poor managers in modern day situations including the rarer and particularly surprising situations.

Most pilot training is sufficient for the overwhelming majority of operations; we are a safe industry, pilots can takeoff, land, – fly in the every day situations as required, in which they have been trained for. However, human performance will suffer in those rare unforeseen situations which we only identify with hindsight; if we could see these with foresight then we might be able to train for them.

In a similar manner the qualities of airmanship have changed, the drive for knowledge and expertise, the need to practice both the skills of flight and of managing – the aircraft and our thoughts; these have been reduced by society’s norms. We are no longer the people who we think we were.

Opposed to considering more of the ‘old way’ of flight training we should first consider what has changed, and why; then we might better understand the problems of modern operation (and there are many of them), and thus consider improvements.

Modern aviation is intractable; we are not able to fully understand the working of our aircraft, nor the operational situations; thus start with the problem of how we might manage these with less than a complete understanding.

FDMII

4th Jan 2016, 19:10

safetypee, thank you; - a refreshing and engaging interpretation of the state of modern aviation, and one with which I am not at all in disagreement.

To clarify, the urgency of "knowing one's aircraft" encompasses knowledge of high-altitude, swept-wing, high-speed, large-transport flight.

:ok:, "rarer and particularly surprising situations"

Clearly I and a number here come from cables-and-pulley aircraft and steam cockpits, retiring off high-automation aircraft, and many have incorporated what was known and accepted as "wisdom" then, into modern operations because it worked and kept us alive. I take from your comments that this no longer is wholly the case and that such circumstances are not necessarily undesireable. We might say it is nowhere near the change made in the sixties from piston-to-turbine, straight-wing to swept-wing flight!

In terms of the original thesis regarding autonomous commercial transportation at levels we currently have, I think human performance either in the cockpit or displaced to the ground, will remain a challenge, and not entirely due to the difficulty in writing the code for such systems.

Foreseeing situations and either training, or writing software and firmware for such eventualities will I believe, obtain approximately the same outcomes (in terms of occurrences), for reasons stated earlier.

At the moment, (and I am always prepared to change, given evidence), it seems to me that pilotless commercial flight is an equivalent to Mr. Turing's test, and if the machine can pass it, we will have achieved that goal!

RAT 5

4th Jan 2016, 19:51

Safetypee brings up the notion of management, and mentions it often. I agree; it is a vital integral component of the captain's role.
I brought up the question of low experience SFI's teaching the next generation of low hour cadets, and if this is a good method of building a solid foundation in aviation, not just one version of SOP's. (I have met low hour captains from this type of pilot farm who believed there was only one way to fly a procedure.)
Now what about the low hour captain and their expected handling capabilities? There seems to be some common idea that those are being eroded due to lack of experience first & practice second. So now what about management? How much of commands in rapidly expanding modern airlines pays attention to operations management? OK, they trot out the regular CRM stuff; they pump in a few slightly more than average QRH non-normals and see how the new ace handles the situation, according to the book. What about 'total operation management?' That means, ground ops, catering, flight planning, ATC, slot times + problems, passenger problems, baggage problems, en-route weather problems, diversion problems including managing the pax handling in a foreign country where you are not expected, technical diversion, pax problems on board = divert yes/no et.c etc. Now of these have a QRH, MEL or DDG. You have no coms back to base. You are at the front line and in charge. Do most 4 year experienced 28year olds have what is all necessary?

A discussion point.

I did some command training, in a foreign country from our own airline, while operating a charter contract for a local airline. It was fascinating. Over a week, everyday, something needed a captain's decision which was not in any manual. The answer was based on knowledge of the environment, common sense, multi-tasking and problem solving using all agencies and resources available while pleasing the customer. It was excellent and the candidate was good enough to make some himself and learn from suggestions & hints. He was a mature (age) pilot with 7 years as F/O including some long-haul and quite a few sub-charter ops. He'd seen quite a lot, but unfortunately had been lumbered with captains who did not teach and demonstrate ( e.g. what would you do?) but just gave orders with no explanation. He rose to the challenge. I wonder how much of today's rapid command process can really prepare the newbie for what they will will have to handle. Handling the a/c is one thing, managing the whole operation, out of sight, is another.

This is even more relevant with the 'management' of an intercontinental wide-body operation. No you can throw in the night-stop issue that will breed unforeseen problems. If the rapid command criteria were applied to those flights, and LOCo's branch into intercontinental ops, you could see quite young low houred captains. Would that be healthy or should there be higher thresholds?

A cross-channel ferry is one thing, a world cruise is another.

GlobalNav

4th Jan 2016, 21:18

It is a curious adverse affect that the constant/continuous use of the modern flight deck seems to have on pilot behavior and awareness of the airplane's state. For the most part, the increasing application of automation has yielded the desired and intended improvement of nominal performance and operational efficiency. I can't prove that with data but I'm sure there are marketing types around with plenty of evidence for that.

But the automation brings attention to itself, its set up, its management and its own unique indications - of how the automation is doing, not how or what the airplane is doing. The pilot has gradually become a systems manager in spite of the title "pilot" and by habitual practice fostered by the modern flight deck become less attentive to and aware of the airplane state, leading to a lower state of readiness to recognize, interpret and react to hazardous non-normal conditions.

The automation performs so well in normal conditions and is so reliable that "normal" conditions are predominant. The airplane's state, while not deliberately neglected, is normally so benign that perceived need to monitor it closely is diminished. Other more apparent needs for the pilot's attention, whatever they might be, can seem to be safely attended to without any obvious consequence - normally. Like a constant dripping of water, the modern flight deck is, in effect, retraining the pilot, changing the pilot's routine behavior. The water is slowly but continuously getting warmer without notice, until it comes to a boil and things quickly become messy.

The non-normal condition occurs, the pilot keeps expecting normal system behavior, but it's not normal and the pilot is confused, not quite believing the indications. Not used to connecting the dots because the modern systems have been doing that for the pilot, the ability and likelihood that the dots can be reconnected in the midst of missing and disparate indications is unsurprisingly low.

The unintended consequences of flight deck modernization due to a failure to consider the effects on the human component of the system, that component which all the safety analyses assume will be there to put humpty-dumpty back together again, but just isn't up to the task - too little experience dealing with THIS situation.

Consider the Schipol 737 accident, the Buffalo Dash-8 accident, AF447, even Cali 20 years ago, and so many others. I do not presume that there are any silver bullet solutions to the many factors that feed this unfortunate state of affairs. I really don't believe that the typical response - to add another alert to compensate for inattention and lack of awareness - really addresses the problem. Why? Because it is not sufficient to presumably bring the pilot's awareness to its necessary level only when the situation has become hazardous and when an immediate, correct intervention is necessary. There are too many examples of disbelief, confusion, and delay for such unanticipated conditions.

The solution(s) must address the real problem - lack of routine, continuous, and deliberate awareness of the state of the airplane and associated systems - EVEN WHEN things are normal and the automation is actually handling the airplane. We need a "post-Modern" flight deck - designed to draw the pilot's attention regularly and continuously to where it belongs and where our system safety analyses have been assuming it was. The pilot should have timely awareness of even small unintended deviations from the normal desired conditions, that in their own right are not hazardous, but if left to grow unchecked could become hazardous. Such "minor" deviations should be corrected sooner, before they become major. A pilot (or flight crew) that has successfully maintained continuous awareness of the airplane is best prepared to do this.

What can system design do to help achieve this? Like I said, I have no silver bullets. I do think that more could be done to more positively distinguish normal, within desired tolerances, conditions from those where minor but certainly unintended deviations occur. Distinguished well enough that a quick glance will at least draw a double take and lead to heightened vigilance. The need for correction is not urgent, and means of correction need not be heroic. The vigilant pilot (flight crew) can assess the situation and take timely action, without the airplane ever reaching a condition in which safety was jeopardized. Whatever the cause of the deviations, including unexpected automation behavior, the pilot (flight crew) is aware and has been intervening (or at least thinking about it) before they ever reach an unsafe level.

I suspect, but have no hard data, that such "near normal" deviations occur more frequently than we think. That the pilots becoming aware of these will naturally become more vigilant - because their expectations will have changed. The result? The "post-Modern" flight deck will train pilots in the opposite direction that the modern flight deck has - toward more vigilance and awareness, not less. And THAT is addressing the problem. Building hours on the modern flight deck is not giving them the experience and wisdom we want from airline pilots. Building hours on the post-modern flight deck will have the opposite and desired effect.

Willie Nelson

5th Jan 2016, 08:52

We all know the combination of various automation policies and human nature has the potential to de skill a pilot just as soon as look sideways however a bit of personal responsibility doesn't go astray.

Buy a cheap flight sim and nerd burger it out for a couple of approaches with all automatics off in whatever conditions you like, take the extra time in the sim after the session's over, arm chair fly a few made up non-normals and practice your management model, the bastards can't stop you doing that.

I am paid to be ready for the day when the s&$! hits the stage one compressor, the rest is just data entry, bad coffee and good conversation.

RAT 5

5th Jan 2016, 12:22

Globalnav: I like some of your thinking & comments, especially about being aware and staying alert to what the a/c is doing. Many years I found it very disappointing to be a new train sign captain in a fledgling airline. It had just transitioned from a needles & dials +FE a/c to the latest EFIS/EICAS LNAV/VNAV new toy.
The instructors developed the mantra of "fly the FD", and the idea that it was not necessary to keep a scan of the overhead panel, or anywhere else, as "EICAS would tell you when there is a problem". My philosophy of being alert to trends and being proactive was not appreciated. They thought EICAS had replaced the hairy old fart who used to sit behind them and monitor trends. EICAS only tells you when a limit is reached. You might now be faced with a worse scenario than 30 mins earlier. IMHO these 2 mantra's led to a false sense of security and low awareness; both can be disastrous.
I think you are with me in questioning the technocrats + accountants idea that error can be reduced by more automation and more back up redundancy just in case.
Can someone please tell us how much line pilot input is there into modern a/c development. I don't mean manufacturer's test pilots, I mean day in day out line training captains. At a Boeing visit to our home base we were invited to discuss issues as we had more operating experience than they did. It was interesting how much detail we had to include to gain a full understanding by the Boeing pilots. Sometimes it was something they had not appreciated. It didn't always lead to a change, and we don't know if it was carried forward in the development process, but we tried.

FDM11: Also some very interesting points. Your comments ref. SOP's in the new age is relevant. I once heard 2 very different philosophies about SOP's. One was the old idea that it allowed many different pilots to fly together in a manner that the DFO & CP had deemed safe & efficient. The other was that they were a legal safe-guard. If it went wrong, but you had followed SOP's then you were vindicated; not your fault. Ouch!
When training & checking I focused more on the overall operation within an SOP framework rather than the SOP minutiae. Was it acceptable, safe, good airmanship? The grading process indicated that X SOP errors = A grade, Y errors = B grade, Z errors = C grade etc. I had a more subjective view. This of course brings in personal attitudes of trainer/checkers and subjective assessments. I still prefer that to the nit-picking black & white trappers.
Of course a certain profile had a crew coordination process and a correct use of the automatics to achieve a safe result. That is correct as it is a crew procedure and both expect the other to act in a certain way & certain times. No confusion. Solid SOP required. Pass/fail?
What many forget is that it is an SOP to deviate from SOP's when safety dictates. What that requires is the realisation that something is going awry, why the normal SOP will not be the best, and what other FCTM technique is a solution. IMHO this is what is missing in basic TR, and more critically in command training. It can be that SOP focus is even more intense in that phase.
One then hears real life stories which leave the question "why did they do that & not the other?" You will often find that they were outside their comfort zone, knew no other way of doing something, even though they suspected it might not be the best; but they could not be blamed for following SOP's. It would not be their fault. Ouch.
This is where the training process has let them down. It was a common comment from cadet based F/O's that they liked flying with the old farts from a varied background rather than the newbie captains. When presented with a situation they got on with it and used all resources to achieve the task required; no hesitation. Smooth, efficient and well managed with good CRM, while complying as best as possible with SOP's but not afraid to deviate as required. The newbies first thought was "what's written down." Then doubt crept in and moments of indecision delayed action.
FDM11 questions the true and best status for SOP's. Should they be 'obedience of fools & guidance of wise men,' or something which fits into the auditing process of right/wrong black/white?

FDMII

5th Jan 2016, 15:36

RAT 5, re:
Of course a certain profile had a crew coordination process and a correct use of the automatics to achieve a safe result. That is correct as it is a crew procedure and both expect the other to act in a certain way & certain times. No confusion. Solid SOP required. Pass/fail?
What many forget is that it is an SOP to deviate from SOP's when safety dictates. What that requires is the realisation that something is going awry, why the normal SOP will not be the best, and what other FCTM technique is a solution. IMHO this is what is missing in basic TR, and more critically in command training. It can be that SOP focus is even more intense in that phase.:ok: I like that series of observations. I think it captures what is meant by "guidance of wise men,...", etc. I particularly agree with you where automation and SOPs is concerned, (Solid SOP required), and I would add the same comment where the activation of protections (for both Boeing & Airbus) are concerned; Follow the book!

That said, I recall ignoring the ECAM Abnormal drill on an A330 flight, for what I considered to be very good reasons, a decision which proved to be the correct one but only after all was said and done. That's what the captain is for. And, glancing at the thread's thesis for a moment, almost certainly any software/autonomous/pilotless aircraft would have made the wrong decision and placed the aircraft and its payload in a high-risk condition. This is because software cannot parse what the belly senses, nor is there is a way that a mere abundance of "data" could replace experience and render a "correct" decision.

The "audit" item I brought into the dialog as only lately has this added notion entered into the discourse on human factors accidents when SMS began to take hold. I like SMS and think it is far better approach to risks and occurrences than blame/discipline/enforcement models. But the difficulty with the audit process is that it is a vertical, bureaucratic model (vice lateral process), which requires satisfaction of superiors in the up-and-down structure of command-and-control, without permitting variability in standards, (lest one open oneself to liabilities, blame and ouch).

I think that is a potential failing of the audit process should it not be designed or handled well, and can cause precisely what such process is intended to avoid/prevent.

RAT 5

5th Jan 2016, 16:55

This is because software cannot parse what the belly senses, nor is there is a way that a mere abundance of "data" could replace experience and render a "correct" decision.

And computers don't have hairs on the back of their necks, or sweaty armpits before a limit is reached. I'm not sure they will have planned at least 1 or more escape route before they enter into any void. I wonder how many have Plan B & C programmed in.
That to me is one of the essential parameters of command; few last minute surprises from foreseeable problems. There will always be the odd one, but then that really will be a surprise.

FDMII

5th Jan 2016, 18:01

Yes, for sure.

And to your point, computers/software are not and cannot be anticipatory. They are forever and always reactive to present input, even as that input and reaction to the "present" may be a billionth-of-a-second. As you observe, the mere appearance (as in, "mimics or looks like, but isn't"), of anticipatory behaviour is not truly anticipatory.

In terms of software engineering and the above, the question must be asked, "What is behaviour?"

To be humanly anticpatory is a philosophy-of-mind* notion and until one understands and comprehends this, autonomous flight will always and first, be dependent in some way, trapped in "the present" and therefore reliant.

It is these questions which we have not even seen posed in the discourse on autonomous flight, let alone a set of proposed solutions/answers which address such matters.

This doesn't mean that autonomous flight can't be done in the ways proposed, nor are these qualifying questions which, when apparently solved, autonomous flight may occur. We don't know what the qualifying conditions are yet.

It just means that such questions that involve an understanding of the mind must be satisfactorily anticipated and addressed.

*Conditions for Fully Autonomous Anticipation (http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/30868284/collier-Corrected-April-8-2006.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJ56TQJRTWSMTNPEA&Expires=1452025499&Signature=jD8yK3bO3jgGyGCPYb91dVkCvQM%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DConditions_for_Fully_Auto nomous_Anticipa.pdf)
The paper, by John Collier, may be useful in understanding what is meant by this sentence. There are a few typos in the PDF, likely through OCR errors.

GlobalNav

5th Jan 2016, 18:36

"And computers don't have hairs on the back of their necks, or sweaty armpits before a limit is reached. "

Granted, and neither do pilots not paying attention or unaware of proximity to the limit.

"And to your point, computers/software are not and cannot be anticipatory. "

Granted, likewise, and neither do pilots not paying attention or unaware.

We may be tempted to criticize pilots not paying attention or unaware as unprofessional and not doing their jobs. But criticism, deserved or not, is insufficient. The modern automated flight deck is creating such pilots. At best they, while becoming less anticipatory, are becoming reactionary. But as a whole I'm not convinced they are even that as well as we need.

Please don't misunderstand, I am not praising software and automated systems nor desiring them as the superior replacement for the human component. We need to design the flight deck better to account for the nature of the human component and rightly take advantage of all its strengths.

RAT 5

5th Jan 2016, 19:39

It has been a fascinating debate/discussion. I feel we can end up in a never ending circle. What we are seeking is a solution to a perceived problem. That seems to be distant and we 'old f*@ts are becoming frustrated that no-one is taking action.

I'd like to widen the discussion to the very people we are discussing, i.e. the enthusiastic newbies, be they cadets or low hour captains. The topic we have been discussing is how these new-tech modern cockpit jockeys cope with the job. How do they feel about it? What do they think about their training? Do they feel sufficiently empowered with knowledge & authority every day?

I remember my first jet command; not first command, but the first 'wide-eyed finally, at last' moment. My first solo sector I had a flap problem at 10 mile finals on my 1st ILS as PF captain. It was completely no big deal. The foundations were solid. It was classic text book QRH/CRM stuff. Later, I had more spurious problems with those less tangible items that required management. Again, no big deal: common sense forged by the apprenticeship served.

So what do the newbies think about their apprenticeship? 148 hrs and a shiny jet? Newbie captains, 3000hrs and it's your responsibility? Are we correct in our nervousness or are we making mountains from molehills due to the spectacular screw ups? For every spectacular headline there are 10,000's of smooth flights.

Thoughts?

FDMII

5th Jan 2016, 21:17

I'd like to widen the discussion to the very people we are discussing, :ok: -agree, & standing by.

Cheers to you, RAT 5

Willie Nelson

5th Jan 2016, 22:31

Good point Rat 5

I am one of those relatively new captains that you speak of. I've got over 3000 hours in the left seat of the 320/321.

Davies was spot on, by talking of enthusiasm being one of the best resources for the job and thankfully, I still carry this in spades.

Let me make this clear: Failure is a much better teacher than success.

From my perspective the problem will always be, you don't know what you don't know and having a few hours 'without incident' can very much lead you down the path of complacency.

The first thing that woke me up was failing a sim session for the first time ever, I was absolutely mortified. I had studied, I knew what to expect and then, on the day, the major failure occurred and although I got the thing on the ground safely, there had been a couple of altitude busts during initial descent (around 300 feet each time) and I had interrupted the FO at critical times during his ECAM actions without really giving my timing much thought.

What was clear to me was not that I couldn't hand fly the aircraft but rather I didn't have the various stress tested blocks of flight management process in place for example, what to do before even starting the ECAM, when to interject or review and how to observe my offsider sanctions effectively.

As a result of course, I spent most of the exercise second guessing each decision that I had already made, which then led to tunnel vision, etc, etc.

The company was a lot easier on me than I was on myself and and after picking myself up off the floor I then started speaking to other skippers about their various management models, I took a little from here and there and came up with some very specific and clear processes that could be transposed on to any situation with regard to aviation, navigating and communicating in that order.

The second thing was AF447: Holy s#!t, three 'qualified' guys couldn't figure it out and I was flying with guys almost every day with less experience than the least experienced guy on that flight deck.

I had always had a great deal of interest in reading the crash comics as I understood that I didn't have time to make all the mistakes myself and rather, had to learn from others including the crew of AF447. Since then I have spent plenty of time reading up and transposing my own blocks on to various other situations to stress test them and all I can say for sure is that I am much more experienced than I was before.

Failure in the sim sucks but if it happens to you, lap it, take notes, learn well and move on with greater confidence and be thankful for the chance to fail in a safe place.

Great discussion.

Capn Bloggs

6th Jan 2016, 05:01

O8b1ewfRdCg

seen_the_box

6th Jan 2016, 08:22

I'll add my experience to the mix. I'm an ex-cadet. I joined my first airline from a three letter flying school with 200 hours or thereabouts, straight onto the 320/1. The airline I joined didn't actively ban manual flying, but I wouldn't exactly say that it was encouraged by either trainers or the majority of line captains, although there were notable exceptions. In three years there, I probably flew fewer than five approaches with the auto thrust off. It was something that I simply wasn't very comfortable doing.

I made the decision to move to my current (large loco) airline after three years, and found myself in a different type of environment. In my base, manual flying seemed to be the norm. The company states in the OMs that manual flying is encouraged and should be regularly practiced. Manual flying was even a line training item during the company OCC. I forced myself to move out of my comfort zone, followed the lead of my captains and started flying more and more approaches with raw data, and with all of the automation switched off. The result is that now, four years later and a captain myself, I'm arguably more comfortable flying an approach with everything switched off than with all the magic working. Indeed, I sometimes choose to fly an approach to minimum with all the automation engaged to practice using the automation!

There are still some pilots who are very nervous about manual flying, thinking that they are going to get hauled over the coals for making a mistake while hand flying. Certainly in my current company, I'm not sure where the attitude comes from. I have personally never heard from the FDM team, and don't know anyone who has for an FDM occurrence related to hand flying. If you screw up an approach (which we can all do), you go around, file an ASR, and that's the last that you will hear of it. Nobody will be blamed for messing up an approach and going around, regardless of the level of automation they were using.

To touch on a point raised regarding 'excellence' vs. seniority: here, command is something that you have to apply for. It's not a case of waiting for your number to come up and being granted a course. I applied and took my command way out of seniority. The failure rate is very high at each stage of the five stage process, and suitability for the role is recognised and valued. Everyone talks; everyone knows who the good (and bad) FOs are, and management and training actively solicit the opinions of line captains when considering someone for command. Merely 'adequete' training records are definitely not enough; to move beyond the very first stage of the assessment process, a release from the training department is required, and the decision whether to grant the release or not is contingent on your training records being above standard.

RAT 5

6th Jan 2016, 12:22

Great to see the ball rolling. I was wondering how it is now with many 'apprenticeships' less than half what they were in 80's & 90's. How is it swimming in the deep end so early? It's not just about flying, it's about managing the daily operation, taking responsibility, using your authority and making decisions about non-QRH issues.
Good luck to all. Let's hear more.

1201alarm

8th Jan 2016, 22:30

At the end what we are talking here is a twofold thing: knowledge and skill.

You need to have some knowledge: how a wing flies, what AOA is, what stall means, how you have to react to stall, what the backside of the power curve is, what happens in high level aerodynamic (coffin corner), what it means to fly on mach, the concept of energy in terms of alt, speed, weight and wind vs. distance to go, pitch and power values for the usual flight regimes incl. go around and single engine go around, function of slats and flaps, effect of underslung engines, danger of WS and TS...

That is what comes to my mind when I don't think about it more deeper. I am sure others will come up with some more points.

It is really not that much, and all these things can be learned and understood under own efforts, independantly what your airline does. The examples (accidents) are easy to find to learn and understand these basics. No excuses possible!

So lets move to skills: once you have understood above basics, how do you make it work in real live, in the sense that a skill is a knowledge that is applied correctly and made to use in reality?

The most important skill is scanning. Scanning of your instruments, your basic T plus the engine instruments. Your eyes need to be fix in wandering around, scan, scan, scan... The best way to train this is by flying manually, ALWAYS with ATHR off when the AP is off (remember, speed MUST be in your scan), and you want to be proficient in pitch and power. Regularly you should even switch of the FD. Hand-eye-coordination will become much better.

Here the airlines come into play, some have a good culture in switching AP/FD/ATHR off, some not. A good culture encourages switching AP/FD/ATHR off, and has a basic understanding among pilots and some rules when it is appropriate to do so and when not.

Once you have been accustomed to it, it is really no big deal anymore. Your scanning capacity becomes so good, that is becomes a peace of cake to supervise your autopilot.

[I can understand that on longhaul, it is a bit more difficult.]

Then no one is stopping you from ignoring FMS managed descent calculations (if not required by airspace, route, ATC) and being skilled in judgement of wind, weight, speed, alt vs. distance to go. Just refine every day out there the point you start your idle descent towards the field.

At least the message is getting out there, leaders in safety and training have since quite a while been past the point where automation was seen as the be end of all.

However, individual airlines still are lagging behind, but at least most of the big carriers seem to have understood.

It is not rocket science, it does hardly cost money, it just has to be done.

RAT 5

9th Jan 2016, 12:18

FDMII

9th Jan 2016, 17:21

RAT 5, indeed, would that this were true but I don't think it is. But I'd be interested in specifics, not naming an airline of course, but affirmations that one's carrier encourages a balance of fully-manual and fully-automated flight and has in place a reasonable automation policy for their crews' guidance.

Carriers who have experienced screw-ups when the automation has been turned off were, and I think still are quick to tighten up automation policies due expense and liability concerns, regenerating not fixing, the original problem. I watched this occur twenty-five years ago; it became a recursive process, with known, and in my view unfortunate results.

In terms of skill, I think one ought to be able to do a visual approach just by looking out the window. For the bean-counting crowd, it saves a bit of fuel and time, (by the flight data, not a lot of savings though), and it maintains skills such as self-perception as part-of-the-machine, S.A., judgment, timing, energy-management, scan, (outside & in), & hands-&-feet.

PS, seen-in-the-box, I sure liked your post, thank you for taking the time. Very real, and well worth reading for other pilots as it's speaks a lot of truth.

RAT 5

9th Jan 2016, 17:40

In terms of skill, I think one ought to be able to do a visual approach just by looking out the window. For the bean-counting crowd, it saves a bit of fuel and time, (by the flight data, not a lot of savings though), and it maintains skills such as self-perception as part-of-the-machine, S.A., judgment, timing, energy-management, scan, (outside & in), & hands-&-feet.

:) Love it 100% + 'confidence in your own abilities'. It was the norm in the old days for every line pilot & IMHO this should be part of a command upgrade check. If you can't do it you should not be in command of a commercial a/c. I've experienced carriers where the visual arrival, for cost saving, was written in the books. However they did not train it nor ask captains to demo it so the F/O's apprenticeship was not enriched. What happened on summer CAVOK days was the number of G/A's due unstable approaches increased alarmingly. After the winter months no-one had been practicing. Solution? discourage manual approaches, or if you do them, use the automatics.
Bean counting gone mad.
I still ask the question. How is that, in general, airline piloting skills are less than 2 generations ago? Some will disagree, but I think they are in their lucky bubble. During my varied airline exposure in both employer, technology and national culture I think it has.

john_tullamarine

10th Jan 2016, 09:45

one ought to be able to do a visual approach just by looking out the window

Indeed ... sometimes it got a tad interesting ..

One of my fondest memories is of a licence renewal check on the 727 .. the checkie (thanks, Brian) required everything useful in my vision to be switched off at about 70-80 DME into SYD on a severe CAVOK day (I couldn't see Sydney, let alone the airfield) .. and the task was to intercept the extended ILS (Mk 1 eyeball only) and fly it to touchdown. Local knowledge of mountains, rivers, etc., saved the day .. as he, no doubt, intended. Not a usual event but typical for pushing the learning boundaries and, on this occasion, during a quite low traffic period.

Another regular exercise on routine line ops (PER-MEL) was to be held high for an ILS onto 27 .. but then be offered straight in on 09 (T-VASIS and nothing else as I recall) .. near invariably we would take the offer to save a heap of time .. good fun and I can't ever recall there being a need for a miss .. it follows, though, that the Mk 1 brain was well employed throughout to make it all work ....

