Sikorsky Sued by Widows of Three Navy Helicopter Crew

[SASless]

Lawsuit filed over bad wiring causing a fuel fed fire that caused a fatal crash of a Navy CH-53 in 2014.


Lawsuit blames Sikorsky, other contractors, for death of sailors in 2014 Sea Dragon crash - U.S. - Stripes (http://www.stripes.com/news/us/lawsuit-blames-sikorsky-other-contractors-for-death-of-sailors-in-2014-sea-dragon-crash-1.386782)

[riff_raff]

"The lawsuit filed in federal court alleges that Sikorsky and the other defendants, including General Electric, designed and manufactured an unsafe helicopter and failed to warn the military about its risks."

The loss of life in this accident was tragic. When the MH-53Ewas designed back in the 70's, polyimide (kapton) wire insulation was high technology. It was lightweight, could handle extreme temperatures, and was considered safe for use as aircraft wire insulation. The issues with long term durability did not become known until the mid 80's.

Both military and commercial aircraft manufacturers became aware of the long term durability issues with kapton wire insulation after it was determined to be the cause of several accidents. Kapton insulated wire has not been used on new aircraft designs for almost 2 decades, but there are lots of older aircraft still flying with kapton insulated wiring.

It seems the Navy was fully aware of the kapton wire insulation issue by the late 80's and had taken some action over the past few years to address the problem on the CH-53 & MH-53, but it did not include replacing all of the kapton wiring. I don't see how Sikorsky can be blamed for knowingly designing/manufacturing a defective product since the problem was not known at that time. The aircraft belong to the Navy, so it was not Sikorsky's decision whether or not to replace the kapton wiring. The kapton wire insulation was considered safe when the aircraft was designed, and NAVAIR approved the MH-53 design including use of the kapton insulated wiring.

Here is a lengthy 2008 FAA study on the problem. (https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwj-tZGW-Y7KAhVJ_mMKHbpNAE0QFggsMAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tc.faa.gov%2Fits%2Fworldpac%2Ftechrpt%2 Far082.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHnZzB_WraJuYtNfWplOty4m5EVOg&bvm=bv.110151844,d.cGc)

[Lonewolf_50]

I am trying to remember the cost of rewiring a helicopter: from foggy memory, something over 100k for a CH-46 back in the 80's. (Replacing all of the wires and wire bundles and then doing all of the tests to make sure it all works. )


It would seem that NAVAIR in the 90's (when the budget was constricting) did not see replacing all of the wires as a valid or priority expense during an overhaul period (DSLM) for a 53.


Chances are, someone did a risk assessment and found that either X procedural mitigation worked, or inspections etc could find looming problems.


Riffraff, thanks for the link to the FAA piece. A good read.

[riff_raff]

Lonewolf_50, here is a related article from 2014 (http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/09/08/inquiry-frayed-wire-led-to-fatal-navy-helo-crash.html). The interesting part starts about halfway down:

"In a report to Congress in 2012, the Navy listed old electrical wires -- known commonly as Kapton wiring -- as "the highest ranked safety risk" to the remaining fleet of 28 Sea Dragons and the Marine Corps counterpart, the CH-53E Super Stallion. Since 2004, the Navy has spent $37 million replacing the most dangerous Kapton wiring in Sea Dragons and Super Stallions, but a majority of the helicopters still have at least some of the old wires, according to information provided by Naval Air Systems Command. Two Sea Dragons are still totally outfitted with Kapton wiring."

In the case cited, it appears one contributing factor may have been the way the kapton wire bundle was attached to an aluminum fuel line. Polyimide plastic is a very strong material. The article states the kapton wire bundle was clamped to an aluminum fuel line using a nylon zip tie. It's easy to see how over time any rubbing between the polyimide and aluminum at the clamped location could wear both materials. A fuel leak and electrical arc at the same location.

[John R81]

I understand that a case is currently running before the US Court of Appeals (Third Circuit) which considers the question of whether the Federal Aviation Act prevents any claim for "defective design" where the design has been approved by the FAA. In Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 45 F.Supp.3d 431 the court considered a wrongful death suit in the crash of a Cessna 172 where claims were made against Lycoming based on engine design. The lower court decided that there could be no claim and that is now the matter being appealed.


There may be no direct read-across from that decision to a military specification but my guess is that the current case under discussion here has more traction against the Military, as a known issue was not addressed in a timely manner based (one might argue) on cost grounds.