Another fun night I recall saw us LST-SYD on the Electra .. standard noise arrival required out north and turn back in for a significantly displaced 16 threshold landing .. started descent FL300 abeam the airport .. didn't go north of the harbour and still needed to power up in the normal manner .. we three were quite relaxed about it all .. the ATC-er, though, thought it all a bit stressful, methinks .. at 0-dark-30, though, it did increase the cerebral activity .. No real purpose other than for the learning exercise .. nil traffic at the time.

This was all routine grist for the mill at AN back in the good days .. if the kids these days miss out on such exercises it is all a bit sad ..

1201alarm

10th Jan 2016, 10:09

Although I never made a statistic, if I would have to make an educated guess (as Clooney had to do when he faced st. peter ;) ) I would say all the big ones in north america have a strong focus on piloting skills and let pilots go fully manual. Same can be said for Lufthansa Group. I also observed the same on AF/KLM group lately, although it might take time on the french side to become the norm. EJ seem to be relaxed about automatics off at appropriate times from what I hear, don't know about BA and RYR. The charter carriers in Europe could not function without automatics off.

I would guess all these mentioned above together make more than 50% of worldwide commercial annual movements.

Then the chinese seem to put emphasize on manual skills in their checkrides, don't know how they handle it in daily ops though.

It is a slow process, and such discussions as we have here will continue to remain important to spread the word. But my impression is definitively that we have turned the tide and the message is coming through.

Centaurus

10th Jan 2016, 12:48

EJ seem to be relaxed about automatics off at appropriate times from what I hear

Nice to know. Although I was told by an Emirates pilot he decided to turn off his flight director for a climb in CAVOK weather. He was pinged by the QAR and severely castigated by management for deliberately turning off the FD. That would suggest Emirates are not that relaxed at all. :confused:

But my impression is definitively that we have turned the tide and the message is coming through.

I wish I shared your optimism, but from my experience the message might be on Pprune but will never fully reach the real world of airline flying.

1201alarm

10th Jan 2016, 16:41

Centaurus,

EJ means Easyjet, not Emirates.

Don't know what is happening in the middle east, but the flying circus there with airline managers and regulators being the same, not accounting for a lot of duty time etc., govermentally financed is sure not an industry model. Do not forget that they are mainly flying longhaul and in terms of movements are not really big players in the grand scheme of things.

They might very well be erased by a political black swan one day, but that is another story.

FDMII

10th Jan 2016, 16:54

Centaurus, :ok:

1201alarm;
Then the chinese seem to put emphasize on manual skills in their checkrides, don't know how they handle it in daily ops though.I would surely like to believe this, but I have several colleagues / friends instructing at various Asian carriers and am informed that they are by no means "emphasizing" manual flight in the sim, even after San Francisco. "Engagement of the autoflight systems is expected immediately after liftoff; no one disconnects", is what I am hearing. A strict though informal social/military hierarchy also appears to be observed; such would affect cockpit dynamics and decision-making processes. In addition, the Asians continue to use flight data analysis programs to punish and even fine (as in $$ fines) pilots for "transgressions", an unbelievably unenlightened approach to flight safety processes and procedures.

I have friends at Emirates - I believe it is the same standard.

I can't speak regarding EJ or European carriers' approach to autoflight policies. I would expect that they'd be "enlightened", perhaps more than N.American carriers but I just don't know. I know again from friends that some S.American carriers are "enlightened", (eg., Lan Chile) but do not know to what extent manual flight is practised.

I would again surely like to believe it, but, in my view, no airline really "gets it", primarily because they believe that they can't afford to; it is true some are better than others but I would not accept that "the tide has turned" until I saw actual performance data from each carrier supporting the claim - big study I know, but the claim is equally big.

Perhaps we could hear from those doing the daily work - that would be a good start.

In my view, many airlines are afraid to turn their pilots loose with the controls even as they may (or may not) have automation policies.

Now we have to quickly acknowledge that reduced navigational separation standards to pack more airplanes into busier airspaces demands more accurate tracking and speed control and it is wise to engage the autoflight systems otherwise one is indeed asking for trouble. But this is mere "guidance for wise men* and obvious, (or should be!) So the engagement of autoflight systems becomes a habit even when the opportunity for manual flight practise is presented.

I am keeping in mind also, safetypee's post (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/572593-automation-dependency-stripped-political-correctness-2.html#post9228292), regarding how society itself has changed, and how it has changed us regarding the automation of routine processes. If I may interpret, (and be corrected by s.p. as needed!), the emphasis shifts to managing flight which concurrently requires the same levels of high situational awareness skills but by design de-emphasizes manual skills. I am not in disagreement with this shift in primary requirements recognized and commented upon in the post, except that when required, manual skills need to be there, supported of course, by some understanding of the subjects mentioned in the previous post (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/572593-automation-dependency-stripped-political-correctness-2.html#post9228217).

In shorter words, I would not advocate a return to manual flight. Automation, particularly the Airbus design, is almost certainly the greatest contribution to the enhancement of flight safety since EGPWS & TCAS. It's just that many if not most carriers treat automation as the third pilot, (or even the second pilot!), and not the toolkit that it is, (notwithstanding original intentions by the manufacturers).

*it's a saying; obviously it applies to all genders...

RAT 5

10th Jan 2016, 18:42

t's just that many if not most carriers treat automation as the third pilot,

In mid 90's I worked in Italy and this was the attitude of the XAA. You could operate 16 hrs with 2 crew if the A/P was available. It was the 3rd pilot to allow crew to sleep in the cockpit. Heavy crew = 24hrs. That was only 20 years ago in Europe. EASA has, perhaps, made some improvements.

no airline really "gets it", primarily because they believe that they can't afford to;

Indeed, from experience.

I was appalled/intrigued to see a Peugeot 208 advert lauding the auto-active braking system and self-parking system. The video showed a demo of the braking system if you became too close to metal rocks ahead. And this is supposed to enhance driver awareness? How long before motorway tail-gating at 70mph becomes the norm because you believe HAL will say the day. You select cruise control and do no more than steer.; but there is even a lane wander warning system too. so...???? And when you arrive home to push PARK and then go inside for a cold one. Let's wait and see what happens after the first huge motorway pile up and a smoking hole.
The world is going mad and in the hands of technocrats. They do because they can, not necessarily because it is necessary. Sound familiar?

Check Airman

11th Jan 2016, 07:21

As a new A320 pilot, a few line captains have encouraged me to do a bit of flying with all the automation turned off, and I've found that the airplane is a real joy to fly.

A previous poster mentioned that BA doesn't allow the AT to be disconnected. Can anyone confirm that? I hope it isn't true. Is the AT considered a no-go item? Is it an emergency if the AT fails in flight?

As for hand flying with the FD on, I'm really not a fan. I feel a lot more out of the loop. I concentrate more on the FD than the instruments. With the FD off, I feel as though I'm much more aware of what's going on.

RAT 5

11th Jan 2016, 07:36

With the FD off, I feel as though I'm much more aware of what's going on.

Right on. Go for it and enjoy. Spread the word.

Goldenrivett

11th Jan 2016, 09:04

Hi Check Airman,
A previous poster mentioned that BA doesn't allow the AT to be disconnected.
I don't know the present position, but it was true many years ago.

There were several SESMA events on the Airbus fleet when crews were taking the auto-thrust out in order to "practice for their next sim check". This was a case of the tail wagging the dog. Extra sim practice with AT off was then given to the Airbus crews.

There was no AT restriction on Boeing crews, since all manual flight is conducted with the AT off due to the pitch/power couple (& advantage of feed back loop "feels heavier when slow" etc).

RAT 5

11th Jan 2016, 09:09

There were several SESMA events on the Airbus fleet when crews were taking the auto-thrust out in order to "practice for their next sim check"

I was always amazed at this idea. If all you want to do is 'practice' basic flying then something is wrong with your daily routine. If you are not competent nor confident then a couple of 'practices' will not solve the problem. There is an old story of someone taking this to the extreme when on a ferry between to close airports they flew it on 1 engine: to practice for the sim. I think it was a no tea no biscuits consequence.

winterOPS

11th Jan 2016, 10:13

rat5, it was a Jetstream in northern Sweden, in 2003. It got more than a few dents as a result...

Like the idea of flying manually (kind if the reason we started to aviate, ain't it?) and Our company culture encourage the crews to pick a visual up when conditions permit.
And even in our manual it is actually stated that when flying a visual or circling and FD not needed they should be off... So we fly them lookin out the window which is quite nice :ok:

safetypee

11th Jan 2016, 11:31

FDMII, we are looking in the same direction :ok:

If we consider the many different views in this thread as parts of the same safety issue, then we could reconsider the operational continuum with a wider perspective. We should refrain from focussing on isolated problems, or with the hindsight of the last accident; Dekker - all viewpoints (ref).
If the industry adopts this way of thinking, then ‘the problem’ becomes which views might offer an adequate solution, given that there is no ideal in time, money, (automaton, training) or with assurance of human behaviour (training).

Regulation and training may be seen to be the quicker to implement, but perhaps the least effective, particularly without changing automation or the operational environment.

New automation could help, but this is neither a quick process or low cost; and we must consider the existing ‘grandfather rights’ aircraft still in-service (B737 AMS Rad Alt, MD80 MAD TOCW accidents).

Changes to the operating environment could affect commerce – we may not be able to reduce workload by going back to the old ways. However, it might be possible to adjust the current operational environment to reduce complexity and workload, e.g. the way we implement SOPs, reduce overburdening call outs, and simplify flightpath procedures.
The diagrams below (Amalberti, Cook, Rasmussen) provide a high level view of ‘the problem'. If we can understand the contribution of the pressurising influences on accidents – excursions beyond the safety margins, then we might better focus our safety improvements.

What social contributions influenced crew behaviour in QZ8501; everyday we might switch a computer (automation) Off then On to rectify a fault. We have acquired Ctrl-Alt-Del mentality.

What were the commercial–environmental-social contributions in AF447; we like (need) direct routing, we have better WXR thus we might cut CBs closer than in previous operations, but the industry ‘overlooked’ ice crystals. Or did the regulator see the human as a hazard in need of (UAS) training opposed to the human as an asset who could avoid CBs if this were to be the focus of training – avoidance vs recovery.

What regulatory training influences were there in Cogan; ice related tail-stall (not a realistic hazard, if at all, in that aircraft) where the training involved a film, no hands-on to reinforce knowledge that there would not be a stick shake – nor that tail stall did involve aerodynamic wing stall and thus conventional recovery action did not apply.
‘The problem’ could be clarified by positioning these accidents on the diagrams, then consider viable defences and how might we continue to operate closer to the margins to safety, yet recover from inevitable excursions into the safety space which is always reducing due to the operational workload, economic, technological, and social pressures.

http://i64.tinypic.com/2prsktv.jpg

Refs: In the system view of human factors, who is accountable for failure and success? (www98.griffith.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/handle/10072/46628/70230_1.pdf?sequence=1) Note the concluding pages.

Also see: Managing the Unexpected (www.bus.umich.edu/pdf/managing_unexpected_sutcliffe.pdf ) and Safety Differently (www.crcpress.com/Safety-Differently-Human-Factors-for-a-New-Era-Second-Edition/Dekker/9781482241990 ) (read the summary).

Amalberti. The paradoxes of almost totally safe transportation systems 2001. (www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092575350000045X)
Cook, Rasmussen. Going Solid 2005. (http://qualitysafety.bmj.com/content/14/2/130.long)

Jwscud

11th Jan 2016, 12:02

A previous poster mentioned that BA doesn't allow the AT to be disconnected. Can anyone confirm that?

The AAIB report into the 320 that lost its cowls made clear that this was fleet policy. Neither pilot had flown manual thrust outside the sim for several years.

I understand from conversations that the FBW Boeing types have the same policy but the 747/767 do not.

I joined a loco with around 300h. Manual flight raw data was encouraged during line training (all landings were done without FDs until proficient) and it my first permanent base in Italy. Several crusty old captains took time to invest in keen FOs and teach them to explore the envelope, meet the performance assumptions on every landing and so on.

I then moved to a large UK base, where a lot of line training takes place, and the line captains were less keen on manual flight, and were in general too fed up with constantly flying with 500h FOs to invest in mentoring as much. However, raw data flying was still available with the right captain. The command course also includes a lot of raw data manual flight to increase the capacity of the candidates.

The airline in general however discourages manual flight on the line, and has forbidden switching off FDs except where required by normal procedures. The good old boys talk about the days before OFDM where on ferry flights they would practice V1 cuts in the aircraft by one pilot closing a thrust lever after V1, conduct quiet approaches, tight visual approaches &c &c

"Visuals" are flown in LNAV/VNAV following the magenta line to a minimum of a 4 mile final and nothing disconnected until established on path on final.

Tee Emm

11th Jan 2016, 12:16

The airline in general however discourages manual flight on the line, and has forbidden switching off FDs except where required by normal procedures

Clearly the management has little faith in the instrument flying skills (?) of its crews if they are unable to manage without the crutch of a flight director even in VMC. Quite tragic really.

LlamaFarmer

13th Jan 2016, 16:34

I guarantee you if given the green light and with an accepting market that an autonomous passenger aircraft could be in operation within a few years or less.

But what about all the non-technical issues that need human input.

What about when a decision needs to be made in the moment, can a computer run DODAR/TDODAR/PIOSEE the same way two humans can? Can the computer apply reasoning and judgement.

What if a fire develops and the aircraft systems are damaged.

Could a modern day computer have dealt with Sioux City, or QF32? Could it make the decision to go/no-go with a failure approaching V1? Could a computer decide when to evacuate an aircraft (BA2276), or what to do in the event of a double engine failure over a built up area (US1549)?

What about with a critical medical emergency over the Atlantic. How does the computer decide where to go?

The most important and viable reason for removing a pilot from the aircraft is risk-to-life.

Such as with combat UAVs. It also allows for smaller (therefore cheaper) aircraft.
The same could happen for cargo and freight eventually.
But when you've got 100-500 passengers on an aircraft, removing the pilots for that reason is irrelevant.

wiggy

14th Jan 2016, 05:39

Check Airman

A previous poster mentioned that BA doesn't allow the AT to be disconnected. Can anyone confirm that?

Depends on the fleet - it is certainly the case on the 777, I believe that's also the SOP on the Airbus fleet,

Is the AT considered a no-go item?

It is not a no-go item.

Is it an emergency if the AT fails in flight?

No.

Please note that I am not saying whether I am a supporter of the policy...or not...

Check Airman

14th Jan 2016, 08:48

Thanks Wiggy.

One really has to wonder about the competence of manual writer(s).

You have a system that you're never allowed to control manually, but you may dispatch with the auto mode inoperative, and are expected to fly the plane to the same level of precision- a task you have never attempted.

:ugh:

I don't know of any US carriers with that sort of automation policy. Does anyone have any theories on why European carriers seem to take these extreme policies?

Tourist

14th Jan 2016, 11:03

Could a modern day computer have dealt with Sioux City,

I'm getting really bored of answering this question.

Yes, It could.

NASA trialled a system in the 70's that dealt with it so well that a PPL managed to land the aircraft.

It was transparent to the pilot and took about 2 seconds to fully learn how to fly using only variable thrust.

Re can computers make decisions like humans.

No, they don't get scared or excited and make errors.
They think at 1000 times the speed and get all the maths right. They never misread a landing distance chart, they know which is the nearest suitable airfield.

The one area that a human will be better than a human for the near future is black swan event.

There are very few of them.
There are a lot of pilot errors.

That sort of thing is exactly what computers are really good at.

Can't be bothered to hunt for the links again.

Uplinker

14th Jan 2016, 11:52

Computers are built and programmed by humans.

Computers cannot think.

A computer will literally do exactly what it is told. If it has been misprogrammed to fly towards a cliff, or below MSA then it will do so.

Errors are made, databases have been wrong.

Some of these errors are not apparent during testing and validation. They only appear one day when an unforeseen unique set of circumstances arise.

NASA's Apollo 11 LEM computer was taking it towards a boulder field to land, until the human pilot, a certain Mr Armstrong, took manual control and vectored it clear.

In the event of failures of aircraft systems, the computer(s) may not have been programmed to respond appropriately, or may be incapable of responding correctly owing to loss of hydraulics or electrics or atmospheric measurement. That's why you always need humans in the loop.

Humans are not infallible of course. This is why you need two of them, and proper, thorough training, proper experience, and properly rested and motivated crews. Today's economics has taken precedent over this and we are seeing the results - a series of crashes and incidents that should never have happened.

I think it is significant that these 'automation dependant' crashes have started occuring now that pilots go from small training piston aircraft straight onto modern jets, missing out what used to happen - which was a few year's apprenticeship on turbo props, actually flying the aircraft and learning the ropes in a commercial environment, and applying all the things that had been learned in the ground school.

LlamaFarmer

14th Jan 2016, 12:44

they know which is the nearest suitable airfield

What defines the nearest suitable airfield then?

It's not just the nearest airfield that the aircraft can safely land at.

It depends on a whole host of different factors.

In a medical emergency one airport further away may actually be the quicker option for the necessary hospital care.

You're right, humans do make mistakes. Thats what cross-checking is for, and it does a good (not perfect) job of eliminating or identifying as many mistakes as possible.

But a computer is programmed not by a computer but by a human. They can make mistakes too.

FDMII

14th Jan 2016, 15:57

LlamaFarmer, to your point, I was googling the abbreviations in your post, (DODAR, etc) and in the list of hits was this AAIB Report (https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/5422ffd3e5274a1317000a6f/Airbus_A321-231__G-EUXM_09-13.pdf) on two UAS Events, (same aircraft).

Like QF32 and numerous others I can recollect, including some from personal experience, I think it is a useful if not familiar example of why autonomous flight is a very long way from a successful, demonstrably lower risk, commercial implementation, ("lower-risk" being the erstwhile* raison d'être behind the notion of autonomous, routine, commercial flight).

*erstwhile, because I don't believe the primary reason for autonomous flight is risk-reduction

LlamaFarmer

14th Jan 2016, 16:13

*erstwhile, because I don't believe the primary reason for autonomous flight is risk-reduction

Cost reduction the primary reason?

Airlines don't care about risk, they never have. They care about cost.
Which is understandable, they are a business after all.
Risk and safety directly affect the cost outcome though.

FDMII

14th Jan 2016, 16:42

Cost reduction the primary reason?In a word, yes I tend to think so. But I wouldn't call such a process an "amoral calculation", (Vaughn, The Challenger Launch Decision), in the sense that the risk was understood but the economic goals outweighed the perceived risks. Amoral calculation is perhaps too blunt a term. Automation makes sense as presently implemented; what the regulator and the industry have each left as a sidebar and largely unaddressed is the long-term effects upon highly-skilled human contributions to the safety of flight.

For most legacy carriers, the payroll alone for flight crews is second only to fuel costs, (debatable today - with both having plummetted over the differing periods of time, it's perhaps a toss-up which is lower, but they're not third or fourth). The industry is finding the pipelines drying up and autonomous flight provides an enticement not previously, realistically available.

As I have posted in earlier contributions, this is something like aviation's "Turing test"; there are obvious impediments to the notion of autonomous flight, the first being the thinking that someone on the ground writing software and firmware is somehow equal-to/better-than someone in the cockpit who is highly-trained, experienced, human and there, (with skin in the game).

These impediments are, in my (untrained/inexperienced in AI) eye, presently insurmountable but if one accepts that the fatal accident rate may climb "acceptably", (this is a perception/insurance/social issue, not a technical issue), then trials and targeted implementation may not be insurmountable while the concept is established towards "normal".

Some may accept that self-parking cars, UAVs and the like are "equivalents" to these goals; I think such perceptions are just magical thinking, not that dreaming is bad, but in aviation, there are no such things as sky-hooks, even in imaginative solutions to the problems of flight.

Airlines don't care about risk,Well, of course they do care, a lot, and put tons of money behind that caring but I do understand what you're saying; the costs involved as a result of failing to care puts airlines out of business. We don't have to look far for examples.

LlamaFarmer

14th Jan 2016, 18:01

For most legacy carriers, the payroll alone for flight crews is second only to fuel costs.

Really? I'd have thought handling/airport costs were significantly above crew costs. Particularly on SH side of operations.

FDMII

14th Jan 2016, 19:29

LlamaFarmer

14th Jan 2016, 22:10

"Really?"

Yes.

I was incorrect only in stating "payroll for flight crews" - air carriers' highest financial liabilities are fuel, followed by employee (not just flight crew), salaries/benefits/costs. Flight crews are (or used to be) a substantial portion of the category. Fuel costs are about 5 to 10% higher than employee costs.

This does not take into account training costs & other costs associated with maintaining crews in cockpits.

Take a look at the financial statements of air carriers; many are available online. Airports/costs are way down the list.

It's a big difference LOCO vs Legacy. But also hard to make direct comparison as does BA Employee costs cover the whole operation, or just flight & cabin crew. Wouldn't say airport costs are way down the list though, very near the top of both.

EZY Operating Costs
Fuel - £1,199 million
Airports and ground handling - £1,122 million
Crew - £505 million
Maintenance - £229 million

BA Operating Costs
Fuel, oil costs - £3,515 million
Employee costs - £2,422 million
Landing & handling costs - £2,168 million
- Landing fees and en route charges - £787 million
- Handling charges, catering and other operating costs - £1,381 million
Engineering and other aircraft costs - £613 million

Starting to shift rather a lot off the topic though.

FDMII

14th Jan 2016, 23:27

LlamaFarmer;

Ah, ok - yes, LoCo, and U-LoCo, understand. BA's numbers look similar to here, except the landing fees & enroute costs, a billion+ USD? And of course, those costs can't be automated and like fuel are at the behest of the provider.

Off-topic - thought of that too, but removed the comment as it's orthogonal to the cheaper-than-pilots thesis.

Interesting tho', ...perhaps I'm not reading closely enough, but in the industry literature, (AW&ST, AI, BCA, etc., magazines, not the academic work), I'm not reading or seeing even little filler blurbs regarding for example, just the exploration of autonomous commercial flight; the subject's just not 'present'.

Tourist

15th Jan 2016, 08:40

Uplinker

We have had this debate before.

On the previous thread you ignored all the links proving that all of your points were totally incorrect and provided no references of your own to back up any of your points.

I see little point in reliving that ignorance demo.

Suffice to say.

All your points are still wrong, and feel free to go to the previous discussion and this time read the links, watch the videos.

p.s. Seriously? Arguing that because a computer on the Apollo missions needed assistance that todays computers can't cope!?!?!

You do understand that things have moved on a little?

Uplinker

15th Jan 2016, 09:29

Oh dear. Got out the wrong side of the bed?

Since you quoted NASA - saying that their computer system would have totally coped with the Sioux City incident - I thought I would give you an example where a NASA computer got it very wrong. It did so because the wrong data - or insufficient data - had been loaded into it, (by humans). When it got to a few ?hundred feet above the moon, the pilots could see that the computer was about to do the wrong thing so they intervened.

The point I am trying to get across is that no matter how complicated and powerful a computer might be, it will still be built and programmed by humans, and the actions it takes will have been decided by humans. Humans are therefore still involved and humans make mistakes.

Your point of view seems to be based on an assumption that there wil never be any manufacturing or programmimg errors in a computer. I am challenging that point of view. You will always need humans to intervene if it all goes wrong.

Thank you for calling me ignorant, how nice. Do you know how computers work? Have you been trained in electronics,? Have you ever programmed a computer? (I can say yes to all three - and I am also an Airbus pilot approaching 10,000 hours TT, so I do have some experience in this area).

cav-not-ok

15th Jan 2016, 10:16

The only people who care about risk, are the insurers.

RAT 5

15th Jan 2016, 11:28

APNewsBreak: Government not ensuring pilot skills are sharp (http://www.bigstory.ap.org/article/699de9716b4d4f848d933a28499a21ad/apnewsbreak-government-not-ensuring-pilot-skills-are-sharp)

Not sure if this has been posted on this topic, but the topic on Rumours was very inactive. There are a couple of telling comments made by FAA and ideas to enforce manual skill enhancement including line flying. I know of a couple of large airlines who actively discourage such heresy. One reason is that too many screw it up and cause costs;y G/A's. Better to forbid than improve. The future is bleak.

oggers

15th Jan 2016, 12:46

Uplinker

Since you quoted NASA - saying that their computer system would have totally coped with the Sioux City incident - I thought I would give you an example where a NASA computer got it very wrong. It did so because the wrong data - or insufficient data - had been loaded into it, (by humans). When it got to a few ?hundred feet above the moon, the pilots could see that the computer was about to do the wrong thing so they intervened.

Is that really a good example? Computer with less capacity than a modern toaster has snag during most ground breaking test flight in history shocker!

Jwscud

15th Jan 2016, 13:27

The Apollo 11 point is a red herring. The computer was not designed to perform a fully automatic landing without astronaut input. It was designed to provide FBW stabilisation, thrust control and guidance until the commander could see an intended landing site, at which point it was flown in a (still FBW) attitude hold and autothrust program to allow the commander to fly the vehicle to his chosen landing site.

Tourist

15th Jan 2016, 13:34

There is no point guys.

You can tell him till you are blue in the face. You can provide references and videos but he will still come on the next thread an disagree as if the point was not proved.

The NASA example and the 10000 Airbus reference just make my point.

(You think 1970s vintage avionics in an airbus are somehow relevant?!)

Tourist

15th Jan 2016, 13:36

ExV238

15th Jan 2016, 17:05

Plus of course even a cursory knowledge of the Apollo landing would show that the pilot (Aldrin?) nearly screwed it up by being human. He messed with the computer when he should not have according to SOP and caused it buffer overrun failures.

Yes indeed. And the human mission controllers made the decision that the landing could continue. I guess an automated system would have aborted.

No answer was given to the previous point that some situations cannot be foreseen and some situations require imagination to resolve. The Hudson river was mentioned, but I would also offer the example of the successful ditching of an RAF Nimrod in 1995. That was as a result of a wing fire, the progress of which was monitored by a human crew member who gave verbal descriptions of the damage as it progressed. The pilot decided to ditch although just a handful of miles from a suitable runway and later examination of the aircraft validated that decision. What would an automated system have done?

OK, so we can argue probabilities of such events. But to me, the key point is that made by Uplinker; that all systems are designed and built by humans and are subject to human error. There are stats for accidents caused by pilot error, but there are no equivalent stats for pilot 'saves'. No system could or ever will be designed and/or built to perfection, and removing the human pilot would remove the last chance to save the day.

Finally, these are complex, interesting and important debates and no one contributor should claim to have all the relevant experience and answers. So it's a shame to see accusations of ignorance and such like being thrown around.

RAT 5

15th Jan 2016, 18:09

Plus of course even a cursory knowledge of the Apollo landing would show that the pilot (Aldrin?) nearly screwed it up by being human. He messed with the computer when he should not have according to SOP and caused it buffer overrun failures.

Was Tommy Lee Jones (Space Cowboys) thinking he was really Buzz Aldrin? Shame on him.

Everybody keeps mentioning the Hudson. I guess it was the red carpet ride around the world's media. Time to make a decision, time to execute it. Everybody things it was a great day for human over computer perhaps because it was an Airbus. I wonder the reaction if it had been a simple basic B738.
Oh wait. The bird strike on short finals at CIA, B738, engine rundown, attempted GA by F/O PF, power loss on other engine, captain took control and planted it on the runway. Everyone survived, but no TV video. Damn. No time to think, just react instinctively.
Think what might have happened with another captain onboard. G/A over S.E. Rome, power loss on both engines. The smoking hole does not bare thinking about. Brilliant 'save the day' experienced human intervention. The captain lives in obscurity. Hundreds just live never realising.

FDMII

15th Jan 2016, 18:59

RAT 5;

The "Hudson" phenomenon is, by Sully's own admission, "what we do". He accepted the accolades graciously, gave a superb and timely presentation to Congress, (February 2009) decrying in part, the corporate treatment of airline pilots, but acknowledged that what he, his F/O and his crew did under extraordinary circumstances, was itself not extraordinary, and, in spite of digital/computerized flight control & the laws, was what professional crews do.

We might view Sully as the epitome of what represents the very best in airline pilots but, and I suspect you, Uplinker, numerous others here and in the profession know this already, many pilots and crews, with minor variations, could have and would have done the same thing. It's what airline pilots do.

Thirty-one other crews experienced a UAS event on their A330 and wrote it up in the log-book.

Every day, there are hundreds, perhaps thousands of small and not-so-minor incidents in commercial aviation and, with a few exceptions noted here and in other websites, remain unsung as they should, out of the media and passengers, as you say, are largely unaware. The quiet examples are there by the thousands.

The best statement I've ever heard that captures this unique character of the profession of "airline pilot" was, "I earn a hundred-thousand-dollars-a-minute, but you'll never know which one; the rest is for free". It's old, and still relevant.

The notion of professional ethics and the old-fashioned notion of "address", (the forceful and competent imposing of high skill and long experience to an unusal circumstance or emergency), seems to have evaporated with the digital age; it most certainly has not evaporated from the principles of aviation, however.

We are showing here in this discussion that there are many circumstances in commercial aviation that are far beyond those typically imagined by non-aviators that cannot be addressed without active, immediate human participation and/or intervention.

RAT 5

15th Jan 2016, 20:02

FDMII:ok::) agree whole heartedly. Not wishing to dilute any accolade. My comments were to support the human in the debate. I like the $100,000 per minute philosophy.

Brgds.

Tourist

16th Jan 2016, 08:30

Many on here insist on using the very best of human piloting as the standard to beat, but use the worst of automation as if that is as good as it gets.

Sully was not, as is demonstrated repeatedly "what we do"

The average airline pilot is currently awful.
Yes, they can follow the script, but as soon as things are abnormal, they/we are abysmal.

The only reason that the safety statistics have improved so much over the years is engineering brilliance.

The simple fact is that automation has already quietly replaced what used to be "what we do" to enormous benefit.

TCAS and EGPWS are a tacit admission that humans are not very good. In most aircraft the pilot is still in the loop when carrying out an RA or a "pull up".

This is not due to a recognition that the pilot helps the operation of these systems, it is merely a way of smoothing their entry into service.

The more modern aircraft coming into service have the systems integrated with the autopilot due to the recognition that the only effect that a human has on these safety systems is to add errors.

Automation has been coming into service slowly but surely for decades.

The upshot of this is a huge increase in safety.

Can anybody on this forum come up with a single automated system that has been added since the dawn of civil aviation that has not contributed to safety?

We are currently in an uncomfortable transition period which hold neither the best aspects of automation or human input.

Anybody that tries to suggest they have any understanding of automation by saying they have "10000hrs Airbus" is delusional.

The airbus systems are from the 70's
Remember cars from the 70's?
Mobile phones?
Televisions?

Due to certification issues, it is easier to just stay with that old dross for now.
That is not because they are any good, because they are dross.
Baby SEP aircraft have far superior avionics to an airbus now.

An average A380 has about 600 times the processing power in the passengers mobile phones alone compared to the computers running the systems.

Systems which, incidentally are not designed to be autonomous!

To say that without a human airbuses would be dangerous is missing the point. They were never designed to be autonomous so they are not. If they were, then they would be.

People keep using the Qantas A380 as an example of why you need human pilots.

They forget, of course that that aircraft was not carrying the normal crew.
With just 2 pilots, how would they have done?

At least an automated system could have run through the million ECAM pages in about 2 seconds.

The important metric is not whether an automated aircraft can beat a human pilot in all cases.

Currently, it cant.

The important metric is whether it has less accidents overall.

Due to the fact that the vast majority of accidents are human error, then I think that is easy to achieve.

People also keep saying that computers are programmed by humans so there will still be human error miss two very important points.

1. Each error will only be made once. After that, the scenario will be sent around and no other automated aircraft will ever make that error again.

2. It really doesn't work that way. There was a time when "hand made" was a symbol of quality. Nowadays, if you want something engineered properly and consistently you use a machine. That machine may have been programmed by a human, but it does not make mistakes like a human.

Some may think "ignorant" is a harsh epithet under the circumstances.

I disagree.
I have had these discussions with uplinker before. I have given extensive references/videos/NASA articles/TED talks to all the points raised.
I covered see and avoid, neural nets, learning computers,
At no stage has he rebutted a single one of these points with any evidence whatsoever beyond statements of opinion given as facts.

That, in my opinion is ignorance personified.

If any of you are interested, here is the link to a previous thread where most of this is covered.

http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-emergency-response-planning/552175-pilotless-airliners-safer-london-times-article-5.html

I would be genuinely interested in debating any of the point if you think my references don't cover the points adequately or you have evidence that I am wrong.

I see no point though if the answer is "you are wrong"

ExV238

16th Jan 2016, 11:02

I don't think anyone is arguing that the development of technology to protect against (the inevitable) pilot error is a bad thing, or that such technology hasn't added to safety. But the point being made about human error in engineering is more about the design of such systems and the ability of designers to foresee and cater for all necessary scenarios than it is about discrete failures. Just as system design can mitigate pilot error, some way of mitigating design errors or omissions will be needed for the foreseeable future.

Technology has smoothed out some forms of pilot error in recent decades, but it's simply wrong to attribute all of the improvements in safety to automation. Developments in the understanding of human factors, decision-making and error management have also played a significant part.

For an automated system to respond to an adverse situation, that system has to detect and 'understand' what is going on. Hence my example of the Nimrod ditching, a few posts back. For sure, technology will keep moving on; to compare an 'Airbus' (a simplistic term) with a 1970s car or phone is disingenuous. Even the A320 family has been developed over the years, and is now significantly different to the early versions under the skin. An A350 is a very different animal altogether.

Yes, current 'automated' aircraft are a very basic representation of what will be achievable in the future in engineering terms. But they are also a lens through which to view the fundamental issues of how to cater for human limitations in aerospace, whether on the part of 'pilots' or designers. Those limitations won't go away and nor will the commercial and business imperatives that limit development and testing time.

Haven't got time to delve further right now; gotta go supermarket shopping. Now that's something I'd like to automate...

RAT 5

16th Jan 2016, 12:03

The average airline pilot is currently awful.
Yes, they can follow the script, but as soon as things are abnormal, they/we are abysmal.

with a caveat: usually, if they can read, utilise good CRM/MCC, and the non-normal comes directly under a QRH procedure they should be able to cope. It's when they need to use their (often lacking) experience to react (even be proactive) to handle a situation without a simple checklist. That takes brainpower in a variety of ways. Often then the human makes a bad situation worse and a descending spiral is entered way beyond their comprehension.

Automation has been coming into service slowly but surely for decades.
The upshot of this is a huge increase in safety.

I wonder/expect there are more approach/landing accidents that takeoff ones. The former might be more human influenced: bad decision making due to known technical non-normals or bad judgement due weather, or bad execution of an approach procedure. The latter technical first then human reaction make its worse.
In the modern a/c it could be that GPS becomes an absolute standard in all types, even turbo-props. That then brings in that PRNAV STARS to RNAV/ILS approaches is the norm. That could then lead to all normal approaches being autoland, even in the middle of nowhere. Technically it will come possible. How is that going to jive with the FAA stance that pilots should exercise more manual flying to retain the skill set necessary to save the day when HAL goes AWOL?

There will still be a single monitoring pilot onboard, but the role could become so rudimentary that a whole new training regime is required. I still wonder at the difference in applicant characteristics & qualifications for the different companies. The parameters in legacy carrier application forms is from the old days. Most of their pilots are so over-qualified as to be board stiff most of the time; and irritated like heck at the way they are treated. I wonder if the correct stuff is sitting in modern a/c these days, and will be in the future. The modern job is so different from 30 years ago, but the entry requirements for the old school legacy carriers seem to be still from that era. The LoCo's have perhaps gone too much the other way and made ability to pay, with reasonable aptitude, the norm.

Much to contemplate, but who is doing it?

Judd

17th Jan 2016, 06:53

Here the airlines come into play, some have a good culture in switching AP/FD/ATHR off, some not. A good culture encourages switching AP/FD/ATHR off, and has a basic understanding among pilots and some rules when it is appropriate to do so and when not.

Once you have been accustomed to it, it is really no big deal anymore. Your scanning capacity becomes so good, that is becomes a peace of cake to supervise your autopilot. To improve confidence of pilots who are brain washed into automation dependency, you first have to go back to basic instrument flying technique.

That means scanning the full gambit of flight instruments whether manual flying or not. The only way to do this is to turn off the flight director. The flight director is a highly compelling instrument which because of its design- keep the needles centred and everything will be fine Bloggs - means concentrating on two needles often to the detriment of correct scanning of the rest of the flight instruments. Despite what some claim it is not possible to effectively "look behind" a FD. It has to be turned off to see the full ADI picture.

One effective method to increase pilot scanning skills is to climb, cruise and descend without the distracting influence of a flight director. If you cannot fly smoothly and accurately without using a flight director to tell you what to do, then you should not hold an instrument rating.

While there may be a regulatory side to flight director use, that would normally only apply to perhaps a take off and landing in certain weather conditions. Unless of course there is an airworthiness aspect that requires the use of an FD. For instance, can the aircraft be dispatched with an inoperative FD?

If the answer is yes, it implies the pilot should be competent to fly safely on instruments without the aid of a FD. Not every pilot is competent to do that; hence the occasional embarrassment seen in the simulator when raw data competency is supposed to be demonstrated during an instrument approach, including with a substantial crosswind.

If airlines ops management are serious about improving manual instrument flying skills - and according to the FAA they should be - then the first step is to improve basic instrument flying skills. You will never improve these skills while you are locked on brain dead to a flight director.

Once a pilot can confidently fly in VMC with the FD out of view, then flying in IMC without a FD will not hold the apprehension that seems to be prevalent in todays glass cockpits. By all means engage the autopilot and AT for complex SIDS and STARS, but switch off the FD and watch how the autopilot flies raw data. It should do it quite nicely. At the same time your own scan rate will improve greatly with exposure to all the flight instruments and not just an FD display.

Once your scan rate becomes professional, then your confidence in manual flying will slowly come back. You may even find yourself enjoying flying by hand. Try it for ten minutes or so at a time but pick the time and place to do so. If your company insists on the head in the sand approach to manual flying during line flying, at least they should heed the FAA warnings of the dangers of automation addiction and ensure each simulator recurrent training session should be equally split between automatics use and manual raw data flying.

Willie Nelson

17th Jan 2016, 08:41

There seems to be two issues here that while not unrelated are perhaps being somewhat conflated.

Automation dependency and autonomous flight are not the same issue and although they will inevitably merge at some point, we're a few years off.

Interestingly, I listened to a talk on ' ABC big ideas' recently by Professor Alan Finkel, Australia's new chief scientist who talked on 'Future shock again'. He didn't address aviation, however he did talk quite calmly about the approach of what computer scientists call 'The Singularity'

This is the time when computer processing power, whether it be defined as artificial intelligence or otherwise, overtakes human capacity for reason, and judgement. He talked about computers then being designed solely by other computers and henceforth being able to develop themselves much quicker than we can. It was an eye opening talk from someone experienced as an entrepreneur, electrical engineer and neuroscientist. Even still he talks of this being at least a few years off yet.

Nevertheless, it seems that that the main concerns that we face as professional pilots in the here and now are automation dependency and I think Others have already outlined the issues pretty well, what will be most significant for me is the fallout from QZ8501 and what may or may not change as a result. I think the writing has been on the wall for some time but whether or not anything is done form here is another issue again.

Tourist

17th Jan 2016, 10:41

The flight director is a highly compelling instrument which because of its design- keep the needles centred and everything will be fine Bloggs - means concentrating on two needles often to the detriment of correct scanning of the rest of the flight instruments. Despite what some claim it is not possible to effectively "look behind" a FD. It has to be turned off to see the full ADI picture.

I quite agree, and in fact would go further.

Having gone back and forwards a few times between old school steam driven instruments and a variety of glass cockpits, I have come to believe that whilst some aspects of EFIS cockpits such as the map display/wind/drift etc are hugely beneficial to situational awareness, I don't think the actual flying instruments are as good even leaving aside the issues with FD focus for maintaining a scan.

The basic "T" I find leads to better flying, but it is of course possible that I am biased from having an old school upbringing in aviation.

When I flew Airbus for an Airline, I also used to fly an old aircraft as a sideline, and my airbus instrument handling was greatly improved by each time I flew something more mandraulic.

safetypee

17th Jan 2016, 10:51

Many posts and public discussions focus on the autopilot as being responsible for automation dependency, and thus erroneously conclude that more manual flight is required. The wider issue is the use of technology – consider manual navigation, manual terrain and traffic avoidance, flight with standby instruments, and unprotected stall avoidance. Most of these systems impact awareness, and thus may indicate that flight with degraded or reduced awareness or differing means of acquiring it is an effect of reliance on technology.

The DoT audit via RAT #77 (original document) (www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Flight%20Decek%20Automation_Final%20Report%5E1-7-16.pdf) objectives were “(1) determine whether FAA has established requirements governing the use of flight deck automation and (2) identify FAA’s process for ensuring that air carrier pilots are trained to use and monitor these systems while also maintaining proficiency in manual flight operations.” Note that manual flight was almost an afterthought.
The audit states “FAA does not have a sufficient process to assess a pilot’s ability to monitor flight deck automation systems (technology) and manual flying skills, both of which are important for handling unexpected events during flight. In addition, FAA is not well positioned to determine how often air carrier pilots manually fly aircraft. FAA has also not ensured that air carrier training programs adequately focus on manual flying skills.”
and concludes “Relying too heavily on automation systems may hinder a pilot’s ability to manually fly the aircraft during unexpected events.” The emphasis of the audit drifted towards manual flight, note ‘may hinder’, perhaps the lack of justifying evidence, and ‘unexpected events’, specific situations perhaps unrelated to the FAA’s advice for more manual flying in benign situations.

The FAA response is similarly biased towards manual flight and monitoring, vice the deficiencies in oversight. This may reflect the findings and recommendations in the referenced reports, but somewhat simplified and lacking practicality; e.g. does monitoring refer to PF monitoring the aircraft, or PM monitoring the aircraft and PF, or self-monitoring thoughts and behaviour. Noting that humans are very poor and often unreliable monitors and that the situations requiring most monitoring are those involving high workload, and thus most likely to result in monitoring breakdown.

The referenced NASA report (2014 ) The retention of manual flying skills in an automated cockpit (http://hfs.sagepub.com/content/56/8/1506.full.pdf) concludes; “We found that while pilots’ instrument scanning and aircraft control skills are reasonably well retained when automation is used, the retention of cognitive skills needed for manual flying may depend on the degree to which pilots remain actively engaged in supervising the automation.” Note ‘cognitive skills’.

The other referenced NASA report (2015) The Effectiveness of Airline Pilot Training for Abnormal Events (www.researchgate.net/profile/Stephen_Casner2/publication/247154057) concludes and recommends; “The results suggest that the training and testing practices used in airline training may result in rote-memorized skills that are specific to the training situation and that offer modest generalizability to other situations. We recommend a more complete treatment of abnormal events that allows pilots to practice recognizing the event and choosing and recalling the appropriate response.”

A further NASA report (2010) Aircraft Loss of Control Causal Factors and Mitigation Challenges (http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20100039467.pdf ) concludes “Although the causal factors have been loosely organized into three categories: human or pilot-induced, environmentally-induced, and systems-induced, no single category is solely responsible for loss of control accidents. Rather, accidents occur when combinations of breakdowns happen across human and engineering systems, often in the presence of threats posed by the external environment.”
Also as a presentation Aircraft Loss of Control Causal Factors and Mitigation Challenges. (http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20100036832.pdf)

Interesting and alternative views, which might suggest that … … re more manual flight?

Mansfield

17th Jan 2016, 19:31

This is a very interesting and well-debated thread.

It is fine to say that most accidents are the result of human error…but what we don’t know is how many potential accidents are avoided by human intervention. We can see it in cases such as the Hudson ditching and QF32, but we cannot see how many times absolutely nothing happens solely because a human intervened.

I was struck by FDMII’s observation earlier in the thread:

Another thing - the notion that the aircraft commander IS the legal commander responsible for the safety of the flight, and in the end is the sole decision-maker on board the aircraft is gradually being made subservient to the audit process where such authority is "modified". Certainly the commander must answer for each and every action, but the assessment of such action must be based upon a broader set of "rules" than mere standard documentation.

At the heart of the automation dependency issue may lie a question of the pilot’s autonomy itself. It is indeed hard to remember, after so many years of administrative theory and systems management, that our capable and competent aviator actually remains a fully autonomous actor in the whole scheme of things. The regulatory obligation is and always has been that the pilot is the final authority as to the operation of the aircraft and command of the crew, no matter how much a whole cast of corporate characters would like to water him down. That authority presupposes a role for free will and transcends the conditions of employment, making the pilot-employee something of a greased pig for all styles of management.

Taylorism, which lies at the root of most management schools of thought, was very much aimed at diminishing craftsmanship in the name of efficiency. For the craftsman, this was a disaster; yet on the precipice of an exploding industrialist economy, there was no time to apprentice craftsmen and no money to pay for their exquisite, and wildly inefficient, labor. Taylorism, conveniently, was also an open door through which class discrimination could be imposed and managed.

Automation is Tayloristic. It removes the craftsman and replaces him with efficiency, consistency and predictability. From a management perspective, this is ideal. It is cost-effective and appears to yield the necessary degree of safety. For a management class schooled in what Dekker calls “Newtonian scientism”, it makes perfect sense. The problem arises when we encounter a nonlinear environment…think weather but also complex technical systems…because Taylorism and Newtonian scientism are very much linear frames of reference, and automation, although exposed to nonlinearities through complex systems, is expected to operate linearly.

The challenge for future pilots is to produce a culture which retains the autonomy that they must have to counter nonlinear environments, executes the obligation toward public safety that they are entrusted with, and accommodates the changes in technology that are necessary to create efficiency and meet commercial demand. To my mind, that is first and foremost accomplished through the protection of margins.

We track down the centerline of the runway for a reason…to protect the 75 foot margins on either side. In fact, this is the primary responsibility of the pilot…to make decisions and inputs that protect the design margins, the regulatory margins, and the system margins. One of those margins is our ability to manually fly the aircraft. Another is our ability to keep the autoflight system tracking the “centerline” it was intended to track. Another would be to arrive at the final approach fix…at the alternate airport… with a realistically adequate quantity of fuel…enough for, say, a gear indicator light not working. The list is extensive, and you won’t get much help from the company, because the beancounters just can’t figure out how to measure the effectiveness of margins. Therein lies the craftsmanship today. How well can we use our authority to protect the margins?

1201alarm

17th Jan 2016, 22:16

I would strongly oppose any view that says all accidents nowadays are due to human error, so we need to design the human element out of the cockpit.

These claims can only seriously come from people who have no real experience in real life commercial ops. As a pilot I make so many decisions on each work day to smoothen things, and deal with so many technical issues each month, I just don't see how we could ever construct such a complex machine like a modern airliner which will operate to a safety level of 1 in 10 million (that is where wer are right now industry wide) fully autonomous!

A plane is much more than only software and computing power. It consists of metal parts, mechanical engineering, interacting systems, and last but not least a whole bunch of sensors. Each of them can fail, which will pose it's own challenge to a solution.

And this whole amassment of technology operates in a real world environement, in challenging weather, with other participants who can whirl your own idea how to proceed in a second. If your company operates a good sms with publications, just read what kind of freakin stuff regularly happens no one ever would have thought about.

1 in 10 million fully autonomous? Never in my life time.

Which brings me back to the original question. We need good basic skills more profoundly distributed throughout our industry. TK in AMS, Asiana in SFO, AF in the Atlantic, Air Asia over Java Sea should never have happened. These accidents showed major deficiencies in piloting skills (not just stick and rudder, but also understanding what flying means in aerodynamic terms). I however believe strongly, we can train pilots so such crass things do not happen again. May be in the last 20 years, we traded too much protection for skill. But the industry is slowly changing so we add protection to skill.

There is still a lot to be further gained also on the technical side. ROW/ROPS systems hopefully will improve excursion statistics. We could possibly go further with braking coefficient measuring and making it available to following aircraft in the approach. GPS technology and therefore approaches with vertical guidance can further improve CFIT risk. And the whole complex of TO security has still a lot of potential, I think for example about TO data calculations not on your computer anymore, but directly within your plane FMS. No chance of a typo when entering speeds and TO power, plus the potential warning, when you are not taking of from the position you have calculated (GPS comes in handy again).

But all these will at the end need a pilot who can cope with system and sensor failures, and fly his plane by hand, with a good scan of the main flight parameters. Plus who can do all the tactical decisions that happen every day out there.

Tourist

18th Jan 2016, 12:35

1201alarm

You have stated a lot of things as facts in your post, but have neglected to provide any evidence whatsoever that they have any validity.

Please provide some references?

p.s. I do have experience in real commercial ops. And corporate ops. And military ops.

I have also posted numerous videos and NASA studies etc that support my position. I don't think a single naysayer has yet posted a single piece of research furthering the "must have a human" position.

BBK

18th Jan 2016, 13:20

1201

Well said!

Tourist

Can you provide the reference that "all pilots are abysmal".

Yours in anticipation

BBK

Tourist

18th Jan 2016, 15:55

Can you provide the reference that "all pilots are abysmal".

No, I usually try to provide evidence to back up what I said, not what others try to suggest I said.

I can, however, provide a range of evidence to back up my belief that the average pilot is awful.

What would you like?

Shall we discuss the recent crashes of a fully serviceable 777 into a San Francisco runway?
The Air France A330 with nothing wrong with it into the Atlantic?
Colgan?
The list is painfully long.....

I can also point to the new initiatives from Airbus and the FAA to try to improve pilots skills.

FAA fails to ensure pilots' manual flying skills: government report | Reuters (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-faa-pilots-idUSKCN0UP21N20160111)

http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-emergency-response-planning/559765-airbus-official-urges-major-pilot-training-changes.html

They are not doing this because pilots are good.
They are doing it because despite the fact that most airline pilots will finish their entire career without having to deal with a single serious aircraft problem, enough of the vanishingly small amount of pilots who have to actually do that pilot sh1t are making a complete @rse of frankly banal situations to make the aircraft manufacturers look bad, and that hits the bottom line.

A large British Airline announced at a pilot gathering that over 50% of RAs at the airline were mishandled. Over 50% did not manage to put the needle in the green bit!

Don't get me wrong, I don't believe it is the pilots fault that they/we are rubbish.
I just don't think it is possible for the mortals among us to be good at anything that you rarely get to practise.
Excellence takes repeated practise.
Daily.
Hourly.
Once every six months is a joke.

1201alarm

18th Jan 2016, 21:41

Tourist, although you don't really merit a response, there we go.

Do you need reference for the ballpark figure 1 out of 10 million? Google "airbus commercial flight accident statistics" and see 4th generation fatal accident rate which is 0.11 on the million.

It is up to the techno geeks to convince some entrepreneurs or investors that they can develop a fully autonomous system that matches 1 in 10 million at acceptable cost, not the other way round.

Studies do not count by the way, only real projects with real funding and real business case. I do not believe in it.

Your judgement that pilots in general are abysmal is pathetic, but most probably just a provocation to get attention. AF447 is a great example that you talk bs. It is well documented in the final report that (I think) over 30 crews faced a similar scenario and did not crash. We just had a dual ADR fault in our company, ending in alternate law, manual flight and gravity gear extension. There where no subsequent safety recommendations, because the crew acted as expected from them.

Just because a few crew do not deliver does not proof anything. However 1 out of 10 million is a strong indication that pilots are generally well trained and cope with what is thrown at them.

There seem to be potential for improvement still, especially in the area of basic handling at some operators, but that does not invalidate the general path taken.

Tourist

19th Jan 2016, 06:43

Do you need reference for the ballpark figure 1 out of 10 million? Google "airbus commercial flight accident statistics" and see 4th generation fatal accident rate which is 0.11 on the million.

Thank you, no, I am well aware of the safety statistics, but thank you for bringing them up.

The safety statistics have got a lot better over the last 50 years.

Lets think about that for a minute.

What has changed over the last 50 years?
Have piloting skills got better?
I don't think you would find anybody who would argue that is the case.
Perhaps better CRM, I will give you that, but overall?
Nope. A huge drop in training levels over the decades. MPL etc.
Do we have more humans in the cockpit?
No, we have lost the Flight engineer.
What has led to the great safety stats then?
Firstly, and by a wide margin, engineering.
Modern commercial aircraft failure rates and backup systems are incredible.
Almost nothing serious ever goes wrong with the airframe. (your laughable example of dual ADR failure just makes my point. When did something so banal become worthy of mention? Of course there were no recommendations! You would have to title them "pilots followed ECAM instructions, flew aircraft with own hands. well done")

TCAS and EGPWS have saved countless lives by stopping humans f@cking up. In most cases humans are still in the loop, but it could be described as automation with human interference. An autopilot link without human interface would be more effective, and is now being fitted to modern aircraft. This is a tacit admission that humans are a negative influence on the effective operation of the systems.

ECAM has had an enormous effect.
I don't think people like yourself have really thought through what ECAM is.

ECAM is a clever way engineers have fooled pilots into thinking that they are solving the problem rather than the aircraft.

Think about it.
The ECAM tells you what to do.
You do it.
The ECAM knows you have done it.
The ECAM tells you to do the next thing.

That is automated failure management.

It is blatantly obvious that a system that can do that could also do the next stage, which is to do it itself. This would remove the human who is merely an error vector.

This will obviously be the next stage.
Before anybody jumps in and points out that there as instances where you have to do something outside the ECAM, yes, there are and the cards tell you when they are. This is just paper automation. The human is not doing anything other than remembering the instructions. Hardly a case for the human in the system.

ECAM is another way of removing error prone humans from the system as much as possible because we make so many mistakes.

Tourist, although you don't really merit a response, there we go.

I understand that it is difficult for you to be unbiased what with you being a pilot, but there is no need for personal attacks.
On the plus side, there will be manned aircraft still flying for a long time after the first autonomous airliners, so I don't think either of us will be out of a job soon.
I don't like what I'm saying, I just happen to believe it is true. Know your enemy.

It is up to the techno geeks to convince some entrepreneurs or investors that they can develop a fully autonomous system that matches 1 in 10 million at acceptable cost, not the other way round.

There we agree.
It doesn't have to be perfect, just equal or better and cheaper.

As usual (always?) in aviation the military will lead the way.
Ever more capable autonomous cargo aircraft have been flying in sandy parts for some years now, following the hoards of baby uavs with a variety of levels of autonomy from limited get home capability to fully autonomous.
Fully autonomous Combat UAVs are the future, with nobody expecting any major manned combat aircraft after the current generation.
Links to these programs are in the previous thread.

BAe have been testing a baby airliner with autonomous systems for just such a market.

That is real money.

The only challenges unique to the civil aviation sphere are certification, legal and public opinion.
The certification/legal challenge is already being spearheaded by driverless cars. They are on the roads right now and the kinks are being worked out now. This will have direct read across and also help persuade the public that autonomous is ok.
I'm quite sure that if you had asked someone 50yrs ago if they would get on a driverless train they would say "hell no!" but here we are.

I think you need to research the difference between correlation and causation

You think that:-

Pilots fly aircraft.
Aircraft have had less accidents.
Pilots must have got better.

I believe that.

Pilots fly aircraft a lot less than they used to.
Aircraft design and engineering has improved beyond measure.
Systems have been fitted to catch pilot errors, and despite the drop in skill levels, they are doing an excellent job.

Tourist

19th Jan 2016, 06:53

AF447 is a great example that you talk bs. It is well documented in the final report that (I think) over 30 crews faced a similar scenario and did not crash.

Sorry, I just have to come back to this.

OH
MY
GOD!!!!

Are you seriously using the fact that over 30 crews didn't crash when faced with a minor indication error in the cruise as an example of how good pilots are?