[Never Fretter]

Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp related more to obligations on a TC Holder to report problems with PMA items to FAA.

[John R81]

As I understand it, in Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 45 F.Supp.3d 431 (M.D. Pa. 2014) the lower court dealt with claims of defects in the Lycoming engine and components and the related manuals and instructions in addition to the non-reporting of "failures, malfunctions or defects" as required by the regulations. So I agree that reporting inadequacies were alleged in the case but arguments relating to design standard deficiency were also made.


In respect of only the design-related points:


The court followed precedent of Abdullah, and decided that the design-related claims were invalid due to the FAA granting a type certificate. Quoting from the decision: [this] “denotes the Administrator’s finding that the engine met all applicable requirements,” 43 F.Supp.3d 431, 452.


In the Sikkelee appeal on this point now before the Third Circuit, three questions have been directed to the FAA for response which relate to that finding:


Does field pre-emption under the Federal Aviation Act include tort claims based on alleged defective design or manufacturing?
If such claims fall within the pre-empted field, may they proceed using a federal standard of care?
What weight should be accorded to the issuance of a type certificate in determining if the relevant federal standard has been met?

It will de interesting to see the decision of the Appeal Court in due course.


I omitted any reference to the allegations of failure by a TC holder to meet their obligation to report problems with PMA items to the FAA because that did not seem to me to have any relevance to the Sikorsky story on this thread.

[Jack Carson]

This goes back to a similar case litigated in the 1990s that was ultimately decided by the US Supreme Court Titled “Boyle Vs UTC”. The decision states, in part, that the contractor is not responsible for designs and modifications that are ultimately directed and signed off by the US Government. This case resulted in what is termed the Boyle Test. The test asks, did the US Government participate in the design/manufacturing process and did the US Government signoff on the design and processes? If the answer to these questions was yes then the manufacturer is not responsible for present future issues that result from these directions. When Sikorsky was building the original fleet of MH-53Es, Kapton wiring was used during manufacture as directed by the US Government at the time. During this same time period CH-53E fleet was being modified in the field by service teams as directed by the US Government, to replace Kapton wiring due to safety issues. When asked about this, the US Government stated that they would take care of the MH fleet at some point in the future. I can’t say that this second step of modifying the MH fleet ever took place.

[riff_raff]

Jack Carson, thanks for the reference to the Boyle case. I glanced thru a summary of the case and it described the three part test in the 9th Circuit's decision. The last part requiring a contractor to divulge any risks that they become aware of to the US government as a condition of immunity from liability claims is relevant. In the case being discussed above, the federal government was aware of the issues with kapton wiring. Evidence of this can be found in US DoD military specification for aircraft wiring MIL-W-5088 revision L (dated 10 May 1991) (http://everyspec.com/MIL-SPECS/MIL-SPECS-MIL-W/download.php?spec=MIL-W-5088L.011283.PDF). Appendix A of this specification clearly states that fluorocarbon polyimide (kapton) insulated wire (MIL-W-81381) is not allowed for use on new designs by the Army or Navy.

Very interesting discussion!

[John R81]

Jack Carsen and Riff Raff - thank you for directing the thread; your line of analysis is far more directly relevant than the Sikkelee appeal case at this time.


For interested parties, the Boyle case is at https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/487/500/case.html

[Lonewolf_50]

If the CH-53 fleet had the wiring replaced, but the MH fleet didn't, is there standing to sue the Federal government on this matter? :confused: (point being "known defect not remedied")
I may be going too far off topic for a PPRuNe thread, since there are a number of obstacles to suing government but it can now and again be done.

[Jack Carson]

John R81, there are two additional cases that were joined with the Boyle case: Smith Vs Morton Thiokol (Challenger Event) and Dowd Vs Bell Textron (Mast Bumping Mishap). There may be some additional relevant information of interest in these cases.
All the Best
Jack

[SASless]

More to the story.....and sadly it seems the Navy cannot be held accountable for bad decisions and questionable leadership.

Distress Signal | The human cost of the Navy's most crash-prone helicopter | Local Military | pilotonline.com (http://pilotonline.com/news/military/local/distress-signal-the-human-cost-of-the-navy-s-most/article_060a4418-c412-56c4-b731-da48c25f5d73.html)

The Report mentioned in the Article.....

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1380762-sea-dragon-safety-investigation.html

[Lonewolf_50]

More to the story.....and sadly it seems the Navy cannot be held accountable for bad decisions and questionable leadership.