All any pilot in that situation had to do was ABSOLUTELY NOTHING and they would have survived. Not just survived, but continued in straight and level flight without anybody down the back ever knowing about it.

The fact that a single crew crashed under those circumstances is a searing indictment of the state of piloting skill in the industry.

Congratulating yourself that some did not is jaw dropping. :ugh:

Jwscud

19th Jan 2016, 08:36

What has changed over the last 50 years?
Have piloting skills got better?
I don't think you would find anybody who would argue that is the case.
Perhaps better CRM, I will give you that, but overall?

I think this is a very narrow and unhelpful view. CRM was a complete change in the method and philosophy of operating that cut accident rates as much as improved technology did. It is very notable that airlines that do not have good CRM or operating cultures have comparatively poor safety records - see Lion Air at the moment, Korean air in the 90s.

You mention the Military - the US Military has lately made clear (last week's Flight) that they will not expect as a matter of principle and policy soldiers being transported into combat zones on crewless vehicles.

I fundamentally do not see anything changing in CAT in my professional lifetime. Neural nets are powerful tools, and the technology you talk about is exciting. However, Current new airframe designs are not even built with contemplation of "optionally manned" or single pilot scenarios and they are likely to be in service for at least 20 years.

safetypee

19th Jan 2016, 09:31

Mansfield, 1201, re HF :ok:
A single minded approach to remove the human from the flight deck achieves little; it’s unlikely to happen in the near term and may never be proven to be cost effective (as in safety). See #92 “Rather, accidents occur when combinations of breakdowns happen across human and engineering systems, often in the presence of threats posed by the external environment.”

I had difficulty with the second part of #93, but if it is like “Logic and repairing mistakes” (www.scribd.com/doc/215552539/Logic-Repairing-Mistakes) then I agree; it’s nice to get out of the ‘office’ to find analogies of professionalism, experience, ... airmanship; as a master craftsman.
Also, an often overlooked essential skill Critical Thinking (www.scribd.com/doc/199876698/Critical-Thinking); in flying and debate.

Using ROW/ROPS as an example of a technical improvement (#94) might not be as good as the ‘maker’s label’; see EASA’s mauling in their ‘selected’ comments and responses to the proposed regulatory amendment (http://easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/CRD%202013-09.pdf).
ROPS is a good idea, but as with most automation, a poor input can result in poor output (cf accuracy of runway braking action, proactive / reactive systems) – potentially an induced hazard of automation.

Uplinker

19th Jan 2016, 09:44

Tourist; your posts are starting to verge on trolling. I don't know what your motivation for this is, but you have called me ignorant - twice - and you have started using thinly disguised swear words in your posts.

I don't know why you are doing this or why you have such a hard-on for me? My posts reflect my personal technical and practical experience, and knowledge. I was an electronics engineer for 16 years. I fault-found analogue and digital systems and circuits using oscilloscopes, data loggers, noise measuring equipment, multimeters and other test equipment. I repaired circuits down to component level using soldering irons etc. I designed and built electronic circuits and systems. My colleagues and I set up microwave links and other radio transmission systems. I also worked solo in France and Italy operating mobile satellite uplink transmitter trucks - (hence my forum name).

I then re-trained as a pilot and am in my 15th year of flying commercial passenger aircraft. I have daily practical experience of using automated flying systems and manual flying in busy airspace.

This does not mean that I know it all - far from it. However, I have some relevant experience, so am hardly "ignorant" in this area.

Kind regards, Uplinker

PS: 'TT' means total time, not time on type. I have flown a total of 10 types and several variants, including piston, turbo-prop and jet; old and new.

wiggy

19th Jan 2016, 10:21

Plus of course even a cursory knowledge of the Apollo landing would show that the pilot (Aldrin?) nearly screwed it up by being human. He messed with the computer when he should not have according to SOP and caused it buffer overrun failures.

Ummm...there you go, blaming the pilot again....

If you had a bit more than cursory knowledge you'd know the program alarms weren't down to Aldrin or Armstrong - the "cycle stealing" that caused the program alarms was actually down to an oversight in the final flight plan/checklists that wasn't caught before flight .. In any event it was Human Beings, not a computer, that saved the descent (e.g. Bales and his support team in Mission Control) and a Human Being who cracked the problem just in time for the ascent ( George Silver at M.I.T. for one.)

Edit to add...anyhow don't take my word for it - https://www.hq.nasa.gov/alsj/a11/a11.1201-fm.html

(apologies for thread drift).

alf5071h

19th Jan 2016, 10:38

The article linked in the OP, and other views, are based on the official investigation report. But the limitations in scope and reporting of accidents (Annex 13 – factual requirement) might not be suited to identifying safety improvements for an already very safe industry, particularly where accidents more often involve the interactions of many contributing factors.
Formal reports identify ‘what’ happened and to a limited extent ‘why’; the why is increasingly restricted by the variability of human involvement.
An alternative is to consider ‘how’ the accident could have occurred, not to establish any factual clarity, but with reasoned speculation identify contributory (latent) factors in the specific accident and similar events as a basis for proactive safety improvement.

A reactive safety process is guided by the report, but all that might achieve is avoiding the accident which has just occurred. Similarly a speculative approach seeking a single solution can be subject to hindsight bias, as reflected in many discussions with polarised views on the human vs automation.
However, hindsight, without bias of cause or blame could be used for learning, increasing industry’s knowledge of operations and of ourselves, and from this identify areas for improvement.
What could be learnt from this accident; what have we learnt and how – without the biases?

Learning is often based on enquiry or error, where concepts opposed to facts are more valued. We learn from history, we learn from others, and from activities not directly related to the proximity of an event; i.e.
The contribution from regulation, the airworthiness process and how humans are viewed - a threat or an asset.
The contribution of the training process, how are regulations interpreted by operators, implemented and presented to the crew; including formulation of drills and checklists.
The contribution of behavioural shaping in normal operation, how crews gain experience, assess situations, and make decisions.
Instead of debating strongly held, often biased and factually unprovable views, we should consider what we, individually and collectively, could learn from accidents.
The relative merits of factors, separately and in combination would still be debateable, but at least there might be a greater range of views to consider for implementation.
The choice of implementing ‘concepts’ (if that is possible) would not depend on regulation, or the factual limitations of past events; the choice would be ours, we choose what to learn, what to consider, what might be of value, what if …

From these thoughts we might then be able to turn the hindsight biases of media interpretation and individual views into the much needed foresight to maintain and hopefully improve safety.

Tee Emm

19th Jan 2016, 11:52

There is a case for going back to basics and reading from an actual accident report the fatal result of automation dependency. The report has been edited for brevity but is still quite terrifying to read. If only Regulators could take the trouble of reading such reports (and there are many), perhaps they would take more seriously the lessons learned from automation dependency and apply those lessons to the operators they are supposed to survey.

It is from Flash Airlines Flight 604 (Boeing 737) that crashed after take off from Sharm El Sheikh airport in January 2004.
............................................................ ....................................

U.S. Summary Comments on Draft Final Report of Aircraft Accident Flash Airlines flight 604, Boeing 737-300, SU-ZCF January 3, 2004, Red Sea near Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt. Quote from page 5 of 7:

"Distraction. A few seconds before the captain called for the autopilot to be engaged, the airplane’s pitch began increasing and airspeed began decreasing. These deviations continued during and after the autopilot engagement/disengagement sequence. The captain ultimately allowed the airspeed to decrease to 35 knots below his commanded target airspeed of 220 knots and the climb pitch to reach 22°, which is 10° more than the standard climb pitch of about 12°.

During this time, the captain also allowed the airplane to enter a gradually steepening right bank, which was inconsistent with the flight crew’s departure clearance to perform a climbing left turn. These pitch, airspeed and bank angle deviations indicated that the captain directed his attention away from monitoring the attitude indications during and after the autopilot disengagement process.

Changes in the autoflight system’s mode status offer the best explanation for the captain’s distraction. The following changes occurred in the autoflight system’s mode status shortly before the initiation of the right roll: (1) manual engagement of the autopilot, (2) automatic transition of roll guidance from heading select to control wheel steering-roll (CWS-R), (3) manual disengagement of the autopilot, and (4) manual reengagement of heading select for roll guidance.

The transition to the CWS-R mode occurred in accordance with nominal system operation because the captain was not closely following the flight director guidance at the time of the autopilot engagement. The captain might not have expected the transition, and he might not have understood why it occurred. The captain was probably referring to the mode change from command mode to CWS-R when he stated, “see what the aircraft did?,” shortly after it occurred.

The available evidence indicates that the unexpected mode change and the flight crew’s subsequent focus of attention on reestablishing roll guidance for the autoflight system were the most likely reasons for the captain’s distraction from monitoring the attitude".
............................................................ .......................................

02:32:31 FO: Before start check list completed down to the after start.
02:33:00 ATT: Close two L please
02:33:16 CA: We rely on God, thank God, in the name of God.
02:33:25 ATT: Attention cabin crew doors in armed position and crosscheck
02:33:30 :Sounds for 47 seconds (may be cockpit door, jump seat and unknown ratcheting sounds)
02:34:08 CA: What is this
02:34:09 FO: In the name of God, we rely on God
02:34:11 FO: Duct pressure decrease start valve open
02:34:14 CA: N two
02:34:25 ATT: Ladies and gentlemen, good morning on behalf of Captain Kheder and his crew members welcome you on board Flas Airlines Boeing seven three seven three hundred proceeding to cairo, during our flight to Cairo we shall cover the distance at fifty minutes and altitude twenty seven thousand feet, you are kindly requested to fasten your seat belts and put back of your seats in full up right position, and observe the no smoking sign during all the flight, thank you.
02:39:03 CA: Standard briefing god willing.
02:39:04 FO: before check list is completed down to the line God willing.
02:39:55 CA: To the line
02:40:01 FO: Engine start switches.
02:40:02 CA: On.
02:40:02 FO: Transponder
02:40:04 CA: On.
02:40:05 FO: Before takeoff checklist completed down to strobe lights.
02:40:07 CA: Completed god willing.
02:40:36 CA: Set it on take off ninety and half ...ready for departure.
02:40:38: FO: Flash six zero four ready for departure.
02:40:46 ATC: Flash six zero four surface wind two eight zero one three knots left turn to intercept radial three zero six, cleared for takeoff two two right.
02:40:55 FO: Clear for takeoff runway two two right whith left turn to establisk three zero six Sharm VOR our Flash six zero four clear for takeoff.
02:41:04 FO: God willing.
02:41:09 ATT: Cabin is clear.
02:41:12 CA: Thank you.
02:41:12 FO: Final is clear.
02:41:19 FO: Left turn to establish radial three zero six.
02:41:29 CA: Initially one four zero?
02:41:30 FO: God willing.
02:41:34 CA: Confirm initially one four zero.
02:41:35 FO: And Flash six zero four confirm to the left to establish three zero six.
02:41:40 CA: Initial one four zero.
02:41:43 ATC: God willing.
02:41:44 FO: and initially one four zero.
02:41:46 ATC: God willing.
02:41:48 CA: We rely on God
02:41:59 : Sound similar to increase of engine r.p.m
02:42:00 FO: Stabilized sir N one.
02:42:10 FO: Takeoff power set speed building up, eighty knots, throttle hold.
02:42:11 CA: Eighty knots (one thump sound).
02:42:26 FO: V one, rotate.
02:42:33 : One thump similar to gear retraction.
02:42:33 FO: ** positive rate.
02:42:34 CA: Heading select.
02:42:36 CA: Gear up.
02:42:36 FO: Ok.
02:42:43 CA: Four hundred heading select.
02:42:44 FO: Four hundred heading select sir.
02:42:48 CA: Level change.
02:42:49 FO: Level change, MCP speed, N1 armed sir.
02:42:59 FO: One thousand.
02:43:00 CA: N one speed two twenty flaps one.
02:43:04 CA: Left turn.
02:43:05 ATC: Flash six zero four airborne time four four when you ready to the left to intercept three zero six radial report on course, God willing.
02:43:11 CA: Left turn.
02:43:12 FO: Roger when ready God willing.
02:43:18 FO: Left turn to establish three zero six Sharm VOR.
02:43:22 FO: Speed available.
02:43:23 CA: Flaps up.
02:43:35 FO: Flaps up no light.
02:43:37 CA: After takeoff checklist.
02:43:55 CA: Autopilot.
02:43:58 CA: Not yet.
02:44:00 FO Autopilot in command sir.
02:44:01 CA: Exclamation remark.
02:44:02 : Sound of A/P disengage warning.
02:44:05 CA: Heading select.
02:44:07 FO: Heading select.
02:44:18 CA: See what the aircraft did!
02:44:27 FO: Turning right sir.
02:44:30 CA: What?
02:44:31 FO: Aircraft is turning right.
02:44:32 CA: AH.
02:44:35 CA: Turning right?
02:44:37 CA: How turning right.
02:44:41 CA: Ok come out.
02:44:41 FO: Over bank.
02:44:41 CA: Autopilot.
02:44:43 CA: Autopilot.
02:44:44 FO: Autopilot in command.
02:44:46 CA: Autopilot.
02:44:48 FO Over bank, over bank, over bank.
02:44:50 CA: OK.
02:44:52 FO: Over bank.
02:44:53 CA: OK, come out.
02:44:56 FO: No autopilot commander.
02:44:58 CA: Autopilot.
02:44:58 EC1: Retard power, retard power, retard power.
02:45:01 CA: Retard power.
02:45:02 : Sound similar to overspeed clacker.
02:45:04 CA: Come out.
02:35:05 FO: No god except...
02:35:05 SV: "whoop" sound similar to ground proximity warning

02:45:06 END OF RECORDING.
............................................................ ...................................................
Note the frantic cries of the captain of "Autopilot -Autopilot - Autopilot" as he attempts to recover from an unusual attitude of his own making. Just under three minutes since gear up to crash. If that is not automation dependency at its worst, I don't know what is...

Tourist

19th Jan 2016, 11:54

wiggy

My bad, thank you for correcting me! I obviously was not paying enough attention when I thought I knew about Apollo.
Thank you also for providing a reference to back up your fact.

In any event it was Human Beings, not a computer, that saved the descent

Here is another one which would slightly even the balance

"Due to an error in the checklist manual, the rendezvous radar switch was placed in the wrong position. This caused it to send erroneous signals to the computer. The result was that the computer was being asked to perform all of its normal functions for landing while receiving an extra load of spurious data which used up 15% of its time. The computer (or rather the software in it) was smart enough to recognize that it was being asked to perform more tasks than it should be performing. It then sent out an alarm, which meant to the astronaut, I'm overloaded with more tasks than I should be doing at this time and I'm going to keep only the more important tasks; i.e., the ones needed for landing ... Actually, the computer was programmed to do more than recognize error conditions. A complete set of recovery programs was incorporated into the software. The software's action, in this case, was to eliminate lower priority tasks and re-establish the more important ones ... If the computer hadn't recognized this problem and taken recovery action, I doubt if Apollo 11 would have been the successful [M]oon landing it was.[21][a]

— Letter from Margaret H. Hamilton, Director of Apollo Flight Computer Programming

Tourist

19th Jan 2016, 11:59

CRM was a complete change in the method and philosophy of operating that cut accident rates as much as improved technology did.

You state this as fact but provide no references/evidence.

The airlines you mention would strongly deny that they have CRM problems, just like they would strongly deny that they have pilot ability problems. I couldn't comment on either.

Tourist

19th Jan 2016, 12:13

Tourist; your posts are starting to verge on trolling.

I would counter that what you are doing is closer to the definition of trolling.
You state a "fact"
When evidence is produced that disproves that "fact" you refuse to acknowledge it at all and move on.
You then appear on a new thread spouting the same "fact"

I was an electronics engineer for 16 years. I fault-found analogue and digital systems and circuits using oscilloscopes, data loggers, noise measuring equipment, multimeters and other test equipment. I repaired circuits down to component level using soldering irons etc. I designed and built electronic circuits and systems. My colleagues and I set up microwave links and other radio transmission systems. I also worked solo in France and Italy operating mobile satellite uplink transmitter trucks - (hence my forum name).

I then re-trained as a pilot and am in my 15th year of flying commercial passenger aircraft. I have daily practical experience of using automated flying systems and manual flying in busy airspace.

This does not mean that I know it all - far from it. However, I have some relevant experience, so am hardly "ignorant" in this area.

I disagree.

I don't think you have relevant experience of modern capabilities in automation.
Looking to the past is no way to judge future capabilities.

You refuse to read or acknowledge references from luminaries such as NASA if they disagree with your narrative.

Tourist

19th Jan 2016, 12:22

You mention the Military - the US Military has lately made clear (last week's Flight) that they will not expect as a matter of principle and policy soldiers being transported into combat zones on crewless vehicles.

Thank you for the heads up. Here is the link

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usa-wont-fly-troops-into-battle-aboard-pilotless-he-420306/

Very interesting article, and it makes very clear the reasons for the policy.
The way you have presented the tone of the article might be considered perhaps a little disingenuous?
It has nothing to do with capability, and everything to do with the trust between flight crew and troops. This is a very reasonable policy in the short term.

Interesting that the article also states that

"The army’s new chief of staff Gen Mark Milley last week expressed strong interest in convoys of autonomous ground vehicle for cargo resupply, delivering “water, beans and bullets” to troops.
He says pilotless helicopters are less technologically challenging because of the complex terrain those ground vehicles must navigate, but the bigger challenge for rotorcraft is perhaps institutional."

This reiterates exactly what I said earlier. The challenge is not technological.

Incidentally, the challenge of a military rotorcraft is for obvious reasons far greater than for an airliner.

Centaurus

19th Jan 2016, 13:35

Interesting article by Dave Unwin writing in UK "Pilot" magazine, on the Air Asia Indonesia prang. That accident heavily involved lack of basic instrument flying skills in IMC and is worth reading.

LlamaFarmer

19th Jan 2016, 14:29

I can, however, provide a range of evidence to back up my belief that the average pilot is awful.

What would you like?

Shall we discuss the recent crashes of a fully serviceable 777 into a San Francisco runway?
The Air France A330 with nothing wrong with it into the Atlantic?
Colgan?
The list is painfully long.....

Can you offer evidence that they were an average pilot.

I would be more inclined to believe the cases above involved significantly below average... but then, by definition, 50% of the worlds commercial pilots must be "below average".

The average pilot probably wouldn't have ended up in those situations.

Skill can be a factor in everything, poor skill can compound the outcome, good skill can negate it.

Are you seriously using the fact that over 30 crews didn't crash when faced with a minor indication error in the cruise as an example of how good pilots are?

The fact that a single crew crashed under those circumstances is a searing indictment of the state of piloting skill in the industry.

Are you seriously using the fact that one crew did crash as an example of how terrible pilots are?

Tourist

19th Jan 2016, 14:46

Are you seriously using the fact that one crew did crash as an example of how terrible pilots are?

I am using it as one of many examples, yes.

That is a reasonable thing to do.

Three experienced pilots at a national airline took 3 minutes to utterly fail to fly an aircraft with a minor indication error.
They were not pay to fly.
They were not from a far eastern airline with a "dodgy" reputation.
They did not have an extensive history of poor check rides.
They were, to all intents and purposes "average" pilots.
The post crash reports have not recommended continuing as normal, they have recommended retraining on a huge scale across the piste.

It is not, however, reasonable to use not crashing a serviceable aircraft as an example of good piloting.

Can you see?

Tourist

19th Jan 2016, 14:48

I would be more inclined to believe the cases above involved significantly below average... but then, by definition, 50% of the worlds commercial pilots must be "below average".

The average pilot probably wouldn't have ended up in those situations.

There is a word for this kind of thinking.

"it couldn't happen to me. They only died because they were not very good"

Before the accident, there was no evidence to suggest that they were below average.
To decide afterwards that they were is putting your head in the sand.

Sorry Dog

19th Jan 2016, 17:43

The vast majority of aircraft crashes are a direct result of PILOT ERROR. It would be simple to take every other event and compile the data utilizing unconventional methods used to save or mitigate loss creating a database of logic based response to an event. Loss will always factor in, it will just be less when we remove pilot error.

If for a second we go to a what if scenario... say if five years from now, all airliners became fully automated with HAL running the show...

Your above quote would likely read "The vast majority of aircraft crashes are a direct result of COMPUTER ERROR" ...or at least would say programmer error for not anticipating whatever event was the probable cause. What I am saying is crashes are often pilot error because they are the ones there to blame the crash on. Even if you take a gross example of error like AF447, sure those pilots could have done 10 things differently to save things, but you say could some of the same things about the automation, such as.... Why wasn't there a degraded auto pilot mode, why wasn't there a different sensor mode to estimate the plane's airspeed, etc, etc.

In any case, I'm waiting to see how automated cars turn out first before I become worrried about HAL taking all the pilot jobs away.

alf5071h

19th Jan 2016, 18:02

For practical and technical discussion, consider a hypothetical accident, what might be learnt, what safety concepts are involved, or what might trigger checks of current operations:-
The contribution from regulation.
The process of continuing-airworthiness identifies a weakness in pitot systems, which if simultaneously blocked by ice crystals generate erroneous displays of airspeed and abnormalities in other systems. The severity of the problem warrants major modification (three pitot per aircraft). This will take time, but in mitigation at least one pitot per aircraft should to be changed as soon as possible, but a small residual risk remains if an unmodified aircraft encounters the rare conditions.

In mitigation all flight crews should have refresher training for flight without airspeed. With this the regulatory focus has changed to human failure vice system fault; the human is seen as the threat to be re-trained to minimise risk.
Alternatively and more technically correct, the threat to the aircraft is ice crystals associated with large storms. Thence with a focus on the human as an asset, Cb identification and avoidance may be the better mitigation, which is based on normal everyday activity; emphasised with an alerting awareness of the ‘real’ threat.

The contribution of the training process.
Crews were (erroneously) required to have refresher training for flight without airspeed; anyway shouldn't qualified crews be capable without refreshing. Operators interpret and delegate the training requirements in house or to third party simulation. Was there any checking that the output of the training matched the need, what need, not just the requirement but the real threat; did operators /trainers know of, or consider the real threat?

The abnormal and emergency checklist has a drill for abnormal airspeed. How might a crew decide to select this drill, what is abnormal? With three ‘independent’ airspeed systems it is assumed that with any system disagreement the odd one out will be disregarded … but what if two or all three are in error.
If the additional training focussed on loss of airspeed how was this simulated, just the removal of the airspeed display without consequential failures of other systems / warnings; would this training be consistent with a real event.

The UAS drill has both memory and follow up items, but initially they relate to different situations delineated by a preceding conditional statement – ‘if an emergency follow memory actions, or otherwise go to subsequent actions’.
Consider a situation which may only be an event to an experienced captain, but might be interpreted as an emergency to a less experienced first officer.
Why should drills need conditions before memory items, should there ever be an unboxed item before a memory drill? What if the drills are the sole basis of training?

The manufacturer and regulator probably knew what was meant (dynamic vs static situations), but left the ‘definition’ of emergency to each operator … thence to each crew.
Training to identify and avoid Cbs, together with a reminder to increase the miss distance for ice crystals could be simpler, cheaper, and directly related to the threat.
Why focus on recovery in preference to avoidance, c.f. stall training.

Do SOPs require control to be transferred to the Captain with a major emergency (including simulation), if so then first officers may never get to feel the aircraft in an abnormal condition – they only read the checklist and thus inappropriate boxed items become the basis of their learning.

The contribution of behavioural shaping in normal operation.
Normal operations involve crews detecting and avoiding large storms. Good CRM practices require shared decision making. Do captains state “we should deviate 15deg left of the storm ahead” seeking crew cross check / concurrence, which is easily given if there is no gross misjudgement; what do first officers learn from this?
An alternative is to ask “what action should we take for the storm ahead”, this requires all crew to participate with active assessment and judgement, which provides opportunity for practicing decision making skills and gain experience of the situation.
In situations where a first officer deputises for a captain on long flights, are the existing views or implementation of CRM sufficient for all operations, to avoid Cbs by a reasonable margin, or even greater with ice crystals?

An afterthought; ‘what if’ a simultaneous malfunction of engines was considered instead of pitot error - engines are only a larger pitot; would crews be required to be trained for flight without power.
Not in the case of recent restrictions on two aircraft types which stressed Cb avoidance to minimise the risk of engine malfunction in ice crystals (software being updated).
Was this learned from the pitot events; more likely that the powerplant departments knew about the problems of ice crystals before pitot events occurred - since 1990s; but this information would only be of value if shared, learned, and remembered – back to the process of airworthiness and regulation – beware ivory towers.

So this has nothing to do with automation dependency ... ... exactly.

Mansfield

20th Jan 2016, 00:03

There is another factor in play here, and it is likely present in the AF447 accident.

Part of my work as a contractor to the FAA has been to build an inflight and ground icing accident database. This involved the review of a very large number of icing incidents and accidents; for the 309 events dating back to 1983 that were deemed applicable, I reviewed all of the available data, i.e., NTSB dockets, pilot statements, ATC transcripts, DFDR plots, etc. In this set of events, I identified 19 cases yielding enough information to determine that the pilot’s first response to an ice contaminated stall was to pitch the aircraft nose up. This ranges from twin Cessnas to the ATR at Roselawn to an A300 at West Palm Beach.

Now, in many of these cases, the pilot’s next response was to push the nose down. But what has interested me is this initial response; it is almost always immediately following the initial pitch down and/or altitude loss resulting from the stall.

This has led me to suspect that we have a strong “compliance” reflex. The first response is aimed at returning to compliance.

Several years ago, shortly after returning to work for the world’s largest airline, I was in the right seat of a 767 returning from Europe. The relief pilot was in the left seat as we approached Labrador. We had been given a re-routing at the other end of the North Atlantic Route, and when we loaded that into the FMC, it dumped the NAR out of the route. Consequently, we were about four miles from a route discontinuity. The poor relief pilot was in a near panic, because he did not want to be seen as straying off course. As it happened, the correct track for the now-missing NAR was exactly the track we were on, so all that was imminent was a change from LNAV to HDG HLD, followed shortly by a return to LNAV once we reloaded the NAR. (In the end, I was able to reload the NAR before we reached the discontinuity.)

In another example, while recently executing a fairly prompt return to landing when my MD80 started emitting a burning odor shortly after departure, my ex-military, newly hired first officer was likewise very concerned about the prospect of landing a thousand pounds overweight. I pointed out afterward that such was the value of declaring an emergency.

It occurs to me that these are forms of the same compliance reflex. The relief pilot in this 767 case was visibly stressed about being seen as non-compliant by Canadian ATC. My MD80 FO was worried about deviating from the approved limitations. It seems possible that such a stress response may be at the root of the 19 events in our icing database. The same thing may have been involved in the first few seconds of the AF447 sequence; I don’t know.

So in parallel with the question of automation dependence may be a fear of violation or non-compliance. This goes straight back to the sense of autonomy that should be inherent when ensuring that “the successful outcome of the maneuver is never in doubt” (ATP Practical Test Guide…or at least it used to say that).

Many companies and some authorities tend to behave in ways that reinforce this. Years ago I remember an internal company training video in which an MD80 captain was interviewed regarding a high altitude stall that he had managed to get himself into, and obviously out of, with a 4000 foot altitude loss. They had actually blurred the fellow’s face as if he was in some kind of witness protection program, and the whole theme was about how you really, really did not want to have to “one of those meetings” with the FAA.

After 30+ years of accident investigation, I can tell you that what you really, really don’t want to do is have “one of those meetings” with the crewmembers’ family members. The FAA can take a hike.

Just food for thought…

1201alarm

20th Jan 2016, 06:39

Tourist, you come over as obsessed and spring loaded, and you make conclusions about people which are of your own making.

ECAM is another way of removing error prone humans from the system as much as possible because we make so many mistakes.
Mostly to make it easy for pilots not to make mistakes while keeping the final authority with the human with regard to what is really appropriate action.

I don't like what I'm saying, I just happen to believe it is true.You believe. Finally some modesty and reasonableness.

The only challenges unique to the civil aviation sphere are certification, legal and public opinion.The biggest challenge is to construct a highly complex system where all the systems (which right now are independantly operating from each other) coordinate themselves automatically and without human input and decision making.

I think you need to research the difference between correlation and causationDo I? Well, I think you need to calm down a bit and stop making conclusions about people.

You think that:-

Pilots fly aircraft.
Aircraft have had less accidents.
Pilots must have got better.
No I don't.

I believe that.

Pilots fly aircraft a lot less than they used to.
Aircraft design and engineering has improved beyond measure.
Systems have been fitted to catch pilot errors, and despite the drop in skill levels, they are doing an excellent job. You believe.

Well, I believe that it won't be possible to construct a complex machine like an airliner that will operate fully autonomously in an real world environment at the same cost and with a safety rate of 1 in 10 million. It will just not be handable, it will be too complex, and do way too much "funny" stuff.

However what is clear there will be more automated systems that support pilots in their task. Some have already been mentioned here.

Bergerie1

20th Jan 2016, 08:03

Mansfield,

You have introduced a really interesting aspect to this debate - the psychological effect from being conditioned to comply. Is this a result of companies over-emphasising the need to comply with SOPs and company procedures rather than educating pilots to understand aerodynamics, their aircraft and its systems so that they can work from first principles?

Don't get me wrong - SOPs are the bedrock of a good safe standard operation, and adherence to them is vital. BUT - there are times when it is necessary to apply basic understanding - and this requires education rather than the slavish following of rules.

For example the basic application of correct attitude and power to achieve the desired speed.

737er

20th Jan 2016, 08:35

One has to laugh at the often asserted notion of driverless autonomous cars dominating the roads within a decade or so. It would be automation dependency stripped of political correctness AND The Big Sky Theory.

It won't happen before artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence is so much in its infancy that it still doesn't exist.

Good times. Back to reading my 1950's Popular Science articles about how everyone will have a flying car within a couple years.

There sure are a lot of liars in high places out there and PT Barnum was right.

Someday....of course...but it's frustrating watching the public get conned on this so much. At least there are people like Gill Pratt out there.

Thread creep...well sort of.

john_tullamarine

20th Jan 2016, 09:39

Folks,

We appear to have a tendency towards agitation in some quarters.

As you are aware, I avoid interfering unless things get out of hand.

Please keep things on an emotional even keel and play the ball, not the player ..

Knowing who some of the posters are, there is a lot of pertinent knowledge horsepower in the arena here .. the rest of us can benefit from listening intelligently.

regards, John

Jwscud

20th Jan 2016, 10:03

compressor stall

20th Jan 2016, 10:28

Just to clarify the Apollo 11 radar in the wrong position causing buffering...

I just watched an interview with buzz where he said he switched it on deliberately so it was ready for the departure and subsequent rendezvous. There was no published restriction On it as the design team never thought it would be activated prior to it being needed.

Centaurus

20th Jan 2016, 12:26

Since the high level of accidents in the 70s we have had:

- New generations of aircraft
- Better automation
- TCAS (which is generally there to protect from human error, but mainly ATC)
- GPWS/EGPWS
- The CRM revolution

CRM is a cottage industry that has swept most airlines of the Western World. My guess from personal experience is that CRM has not been effective in the prevention of accidents in the vast majority of those airlines where ethnic culture is the dominant factor in the cockpit. And that is lots of airlines, large and small. There may be much bumpf written about CRM in those operators Operations Manuals; but lip service in the way of written words, is about as far as it goes.

Tourist

20th Jan 2016, 13:44

Even if you take a gross example of error like AF447, sure those pilots could have done 10 things differently to save things, but you say could some of the same things about the automation, such as.... Why wasn't there a degraded auto pilot mode, why wasn't there a different sensor mode to estimate the plane's airspeed, etc, etc.

There was a degraded autopilot mode.

It was called "hand it to the pilot"

Airbus are not designed to be autonomous and deal with all problems themselves, so they don't.
You cannot reasonably judge the possibility of autonomous aircraft based upon aircraft that are not intended to be.

The design philosophy (rightly or wrongly) is that the systems will look after everything whilst it is all going fine, then hand more and more to the pilot once things are not.
They also work under the assumption that the pilot can do it all himself if necessary.

This may well have been true before Airbus and other modern aircraft came along, but 10yrs of monitoring Airbus magic can kill the skill level of even a Chuck Yeager.

The simple fact is that if you designed a scenario to make life difficult for human beings, modern airline operations tick nearly every box.

Humans are nothing like as good at repetitive dull actions as machines.

Humans are very poor at monitoring systems that very rarely go wrong.

Not just that, but the people who are better at this sort of thing (without being too offensive, shall we call them people of limited imagination) are not the sort of people who make pilots.

Machines never tire of watching an EPR gauge. They are never tired, they never miss a single flicker and they can watch vastly more metrics than a human ever could.

https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20627561-600-maxed-out-how-long-can-we-concentrate-for/

Humans need continuous practise to be good at things.
Machines not only don't need practise, but once one machine has learnt something, then all machines can know it.
Autonomous aircraft will have "pilot error"crashes, but at least each accident should be the last of that type. All the others can be programmed to not make the same error.
We have tried to do that for ever with humans, but the simple fact is that the same errors appear again and again in accidents.

Humans can not concentrate on more than a very limited number of things at once.

Humans Can Only Think About Four Things At Once, Study Says - InformationWeek (http://www.informationweek.com/humans-can-only-think-about-four-things-at-once-study-says/d/d-id/1063868?)

Humans do not operate well when tired.
Airline ops fatigue everybody.
Machines do not tire.

RAT 5

20th Jan 2016, 13:47

So in parallel with the question of automation dependence may be a fear of violation or non-compliance. This goes straight back to the sense of autonomy that should be inherent when ensuring that “the successful outcome of the maneuver is never in doubt”

Don't get me wrong - SOPs are the bedrock of a good safe standard operation, and adherence to them is vital. BUT - there are times when it is necessary to apply basic understanding - and this requires education rather than the slavish following of rules.

Mansfield & Bergerie have both made the same great point. Might not be absolutely in the 'automation dependably' file but relevant. I saw so much over the past years whereby cadets join a rigid SOP airline. They are taught only one method of achieving a task. They are keen but green pilots and terrified of non compliance with SOP's, be it using auto or manual fight. As a result of having a small knowledge data base, and a blinkered view of aviation requirements, they often are slow to realise that their singular technique was not the best applicable to their current scenario. Further their knowledge of all the possibilities available within the AFDS was too low a %.
A simple example: SOP for departure says no use of V/S until flaps are up. SOP for altitude capture says max 1000fpm within 1000' of altitude. 99% of time no problems. Now they have a SID which requires F1 to achieve turn radius. SID cap = 4000'. Passing 3000' F1 ROC = 1500fpm. Inbound traffic descending 5000' and a TA occurs. I suggest V/S 1000fpm to avoid a possible RA (and the associated paperwork). F/O now has a major mental conflict; SOP compliance or application of airmanship. He thinks it is forbidden (violation? unsafe?) to use V/S, but Boeing FCTM has no such restriction. This is a very simple example but there are similar conflicting occurrences where it is more complicated. In these latter scenarios not using the best method available can cause some confusing consequences and delay in action.
Even worse, I once flew with an outfit who had just received the new VNAV/LNAV a/c. They had been taught that in LVL CH descent you increased ROD by increasing MCP speed. So there they were, too high downwind, 210kts, clean and ATC gives descent to circuit altitude, a step down of 4000' before base turn. Solution 1: LVL CH and increase drag & maintain 210kts ready for flaps later in circuit. Solution 2. LVL CH , speed 250kts. (above flap speed) When solution 1 was insisted upon there was a confused silence.
I'm concerned about automatic dependence diluting manual flying skills, but I'm more concerned about automatic dependency causing a dilution of airmanship, situational awareness, and effective management of the flight. IMHO automatic dependance, with only a 50% knowledge of what the automatics are capable of, is very dangerous.
I see too much of this: after a selection the a/c does not perform in the manner you expected. There is a confused pause to try and figure out why; rather than make another simplified selection and force the a/c to do what you want. Even worse, a section is made and it is assumed the a/c will do what you want and there is no follow up monitoring, while you go off on another task, until quite a few moments later. You are really behind the a/c now, playing catch up.
What is missing in normal ops is the application of a non-normal scenario management technique. There are many titles for this, but in principle you identify a problem, consider options, select one to apply, action it and review its effect. There is a complete circle with a feedback loop structure. That is often missing is use of automatics in normal ops. Why? Because it is not taught in normal ops only in non-normal ops. IMHO that is a lack of training awareness and parts of the modern trained monkey syndrome.
Couple all this with quick low hour commands and low time SFI's and the dilution process is complete. In the old days (not always good old) TR courses were conducted by training captains, recurrency could be F/O SFI's. Command
up-grade courses were all captain TRI/TRE. Commands were minimum 5000hrs. Now there are training F/O SFI's at 2 years, even on initial sessions on command courses, and commands at 3000hrs. Is this the best way forward given that the students under training are now joining with so little aviation experience? It's not quite blind leading blind, but it does lead to an eduction based very heavily on a strict following of rigid SOP's in singular methods of operation and heavy use of automatics.

Tourist

20th Jan 2016, 14:00

Since the high level of accidents in the 70s we have had:

- New generations of aircraft
- Better automation
- TCAS (which is generally there to protect from human error, but mainly ATC)
- GPWS/EGPWS
- The CRM revolution

As far as I'm aware without the ability to crunch MORs, NASA ASAPs, company safety reports &c we only really know that the accident rate has decreased, and that a number of high profile accidents have involved human failings.

I am interested in how one can ascribe a certain percentage of the accident rate reduction to different factors above and others I have not mentioned. I would welcome links to studies that attempt to do that.

Let us look at your list, which I fully agree with.

1. New generations of aircraft.
Things go wrong less often thus requiring less input from pilot to not crash.
=Less reliance on pilots being capable of dealing with emergencies.

2. Better automation.
=less reliance on pilots being capable of actually flying. (downside of reducing pilot capability!)

3.TCAS
Catches pilot/ATC errors and tells pilot what to do to solve problem.
=Less reliance on pilots being capable of spotting aircraft and avoiding.

4.GPWS/EGPWS
Catches pilot/ATC errors and tells pilot what to do to solve problem.
=Less reliance on pilots being capable of maintaining SA.

5.The CRM revolution
In large part, in reality, a lot of CRM is following SOPs. When you sift it down, SOPs are an attempt to automate humans. They are an attempt to minimise human creativity in how to accomplish the various tasks. As many scenarios as they can think of have a proscribed way of accomplishing them.
This has been very successful at helping teams to integrate and work well, but to pretend it is not another instance of automation is slightly fuzzy thinking.
=Less reliance on pilots being capable of coming up with best solution on their own under pressure.

The result of this is that I don't think we need to work out the percentages between these factors.

All your factors once rendered down are to do with higher automation and less reliance on human pilots being good at their job.

There is a lesson to take away from that.

Every instance of higher automation that I can think of has improved safety overall.

Why stop now?

FDMII

20th Jan 2016, 15:18

Mansfield, I very much enjoyed your comments regarding Taylorism. To me it showed a broader view of matters, which is something the "automation discourse" does need, including a touch of philosophy.

Such a predisposition helps to delineate and therefore to be aware of our assumptions behind some of the terms we use all the time but for which there will be slightly differing interpretations; so thank you for the entry.

alf5071h

20th Jan 2016, 17:00

Mansfield, Bergerie, “compliance” reflex. AF447, yes, correcting an apparent height loss of 400ft, or complying with the loss of airspeed procedure – box items; both actions relating to ‘trained’ memories (pull up), or acquired beliefs and biases.
A similar viewpoint of other accidents might identify the same behavioural patterns; Colgan, where both crew’s actions were consistent with the recently learned tail stall procedure; or resetting cbs in flight, engaging the autopilot to resolve misunderstood situations.

The hazard in this behaviour is not necessarily the actor, but the source of the ‘norm’.
Inappropriate training, ill-conceived SOP’s, reliance on SOPs – fit the SOP to the perceived situation vs the need to assess the situation first.
How might we identify the source, avoid these aspects, create barriers or mitigations?

In most accidents we are unable to ask the pilots for their view of the ‘norm’, i.e. the origin of the ‘reflex’. Of greater concern is that even with crew recollection they might not know because the ‘reflex’ comes from subconscious memories; thus the problem of identification would include how these aspects became to be embedded in the subconscious memory.

A further thought from modern ideas of cognition is that all of our thoughts and actions come from the fast acting subconscious process, and that slower conscious thought is only an error checker / detector. If so, then an inappropriate reflex action could be seen as a by-pass or failure of error detection, which could also be a function of the appreciation of time – another contributor to these types of accident.

A wider view of these accidents and the previous hypothetical example (#116), is that these accidents were ‘designed’ by others just for these crews, all the holes lined up, human variation peaked, limited attention resources, … , but no one identified these future circumstances.

Centaurus, CRM, agreed; “everyone knows what CRM is for, but no one knows what it is”, (it’s like an inverted bidet in English humour).

Centaurus

21st Jan 2016, 01:21

but 10yrs of monitoring Airbus magic can kill the skill level of even a Chuck Yeager.

Seems Boeing don't trust the skill level of lots of customer pilots. A Boeing test pilot told a friend of mine who was a simulator instructor on the 787. "Boeing have designed the 787 assuming it will be flown by incompetent pilots.":ouch:

wiggy

21st Jan 2016, 04:41

"Boeing have designed the 787 assuming it will be flown by incompetent pilots."

I think it has crept onto other Boeings, given that they recently introduced a rather annoying "[] VNAV step climb" checklist on my type. Guess they think reading and understanding the FMC is a bit tricky for some.

Tourist

21st Jan 2016, 05:28

I think it is an unavoidable chicken and egg situation.

When aircraft were poor, the constant struggle to stay alive and not lost kept the pilots skill levels high and stopped all but the gifted entering the profession.

Now that aircraft are fantastic, pilot skills wane through lack of usage and a lower standard of pilot can successfully enter the profession.

Boeing and Airbus are merely recognising the fact and attempting to mitigate.

Tourist

21st Jan 2016, 05:40

LlamaFarmer

21st Jan 2016, 06:13

As a slight aside, it seems to me that autonomous aircraft would mean that less aircraft would end up airborne with emergencies, and aircraft could safely get airborne heavier off shorter runways....

V1 was invented to deal with human failings.

Recognising that humans need thinking time, and have trouble making the correct decision under extreme time pressure and multiple inputs, V1 is a very good idea for humans.
It is binary system designed around a best guess set of circumstances with flex built in for reaction time after history showed that humans kept making the wrong decision.

A computer could simultaneously assimilate enough information about A/C energy levels, actual position on the runway, engine thrust, engine health, A/C acceleration etc to make a tailored decision about each circumstance including making the decision to not get airborne despite insufficient stopping distance available.

Can anybody think of a reason why V1 would have to be retained?

80kts, V1 and go/no go is merely a human-run algorithm, albeit with some human judgement.

There is still a point, depending on performance and weight, at which an autonomous aircraft cannot stop safely in the distance remaining.

Some judgement is needed though and it's not always black and white.

A thread on here maybe a few weeks ago regarding a 738 in Canada I think that got smoke in the cockpit below V1... they continued as it is known that an APU bleed takeoff after deice can cause smoke, and versus an RTO on a contaminated runway they decided continuing was safer option (and I agree).

Can an autonomously flown aircraft detect and decide what's smoke and what's SMOKE? Will it be able to include all factors when weighing up decisions?

I think it would still have a double-level of go/no-go mode, like we have now...
level one (i.e. below 80) it can stop for anything
level two (80 to V1) it will stop for anything major (engine failure or any fire)
level three (above V1) it will continue.

But then if you can suffer a bird strike to the engine after V1 (as has happened several times) you can not implausibly suffer a bird strike to both engines. What does it do in the event of a can't fly won't fly situation?

Tourist

21st Jan 2016, 07:04

There is still a point, depending on performance and weight, at which an autonomous aircraft cannot stop safely in the distance remaining.

Yes I quite agree, but this is need not be based upon a set speed. A computer can easily calculate this in real-time based upon real-time information about energy levels/acceleration vs runway remaining.

But then if you can suffer a bird strike to the engine after V1 (as has happened several times) you can not implausibly suffer a bird strike to both engines. What does it do in the event of a can't fly won't fly situation?

That is exactly where a computer would have the advantage. It will be constantly monitoring the hundreds of engine metrics which are taken but are currently opaque to the pilot and will have a far better idea of the health of the engines. If the aircraft knows will not have enough thrust to fly it can abort despite lack of runway and accept the overrun.
This is very difficult to train a human pilot to do even if he could assimilate the engine data.

Can an autonomously flown aircraft detect and decide what's smoke and what's SMOKE? Will it be able to include all factors when weighing up decisions?

There a computer maybe in the same position as a human re diagnosis, but still has the advantage.

1. Because there is no need to build in the reaction time/ worst legal pilot buffer.

2. There is no need to have a set speed delineating the go/no-go decision.
This can always be made in real-time by a computer.

ie.

At any point when something triggers an alert, the computer can calculate from the real data, not planned data, the energy situation.
This is not tricky for a computer.
I knows whether it can safely stop on the runway.
This would mean that an autonomous aircraft with a smoke caution well above the speed where a manned aircraft would be committed to take-off could safely stop sure in the knowledge that it would have sufficient runway.

This can only lead to safer flights.

wiggy

21st Jan 2016, 07:16

Tourist

I can see how there may well be advantages of having a real world, dynamically/real time calculated V1. I can see how it might well be a safety improvement if the emergency you are dealing with an easily defined "binary" go or no go type of failure...(e.g Fire warning, or "engine failure confirmed by at least 2 parameters...")

What I'm struggling with is how is your automated decision making process is going to handle more subtle/less binary events - smoke has been already been mentioned but there's also the likes of an engine failure indicated by only one measured parameter- but there was an associated external noise, a "blocked runway" ( what runway length is HAL going to use for the number crunching?), or the good old abandon because in the opinion of the captain it "was unsafe to fly"..(good luck with coding that one).

LlamaFarmer

21st Jan 2016, 07:32

Yes I quite agree, but this is need not be based upon a set speed. A computer can easily calculate this in real-time based upon real-time information about energy levels/acceleration vs runway remaining.

I knows whether it can safely stop on the runway.

It would still need safety factors... there's a lot of variables as to whether it can safely stop in the distance it thinks.

Braking coefficient and reverse thrust the main ones.

But what about in the event of an RTO when the cabin needs evacuating. Who makes the decision, and who deems it safe, cabin crew or the aircraft?

A lot of your points are valid, and computers can make decisions much quicker than humans... but only the decisions it's programmed to make, and only using the factors it's told to take into account.

Tourist

21st Jan 2016, 07:41

What I'm struggling with is how is your automated decision making process is going to handle more subtle/less binary events - smoke has been already been mentioned but there's also the likes of an engine failure indicated by only one measured parameter- but there was an associated external noise, a "blocked runway" ( what runway length is HAL going to use for the number crunching?), or the good old abandon because in the opinion of the captain it "was unsafe to fly"..(good luck with coding that one).

These are valid points, however at the very least, the dynamic V1 gives a longer thinking/evaluating/watching developments time before making the decision.

A computer watching hundreds of parameters has a far greater chance of diagnosing spurious/valid engine problems than a human particularly since it can monitor trends in short spaces of time.

Tourist

21st Jan 2016, 07:46

It would still need safety factors... there's a lot of variables as to whether it can safely stop in the distance it thinks.

Braking coefficient and reverse thrust the main ones.

Yes, it would still need some kind of safety buffer to account for unknowns.

A lot of your points are valid, and computers can make decisions much quicker than humans... but only the decisions it's programmed to make, and only using the factors it's told to take into account.

This is true, however at the moment the decision making process is necessarily extremely simplified because of human limitations re time and complexity.
It should not be impossible to at the very least match human capabilities.

ie.

Autonomous aircraft going down runway.
Unknown/unplanned/confusing situation occurs.
Do I have enough stopping distance available?

No.
Take it airborne.

yes.
Stop.

Tourist

21st Jan 2016, 07:49

Thinking about it, there is actually no reason that the same system could not be fitted to manned aircraft in the same way as TCAS and EGPWS have appeared to assist humans.

You might lose the benefit re the shock/reaction times but would still gain a lot.

Loud voice says "GO" or "STOP"

Too late to patent the idea now:uhoh:

wiggy

21st Jan 2016, 08:16

It should not be impossible to at the very least match human capabilities.

ie.

Autonomous aircraft going down runway.
Unknown/unplanned/confusing situation occurs.
Do I have enough stopping distance available?

No.
Take it airborne.

yes.
Stop.

Playing Devil's advocate here but you might need a a third option
"stopping distance now unknown"..

As would apply in the case of a sudden runway incursion ahead during the take off roll - the blocked runway case....

(I'm not suggesting an answer - just wondering what logic you would suggest is used )

safetypee

21st Jan 2016, 08:37

Jwscud, I don’t know of any particular research re the effect of technology on reducing the accident rate (N.B. not autoflight). Of the few documents which profess trends most restrict their views to one particular subject, which may or may not be correlated with other contributors.
The difficulties in multivariable analysis are often reflected in accident reports which state a wide range of recommendations covering a raft of issues, but without individual prioritisation.
It’s difficult to visualise complex interactions; NASA has attempted this in the previous referenced Aircraft Loss of Control Causal Factors and Mitigation Challenges (www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/3184.pdf); however the analysis is based on the outcome and not the contribution of technology or safety activity.

An overriding problem in this is how safety is perceived - predominantly by accidents, failures; whereas the objective is to eradicate accidents – no failures, which if achieved might represent ‘no safety’; as there shouldn’t be anything to measure. Hollnagel discusses this in many documents on Resilience, Safety 1 and Safety 2.

Airbus’s refreshingly different analysis of Commercial Aircraft Accidents 1958-2013 (www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/3296.pdf) compares categories of accidents vs the advancing technical generations of aircraft.
Thus the reduction in CFIT and LoC accidents might be related to TAWS and Envelope Protection, whilst with little technical activity Runway Excursions remain high (page 15).
However there are inconsistencies; even with the later implementation of TAWS, why does second generation CFIT rate remain high (page 16). This quandary might be more marked by the apparent increasing LoC and Runway Excursion in second generation aircraft which might be as expected by a ‘U’ shaped distribution with age and lack of technical intervention; older aircraft, operating environment, engineering standards, etc. (pages 17-18).
This might indicate that there are greater non-technical issues involved.

I can see the attraction of including CRM in the list, but there may be greater safety value in considering the wider social/operational environment (discussed in previous posts) which may have better capability to influence human behaviour, i.e. in creating the situation which the human has to assess, understand, and manage.
Alternatively, both improved technical and 'non CRM' human input can create safety (the opposite measure of safety as in alf’s designing an accident) by shaping the operational environment. This has some synergy with Engineering Resilience – to build something, but this too involves human activity much earlier in the process – regulation, training, normal behaviour; cf previous hypothetical accident. CRM for regulators and managers; and technology to aid, shape, and guide human behaviour: - decison aiding, not decison making.

Tourist

21st Jan 2016, 08:47

Wiggy

Well, there are various mature technologies available to both "see" and range-find. Some kind of combination?

Would a computer be any worse at judging these things than a human?

I'm thinking that any autonomous aircraft will of necessity have to use one of the various tech solutions for see and avoid and these should read across onto runway surveillance.

Even a laser rangefinder would do the job.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_qah8oIzCwk

Yes, the system on this video is crude, but it is entirely visual based and incredibly small.
More importantly it is what a bunch of kids and hundreds of pounds can do not Boeing/Airbus with billions of pounds.

wiggy

21st Jan 2016, 09:03

Would a computer be any worse at judging these things than a human?

Judging energy states - probably not. Making a sensible decision? That brings me to my next awkward question which would be OK, what are you going to code for "not enough stop run available AND not enough energy to take off".......:bored:

As AI stands for your idea to work you've pretty much got to forsee and code for all the "unknown unknowns" out there........Are you willing to guarantee you can do that with 10 to the 9 reliability or better...or would it be simpler and cheaper to stick with the idea of a couple of Human Beings up there to try and handle the WTFs, aided by better automation/technology...

Tourist

21st Jan 2016, 09:19

That brings me to my next awkward question which would be OK, what are you going to code for "not enough stop run available AND not enough energy to take off".......:bored:

No need to code.

Under that circumstance, the computer will do exactly the same thing as a human pilot.

Crash.

As AI stands for your idea to work you've pretty much got to forsee and code for all the "unknown unknowns" out there........Are you willing to guarantee you can do that with 10 to the 9 reliability or better...or would it be simpler and cheaper to stick with the idea of a couple of Human Beings up there to try and handle the WTFs, aided by better automation/technology...

The problem is that I believe we are at the tipping point where humans are impeding automated systems rather than helping.

Jwscud

21st Jan 2016, 09:25

Safetypee - thank you for the fascinating reading.

Tourist - regarding your idea of a dynamic V1, I agree it is technologically possible. The main question any good analysis would ask is is it worth it? Perf A does not exactly provide massive margins at the moment (look at wet takeoff performance on a limiting runway for example) so I fundamentally don't see there is much more than an extra few hundred kilos of payload to get out of it.

In contrast, the additional risks from cutting margins entirely to the bone is in my view not warranted. Why would anybody waste billions of dollars certifying their dynamic stop-go aid when they could just program HAL with Perf A?

There is a small subset of types and fields where it may be useful - I have operated bizjets capable of sub-1000m landing rolls off 3000m runways, and am well aware that the aircraft could safely be stopped past V1/Vr (as the two are normally the same) given one has 1800m of runway still ahead as one rotates. This is generally less likely to be the case for medium and heavy jets though.

BaronVonBarnstormer

21st Jan 2016, 09:41

Whichever way you cut it computers are rapidly approaching the point where fully autonomous commercial airliners are technologically viable. Indeed there are some very clever people working at this very moment on making fully autonomous air travel a reality.

However what computers lack is imagination, intuition and a sense of self preservation. How many times as a pilot have you had a 'gut feeling' about a situation where something just didn't sit right with you? I'm guessing a fair few times. Lets not forget that computers are only ever as good as the person who programs them.

Though the factor I think will ultimately keep the robot airliner at bay is the passengers. Would you want to put your life in the hands of a glorified calculator? I know I wouldn't.

RAT 5

21st Jan 2016, 12:35

A Boeing test pilot told a friend of mine who was a simulator instructor on the 787. "Boeing have designed the 787 assuming it will be flown by incompetent pilots

I recently checked the listings offered in the 'XXXXX for dummies.' library. Couldn't find B787. Perhaps FCOM should be retitled.

What is a fact is that Boeing FCOMs in last 25 years, ever since EFIS FMC a/c were introduced, now contain less & less technical information than previous generation a/c. Added to that is the universal acceptance of CBT self-study of technical training, multiple choice questions and little chalk & talk wash-ups at the end of the day by a knowledgeable engineer. Couple this with the limited knowledge gained during TR courses and the a/c knowledge of today's pilot, compared to yesteryear, is minimal. Don't think, just do. OK, sometimes you can out-think the QRH and dump yourself in a load of poo; but I found it disappointing/frustrating in FFS TR sessions, with non-normals, that the students were not aware about why the QRH was instructing them do make certain selections and take certain actions. It was as if they had dumped all their ground school from a couple of weeks earlier and were following instructions blindly. You might get away with it for a simple single failure, but not always with multiple failures or failures which did not fit into the QRH box.

Tourist

21st Jan 2016, 13:32

Tourist

21st Jan 2016, 13:36

[I]

What is a fact is that Boeing FCOMs in last 25 years, ever since EFIS FMC a/c were introduced, now contain less & less technical information than previous generation a/c.

As I said earlier.