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1380762-sea-dragon-safety-investigation.html
Neither can their commander in chief, so I guess it's a wash. :mad:

The brass had planned to retire the Sea Dragon more than a decade ago, but after investing millions of dollars in a failed attempt to outfit smaller helicopters with mine-hunting gear, the Navy was forced to keep the old birds flying. The reversal put the service in a bind; Believing that the Sea Dragons were heading to a scrap yard, defense suppliers stopped making many of the parts needed to keep them going. I'll just say that the old "new technology is just a few years away" for putting good mine sweeping on a CH-60S/MH-60S is about like "Nuclear Fusion Power Plants are just a 10 years away" since about the 1960's.

Further comments censored.
RIP, bubbas.

[riff_raff]

More to the story.....and sadly it seems the Navy cannot be held accountable for bad decisions and questionable leadership.Yes, it's true in most cases the US federal government cannot be sued for death/injury to military personnel based on command decisions. However, there are instances where a manufacturer can be held liable. The 2014 MH-53 case and the Boyle case actually make an interesting comparison. Both lawsuits involved claims of defective design on the part of the prime contractor that was also approved by the government.

The more recent case claimed the OEM's design using unsafe (kapton) wiring materials was a factor in the fire and fatal crash. But at the time the aircraft was designed and approved the problems with kapton wiring were not known, and the government was made aware of the problem when it became known, so this argument would not seem valid.

The Boyle case involved complicated issues of state and federal law, but one claim made against the helicopter OEM was that the design of the co-pilot's escape hatch was unsafe. In this case the escape hatch design was approved by the government. The claim stated that the death of the co-pilot was caused in part by his inability to open the escape hatch after the aircraft crashed into the ocean and began to sink. The hatch was design to open outward and it was argued that higher water pressure on the outside of the hatch made it impossible to open the escape hatch. It seems like a valid argument that this is a potential situation the aircraft's designers should have considered. At the time, most aerospace engineers were aware of the same failure that occurred with the Apollo 1 capsule escape hatch.

From what I read in the Boyle case summary it seems the jury came to the same conclusion, and initially awarded the plaintiff around $750K for this claim. This award was later overturned on appeal.

[Jack Carson]

There are a few facts that may help to shed some light on the Boyle case and exactly what transpires in many legal proceedings. In some cases, it is all about presentation with little room for facts. Initially at the trial Sikorsky was cited for the design of the H-53’s hydraulic system. Specifically, that the primary flight control system was prone to hydraulic hard overs and that it was a hard over that caused the crash. By the end of the first day of testimony the plaintiff’s attorney realized that the hydraulic system was a red herring and his case was going nowhere. At this point the plaintiff’s tactics were switched to the design of the cockpit emergency exit.

A valid argument could be made that an emergency exit that pushes out could be problematic during an underwater egress. The facts of the case did not validate this argument. First the copilot never attempted to use the cockpit window for egress. This was indicated by the fact that the jettison handle had not been moved as indicated by the handle position and an intact shear indicator wire that was unbroken. Second the pilot window was jettisoned and successfully used for egress while the aircraft had rolled onto its right side thus positioning the pilot’s window under water at the time of egress.

I believe that these were the facts that led to the initial reversal of the jury verdict.

[riff_raff]

Jack Carson-

Thanks for the reply. I read a summary of the Boyle case, but I did not have the patience to read the entire opinion and references. My day job is aircraft mechanical systems design, so I find this particular topic quite interesting.

It appears that you have a pretty good knowledge of the Boyle case, and US civil law in general. My only knowledge of civil law was from once serving on a jury in a product liability case. Based on my experience serving on that jury, I definitely agree with your point about how presentation of evidence to a civil jury can influence their decisions. Especially when technical material is presented to a jury primarily composed of people with little technical background. With my case, between the plaintiff and defense there was testimony from a dozen expert witnesses presented over 14 days. The expert witness testimony was gone over in excruciating detail, day after day in court, in an attempt to help jury members understand the technical issues involved. I was jury foreman, and from the comments I heard during deliberations it was clear that none of the other jury members really understood the testimony from the expert witnesses. I really wanted to help explain the technical issues to the other jury members so that they could make an informed decision, but this is not permitted.

The entire process, including 2 days of jury selection, 15 days in court, and 2 days of jury deliberation, was incredibly frustrating. What made it worse was that it was mostly for naught, since the decision was appealed.