The manufacturers have come to accept (rightly in my opinion) that human thinking in the moment is detrimental to the operation of the aircraft.
They would rather you just followed SOPs than figured it out for yourself airborne.
Knowledge encourages thinking.

I think that with the current complexity of a modern airliner, they may well be correct.

Tourist

21st Jan 2016, 13:40

However what computers lack is imagination, intuition and a sense of self preservation. How many times as a pilot have you had a 'gut feeling' about a situation where something just didn't sit right with you? I'm guessing a fair few times.

Gut feeling is just the subconscious brain dealing with inputs.
There is no magic there.
Computers can do all this assimilation too.

Lets not forget that computers are only ever as good as the person who programs them.

This I just not actually true is it?
Do you imagine that the person who programmed the Airbus Autopilot can fly better than it in the cruise?
Do you imagine that the person who programmed the FADEC can run the engines better?
Do you think that the person who designed the various chess computers can beat them?

With neural networks this is extra not true, obviously.

Capn Bloggs

21st Jan 2016, 13:55

This I just not actually true is it?
Do you imagine that the person who programmed the Airbus Autopilot can fly better than it in the cruise?
Do you imagine that the person who programmed the FADEC can run the engines better?
Do you think that the person who designed the various chess computers can beat them?

Tourist, you completely and utterly missed the point. I suggest you start thinking like a normal person instead of 01011010110 HAL. What sort of collection of cells programmed the airbus stall warning to silence below 60 knots? A human. Was that a silly idea? Yes. Machines are only as good as the human programmer. Sometimes I marvel at the programming that went into my aeroplane, it does it so well. At other times, I say "what sort of idiot programmed it do that?".

Jwscud

21st Jan 2016, 15:25

Wet runway accelerate-go data provide for a screen height of 15ft at the end of the takeoff distance and only provide that you will make V2 at 35ft at an unspecified further distance down the road. Not much visible margin there. Would you really get a useful load increase out of the thinking time in the stop case?

Operating on private ops using unfactored landing data, I can tell you there is no margin in "advisory" landing distances using "average pilot" techniques either (we used to practice performance landings on empty legs.) I definitely only use (below) average pilot skill and technique and my results are anecdotal but I suspect your V1 aborts would be equally unrepresentative of the certification requirements including worn brakes &c

I personally would bank the increase in safety margin your system would create but I doubt anyone would develop it on that basis.

TheWrightBrother&Son

22nd Jan 2016, 01:35

Tourist

I am not entirely sure I fully agree with you, but I admit you make really good points and you present things under a sensible and different perspective.
Even thought is understandable that aircraft producers are slimming the FCOMs, I feel, as a pilot, mistreated by that, and the same applies for the ever increasing SOPS that leaves you with almost zero necessity to think.
Right, is progress, is safer. But...

Out of curiosity (I think I've missed it because I can not read every pages), are you a pilot?

Cheers

Tourist

22nd Jan 2016, 03:03

Tourist, you completely and utterly missed the point. I suggest you start thinking like a normal person instead of 01011010110 HAL. What sort of collection of cells programmed the airbus stall warning to silence below 60 knots? A human. Was that a silly idea? Yes. Machines are only as good as the human programmer.

Sorry, yes maybe I did miss the point, but I don't think that is my fault. If that is the point, it was poorly worded.

I don't think that "machines are only as good as the human programmer" is a clear way of making that point.

"Machines will still be imperfect if programmed by humans" is a better way of making the intended point, and I would agree.

That does not mean that they will not make less errors than humans which is what is important.

You example of the stall warner is a good one.
It is an error that helped confuse pilots already having a problem.
Because it is a machine based fault, however, it can be fixed to never happen again.
Human errors are sadly repeated ad infinitum...

Tourist

22nd Jan 2016, 03:20

I will mention my favorite example one *more* time:

Tell me how a fully automated airplane would deal with the QF32 incident. Then, I MIGHT consider automation without humans.

There are three aspects to this.

1. I don't know enough about the details of this incident to tell you how an automated aircraft would have coped.

Why don't you tell me exactly what an autonomous aircraft could not have done under the QF32 circumstances?

2. QF32 had an utterly non standard crew. Remind me how many were in the cockpit and their background?
The fact that they coped does not mean that the designed number of average crew, which is how 99% of these flights will be carried out, would have coped so why is it a good example?

3. As I have stated many times, autonomous aircraft will not be perfect.
They will still have "pilot" error caused accidents.
These accidents are likely to be different than human pilot caused accidents.
Black swan events are likely to be a higher proportion of those accidents, since that is the real area where humans still hold an advantage.
It may be that QF32 is an example of where a human pilot would be better. I don't know enough about it.
The vast majority of air accidents are not black swan, they are all too familiar repetitive scenarios.

An autonomous aircraft does not have to be perfect, it only has to kill less people than humans, or kill the same number more cheaply to be worth the effort.

For every QF32 there are 10 serviceable aircraft flown into the ground by humans.

Tourist

22nd Jan 2016, 03:31

Tourist

Out of curiosity (I think I've missed it because I can not read every pages), are you a pilot?

Cheers.

Yes, I'm a pilot.
I started out military rotary then military fixed wing and traveled through corporate and airline and now fly an aircraft without an autopilot again because I prefer to play with a toy that requires my input to perform.

I too have seen the reduction in information passed to the aircrew.

I can still remember the pressure at an obscure point in the main gearbox that sets off the Emergency lubrication system on the Seaking helicopter.

By contrast, the tech knowledge required for the Airbus CBT is more like "the ladybird book of planes"

The fact that Airbus manage to be incredibly safe under these circumstances make me think that it is deliberate policy and not degradation of standards that has led to this.

The manufacturers believe that knowledge will lead to thinking instead of performing like automatons in the event of abnormal events. (They may well be correct that modern aircraft are just too complex for us to understand enough for us to make good decisions under pressure.)
They would rather you just did what the ECAM says, in effect performing as the avatar for the computer.

Under these circumstances humans are really just error vectors.
Unable to help situations, but able to hinder.

I say remove the vector.

Tourist

22nd Jan 2016, 07:59

Tourist - regarding your idea of a dynamic V1, I agree it is technologically possible. The main question any good analysis would ask is is it worth it? Perf A does not exactly provide massive margins at the moment (look at wet takeoff performance on a limiting runway for example) so I fundamentally don't see there is much more than an extra few hundred kilos of payload to get out of it.

Had a bit more of a think about advantages of dynamic V1.

All the current performance figures including V1 are based upon worst acceptable pilot having longest acceptable reaction time, worst acceptable engines etc etc.

A possibly very large advantage (depending on age of engines) of dynamic V1 is that the actual acceleration rate and actual engine thrust on the day would be used rather than worst possible case.

All the little safety factors added to temperatures, thrusts, could be quite reasonably removed as well as the human failing related fudge factors.

It would also allow go no-go decisions in real time utilising information about whether full thrust reverse would be available which could make an enormous difference to the critical point.

i.e. If the reason for the alert is cabin fire rather than engine failure, it is reasonable to assume that thrust reverse will work, therefore it could safely make the decision to stop thus avoiding taking a fire airborne at a much higher speed.

If however the problem is an engine failure, it is no longer reasonable to expect full reverse to be effective, so the aircraft may have already passed the critical point.

I suppose another side bonus would be that the accel data would flag up any weight finger trouble issues as well.
If the briefed mass and known thrust don't meet the expected acceleration figures, the aircraft will know it very early.

No more incorrectly set reduced thrust take-offs.

If the aircraft was not performing as expected, the aircraft would know it pretty much instantly and either add power or abort nice and early without causing an incident.

Edited to add This last could obviously be added to current aircraft without difficulty! Why isn't it?

Capn Bloggs

22nd Jan 2016, 08:23

This last could obviously be added to current aircraft without difficulty! Why isn't it?

Because nobody gives two hoots about extracting a few hundred more kilos out of a takeoff...

or maybe it is technically very difficult and/or the regulators are unable to work out how it will be reliable/safe enough and/or the costs involved outweigh the benefits?

Reality check required...

By contrast, the tech knowledge required for the Airbus CBT is more like "the ladybird book of planes"
In most of the recent LOC prangs, a rocket-scientist knowledge of how the thing works wouldn't necessarily have saved them. Being able to fly would have (as well as having a stab trim that doesn't run full back just because Joe Bloggs is holding full backstick :cool:).

The fact that Airbus manage to be incredibly safe under these circumstances make me think that it is deliberate policy and not degradation of standards that has led to this.
Yep, and guess what, the boffins/RS test pilots have been proved wrong. The first skill you need is be able to fly. Can't fly? You'll die. Worry about the pressure of a gearbox later.

riff_raff

22nd Jan 2016, 08:33

Goldenrivett

22nd Jan 2016, 08:34

Hi Tourist,
They would rather you just did what the ECAM says, in effect performing as the avatar for the computer.

I think even Airbus recognises that ECAM doesn't provide all the answers. It's a pity crews like yourself feel you can't use your technical knowledge and experience to anticipate what ECAM will tell you to do later. e.g. Cabin ALT shows rate of climb & outflow valve fully closed = Suspected door seal leak. You can't prevent cabin ALT from climbing - but no ECAM yet.

Do you sit there and wait for ECAM "EXCESS CAB ALT" to tell you what to do or do you anticipate the problem and initiate a precautionary descent?

Tourist

22nd Jan 2016, 08:39

Because nobody gives two hoots about extracting a few hundred more kilos out of a takeoff...

or maybe it is technically very difficult and/or the regulators are unable to work out how it will be reliable/safe enough and/or the costs involved outweigh the benefits?

Bloggs, you misunderstand what I'm referring to.

I am talking about fitting a simple almost stand-alone piece of kit that does the F=MA equation and tells you if you have entered incorrect aircraft mass.

Easy to do and would have saved many accidents and many many near misses.

Yep, and guess what, the boffins/RS test pilots have been proved wrong. The first skill you need is be able to fly. Can't fly? You'll die. Worry about the pressure of a gearbox later.

I have also obviously not explained myself clearly with reference to Airbus dumbing down training.

I was specifically referring to tech training, not piloting skills. I think everybody including the manufacturers have accepted the shortfalls in pilot training.

Tourist

22nd Jan 2016, 08:59

If you think about it, even a fully autonomous aircraft still relies on a control system that functions based on a set of instructions created by a group of humans that designed the controls using their own best judgement on how to deal with any particular situation they thought the aircraft might encounter.

This is not strictly true with a neural net, and even in the areas where that comment may be valid, remember that the humans making that plan have the benefit of time and a testing process. That is exactly why we have ECAM and QRA in the first place. They may not be perfect but they are a darn sight better than working on the fly.

This approach works very well in most cases, but there are the rare situations where a skilled pilot with the ability to make split-second decisions can do a better job.

Human are not good at split second decisions.
That is what computers are good at.
Humans are good at events that are entirely new and unforeseen. Black Swan events.
That is what computers are currently bad at.

How many accidents do you think are Black Swan and how many are the same old accident again and again....

Sully's adventure is usually quoted about now.
His example is actually exactly what an autonomous aircraft would be good at.
An aircraft will obviously know exactly where it is (GPS/INS) and it's energy level. Those, combined with a simple performance data set will give it it's glide range.
It now knows if it can make the nearest airfield.
Not guesses, not wonders.
It knows.
If it can, it goes to the field. (I have seen rumours that it may have been able to. I don't know)
If not, then it makes the same decisions that a human would.
Is there a river/lake in the database?
It will do that near instantaneously whilst putting out a mayday informing exactly where it is going to land, completing the ditching drills, briefing the cabin crew, telling the passengers to brace etc etc.

None of that is technologically too challenging.
There even exist flying today on an optionally manned Blackhawk a system which if the river was not there will scan the terrain for the least worst forced landing area.

When it comes to ensuring the safety of commercial airline passengers, the added cost of having two qualified pilots in the cockpit is money well spent.

Which is it?
Is an autonomous system to expensive to produce as some would have it, or an attempt to save money by binning pilots?

I think it is not unreasonable to make this statement.

Every automation brought into airline cockpits so far have led to the reduction in reliance on pilots, and an improvement in safety.

What makes you think that further steps towards the logical conclusion will be any different?

Tourist

22nd Jan 2016, 09:04

Hi Tourist,
I think even Airbus recognises that ECAM doesn't provide all the answers.

Airbus is not an autonomous aircraft.
It is designed to have a human in the loop
That does not mean Airbus could not make an aircraft that was.

Referring to Airbus aircraft as proof that we will always need pilots is fallacious since they were designed to need pilots.

It's a pity crews like yourself feel you can't use your technical knowledge and experience to anticipate what ECAM will tell you to do later. e.g. Cabin ALT shows rate of climb & outflow valve fully closed = Suspected door seal leak. You can't prevent cabin ALT from climbing - but no ECAM yet.

Do you sit there and wait for ECAM "EXCESS CAB ALT" to tell you what to do or do you anticipate the problem and initiate a precautionary descent?

No.
I am very happy to use my tech knowledge.
As I said above, Airbus is not designed to do everything itself. It is 60s/70s tech. So it doesn't.

Goldenrivett

22nd Jan 2016, 10:30

Hi Tourist,

You must be really confused. You said in post #158
"By contrast, the tech knowledge required for the Airbus CBT is more like "the ladybird book of planes"

The fact that Airbus manage to be incredibly safe under these circumstances make me think that it is deliberate policy and not degradation of standards that has led to this.

The manufacturers believe that knowledge will lead to thinking instead of performing like automatons in the event of abnormal events. (They may well be correct that modern aircraft are just too complex for us to understand enough for us to make good decisions under pressure.)
They would rather you just did what the ECAM says, in effect performing as the avatar for the computer.

Under these circumstances humans are really just error vectors.
Unable to help situations, but able to hinder.

I say remove the vector."

Then you say,
"Referring to Airbus aircraft as proof that we will always need pilots is fallacious since they were designed to need pilots."

So are they designed to need pilots?
Do you want to remove the "vector"?
Make up your mind.

Tourist

22nd Jan 2016, 10:36

Goldenrivet

I think/hope you may be the only person that is under the impression that I'm advocating removing humans from current aircraft...

alf5071h

22nd Jan 2016, 11:16

Re the current discussion my attention was drawn to the NASA report ’The Analysis of the Contribution of Human Factors to the In-flight Loss of Control Accidents’ (http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20120015461.pdf ) *.
An initial reading heightened my inherent bias, the word ‘error’ (what is it, a cause, action, or consequence) and the use of HFACS (categorising, boxed-in thinking, the risk of relating human variability to numbers); then there were Bayesian Belief Networks … !!

However, having struggled to the end, there was acknowledgment of the assumptions and restrictions in the data base, and the limitations of the research in that this was only a model or a process of modelling.
An alleviating concluding statement triggered a re-reading the report. “The analysis of the historical data showed that the deficiencies at the airlines’ organizational levels are often the underlying cause of flight and maintenance crew related accidents. Consequently, the authors developed a high-level airline organizational hierarchy to trace and identify the deficiency propagation”.

Back to Fig 1. which shows the error paths (vectors?) and combinations of contributors, noting that one is a direct vector by-passing the human. Also, that the data relates to the number of accidents, and not the previously discussed number of fatalities.
Idling some numbers, it is interesting that the total percentages in the HE – LOC path totals 77.8%, which is adjacent to the oft misquoted 80% human contribution in all accidents. Is this a model of the real world, or just a model of our perception of the real world?

Considering an ‘automatons’ view, then the “80%” HE would have to be blocked, yet 5.5% of that origionated from ground personnel, and not to forget the previous system related direct path (SC-LOC).
A personal experience of LOC (amongst others, intended and not so) involved the non-existent direct path ENV-LOC; the aircraft was restored to stable flight (LOC-HE-ENV). This represents the reverse, recovery path - the successes of human involvement; in a logic diagram this could involve negative HE - the argument for automation, or alternatively positive human behaviour (a negative vector) – cf concepts that error and success have the same cognitive root.
Automation would have to consider all of the reverse paths in Fig 1, yet there is little or no data which identifies the mechanism of the potentially large number of ‘hidden’ (unreported) successes.

Without identifying this mechanism how might we be sure that automation can replace the human.
Also, because this line of argument is based on a model (computation / automation) it is unlikely that we can ever provide any assurance of sucess; yet the pro automation argument is based on similar (the same model), and that any implemented solution will also use similar computation / automation technology.

Pulling hard on boot laces?

* The direct link my not work:- try NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS) - The Analysis of the Contribution of Human Factors to the In-Flight Loss of Control Accidents (http://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20120015461&hterms=20120015461&qs=N%3D0%26Ntk%3DAll%26Ntt%3D20120015461%26Ntx%3Dmode%2520ma tchallpartial%26Nm%3D123|Collection|NASA%2520STI||17|Collect ion|NACA)

A retired sceptical and biased pilot who spent 25 yrs developing and testing automation, then 10yrs investigating accidents to understand weaknesses in the auto – human interface, and the 40 yrs of accumulated personal ‘error’ in aviation.

Centaurus

22nd Jan 2016, 11:57

I think everybody including the manufacturers have accepted the shortfalls in pilot training.

But have avoided the issue. From where I stand effective action is negligible. Lip service only. Like add one more raw data ILS per year to a sim session plus maybe a manually flown ILS in good weather and no crosswind of course. Fat lot of good that does to address the automation dependency problem. :sad:

Tourist

22nd Jan 2016, 12:56

Yes, I totally agree.

Unfortunately, to bring current pilots back up to the skill level of 30 yrs ago simple cannot be done.

Even if the initial training standard could be replicated, the thing that kept everybody competent in the old days was the constant need to actually do the job.

Now that the only time we do the whole job is during the incredibly rare malfunctions, we cannot hope to remain at our best.

RAT 5

22nd Jan 2016, 13:07

Even if the initial training standard could be replicated, the thing that kept everybody competent in the old days was the constant need to actually do the job.

Now that the only time we do the whole job is during the incredibly rare malfunctions,

I think much of the discussion about competence is more about being able to do the basics; i.e. normal ops, not just those under non-normal (malfunction) circumstances. This concern is motivated by incompetent pilots crunching serviceable a/c. while trying to achieve the normal/basic.

Tourist

22nd Jan 2016, 13:39

[I]

I think much of the discussion about competence is more about being able to do the basics; i.e. normal ops, not just those under non-normal (malfunction) circumstances. This concern is motivated by incompetent pilots crunching serviceable a/c. while trying to achieve the normal/basic.

Ok, I must admit that I generally had no concerns about pilots ability to fly the basic script in my airline with all the toys working.

It was in the Sim with the toys removed where I would see astonishing/horrifying things.

In that list of horrors I would include the degradation of my own basic skills/capacity despite my efforts to hand fly as much as possible on the line.

Mansfield

22nd Jan 2016, 22:37

What is a fact is that Boeing FCOMs in last 25 years, ever since EFIS FMC a/c were introduced, now contain less & less technical information than previous generation a/c.

the notion that the aircraft commander IS the legal commander responsible for the safety of the flight, and in the end is the sole decision-maker on board the aircraft is gradually being made subservient to the audit process where such authority is "modified"

To expand a bit on my earlier post, these two observations actually form the important pattern.

Soon after WWII, Herbert Simon, who later was an early developer of artificial intelligence, said the following, one of my favorite quotes:

“Two persons, given the same skills, the same objectives and values, the same knowledge and information, can rationally decide only upon the same course of action. Hence, administrative theory must be interested in the factors that will determine with what skills, values, and knowledge the organization member undertakes his work.”

This idea, the suggestion that the human mind is simply a binary computer, is at the root of observations like

The manufacturers believe that knowledge will lead to thinking instead of performing like automatons in the event of abnormal events.

This is not necessarily a safety strategy so much as it is a management style. The only way a human being will fit into a flow chart is if you convince yourself that Simon’s idea works. (To be fair to Simon, he was a remarkable polymath who evolved considerably and made substantial contributions to many areas.) Thus, as a manager, you are primarily concerned with “what skills, values, and knowledge the organization member undertakes his work.” Naturally, it is easier to specify the course of action that you would like your human to rationally decide upon if there are fewer skills, simpler values, and less knowledge.

This exists in areas much broader than aircraft systems knowledge. We have new hire first officers straight out of the military who have no idea what an Operations Specification is. How would they know? The company doesn’t issue them to the pilots. They didn’t have OpSpecs in the military, and no ATP course here in the States would ever go so far as to explain how OpSpecs work and why they matter. The company certainly doesn’t want to spend any time on this; the instructors themselves don’t have the OpSpecs. The same ex-military pilot may not know that there is an FAR that says you can’t take off if you know you will arrive at the destination over the max landing weight…nobody ever provided any training in what the FARs say. (Not an indictment of ex-military pilots; many, particularly the former KC-135 guys, hand fly quite well for some reason…)

Reading Langewiesche’s piece on AF447, the most poignant passages are the CVR transcriptions detailing the frustration and near panic felt by the subordinate pilots when the captain did not immediately respond to their calls. Assuming that the translation is accurate (I always worry that meaning is lost in these endeavors), it is clear that neither pilot believed he had the technical skill necessary to resolve the situation. Moreover, they somehow believed that the captain, by virtue of his greater experience, would have that technical knowledge.

Thus, in the stress of the moment, they revealed an inner perception of themselves as inadequate by virtue of inexperience. The “skills, values and knowledge” that they possessed were not up to the requisite course of action. They knew it, and they were clawing their fingernails raw trying to get at that knowledge. How on earth did they graduate from a technical program that awarded them a type rating without the confidence they needed at that moment?

The problem, as I have said in an earlier post, is that all of the management theory generated by Taylor, Simon and others operates within a linear mathematical paradigm. It uses the same understanding of cause-and-effect that babies use when predicting the motions of billiard balls. They probably could not have done otherwise; chaos theory and the understanding of nonlinear behaviors did not exist until the 1970’s for all practical purposes. However, in the cockpit, we actually operate in an environment that frequently exhibits nonlinear behavior. We always have. Turbulent flow off a wing is nonlinear. Weather is nonlinear. Even the function of neurons in the brain is nonlinear. Complex systems, which we already had in aviation and then expanded exponentially with automation, exhibit emergent behavior at the least, in which the system output is something more or less than the sum or product of its components.

Standard operating procedures, when well designed, function to protect margins of safety. The margins exist to provide resilience and can absorb nonlinear effects. There are two ways to comply with SOP. In one, you simply do what you are told. In the other, you understand the margins that you are protecting, understand how that SOP accomplishes that, and you comply intelligently, as an act of executing your authority as well as an act of mastery over the aircraft. In the former approach, you become fearful of noncompliance, and pull the nose up as soon as the nose drops regardless of why. In the latter approach to SOP, you preserve the protections and error traps built into SOP while being much less likely to follow the book into the ground.

Linear management theories don’t see the difference.

Nonlinear behaviors are why I am not terribly worried about autonomous airliners in my lifetime. Eventually, sure…but not for quite a while. But much, much more important is how we tailor our profession to meet our obligation as the final authority as to the operation of the aircraft, in an increasingly complex system managed by people who actually think that “Two persons, given the same skills, the same objectives and values, the same knowledge and information, can rationally decide only upon the same course of action…”

CONF iture

23rd Jan 2016, 01:51

Referring to Airbus aircraft as proof that we will always need pilots is fallacious since they were designed to need pilots.
They were designed to protect against pilot's mistakes ... but by now pilots have procedures to protect against "protections" that were supposed to save them ...

Tourist

23rd Jan 2016, 04:55

To be fair, the protections built into Airbus to protect against pilot error do work quite well when serviceable.

Which protections are you referring to that require protecting from?

1201alarm

23rd Jan 2016, 05:35

#126: I'm concerned about automatic dependence diluting manual flying skills, but I'm more concerned about automatic dependency causing a dilution of airmanshipThat is very well put! It needs both, but while the manual flying skills do not need to be perfect (just don't leave your flight envelope, and if you approach the edges of the envelope, stear it back into the middle of the envelope), sound judgement and decision making with good situational awareness is overall the most important.

If we think about AF447 or the Air Asia thing, it was a problem of basic flying, but not in the sense of how precisely can I fly it, but in the sense, how should my plane be flown ROUGHLY right now. You could even argue it was not about what to do, but about what surely NOT to do (pull on the stick).

This area of reasoning comes in very well with #117 This has led me to suspect that we have a strong “compliance” reflex. The first response is aimed at returning to compliance.
To be able to decide properly, when compliance is not anymore the main goal is one of the craftsman qualities a pilot should possess. We do not want too much avoidance of necessary compliance either, compliance is generally a very high contributor to safety, but when becomes the focus on compliance a burden in a specific situation?

The question is then, how can we train, build and maintain sound judgement, decision making skills, situational awareness and airmanship? I think it is a question of culture and training. You need a culture where captains show these qualities to their first officers, and over the time a common understanding developes, what is appropriate and what is not. You need SOP's who support that kind of thinking, and do not hinder it. You need regular training of crews, in simulator and in publications where such decisions are discussed. You need safety publications to sharpen the organisations mutual understanding of what is good airmanship.

And besides that, you still need the basic flying skills with pitch and power, and a good instrument scan, which comes from having a sensible culture and set of SOP for switching off the automatics.

I would disagree that it is problematic that the FCOM have less technical information then they used to have. Systems have become more complex, and as I pilot I do not need to understand them to the deepest technical level. However what I need is an understanding of what the systems are intended to do, how they are supposed to interact with each other and the environment, to make best use of them. And most importantly, I need to be able to recognise a failed system and to judge what I have to do now with the aircraft (what to do with the system comes later).

1201alarm

23rd Jan 2016, 05:47

#168 Automation would have to consider all of the reverse paths in Fig 1, yet there is little or no data which identifies the mechanism of the potentially large number of ‘hidden’ (unreported) successes.Interesting post althogether. Rephrased in non-scientific terms it means that we have no statistics about how often the humans actually saved the day.

This does not only apply to abnormal situations, but all the daily decisions pilots do with regard to passenger and weather irregularities, diversion decisions, etc. Every experienced commercial pilot will know what I mean. There are everyday little situations and surprises.

Which bings me to #173 Nonlinear behaviors are why I am not terribly worried about autonomous airliners in my lifetime.Personally, I believe a fully autonomous airliner would be way too much non-linear, because every level of interaction between nowadays independant systems would lead to enourmous complexity and non-linear behaviour. It won't be able to provide 1 on 10 million.

CONF iture

23rd Jan 2016, 13:37

To be fair, the protections built into Airbus to protect against pilot error do work quite well when serviceable.
They were serviceable ... but data pollution along the chain in made them trigger when inappropriate. Pilots are now requested to kill them before they kill ...
AoA protection is a regular contender.

Tourist

23rd Jan 2016, 13:58

They were serviceable ... but data pollution along the chain in made them trigger when inappropriate. Pilots are now requested to kill them before they kill ...
AoA protection is a regular contender.

You've lost me on that one. Something new?

Please explain further.

CONF iture

24th Jan 2016, 03:11

The new thing is we finally got an Operation Engineering Bulletin how to force the airplane out of Normal Law when protections unduly activate.
Up to that time the airplane was here to save the pilots - To acknowledge that some souls on board could save the airplane from its own system was simply not part of the Airbus line of thought ...

A first known occurrence with Qantas in 2008, then Eva Air in 2012, and was it last year with Lufthansa ...
Switch 2 ADRs OFF to regain control.

alf5071h

24th Jan 2016, 11:25

1202, “… that we have no statistics about how often the humans actually saved the day.”
Yes, but more than that, we have little understanding of the mechanisms behind any statistics.

In Fig 1, the negative HE-LOC vector involves %, but in order to improve safety we need to understand how these adverse outcomes came about.
One simplified view considers incorrect situation assessment or incorrect choice of action (Orasanu), thus turning this around, the successes might represent appropriate assessment or choice of action. Alternative views consider that the behaviour in adverse events and success has the same basis and thus the successes should be fully investigated (Hollnagel).

In some successes the initial assessment/action was not as required, e.g. of the 20+ ICI/ADC events pre AF447, several aircraft pitched up, but subsequent action (adjustment) prevented a stall. Another view involves a continuous process of adjustment – reviewing awareness and action based on an interim outcome.
A further aspect of success involves the really hidden events, e.g. where an unmodified aircraft faced the ICI situational threat, but the crew managed the situation (adjusted behaviour) to avoid an unwanted outcome; normal operation, non- event. (Weick, et al – ‘safety is a dynamic non-event’).
Successful crews / operators appear to be able to manage ‘potential accident scenarios’; not just avoid the fatal accidents, but also all events which could have adverse outcomes, yet the solution need not be ‘machine’ (or SOP) perfect, only acceptable for the situation (machine ~ technology / automation).
This may involve (situation) recognition primed / naturalistic decision making, the basis which may not be completely feasible with machine based decision making. A machine might provide better situation assessment, but not for the choice of action, which may depend on learning. This assumes that machine learning is based on previous situations, whereas human learning enables previously experienced situations to be extended to other un-sampled situations (intuition?), thus for machines to have sufficiently reliable ‘intuition’, the boundaries of this process might have to be programmed by the fallible human.

As for safety improvements, Orasanu considers machine aided awareness, but also complementary crew training to improve experience and judgement - airmanship.
For choice of action, a machine may help in judging risk, but such a judgement would require an understanding of both the situation and the proposed action – what has the human decided to do. i.e. machines may be better at catching an ‘error’ than making the decision, e.g. EGPWS.

Orasanu. http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/papers/seattle_hessd/judithlynne-p.pdf

Hollnagel. https://www.scribd.com/doc/296474809/How-to-Be-Safe-by-Looking-at-What-Goes-Right-Instead-of-What-Goes-Wrong

Weick. Managing the Unexpected - University of Michigan Business School (http://www.bus.umich.edu/FacultyResearch/Research/ManagingUnexpected.htm)

Klein. http://xstar.ihmc.us/research/projects/EssaysOnHCC/Perspectives%20on%20Sensemaking.pdf
And http://xstar.ihmc.us/research/projects/EssaysOnHCC/Sensemaking.2.pdf
And http://psych.colorado.edu/~vanboven/teaching/p7536_heurbias/p7536_readings/phillips_etal_expertise.pdf

Other refs: http://high-reliability.org/Critical_Thinking_MJohns_2010.pdf

Error management in aviation training (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/2004/errormanagement.aspx)

Tourist

24th Jan 2016, 14:23

alf

Could you do me a favour and dumb down your posts slightly.

Speaking for myself I find them very interesting but sometimes a little opaque as if there is required pre-reading to understand some of the points in them.

john_tullamarine

24th Jan 2016, 22:22

if there is required pre-reading

alf5071h (and a couple of others here) has (have) a wealth of knowledge which he (they) make(s) available for the rest of us .. surely a little bit of reading research is a small price to pay for that privilege ?

I'm sure he has better things to do than paraphrase large papers which we can read for ourselves ?

Tourist

25th Jan 2016, 02:46

That's fine, except that despite the fact that he is posting easily the most educated/informed posts on here, few are replying to them due to the language being slightly impenetrable unless you have a PHD in the subject.

Language is about communication.

It matters not that you are correct if nobody is able to understand your idea, and arcane terminology helps nobody on a public forum peopled by those with an interest in the subject but certainly no formal training.

I was not attempting to be rude or lazy, but despite the interest in the subject, I unfortunately do not have time to get a degree in it just to understand the finer points of interesting posts.

The average number of replies to his posts suggests I am not alone.

When I was at school, asking the teacher for a simpler explanation was not considered a bad thing?

john_tullamarine

25th Jan 2016, 05:04

Fair comment .. but we'll have to leave it to the experts to decide how to structure their posts

alf5071h

25th Jan 2016, 08:44

Dumbing down is the deliberate oversimplification of intellectual content within education, literature, cinema, news, video games and culture in order to relate to those unable to assimilate more sophisticated information.The term …, meaning: "to revise so as to appeal to those of little education or intelligence".

… It often involves diminishment of critical thought involving the undermining of intellectual standards within language and learning; thus trivializing meaningful information, culture, and academic standards, as is the case of popular culture.

Tourist, I would not wish to label individuals or group membership by attempting to simplify as above.

We operate in a very complex world; human behaviour is difficult to describe and understand, not that this means a complex solution, but it might require a different approach which currently comes from academia. I regret not having sufficient understanding or the means to communicate this, thus I post opinion and academic references seeking explanatory understanding, through dialogue, two way communication.

One of the industry’s tasks is to translate research into practical applications; the best people to do that are those within the industry, particularly those on the front line who could have unique understanding of how individuals actually operate.
Perhaps the second part of the definition of dumbing down applies to some attitudes in the industry.

Automation Dependency is not a simple cause-effect relationship, that the use of more automation results in a dependency these systems; or that because humans suffer error we should replace them with automation.

Automation is not a dependency as with an addiction, requiring abstinence (fly manually) or a new temperance movement (automate everything), but that it is a 'prosthetic', something which is essential for modern operation, but can be misunderstood or misused.

Tourist

25th Jan 2016, 12:38

Tourist, I would not wish to label individuals or group membership by attempting to simplify as above.

Fair enough, I will just have to think harder.

Automation Dependency is not a simple cause-effect relationship, that the use of more automation results in a dependency these systems; or that because humans suffer error we should replace them with automation.

Not sure I agree with that.

I fail to see how automation can fail to cause a dependency.

Humans require constant practise to be good at anything.

If we expect humans to be able to fly a limited panel raw data non precision approach in a limiting crosswind when the toys fail, then we have to make them practise the same.

The only way I see that humans skills don't fade yet are assisted by computers is if we fly it all ourselves all/most of the time yet have HAL in the background monitoring us and reminding us when we screw up.

That way we are maintaining both skills and capacity.

If Federer didn't hit a ball more than once a week or play a match more than once every six months then he would lose to No 100 on the ladies tour.

Humans require constant practise.

Smilin_Ed

25th Jan 2016, 13:52

If Federer didn't hit a ball more than once a week or play a match more than once every six months then he would lose to No 100 on the ladies tour.

Please translate. Thanks.

Ed

FDMII

25th Jan 2016, 13:54

Absence of responses is not always an indication of a lack of engagement, it is just an indication of "absence of responses", period.

Not every post requires an ack or a response, sometimes because the contribution "says it all", and silence is itself, sufficient acknowledgement. Perhaps many more lurk and read, while gaining valuable understanding; such is the value of providing links to others' work.

When complex subjects and views are engaged, a thoughtful response takes time, work and care.

The links to various, apropos documents is both an honest and respectful way of providing information to others engaged in like-minded pursuits. I can think of many such references over the past dozen years or so that have led to primary changes in thinking and perception of what I did for a living over a period of thirty-five years.

A continuance of such collegial ways of discussing complex subjects is welcome and appreciated.

FDMII

slast

25th Jan 2016, 13:57

Not sure if this has been posted before but may be interesting reading in this context?

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/01/19/more-u-s-military-drones-are-crashing-than-ever-as-new-problems-emerge/?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main_drones-10pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory

Tourist

25th Jan 2016, 14:29

Please translate. Thanks.

Ed

What I mean is that even an initially great pilot can't stay great without practise.

You can't practise being a pilot with the automation doing all the work.

Unless you daily/regularly fly raw data/ old school navaids/ no flight directors/ manual thrust etc etc, how can you be expected to be any good at it?

These things are eminently perishable skills.

Tourist

25th Jan 2016, 14:31

Tourist

25th Jan 2016, 14:35

Centaurus

25th Jan 2016, 21:58

Unless you daily/regularly fly raw data/ old school navaids/ no flight directors/ manual thrust etc etc, how can you be expected to be any good at it?

These things are eminently perishable skills.

The quote here by Tourist is the most succinct I have seen on Pprune on the subject of automation dependency. Well written.

It should be framed and hung on the wall of every airline chief pilots office and every flight operations inspectors office, too. :ok:

Chris Scott

25th Jan 2016, 22:32

Quote from alf5071h:
"Automation is not a dependency as with an addiction, requiring abstinence (fly manually) or a new temperance movement (automate everything), but that it is a 'prosthetic', something which is essential for modern operation, but can be misunderstood or misused."

Quote from Tourist:
"I fail to see how automation can fail to cause a dependency.
Humans require constant practice to be good at anything.
If we expect humans to be able to fly a limited panel raw data non precision approach in a limiting crosswind when the toys fail, then we have to make them practise the same."

I like an academic approach, even when I don't fully understand it - this is Tech Log, after all - but it's useful to draw a conclusion one way or the other, rather than arguing on the fence.

You simply can't do that in an aeroplane. I'm with Tourist on this one.

Capn Bloggs

26th Jan 2016, 00:14

The quote here by Tourist is the most succinct I have seen on PPRuNe on the subject of automation dependency. Well written.

Written, of course, by the greatest advocate of automation because humans are not good enough (except the programmers that leave us mere pilot mortals in the cold when the machinery stops behaving...) :cool:

Tourist

26th Jan 2016, 03:28

Written, of course, by the greatest advocate of automation because humans are not good enough :cool:

Have you asked yourself why I have this opinion though?

I went to an airline from a military and corporate background. What I found there concerns me greatly.
From the quotes during training "this is good as you are ever going to be at handling the aircraft" that I laughed off at the time, but realised was true, to the "minimum standards are acceptable" attitude during 6monthly sims.

I flew in the sim with captains whose patter was awesome, great CRM etc etc, but who simply did not have the handling skills or capacity to fly the aircraft effectively once the toys were broken.

I have no idea how they could continue to operate on the line knowing that an autopilot failure could doom them unless the FO was competent.

I simmed with one who quite simply could not fly a raw data ILS to minimums in bad weather. 3 attempts. He still had autothrust.
I simmed with another who in 5 attempts could not keep it on the runway at vmcg with an engine fail.

These were good guys. The airline had the freedom to pick from the best, yet flying in reliable aircraft which require no skill to operate in day to day usage killed their skill to a level which in my opinion was inadequate to deal with a serious malfunction.

I did not fancy that degradation or skills so I left.
It is worth noting, that the pilots who joined from "crappy" airlines that flew into dodgy little airfields on non precision approaches all the time had far superior skills when they joined our airline, and when jumpseating on one of the old mandraulic fleets my airline had, it was easy to see that their basic skills were still good also.

I now fly a crappy bucket that no decent State would ever allow in their airspace. Raw data manual thrust no flight director every day and my skills are back to a level I am happy with. Ironically, I am paid far more than I was at a legacy airline because there are not many around who can do what used to be called "being a pilot" anymore.

I don't delude myself that I am safer than I was in my Airbus.
Modern airliners are incredibly safe, but that is despite the pilot, rather than because of the pilot. It's the fact that the engineering is so brilliant that piloting is so rarely needed.

At least I know I will never be surprised by the loss of systems that I don't use. I am currently always operating at the lowest level of automation.

I love it!

I think aviation is currently in the difficult final stage where the man machine interface is getting the worst aspects of both.
Humans are monitoring, which is something we are awful at.
Machines are doing all the practise, which is something they don't ever need.

riff_raff

26th Jan 2016, 04:46

A first known occurrence with Qantas in 2008, then Eva Air in 2012, and was it last year with Lufthansa ... Switch 2 ADRs OFF to regain control. While working as a designer for an OEM, I recall a similar situation that I was assigned to work on. There were a couple reports of all three of the redundant ADIRU systems used for the autopilot experiencing failure at the same time. The three ADIRU boxes were all mounted next to each other on the same platform in the EE bay. Under certain flight conditions, the platform would experience a structural vibration coupling mode that would cause the ADIRU's to shut down. All three ADIRU's shutting down required the pilot to take control.

The navigation systems allowed the aircraft to operate more efficiently, but not necessarily more safely.

FDMII

26th Jan 2016, 14:18

riff_raff, #198; The navigation systems allowed the aircraft to operate more efficiently, but not necessarily more safely. Yes, I think so. As I have posted earlier in the thread, autonomous flight is, and has been possible for many years.

The argument for autonomous flight has always been the reduction of "human error", regardless of where that human is/was both physically and in time.

The closer we get to actual technical capability, that argument is beginning to look a bit disingenuous. I think the argument for autonomous flight is largely, (and realistically, only) an economic one - it's "cheaper" to eliminate front-end flight crews. Given how these things go, (elimination of Nav's & FE's and now elimination of the value of experience), with automation being the exchange, the arguments will persist and we may indeed achieve a drone-like air transport capability. However, the nature of how incidents and accidents unfold as has been discussed in the thread, (QF32, QF72, riff_raff's example of the EE bay platform - among thousands of other such examples, etc.), make it reasonable to doubt whether human intuition is programmable such that a routine, commercial transport could continuously pass the equivalent of a Turing Test.

But it will definitely be cheaper, although it will be interesting to hear what the insurers have to say.

But that cannot be done in order to achieve reduced risk; that is, a statistically-significant (one stddev) fatal accident rate than the industry has already achieved.

Tourist

26th Jan 2016, 14:45

FDMII

1. I think you misunderstand the intent.

Nobody wants to make an aircraft that could pass a Turing test.

I would go as far as to say that the exact opposite is the case.
The intent is to remove consciousness and all the problems it brings. The very last thing anybody wants in an autonomous aircraft is a personality.:rolleyes:

The mere mention of Turing shows a deep misunderstanding of what people are trying to achieve.

2. You make some statements regarding whether it can be done safer, but have neglected to provide a shred of evidence or research to back them up.

Examples from the past of problems with computers etc are not valid examples for the simple reason that nobody has yet tried to build an autonomous airliner, therefore they are not autonomous.
ie "This Airbus I fly is rubbish! I keep having to help it out!"
An Airbus is designed to always have human pilots. Therefore, humans are part of the strategy for dealing with problems.

We can however point to the many many examples where increased automation has improved flight safety.

In every single instance I can think of, when automation is added to the flight deck flight safety has improved.
TCAS
EGPWS
FADEC

Can you think of an instance where this is not the case?

alf5071h

26th Jan 2016, 15:16

Tourist, your earlier view appears to be based on a narrow range of experiences – observations, and the gross assumption that the reduced skill is due to automation.

The retention of high skill level requires practice, but even without practice not all skills will be lost (e.g. riding a bike). The vast majority of pilots, including those you observed appear to have sufficient skills to fly safely – undertake the tasks expected in operational situations.
It would be better to consider why those few pilots flew as they did. Perhaps the problem is not with what you observed, but the process of training; why didn’t the trainer/checker intervene, what did the operator know, the interpretation of regulations, what was the organisation’s attitude, and did the regulator have oversight of this. None of which involves automation or dependency.

The regulators normally consider situations that require us ‘to fly raw data/ old school navaids/ no flight directors/ manual thrust, etc,’; this is often based on probability, which is more suited to the certification process, opposed to human behaviour which entails judged risk assessment. A single observation or accident analysis may not justify re training all pilots, particularly if the required outcome cannot be assured. It might be better to teach pilots how to identify and avoid those situations requiring flight with ‘a limited panel raw data non precision approach in a limiting crosswind when the toys fail’ than expect them to retain a rarely used skill. Thus the safety task is to review our expectations of pilots in today’s operations and not in those which we remember.

The nature of modern operations is that there are few cause-and-effect situations; the range of safety intervention requires careful consideration, without basing them on a miniscule data set. This could be aided with a wider view of human performance and use of other sources for evidence such as the process of training and what happens in normal operations.

safetypee

26th Jan 2016, 16:27

FDMII, re autonomous flight. Capability yes; but cheaper, perhaps not.
Consider the safety cases that would be required for the entire supporting infrastructure; will we be able to afford that, let alone ensure equivalent safety as with aircraft. A CS 25 for every element?

And possibly due to a subconscious regulatory bias, which may give credit for human intervention in unimaginable situations, an even higher level of safety may be required for autonomous vehicles. Compare the ‘accepted’ manual landing risk as indicated by operations (IIRC about 10-6), against the higher requirements for an autoland. Even then there are residual risks with triple or dual-dual systems (pitot icing).

Tourist; always love a challenge:
First separate technology from automation; EGPWS, ACAS, technologies have improved safety.
FADEC, automated engine control. 747-8 and 787 had restrictions for Cb related icing, because the FADEC was unable to manage ice crystals. Worst case was that all engines were affected simultaneously, and with ice damage may not restart. Thus the need to avoid the conditions, not practice flying without power.

FDMII

26th Jan 2016, 16:33

safetypee, re, "...but cheaper, perhaps not.", and, "A CS 25 for every element?"

Yes, understand both points. I wanted to at least challenge the notion of "cheaper" in the examining of the balance between raw capability, the implied promise of enhanced safety and the overall notion, "should we do this...?"

safetypee

26th Jan 2016, 16:49

A worthy challenge; accepted. But should we do this … (just because we can)?
No; but human intuition (gut feeling) often overrides rationality.

FDMII

26th Jan 2016, 17:07

"No; but human intuition (gut feeling) often overrides rationality."

Touché

Tourist

26th Jan 2016, 17:42

Tourist, your earlier view appears to be based on a narrow range of experiences – observations, and the gross assumption that the reduced skill is due to automation.

Well, that is all I have, to be fair, and that is what normal opinions are based upon.
I would disagree that it is a gross assumption. More a strong correlation with a limited data set.

I admire your ambition in attempting to portray my suggestion that lack of practice will impact flying skills as somehow contentious and unscientific.

Automation reduces practise in manual flying.

This is an uncontested fact as far as I'm aware. It is, after all, the whole point.

Reduced practise reduces skill levels in all areas of human activity.

This is also an uncontested fact.

Thus, automation reduces skill levels.

Please point out the logical fallacy in any of that.

The retention of high skill level requires practice, but even without practice not all skills will be lost (e.g. riding a bike).

Agreed, not the entire skill will be lost, however vestigial skills are demonstrably insufficient as demonstrated by many recent accidents and now accepted by Boeing, Airbus and various regulatory authorities.
A vague remembering of how to hand fly your aircraft is not enough when you need it. Remember that generally the loss of automation tends to be associated with other non-normal events requiring a large part of the capacity of the pilot.

The vast majority of pilots, including those you observed appear to have sufficient skills to fly safely – undertake the tasks expected in operational situations.

This is the problem.
Due to the amazing engineering standards of today, and the rarity of actually having to do something, people have started to believe that what we do whilst waiting for an emergency is "being a pilot"
It is not.
When everything is working properly, even the people on this forum who believe that we need humans on board would admit that the aircraft can do it itself. They contend that humans are better at dealing with problems than computers, and they may be right at the moment.

If you are arguing that the majority of pilots are adequate to "undertake the tasks expected in an operational environment", all you are saying is that they are good enough to do an entirely unnecessary job. When it is all going well, nobody needs them!
When it isn't, many are inadequate.

It would be better to consider why those few pilots flew as they did. Perhaps the problem is not with what you observed, but the process of training; why didn’t the trainer/checker intervene, what did the operator know, the interpretation of regulations, what was the organisation’s attitude, and did the regulator have oversight of this. None of which involves automation or dependency.

Whilst there is always the possibility that they deliberately failed to achieve a suitable standard for fun, I'm going to go ahead and make another assumption that they flew as they did because they were unable to do any better at the time. The trainer did intervene, and made them retry repeatedly and get me to re-demo repeatedly.
Regulations and operator attitude are further down the line and another question, but don't affect the actual inability of pilots to fly.

It might be better to teach pilots how to identify and avoid those situations requiring flight with ‘a limited panel raw data non precision approach in a limiting crosswind when the toys fail’ than expect them to retain a rarely used skill.

Umm, ok.

You never know when the toys are going to fail. That is kind of he point, thus the only way to achieve this would be to never fly non precision approaches in limiting crosswinds.
If you are suggesting that pilots should just say no, then good luck with that.

Thus the safety task is to review our expectations of pilots in today’s operations and not in those which we remember.

Everything about this statement horrifies me.
Not only is it turgid management speak, but are you saying that we should manage our expectations rather than attempt to improve events?!?

Or are you coming to the same conclusion as me that we cannot expect pilots to do any better so remove them.........

Tourist

26th Jan 2016, 17:51

Tourist; always love a challenge:
First separate technology from automation; EGPWS, ACAS, technologies have improved safety.
FADEC, automated engine control. 747-8 and 787 had restrictions for Cb related icing, because the FADEC was unable to manage ice crystals. Worst case was that all engines were affected simultaneously, and with ice damage may not restart. Thus the need to avoid the conditions, not practice flying without power.

I'll need to read up, but is this an automation issue, or would a human in charge have the same problem?

i.e. Is it just an engineering issue rather than control issue?

RAT 5

26th Jan 2016, 19:08

What I think also needs to be included in this debate, but I don't have an ideal answer, is the characteristics of the modern airline pilot. Before we become mired in the very futuristic assumptions of what an airliner flight deck might look like and entail, let's look closer the present. One problem I see is the very diverse culture in airlines. Some still encourage and expect good stick & rudder skills. Some quite the opposite and have a 'trained monkey' attitude. I've worked and trained in both and the latter made me squirm. This demonstrated that there is not a common characteristic of an airline pilot; even if the pax want there to be when the chips are down.
Thinking back to my days of needles & dials and Heath Robinson automatics I reflect on the aptitude tests necessary to become a pilot. I went through the RAF & BA's selection process, and passed both: very similar when it came to hand eye coordination and multi tasking. The legacy carriers, overall, wanted uni'-graduates of maths & science education. They wanted team players & leaders and strong personalities. (And it seems they still do, but then treat you like little Johnnies when you are in.) The RAF wanted uni-graduates for officer college, but the characteristics were similar. Both wanted hotshots who were sharp cookies. Indeed the job in 70's with embryonic jets and very basic ATC environment required the opposite of trained monkeys. The captain really needed to be the guy on the spot in charge.
Nowadays the ability to pay is quite a major requirement by the airlines and I wonder at the aptitude tests necessary for selection before flight school; or is that also ability to pay, I suspect so.
Now, in this modern flight deck and looking further forward, I question if the best characteristics of an airline pilot have been re-thought. I still see legacy airline application forms stating just what type of person they are seeking. IMHO they are all over qualified for the monitoring role that 99.9% of their life will entail. OK, the long-haul captain really is a manager in the sky. Ultimately, when the pursuer needs help or a decision, then the 4 striper will be called upon and carry the responsibility. Any captain has to contend with Wx problems, fuel problems etc. etc. I'm not sure a university degree will help more than those who have just sound common sense.
Simply this; if the flight deck is going to change so much towards automation, cabin crew are more highly trained to solve the everyday problems, ATC and airports are more hi-tech, sat' phones can connect you to Ops who make commercial decisions, etc. etc., are the basic characteristics & qualities demanded by many airlines appropriate for the job now & in 30 years time?
Without considering this we can end up with 'the wrong stuff' in charge.

Tourist

27th Jan 2016, 06:48

Agree with everything you say RAT5.

I would say that the airlines have already unofficially been altering the requirements that they ask for for a long time.

For many, "can you pay" is the requirement.

Interestingly, the airlines that do this don't seem to have worse safety rates than the ones that demand hoop jumping, so perhaps they are correct.

alf5071h

27th Jan 2016, 16:10

Tourist, “… automation reduces skill levels.”
The NASA report The Retention of Manual Flying Skills in the Automated Cockpit ( http://hfs.sagepub.com/content/56/8/1506.full.pdf) concluded ‘… that while pilots’ instrument scanning and aircraft control skills are reasonably well retained when automation is used, the retention of cognitive skills needed for manual flying may depend on the degree to which pilots remain actively engaged in supervising the automation.’

Thus what might be observed as weak stick and rudder skills actually represent problems with cognition.
This view may also be reflected in a recent Airbus presentation criticising the regulatory focus on training/checking vs the need to learn (cognitive exercise?). Also, that Airbus training now considers manual skills sequentially with the management of the ‘automated’ systems (cognition); this could provide a better understanding of what technology/automation provides and how to manage situations when the technology is unavailable.

Expectations; … consider the assumptions which we make, e.g. in many accident threads, posts often state “I cannot believe how they (accident crew) did not see, could not do,” …. This is reflects the posters assumptions – the expectation that the crew should have been able to see, do, etc, based on hindsight and that all crews will behave in a rational manner in all circumstances.
Similar assumptions are embedded within regulation, crews are expected to be aware of an audio stall warning, whereas in unprotected aircraft a stick-shake may be more effective; crews are expected to be aware of a high nose attitude, but with plan continuation bias are reluctant to lower the nose because they pulled up, whereas a stick-pusher could be very effective.

We should continuously review our expectations, and the basis of our beliefs.
We need to learn from incidents and accidents; not via biased hindsight, but by reconsidering the underlying assumptions in the event. This involves 'double loop learning' – “… the modification or rejection of a goal in the light of experience, … it recognises that the way a problem is defined and solved can be a source of the problem.”
Also, by James Reason Diagnosing “vulnerable system syndrome” (www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1765747/pdf/v010p0ii21.pdf).

A conclusion is that we need to recognise that there is a limit to human ability; identify and reduce the contributors and circumstances of the limiting conditions, and in parallel maintain a high level of human performance, with the focus on cognition, - understand the situation before acting.

Tourist

27th Jan 2016, 18:22

Alf

I have just read the NASA report.

Couple of points.

1. You can call it weak stick and rudder or cognition or whatever you want. The report makes clear that automation damages pilot skills.

2. The report, which I agree with by the way, is hardly scientific either. It uses a self selecting group of only 16 pilots and makes many "gross assumptions" For example:
"It is important to note that this recommendation assumes that pilots attain an initial level of mastery with these skills (Farr, 1987"

3. Interesting quote that agrees strongly with my points earlier:
"This proposal suggests the need for a further study of the effect of active monitoring on procedural skill retention and, perhaps more importantly, if improvements in the human monitoring of automated systems are even possible. There is accumulating evidence of the difficulty in maintaining one’s thoughts focused on the activities of an automated system that seldom fails (Casner & Schooler, 2014)"

alf5071h

28th Jan 2016, 18:04

It’s time for the defence to rest its case, in the belief that the prosecution's evidence is insufficient to justify more automation.
However, as there is less clarity between the need for more training, and the reduction in the situational contributing factors which affect human behaviour, perhaps we need proportionate adjustments in both; together with some improvement in existing technologies (automation).

Some reading while the jury is out: Airlines aren't learning enough from near misses. (www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2016-01/byu-aal011916.php#.VqVNbNy6ABp.mailto)

Original paper: Original paper: Madsen - 2015 - Risk Analysis. (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/risa.12503/pdf)

FDMII

29th Jan 2016, 18:50

alf5071h;

If I may, are you including the notions of "muscle-memory" in the cognitive category or might it be a separate subject?

I ask this from a sense that cognition is a reasoning/memory higher level "thinking" process whereas "muscle-memory", is perhaps autonomic, which requires actual, ongoing practise which is both cognitive and physical. (I"m a pilot, not a scientist or researcher so don't know what to call it, but I know it exists, and not only for airplanes but also for gymnasts, musicians, dancers, sculpters, race-car drivers, etc., etc.).

For what it's worth, I play a musical instrument, (piano), and know that there is a clear and definite connection between the cognitive and the physical (again, the autonomic, in terms of muscle-memory). That is how those who play a musical instrument can memorize and play entire concertos, (or gigs, etc.), without music in front of them, for example. (I emphasize that this is entirely different from those possessing rare gifts of a true "photographic memory" in which the pages of music are mentally "in view", in detail and recallable at will!).

In fact (and off-topic), I would venture the notion that playing a musical instrument has heretofor unanticipated but definite cognitive and physical transfers to other activities, which have yet to be fully explored. I would include flying an aircraft in this category.

In my experience as a pilot for 42 years, 35 of them on heavy transports, there is a strong connection between the two and they both require constant "nourishment", (physical practise), if they are to remain available and useful, "at the surface".

In fact, let us use music to illustrate the counterexample: - if the music isn't "in the hands" as described above, no amount of cognitive horsepower can make the hands perform flawlessly; the muscle memory has to be there from recent experience.*

*again, the "gifted" case does not prove the negative - for almost all persons, the above is going to be the case.

1201alarm

29th Jan 2016, 22:42

Good one, alf! :O

Although I would not say we do generally not need more automation. There are still areas where more automation can help.

RAAS / ROPS comes to mind. Better TO Config warnings, which include position of the aircraft. Or the whole concept of approaches with vertical guidance.

But all these technologies should and will be support for pilots, who remain in charge, have the final authority over the action, and deal with daily problems and malfunctions as they arise.

The only area where I am convinced we need less automation, is in the automation policy. Pilots need regular AP/FD/ATHR off flying at appropriate times to learn and memorize pitch and power values and to maintain a good scan of the basic T.

CONF iture

30th Jan 2016, 00:37

An Airbus is designed to always have human pilots. Therefore, humans are part of the strategy for dealing with problems.
To have to deal with conventional problems is far enough, absolutely no need to have to deal with unconventional ones that the supposed magical automation created on its own.
The Airbus was initially designed with protections to correct mistakes made by pilots ... certainly not the other way around.

vilas

30th Jan 2016, 05:03

After discovery of principles according to which the Universe runs(the process continues) the next logical step was to use them to make human life more comfortable, safety is also part of that. All these inventions have caused loss of human life and will regrettably continue to do so. It is perhaps the price of those comforts. Medicines that are discovered to save lives have taken lives, get banned and newer safer ones are discovered. Aviation is no exception to this. Car brakes fail you don't switch to horses but make better brakes. It is perfectly reasonable to expect better safety from the gadgets but can one be paranoid about them?

RHLMcG

30th Jan 2016, 08:38

Been following this automation dependency thread with great interest. Certainly much to learn for us all. However, at times posts appear to become a little intense.

Saw the following video on a caravan website I frequent and, with much tongue in cheek, offer it as a brief interlude of light relief (of a quasi-automated nature). Hopefully the mods will tolerate the non-aviation theme.

Volkswagen Trailer Assist (http://www.chonday.com/Videos/trailerghu4)

Tourist

30th Jan 2016, 10:25

To have to deal with conventional problems is far enough, absolutely no need to have to deal with unconventional ones that the supposed magical automation created on its own.
The Airbus was initially designed with protections to correct mistakes made by pilots ... certainly not the other way around.

You are little hung up on the fact that a very old aircraft is not flawless, as if this is somehow a searing indictment of the concept.

It does not have to be flawless, merely on balance equal and cheaper.

Airlines are businesses.
They try to make the best balance of safety and cost.
They are allowed to.

If they can make aircraft without pilots as safe and cheaper or safer at the same price they will.

They do not have to be perfect.
They will still have accidents, probably different ones that many on here will decry as things that would not have happened if a human was on board and "proof" that it was a bad idea, but what matters is whether they have less accidents, not whether they have any.

The equation is really simple.
Are more accidents at the moment "black swan" events where a human might help, or basic human error events where a computer would have been fine.

I believe it is more the latter already, and as tech advances it will become more and more obvious.

Alf is all about adapting how we use pilots to best effect.
That is all well and good, and a useful interim phase, but we are just nibbling at the edges of the problem which s the simple fact that tech no longer is better at just the blue collar jobs like manufacturing and weaving etc.

The next revolution is here and standing in it's way will just breed a new generation of angry luddites.

RAT 5

30th Jan 2016, 15:02

The next revolution is here and standing in it's way will just breed a new generation of angry luddites.

Perhaps they are called passengers??

Tourist

31st Jan 2016, 02:43

The next revolution is here and standing in it's way will just breed a new generation of angry luddites.

Perhaps they are called passengers??

That is a fair point, as I do believe that getting them on board is the greatest challenge.

Autonomous cars are going to go a long way towards laying the groundwork though.

alf5071h

31st Jan 2016, 10:43

FDMII, "muscle-memory", yes, we appear to be considering the same aspects. “… a form of procedural memory that involves consolidating a specific motor task into memory through repetition. This process decreases the need for attention and creates maximum efficiency within the motor and memory systems. Examples of muscle memory are found in many everyday activities that become automatic and improve with practice, such as riding a bicycle, playing a musical instrument” (Wiki).

E.g. novice and expert behaviour; where an expert has achieved a skill level which can be undertaken with the minimum of conscious effort. I would also include cognitive skills, not just muscle.
‘Transfer’ is obviously not the skill, but could represent the mechanism of acquiring the skill. This would include the willingness to learn and the process of learning, paying attention, memory, and relating one aspect with another, and situations yet to be encountered. These are important aspects, perhaps missing in an automated world.

With respect to flying, expertise may take considerable time to acquire and then may only relate to a particular situation or those which can be associated with previous experiences. The latter is a process of learning, retention, and projection across scenarios which may be a hall mark of expertise.
Expertise is not a requirement for flying, but it should be everyone’s goal. However, flying does require proficiency, matching the skill level to the task; thus whilst novice pilots are safe – minimum training standard, they may not be as capable in extreme situations as they lack a sufficient range of experiences or the skills of projection and association.

I am less convinced about the need to keep practicing, yet practice is required to achieve expert behaviour in normal operations.
However in rare situations the required skill level need not be very high; it has to match the task, safe, but not perfect (the task has changed). Also, these skills may not be so well practiced, and also in this sense it’s mainly a cognitive skill – knowing what to do vs how to do it; this depends on understanding the situation.

I’m not a musician, but comparing a well prepared expert performance of a major work, with a sudden requirement to play the national anthem for a visiting head of state. Both a novice or expert could follow the new score, but the difference might be the manner in which an expert plays the music (finesse).
Of course this is preceded by the need to select the correct score for that country, where both an expert and novice could be mistaken. ;)

alf5071h

31st Jan 2016, 10:56

1202, "… areas where automation can help”, agreed, but these aspects may be easier to understand and implement if ‘technology’ (an enabler) is considered separately from ‘automation’ (actor).
TAWS, ACAS, RAAS, better ‘enable’ the pilot to understand the situation, but do not fly the aircraft.

Tourist. “Alf is all about adapting how we use pilots to best effect.”
Not so much individual adaptation (not more training), but the need for the industry to review and adjust the system-wide situational influences which could reduce the pressure of operations, so the pilot is better able to perform. Adjust operations to match human capability, not fit the human to the operation.
Not luddites, but the need to learn from the initial use of automation in today’s operations before choosing how and when to use technology and automation in the future.

1201alarm

31st Jan 2016, 11:26

Also, these skills may not be so well practiced, and also in this sense it’s mainly a cognitive skill – knowing what to do vs how to do it; this depends on understanding the situation.

Agree. What you say is basically what I was saying in #176:

That is very well put! It needs both, but while the manual flying skills do not need to be perfect (just don't leave your flight envelope, and if you approach the edges of the envelope, stear it back into the middle of the envelope), sound judgement and decision making with good situational awareness is overall the most important.

If we think about AF447 or the Air Asia thing, it was a problem of basic flying, but not in the sense of how precisely can I fly it, but in the sense, how should my plane be flown ROUGHLY right now. You could even argue it was not about what to do, but about what surely NOT to do (pull on the stick).

It is not about perfect manual flying, but about not messing it up. To not mess it up, you need to understand in what situation you are in.

but these aspects may be easier to understand and implement if ‘technology’ (an enabler) is considered separately from ‘automation’ (actor).

Again I agree. It is actually a good concept to distinguish between automated systems that inform or warn you and automated systems that act.

When I said...
RAAS / ROPS comes to mind. Better TO Config warnings, which include position of the aircraft. Or the whole concept of approaches with vertical guidance.

But all these technologies should and will be support for pilots, who remain in charge, have the final authority over the action, and deal with daily problems and malfunctions as they arise.

... I meant exactly that: additional systems which help to avoid deadly mistakes while keeping the crew in charge.

Tourist

31st Jan 2016, 11:41

... I meant exactly that: additional systems which help to avoid deadly mistakes while keeping the crew in charge.

You will note that the two systems which have had the greatest effect on safety are not such systems.

TCAS and EGPWS are not warning systems, they are directing systems and the current instruction is not to keep the crew in charge. The crew is to do what it is told without second guessing.

This is a deliberate and clear policy to remove the human from the decision making process due to the error rate in humans. I am told that various modern systems have removed the human and the autopilot is integrated thus avoiding the spectacularly high error rate of humans attempting to follow the TCAS RA.

Centaurus

31st Jan 2016, 13:08

It is not about perfect manual flying

I was taught in the military to aim for perfection and that surely is something to be aimed at by all pilots; civilian or military

Tourist

31st Jan 2016, 13:39

I was taught in the military to aim for perfection and that surely is something to be aimed at by all pilots; civilian or military

You'd think so, wouldn't you?

But the entire civil system provides no incentive for excellence, and over time I think enthusiasm wanes in the face of the rigid seniority systems.

vilas

31st Jan 2016, 15:54

In the military combat flying is competitive because one has to be better than the other guy. The pilot has to develop the ability to push the aircraft to limits and to achieve that most of the flying they do is training flying. In commercial flying you fly to make money and for that there is a minimum standard laid down which is practiced mostly in SIM. On line the maximum you can practice is raw data instrument approaches or a visual approach and that is not such a big thing. You cannot push or bust anything that is laid down nor is it required. In AF447 or QZ8501 all that the crew needed to know was in alternate law you never apply full back stick or to the sides for that matter and the carnage would have been avoided. Especially QZ8501 was entirely crews creation.

Bergerie1

31st Jan 2016, 16:26

Centaurus and vilas,

Unfortunately, in most civil flying, the lowest common denominator is sufficient. Disappointing but true.

FDMII

31st Jan 2016, 16:56

Davies dealt briefly with the notion of perfection as well, in offering the thought that air transports must be realistically designed for average skill.

While the goal of perfection is entirely appropriate for the military due mission demands, commercial air transport, particularly in non-state-supported corporations, have neither (relatively) unlimited resources nor does the population base (overall, and of those with pilot licences), support a "top-gun" standard for a commercial enterprise.

As we are increasingly aware, the very opposite is now in place where just enough skill, completed by OTJ-training and MCPL licencing are the twin standards for commercial air transportation. Even that system is not supplying sufficient pilots for rapid growth we are seeing in some parts of the world. Nor is "automation" in any way a supplement for such shortages, particularly if one does not thoroughly know one's aircraft.

That said, alf5071h has, I believe, a good point that manual flying skills need not be ready or practised for rare, complex manoeuvres but should be ready for bread-and-butter operations that at least stabilize the aircraft.

Long-discussed and still relevant, the PF on AF447 certainly had that level of skill as he very quickly and successfully got the roll oscillations under control. Illustrative and in the present context of the thread, the problem was cognitive, not an inability to fly manually. The problem was not comprehending the situation the aircraft was in, which was a non-event and certainly not an emergency, as aircraft which lose airspeed indications remain stable in cruise so long as pitch and power settings do not change.

Chris Scott

31st Jan 2016, 17:48

One of the problems in comparing airlines with the military, of course, is that in the former we are generally referring to two-pilot cockpits (or multi-crew cockpits), whereas a high proportion of military cockpits are single-pilot: a very different game.

Then there's the question of quality control and incentives for self-improvement/development. In an airline I once worked for (and with which Bergerie1 is familiar), check assessment was at that time based on the average (perceived) standard for the airline, which was defined as "Good". There was a chart of the different grades of performance, which was symmetrical top and bottom and based on a so-called percentile of the pilot force.

IIRC, the middle 80% of pilots would be graded "Good" (percentiles 11 to 90 inclusive). Above "Good", percentiles 91 to 99 inclusive graded "Very Good", and percentile 100 was "Outstanding". Below "Good", percentiles 2 to 10 inclusive graded "Satisfactory", and percentile 1 was graded "Unsatisfactory".

The only fail grade was "Unsatisfactory". In practice, however, "Satisfactory" was a euphemism for unsatisfactory, and in need of further training and/or check. The 90% of pilots above that grade were unlikely to be offered any valuable simulator time to brush up their skills. A perennial problem with the grading in practice was that trainers and checkers were inclined to award VG when Good would have been more appropriate. On some fleets more VGs were awarded than Goods, and many pilots came to expect the latter merely for a trouble-free performance. Pilots tended to justify this on the perceived grounds that their fleet was better than average in the company. Grade inflation therefore spread from one fleet to another as new types were introduced.

Of course all that was many years ago...

RAT 5

31st Jan 2016, 19:03

In the civil world one has to ask the difference between satisfactory & adequate. What I have seen over the past 20 years, in some companies, is the dilution of standards. Yes there have been failures in bi-annual checks and command upgrades. For that they have to be bad, bad. Much is available in advance for self-briefing & study. The emphasis is much more on training, coaching, grooming. You have to be a muppet to fail, but still some do. The level of 'good' seems to be the norm, i.e. average. Often the next level down is low average, fair, satisfactory. They are still passes. It has to be a fail, below standard to cause retraining. The line between the 'just a pass' and a fail can be very thin. There are some who think that 'adequate' = good is good enough. For command adequate is all that is needed. Why bust a gut to be better. It is not a meritocracy. For those of us who were trainers, and as such (hopefully) above average, our own standard was the norm to us. It was very disappointing to find that there were some who were satisfied to be just adequate and expect that a command would come their way in time. The rapid expansion of airlines during the last 20 years could only have been achieved with adequate, just good enough, pilots. It's a business.
One would hope that after your driving test/PPL test/CPL test/LST a conscientious person would strive to improve their skills. I'm saddened when that is not the case. I wonder if that is expecting too much.

Capn Bloggs

1st Feb 2016, 00:12

In AF447 or QZ8501 all that the crew needed to know was in alternate law you never apply full back stick or to the sides for that matter and the carnage would have been avoided.
All that was needed was an aeroplane that flies the same regardless of what is wrong with it. You mentioned the military, Vilas. They train the way they fight. Having to fly an aeroplane differently because it's systems have had a dummy-spit is not training the way you fight. Throw in autotrim with backstick and you've set the crew up for a big fall.

vilas

1st Feb 2016, 04:17

All that was needed was an aeroplane that flies the same regardless of what is wrong with it. You mentioned the military, Vilas. They train the way they fight. Having to fly an aeroplane differently because it's systems have had a dummy-spit is not training the way you fight. Throw in autotrim with backstick and you've set the crew up for a big fall. Blogs AB FBW flies the same way in pitch within the flight envelope only thing pilot can push it beyond in alternate law. Why anyone should do that with failures? In roll it is possible to bank beyond 67 degrees but they didn't loose control of bank but applied irrational unnecessary pich input. Without AP one engine out no aircraft behaves same as normal and if you yank back the stick or kick the wrong rudder you can produce disaster in any aircraft. Unless dealing with an EGPWS warning side stick is barely moved beyond an inch. Lack of knowledge of this and average pitch in cruise that was the problem.

FDMII

1st Feb 2016, 06:51

Capn Bloggs, re, "Having to fly an aeroplane differently because it's systems have had a dummy-spit is not training the way you fight. Throw in autotrim with backstick and you've set the crew up for a big fall. "

In the interests of accuracy in a serious discussion on automation which is being read by many, I beg your indulgence regarding the following:

The assumptions behind your statement are inaccurate and incorrect. As such the statement is misleading, particularly to those who are just trying to understand these issues, as they may have related to two known accidents.

It is unfair to the discussion to claim that the aircraft has to be flown "differently". It does not, and it is incorrect to claim this as fact, particularly if one has not trained on, checked-out on and flown the type.

To be clear, the aircraft requires no special handling in Alternate Law. It requires the same handling you'd give any other transport aircraft at high altitude, high Mach Number under the same circumstances.

To the contrary, there is nothing normal about pitching a transport aircraft up to 15° at FL350 and keeping it there. Every other transport aircraft would have behaved the same way, given the same treatment.

In the case brought up (AF447), the moment the airspeed information had been lost, the PF pulled the stick back and increased pitch, reducing energy & speed. The THS moves to neutralize elevator forces. In response to the up-elevator commands from the sidestick, the THS began to move only after sixty-seconds of nose-up input by which time the pitch had increased to 15°NU and the AoA to 12°. The stall warning was sounding continuously by this time with an 11,000fpm descent rate.

From that point, it took a further 45 seconds of consistent nose-up input to take the THS from normal cruise settings 2-3°NU to 13° NU by which time the aircraft had been fully stalled for two minutes and was passing FL290 in the descent.

For reasons we may never know and understand, the aircraft was severely mishandled, just as QZ8501 was.

When an ordinary line pilot enters test pilot territory there are quite possibly risks of a "big fall", but as with any other aircraft, not until. The aircraft itself performed as flown.

Goldenrivett

1st Feb 2016, 09:39

Hi FDMII,
Whilst I agree with most of what you have said, I would also include the accident of D-AXLA, XL Airways https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2008/d-la081127.en/pdf/d-la081127.en.pdf
Please see page 86 2.1.5 Loss of Control.

The common thread with these accidents is the crew were completely confused by the response of the aircraft to their control inputs when the aircraft is in ALT or Direct Law.

"The loss of control was thus caused by a thrust increase performed with a full pitch-up horizontal stabilizer position. This position and the engine thrust made pitch down control impossible. It should be noted that the PF made no inputs on the horizontal stabilizer nor reduced the thrust and that the PNF did not intervene. This seems to indicate that none of them were aware that the automatic trim system, which relieves the pilot of any actions to trim the aeroplane, was no longer available. In the absence of preparation and anticipation of the phenomenon, the habit of having the automatic trim system available made it difficult to return to flying with manual trimming of
the aeroplane."

For reasons we may never know and understand, the aircraft was severely mishandled, just as QZ8501 was.
So were they all idiots or is the man machine interface not perfect?

Tourist

1st Feb 2016, 10:44

In the AF447 case, the aircraft did exactly what they asked of it.

They demanded that the nose remain high and it did.

The only thing the aircraft did not do once in Direct law is protect them from their own errors.

It performed as advertised wrt control inputs.

Capn Bloggs

1st Feb 2016, 10:56

They demanded that the nose remain high and it did.

They did not demand that it wind in full back trim! Nor did they demand that the stall warning switch off when below 60 knots! For goodness sake... Rabbiting on about humans being bad monitors, and here we are, the nerds add autotrim just to make disengagement of man from machine complete! This is not a video game!

donpizmeov

1st Feb 2016, 11:44

The auto trim stops long before the stall bloggsie. If they let go of the stick at the first stall warning (or any time really) the aircraft would have stabilised at the trimmed airspeed out of the stall (letting go too long after entering the stall may mean you run out of air to recover in...bugg@). Well that's what would happen in ALTN law. In direct law this would happen unless you push the motors up to the full noise position, in which case you may run out of stick authority (depending on how slow you got), in which case you need to go to idle, and maybe roll to get the nose down. Pretty conventional really.

To stall an Airbus you need to hold back pressure on the stick to maintain an attitude once the autotrim stops (autotrim will work into VLS, but stops prior to Alpha Prot or Alpha SW, depending in what law you are in). This is a big warning sign of what is about to happen if you continue doing what you are doing. Seems easy sitting at a desk, but add fear, startle effect, and pilots that have only experienced non-normal in a Simulator and the outcome will not always be successful, as shown by bent metal of all makes.

Tourist

1st Feb 2016, 12:11

They did not demand that it wind in full back trim!

So what?
The simple fact is that if they had done the same thing in a Boeing they would have held it in the stall into the water as well.
If you hold the controls full back and never attempt to push the nose forwards then you stall and die.

Nor did they demand that the stall warning switch off when below 60 knots!

There you have more of a point, it is certainly not a great design feature, though should not be enough to stop a pilot realising what is going on. I have heard no reason why the stall warner is inhibited below a certain speed but I assume it was a poorly thought through attempt to limit spurious warnings on the ground.

I am also anti auto-trim by the way, I think it removes some SA from the pilot, but I don't think this incident should be blamed on the aircraft. It was pilot incompetence all the way.

RAT 5

1st Feb 2016, 12:24

It was pilot incompetence all the way.

I agree, from all we know, that the crew did not understand some of the basics; and it is even said that letting go would/could have saved them.
What I also reflect on is knowledge. Reading the posts from various AB pilots (I'm not one) it seems there is a varied amount of knowledge & understanding of all the possibilities, laws and handling characteristics on AB a/c. There will be pilot geeks, trainers and others who know everything and can recite it all. There will be the average, and even below average, line pilot who operates every day in an ideal world where nothing goes wrong, radically, and does not understand all the nuances. This then cause me to ask about the 'competence' of the initial TR training and regular recurrence training.
Perhaps people in the know can inform us. There will be readers who themselves know if they have an in-depth knowledge of all that has been discussed; and they will know why they might feel ignorant. Is it due to lack of training or lack of self application? Equally there will be those who now it all and can tell us how & why? What is the difference in airline training syllabi? If it can be identified that some operators deal only in the ideal basics then a review of training regimes can be made and corrected.

FDMII

1st Feb 2016, 14:48

So were they all idiots or is the man machine interface not perfect?They were neither "idiots", nor was/is the man-machine interface perfect. This is why we are discussing these issues on a Tech Forum and why being knowledgable and correct regarding how these aircraft behave is important. Re the autotrim on the Perpignan accident, please see below.

Capn Bloggs, the point regarding the auto-trim and the absence of stall warning in NCD conditions is not to excuse them but to understand them.

It is not as though the design was without thought, and certification both in Europe and North America.

If I recall, the stall-warning issue is being addressed. The auto-trim appears, to me anyway, more complex because it is part of a FBW system with other performance requirements. That it should cease moving during a stall warning appears on the surface to be obvious, (and I think it should stop), but reversion to manual trimming, (which makes the aircraft an ordinary aircraft), didn't prevent Perpignan, (which had other, serious antecedents as you would know from reading the report). For AF447, there was sufficient elevator authority to get the nose down and unload the wing. The THS would have followed sidestick commands towards the ND position, but the crew also had the option of rolling the trim wheels forward as well, notwithstanding the huge demands being made on these crews by LOC circumstances.

CONF iture

1st Feb 2016, 15:46

You are little hung up on the fact that a very old aircraft is not flawless, as if this is somehow a searing indictment of the concept.
You have faith how the newest tech will deliver better than the last one - I say surprises will come along and more simple is better enough that pilots in an airliner have still a long way to go.
But as money leads the way, you don't need to insist how pilots are terrible to justify the move.

The simple fact is that if they had done the same thing in a Boeing they would have held it in the stall into the water as well.
In the B you would need both your arms to hold it there and trim it yourself to get comfortable.
In the A, once stalled, you could leave the stick alone and the auto will trim all the way to comfortably maintain the bird in a fully developed and pronounced stall.

ExV238

1st Feb 2016, 16:02

In the A, once stalled, you could leave the stick alone and the auto will trim all the way to comfortably maintain the bird in a fully developed and pronounced stall.

Thread drift to an extent, but this is simply incorrect. Please take note of FDMII's well-considered posts and let's not mislead fellow professionals (and others) with stuff that's not based on fact!

OK465

1st Feb 2016, 16:22

Thread drift to an extent, but this is simply incorrect. Please take note of FDMII's well-considered posts and let's not mislead fellow professionals (and others) with stuff that's not based on fact!

There's a number of misleading comments on this subject, but CONF's is not one of them.

CONF is correct.

Chris Scott

1st Feb 2016, 16:49

OK465,

Bother, you got in first!

FDMII's analysis of AF447 seems to be error-free, but he doesn't mention that the Pitch-Alternate Law in operation (as opposed to Pitch-Direct, to which the FBW did not revert) is a C* law. That means the pilot's fore/aft movements of the sidestick are commands for changes in normal-acceleration (Nz) - not pitch. Because the PF continued to hold the stick aft of neutral for almost the whole sequence, the a/c eventually had full up-elevator in its attempt to deliver an (impossible) increase in Nz above 1g. Contrary to what donpizmeov writes, the autotrim kept trimming back until the THS reached full nose-up trim.

Having said that, the PF's apparent inattention to pitch - particularly during the departure from cruise alt and the unsustainable climb-sequence - would be unlikely in a pilot that had regularly practised flying the same a/c level at cruise altitude with the AP and FD (and preferably the ATHR) off.

FDMII

1st Feb 2016, 17:21

ExV238, OK465, Chris Scott: yes, CONF iture's reference is being made to the movement of the THS as it follows-on the elevators' attempt to maintain the 1 G datum when the aircraft is not in Direct Law.

The opposite case also applies: with SS held fully-forward the THS would follow and return to normal cruise setting.

This thread diversion into what has been since 2009 and moreso since Perpignan and AirAsia a very complex series of arguments and important points, is valuable as it clarifies for many who may not have read the original AF447 threads and who are professional airmen, aircraft system behaviour in extremely rare circumstances, the point being, notwithstanding, automation has enhanced flight safety in the same way EGPWS, TCAS & ADS have. It is abundantly clear that automation is reliable to certification standards cited elsehwere in the thread, which, it is important to acknowledge, do not guarantee or contemplate 100% fault-free operation.

Tourist

1st Feb 2016, 17:46

In the B you would need both your arms to hold it there and trim it yourself to get comfortable.
In the A, once stalled, you could leave the stick alone and the auto will trim all the way to comfortably maintain the bird in a fully developed and pronounced stall.

Yes, and in an airbus you only need to use one hand to keep it stalled all the way down.

Either way, if you hold the stick back you stay stalled. I'm glad you find the necessity to use both hands in the Boeing reassuring.

RAT 5

1st Feb 2016, 18:21

Ladies & gentlemen: you are proving my point; the pilot was confused about the basics. In my days of simple Boeings you could ask any pilot a question about the systems & handling effects and get the same answer. Now it seems there is a variety of mis-understandings. So will some one answer my question and stop having a bar-room squabble about if it's apples or oranges.

This thread has now been alive for a month without a consensus.

FDMII

1st Feb 2016, 20:22

. . . .
Is it due to lack of training or lack of self application? Equally there will be those who now it all and can tell us how & why?
I know one important thing about "knowing it all": I don't. No one does, even B & A.

Like all complex professions such as ours there are a dozen ways to skin a cat and each has his or her favourite.

Only ego prevents us from learning from others.

Wrinkles and gray hair no longer imply wisdom they just confirm age. I know this for a fact.

With all this in mind:

I think when aviation captures one, one applies oneself naturally, to supplement training regardless of whether it is rudimentary or, more fortunately, from instructors who really do know their stuff and know how to teach while retaining an abiding respect for the professionalism of their candidates. Aviation is a lifetime of self-teaching.

Wherever aviation has, by circumstance, inattention, reduced motivation or perhaps health reasons, become merely a means to an end or worse, has become just a job, there is reduced safety.

Now, the risk here is in falling into the blame discourse but that is certainly not the intent in these comments.

However, many such circumstances in the ebb and flow of life are at least partly within one's ability to affect. Rarely is one not the locus of all action. An induced comfort through many years of ordinary operations has twin effects upon capacity and even competencies, which is the goal of solid simulator and recurrent training and checking.

The notion of "failure" has changed dramatically over the past 3 decades as has the need to repeat a simulator session. While not the most pleasant of occurrences, a failed ride is always first a learning opportunity and an experience with the potential for rescuing one in one of those moments aviation has in store.

What I hear from colleagues who are still active is that asking questions and being curious is seen as "geeky" and not cool. What a disappointment! If that's even partly the case that's a huge shift from the environment in which the guys now retiring were just cutting their teeth. An incessant curiosity is necessary as are questions and listening; - it's a shame that it's seems to be old-fashioned. Giving in to technology is still voluntary even as it may not be a conscious decision.

I'm not a confirmed believer in consensus thinking, particularly at this stage of the thread and, more generally, regarding automated aircraft. But there are some truths which are becoming self-evident and this thread has touched on some of them.

This is one of many ways of responding to your questions.